

DOCUMENTS ON
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1918-1945

LONDON: HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

1956

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Errata

- p. xxi, document No. 377—for Aug. 29 read Aug. 28.
p. lxxiii, document No. 481—for Aug. 30 read Aug. 29.
p. lxxiii, document No. 440—for Aug. 30 read Aug. 29.
p. 574 (fourth entry under "Conversations Held by the Foreign Minister")—for App. II read App. I.
p. 575 (Aug. 29, St.S. No. 668)—for 83/239114 read 583/239114.
p. 578 (telegram No. 200 to Moscow)—for 200, 13 read 200, 3.
p. 581 (telegram No. 418 from Paris)—for 7969/E575169-70 read 7979/E575169-70.
p. 587 (telegram No. 184 from Warsaw)—for 7966/E75002 read 7966/E575002.
p. 647 (German White Book No. 320)—for VI, 730, 4 read VI, 730, 3.
p. 650 (German White Book No. 479)—for VII, 561, enclosure read VII, 561.

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October 15, 1956

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
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DOCUMENTS ON
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1918-1945

SERIES D (1937-1945)

VOLUME VII
THE LAST DAYS OF PEACE
AUGUST 9-SEPTEMBER 3, 1939

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PREFACE¹

I

In June 1946 the British Foreign Office and the United States Department of State agreed to publish jointly documents from captured archives of the German Foreign Ministry and the Reich Chancellery. Although the captured archives go back to the year 1867, it was decided to limit the present publication to papers relating to the years after 1918, since the object of the publication was "to establish the record of German foreign policy preceding and during World War II." The editorial work was to be performed "on the basis of the highest scholarly objectivity." The Editors were to have complete independence in the selection and editing of the documents. Publication was to begin and be concluded as soon as possible. Each Government was "free to publish separately any portion of the documents." In April 1947 the French Government, having requested the right to participate in the project, accepted the terms of this agreement.

In accordance with the understandings on the basis of which the project was originally undertaken, the Editors have had complete freedom in the selection and editing of the documents published in this volume. They were selected jointly by the American, British and French Editors. For the footnotes and other editorial matter the British Editor-in-Chief has entire responsibility, as well as for the translations which were prepared by the British translation staff. She wishes to record her gratitude to Mr. E. J. Passant, until recently Director of Research and Librarian at the Foreign Office, the Deputy Librarian, Mr. C. H. Fone, and Miss A. C. Johnston, for their co-operation, and to Miss E. C. M. Breuning, Mr. T. H. Frame, Miss V. Klein, Mr. G. K. Meister, Mr. D. A. R. H. Webster and Miss F. H. Yorke for their assistance in the preparation of this volume.

II

The present volume, the seventh in Series D, opens on August 9, 1939, when an important conversation took place in Berlin between

¹ In each of the first four volumes published in the Series there appears a General Introduction. The editors have not felt it necessary to repeat this introduction in the present and succeeding volumes. Interested readers may wish to refer to it for information on the nature of the German Foreign Ministry archives on which the publication is based, their present condition, and some of the principles which have guided the editors in their work.

the State Secretary and the Polish Chargé d'Affaires, the first serious official contact between the two Governments since May 5, when the Polish Government had formally replied to the German denunciation of the German-Polish Declaration of 1934. The volume closes on September 3, after the British and French declarations of war.

German foreign policy during this period can be properly appreciated only against a background of the requirements of military planning, which are revealed only indirectly in the diplomatic records. The military directives issued in early April (published in Volume VI of this Series as documents Nos. 149 and 185) required the Wehrmacht to be prepared by September 1 for a campaign against Poland, whose isolation was meanwhile to be achieved by diplomatic means. The precise starting date of such a campaign was governed by the largely predictable factors of logistics and weather. The date, whilst not inflexible, could not be far advanced because preparations would be incomplete nor long retarded because of the risk that wet weather and Polish mud would bring operations to a standstill. The campaign was planned to commence, if at all that year, between August 24 and September 2, and this ten-day period was of crucial importance in determining all aspects of German policy.

The motives underlying the various diplomatic negotiations which form the central themes of the volume, and even the actual sequence of events, can therefore often be more easily followed by referring to the excerpts from the notebook kept as a daily record at the time by the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Halder, and which are printed as Appendix I. This notebook shows, for instance, that as early as August 14, Hitler, when the outcome of his diplomatic plans was still uncertain, envisaged going ahead with military operations on the assumption that a lightning campaign against Poland would create a *fait accompli* which the West might be brought to accept.

It is clear from a study of Appendix I and from other contemporary records, to which editorial reference has, where appropriate, been made, that official German records of some episodes were either never made or have since been lost. Others, such as the activities of Ribbentrop's special representative in Danzig, Veessenmayer, are here covered in some detail for the first time. Documentation on the formulation of German foreign policy at the highest level, such as is provided by the records of Hitler's conversations with Ciano, his correspondence with Mussolini, and his speeches of August 14 and 22, is on the whole rather fuller for this period than was the case with preceding volumes.

While some of the main documents included in the present selection have already been published, they are here reproduced in context with their surrounding material. The documentation of German-Soviet relations includes also the economic negotiations leading to

the Credit Agreement and Protocol of August 19 and 26 respectively. Other fresh material shows German concern at reports of the withdrawal of Red Army units from the Polish frontier, anxiety to have the Non-Aggression Pact speedily ratified and pressure to have Soviet liaison officers promptly posted to Berlin.

In South-East Europe Slovakia assumed a key role as a position of assembly for German troops. Great importance was attached to increasing and safeguarding the oil supplies from Rumania. Other actions directed to circumventing a possible British blockade include the despatch of special missions to the Low Countries and the Northern States to impress upon the Governments concerned that economic neutrality required the maintenance of normal trade with Germany.

Attempts at mediation in the German-Polish dispute, notably by the President of the United States, the Pope, the King of the Belgians and the Queen of the Netherlands, and finally by Mussolini, were rebuffed. With the approach of war, German-Italian relations entered upon a period of considerable strain, whilst Japan broke off negotiations for the conclusion of a military alliance with the Axis in consequence of the German-Soviet Pact. Nor did repeated German assurances to the contrary serve to allay anxiety amongst the smaller States of Northern and South-Eastern Europe that this Pact would entail sacrificing their independence. Uncertainty as to Hungary's attitude led to the suspension of German military supplies, whilst Soviet aid was enlisted in the attempt to keep Turkey neutral in the event of the war spreading to the Eastern Mediterranean.

As in the case of the preceding volume, the present selection also includes certain military directives, notably the first two of the numbered sequence of Hitler's directives for the conduct of the war.

The chronological arrangement of the documents adopted in Volume VI has been continued. The analytical list, arranged by topics and containing cross references, is designed to enable the reader to follow any particular aspect of German policy.

III

The documentation for the period covered by this Volume is not complete (see General Introduction, Section IV). The post-1936 Economic Policy Department collection (see Volumes I and II of this Series, Appendix I, item 97) contains no files on Russia and none on the Far East for the period 1936-1942. The economic files of the Embassy in Moscow are also missing, but it has been possible to trace German-Russian economic relations from documents contained in the personal files of Wiehl and Clodius and in the special State Secretary file dealing with the economic negotiations connected with the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.

Readers should bear in mind that these documents are presented as a source book for the study of history and not as a finished interpretation of history. It has been the aim throughout to keep any interpretative comment out of the footnotes, and to use them exclusively for the factual elucidation of the text or, on occasion, to draw attention to other publications which contain relevant source material. No reference has been made in footnotes to the altered versions of numerous documents, here produced in their original form, which were published in the German White Book, *Documente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, Auswärtiges Amt 1939, No. 2 (Berlin, 1939), but a table has been provided in Appendix IV giving either volume and document numbers (in cases where the original has been reproduced or cited in Volumes VI and VII of this Series) or the film serial and frame numbers of all documents published in the German White Book, falling within the period March 15–September 3, 1939, of which the Editors have been able to trace the originals in the Foreign Ministry Archives. Appendix II provides, for the period covered by the present volume, a list of all the records of conversations held by Hitler, Ribbentrop and the State Secretary and of the telegrams exchanged between the Foreign Ministry and the seven main Embassies abroad, which it has been possible to trace in the Foreign Ministry archives, and shows where the texts may be found.

Appendix III contains additional material relating to previous volumes in this Series. All the microfilms of documents falling within the period covered by Volumes I to IX of this Series, together with the special film of documents referred to in Appendix IV, will be made available to the public simultaneously with the publication of the present volume.

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS¹

BALTIC STATES

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939			
Aug. 20	<i>The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Vice-M.F.A., in discussing the German-Polish question, spoke critically of Poland, but nevertheless believed that, if Germany resorted to force, Britain and France would intervene; considered Soviet attitude doubtful; stated that Estonia would preserve her neutrality and if need be defend it.	134	151
Aug. 21	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Estonia</i> Refers to document No. 134 and instructs Minister that firmer language should be held on the question of any intervention by Britain and France.	163	170
Aug. 22	<i>The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Replies to document No. 163 and explains his conversation with Vice-M.F.A.	177	186
Aug. 28	<i>The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that M.F.A. offered congratulations over German-Soviet Pact, which together with German-Estonian Non-Aggression Pact should provide security for Estonia; Estonian press contains isolated references to need for a certain caution in event of further German-Soviet rapprochement.	375	378
Aug. 29	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Lithuania</i> Instructions to state to Lithuanian Government that in accordance with Treaty of March 22, 1939, Germany will not resort to force against Lithuania, but in return will expect Lithuania to observe complete neutrality towards Germany, resisting any possible third party infringement.	410	404
Aug. 29	<i>The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 410 and reports has made prescribed declaration to M.F.A. who expressed his thanks and repeated his assurances that Lithuania would observe strictest neutrality.	419	411
Aug. 29	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Lithuania</i> Refers to document No. 410, and conveys Ribbentrop's instructions to sound Lithuanian Government about staging demonstration on Polish frontier.	429	423

¹ The documents in this volume have been arranged chronologically. For the convenience of readers who wish to trace topics through the volume the analytical list of documents has been arranged alphabetically by countries or, where policies are closely interrelated, by groups of countries, such as the "Baltic States", the "Far East", the "Low Countries and Luxembourg", the "Northern States", "Spain and Portugal". In addition three subject headings have been included: "General Policy", "Interdepartmental Communications", "Military Directives and Conferences".

BALTIC STATES—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939 Aug. 30	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Lithuania</i> Refers to document No. 419 and instructs Minister to express still more clearly German sympathy for Lithuania's aspirations to Vilna, and to state that, in any territorial readjustment between Germany and Poland, these claims might be largely taken into consideration.	459	450
Aug. 30	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Has informed Latvian Minister, in response to his enquiry, that Germany is sceptical of Poles proving willing to negotiate; further, has denied that any agreements about the Baltic States were reached during German-Soviet talks.	463	455
Aug. 31	<i>The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with M.F.A. who stated that, since conclusion of German-Soviet Pact, public opinion was uneasy and some reassuring gesture from Germany would be welcome. M.F.A. therefore proposes issuing official statement to press that German Minister had repeated German assurances that German-Soviet Pact did not lessen independence, security and integrity of Baltic States and had no connection with any agreements affecting Baltic States.	477	464
Aug. 31	<i>The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Lithuania's determination to maintain and defend her neutrality has received public emphasis; although possibility of violation only feared from Poland, Government reluctant to make any outward demonstration against Poland since public opinion divided.	481	467
Sept. 2	<i>The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that M.F.A., after handing him Estonian declaration of neutrality, enquired whether Germany had made the same declaration to Finland about respecting her neutrality as previously made to Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Lithuania.	548	519
Sept. 3	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Latvia</i> Instructions that M.F.A. may be orally informed that Germany's relations with Latvia are based on Non-Aggression Pact and that no agreements contrary to this have been concluded: authorizes publication under certain conditions.	570	548

BULGARIA

1939 Aug. 9	<i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that his Military Attaché has been informed by Bulgarian Minister of War that Bulgaria's military situation requires rapid despatch of machine guns promised by Germany.	1	1
Aug. 10	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Bulgaria</i> Refers to document No. 1, and states that despatch of machine guns to Bulgaria is proceeding with all possible speed.	11	10

BULGARIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Aug. 10	<i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 1 and repeats request for speediest possible despatch of machine guns to Bulgaria, in view of Minister President's emphasis on constantly growing threat to Bulgaria's frontiers. Minister President also stated that units of Russian fleet had been sighted near Varna and therefore asked for transfer on loan of two German submarines.	12	11
Aug. 11	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> Records Hitler's decision that no submarines are to be supplied to Bulgaria for the present.	33	31
Aug. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Refers to document No. 12 and states has ascertained from OKW that Hitler has decided against the loan of two German submarines to Bulgaria. Requests instructions on reply to Bulgarians.	34	32
Aug. 14	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Has been informed by German Military Attaché in Sofia that leading Bulgarian officials expect an ultimatum from Turkey and Rumania demanding that Bulgaria join the Balkan Pact, and that Bulgarians wish to ascertain whether, in that event, Germany would give them direct military assistance.	60	66
Aug. 16	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Bulgaria</i> Refers to document No. 12 and states that armaments deliveries to Bulgaria are being speeded up; transfer of two submarines presents difficulties but will be considered for a later date if necessary.	78	86
Aug. 17	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The German Military Attaché in Sofia has stated that, in respect of Bulgarian requests for German military assistance, he has instructions from his own military authorities to confine himself to a general statement of good will.	101	109
Aug. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Conversation with Bulgarian Minister who remarked on British and French declarations that war would not remain localized, and assumed that, should these two Powers intervene, Britain would try to drag Bulgaria in.	168	177
Aug. 26	<i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with Bulgarian Minister President, who said Bulgaria welcomed German-Soviet Pact, and expressed hope that Turkey would now revise her policy.	314	320

EIRE

1939 Aug. 26	<i>The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with Secretary General of the Irish Department of External Affairs who stated that, in event of war, Ireland would remain neutral unless attacked and suggested formal declaration that Germany had no aggressive aims in Ireland.	303	311
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EIRE—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939			
Aug. 29	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Eire</i> Refers to document No. 303 and instructs Legation to make proposed statement defining German attitude towards, and expectations from, Ireland in event of war.	428	422
Aug. 31	<i>The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 428 and reports instructions carried out. Government want a short press announcement on German assurances and De Valera's reply; requests approval for this.	484	471
Sept. 1	<i>The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 484 and reports that, if compelled by rapidity of events to make independent decision, will only agree to public statement conforming to text of his instructions.	499	482
Sept. 1	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Eire</i> Refers to documents Nos. 484 and 499 and agrees to terms of press announcement provided German assurances be described as conditional on corresponding Irish attitude.	527	504

FAR EAST

1939			
Aug. 10	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 762 in vol. VI and reports that at Five Minister Conference on Aug. 8 War Minister demanded resumption of alliance negotiations with Axis Powers by making certain concessions to which M.F.A. and the Ministers of Marine and Finance were opposed.	7	6
Aug. 11	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports communication made by War Minister to Italian Ambassador and himself, explaining reasons for Army's anxiety about alliance negotiations and urging that Germany and Italy should accept Japanese proposals of June 5 in alliance question with certain provisos. Ambassador supports War Minister's plea.	25	24
Aug. 18	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 25 and reports is reliably informed that the resignation of the Japanese Minister of War is imminent, owing to disagreements over alliance policy. Supporters of alliance hope for a German statement of willingness to continue negotiations, which would end deadlock and prevent Cabinet crisis which must react unfavourably on policy of alliance.	110	119
Aug. 22	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Requests instructions how to reply to spate of dismayed enquiries from Japanese Army, Foreign Ministry and press, for German explanation of impending German-Soviet pact.	174	185
Aug. 22	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Japan</i> Informs Ambassador that Japanese Ambassador in Berlin has privately informed Ribbentrop that he is tendering his resignation. In view of importance for German-Japanese relations of Oshima remaining in Berlin, instructions to try to ensure that he does so.	183	191

FAR EAST—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939			
Aug. 22	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Conversation with Japanese Ambassador, whose doubts about German-Soviet pact he tried to dispel.	186	198
Aug. 23	<i>An Official of the News Service and Press Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Reports on reactions of Japanese press to German-Soviet Pact.	209	222
Aug. 23	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Records Head of Press Division VIII has complained to Japanese Ambassador about alarmist report on German-Soviet Pact by Japanese press representative. Oshima replied that Japan regarded Pact as moral breach of Anti-Comintern Pact, and that he was himself disappointed at being presented with <i>fait accompli</i> .	223	237
Aug. 24	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on Japanese reactions to German-Soviet Pact; is combating annoyance over being presented with <i>fait accompli</i> by emphasizing that Pact weakens Britain's position, thus assisting Japan in her China policy.	246	259
Aug. 25	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports has learned from Japanese M.F.A. that Japanese Ambassador in Berlin has been instructed to inform German Government that Japan regards negotiations for tripartite pact with Italy as being at an end in view of conclusion of German-Soviet Pact, which represents violation of Secret Agreement appended to Anti-Comintern Pact; nevertheless Japan desires to continue friendship with Germany.	262	277
Aug. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VIII</i> Brief outlining advantages of German-Soviet Trade Agreement for use in conversation with Japanese Ambassador should latter raise this topic.	292	300
Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Conversation with Chinese Ambassador who enquired whether conclusion of German-Soviet Pact would provide opportunity to return to better terms in German-Chinese relations, both politically and economically.	327	333
Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Conversation with Japanese Ambassador who acted in accordance with his instructions as reported in document No. 262. Advised Ambassador privately to take back his protests, and reconsider acting on his instructions, as these not to advantage of German-Japanese relations.	329	334
Aug. 28	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports resignation of Japanese Cabinet, and suggests gesture by Germany to strengthen Army in its efforts to prevent the formation of a pro-British Cabinet.	367	369
Aug. 28	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in China to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Wang Ching-wei's return to Shanghai and his efforts to form new Chinese Central Government as independent of Japan as possible.	368	370

FAR EAST—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939 Aug. 28	<i>Note by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i> Submits account given him by Japanese Ambassador in Berlin of character of new Japanese Minister President, General Abe.	403	398
Aug. 29	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Berlin representative of Domei has latterly transmitted unfavourable reports on morale in Germany, and recommends sharp warning.	409	408
Aug. 30	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 367, and comments on various members of new Cabinet, stressing influence of Army in its composition, especially over appointment of General Abe.	455	444
Sept. 2	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with his Japanese colleague, who has been recalled to Tokyo, and on his way home would welcome opportunity of discussion with Ribbentrop; believed new Japanese Cabinet afforded prospects for furthering Japanese <i>rapprochement</i> to Axis and settlement with Russia.	556	525

FRANCE

1939 Aug. 11	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with M.F.A. on Abetz case. Bonnet intends proposing to Daladier that Abetz be given clear statement that he is neither suspected of espionage nor of having offended against French laws. But Bonnet considers that French Government's complaint against Abetz still stands and his presence in France at the moment would be undesirable.	22	22
Aug. 11	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports telephone conversation with M.F.A. concerning a press indiscretion over Ribbentrop's letter to Bonnet. Latter attributed this to Polish press, and had issued statement to press that the letter in question was in reply to his Note to Ribbentrop.	23	23
Aug. 11	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 23 and transmits text of "correction" issued by Havas on Bonnet-Ribbentrop exchange of letters.	24	23
Aug. 11	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports French press reaction to speeches of Gauleiter Forster and Colonel General Brauchitsch, as well as to the Ribbentrop-Ciano meeting.	30	29
Aug. 14	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 22 and transmits text of official French announcement on Abetz affair stating that, although no espionage has been proved against Abetz, his presence in France is not desirable.	49	58

FRANCE—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939			
Aug. 15	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Conversation with French Ambassador who said that, although France ardently desired German-Polish settlement, a German-Polish conflict would automatically involve France. To the suggestion that the follies of recent Polish policy would free Poland's friends from their obligations to her, Coulondre replied that, apart from the legal obligation, France was obliged to support Poland against being overrun by Germany in interests of balance of power required for France's own security.	64	69
Aug. 15	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Has informed the French Ambassador that official French statement about Abetz did not settle this affair for Germany.	65	72
Aug. 19	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that although official circles in France regard international situation as serious, they are trying to create impression of extreme calm, and stressing French and British determination to fulfil obligations to Poland.	122	131
Aug. 21	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comments on attitude of Government circles and of press to developments in Far East and delays in Moscow military negotiations.	156	166
Aug. 21	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Has learned from non-German informant that discord has arisen in Moscow military negotiations through Russian demands for precise details on British military position; according to British memorandum transmitted to the French, Russian transport system can handle neither sufficient troop transports for operations against West, nor supplies via Russia to support Polish Army.	164	171
Aug. 22	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comments on official communiqué and semi-official statements issued after meeting of French Cabinet.	184	191
Aug. 23	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records has informed French Ambassador of contents of Chamberlain's letter and Hitler's reply.	207	221
Aug. 23	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on reactions of French press to German-Soviet Pact.	215	230
Aug. 23	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports further contingent of reservists to be called up; has heard authoritative French circles are doubtful whether France and Britain strong enough to take military action against Germany on outbreak of German-Polish conflict, and about attitude of USA.	216	231
Aug. 24	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on reactions of French press to situation created by German-Soviet Pact.	238	253

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Aug. 24	<p><i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Records conversation with former French Minister President, Flandin, who thought that agreement between Germany and Poland could still be reached through discussion; Britain and France could not, for prestige reasons, give way to Germany over Polish question.</p>	258	271
Aug. 25	<p><i>Editors' Note</i> Interview between Hitler and French Ambassador.</p>		284
Aug. 25	<p><i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in France</i> States that, as French press correspondents have left Germany, German press correspondents to leave France immediately.</p>	281	294
Aug. 26	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports views expressed by members of Flandin group in Chamber of Deputies about effects of German-Russian Pact and possible conditions for solving German-Polish problem.</p>	294	308
Aug. 26	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 295 (see under <i>General Policy</i>) and quotes article by Maurras in <i>Action Française</i> attacking Chamberlain's speech and accusing Jewish circles in London and Paris of warmongering.</p>	300	308
Aug. 26	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Summarizes French press comment on Daladier's speech and on possibilities of peaceful solution of impending conflict.</p>	310	317
Aug. 26	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports semi-official statement explaining and commenting on French attitude to international situation, which remains as defined in Daladier's speech of previous day.</p>	322	327
Aug. 26	<p><i>The French Minister President to the Führer and Chancellor</i> Letter in reply to a personal message from Hitler; stresses France's peaceful sentiments and also fidelity to her treaty obligations; believes that, with good will, peaceful solution is possible and appeals to Hitler for last attempt at pacific adjustment between Germany and Poland, pledging own support for this.</p>	324	330
Aug. 27	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comments on various anti-Communist measures taken in France, which he interprets as attempt to convey to States close to Axis Powers that France is a more honest opponent of Communism and thus more reliable than Germany.</p>	348	350
Aug. 27	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Has learned from his Italian colleague that, in conversation, Bonnet stated he saw fresh hopes of peaceful solution in recent interview between Hitler and British Ambassador, that French Government were exerting influence on Poland in this sense, but, if Germany used force, would be compelled to fulfil treaty obligations.</p>	351	354

FRANCE—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939			
Aug. 27	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits French <i>note verbale</i> announcing that from Aug. 27 air traffic is prohibited in certain zones in metropolitan France.	352	355
Aug. 27	<i>The Führer and Chancellor to the French Minister President</i> Letter in reply to document No. 324; rehearses sacrifices already made for friendly relations with France and his efforts to achieve peaceful revision of Versailles Dictate; insists that position of Danzig and Corridor intolerable for Germany; but sees no possibility of peaceful settlement with Poles, who feel themselves unassailable under French and British guarantee.	354	356
Aug. 27	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Has been informed by French Ambassador that French Government will not publish Daladier-Hitler exchange of letters, but cannot prevent its becoming known.	356	360
Aug. 27	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Paris Embassy have reported by telephone that they have been informed that Minister President obliged to make short statement to press, giving general sense of Hitler's letter.	358	361
Aug. 28	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that since, contrary to previous agreement, Hitler's letter to Daladier has been publicly mentioned, he is pressing for publication of full text.	366	368
Aug. 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the State Secretary's Secretariat</i> Telephone report from German Chargé d'Affaires in Paris that, following his <i>démarche</i> , Havas has put out text of Hitler's letter to Daladier.	369	371
Aug. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Telephone report from German Chargé d'Affaires in Paris that both Daladier's letter to Hitler and Hitler's reply now issued by Havas; an influential person has described effect of Hitler's letter as very good.	370	371
Aug. 28	<i>The Embassy in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports semi-official French statement on Hitler-Daladier exchange of letters, criticizing arguments advanced by Hitler in support of his demands.	376	374
Aug. 29	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Draws attention to semi-official French statement reported in document No. 376, describing it as malicious and provocative.	377	376
Aug. 30	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Has learned from well-informed source that Blum and Radical Socialist group have warned Daladier against growing influence of General Staff and allowing himself to be driven into preventive war.	462	454
Sept. 1	<i>The Embassy in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports general mobilization ordered, starting September 2.	503	485

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 1	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Reports request from French Embassy that French Ambassador be received by Ribbentrop together with British Ambassador.	510	490
Sept. 2	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of conversation between Ribbentrop and French Ambassador, who handed over communication from his Government similar to that handed over by British Government (document No. 513—see under <i>Great Britain</i>). Reply by Ribbentrop that it was not Germany who had committed act of aggression against Poland, but Poland who had attacked Germany.	515	494
Sept. 2	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on reactions of population to proclamation of general mobilization and on press reactions to outbreak of hostilities. Concludes that although France will fulfil obligations to Poland, whether she will start hostilities at once remains uncertain; notes favourable attitude to Italian proposals.	538	511
Sept. 3	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Conversation with French Ambassador at midday, as Ribbentrop not available: Ambassador enquired about German reply to French communication contained in document No. 515, and on being informed State Secretary not able to reply wished to make further communication but was prevailed upon to await interview with Ribbentrop.	562	532
Sept. 3	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Conversation between Ribbentrop and French Ambassador who, on being informed that German Government unable to give satisfactory reply to French communication in document No. 515, presented further Note stating that, as from 5 p.m. on September 3, French Government would fulfil obligations to Poland.	563	533

GENERAL POLICY

1939 Aug. 18	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i> Confidential report about increasing signs of nervousness amongst foreign journalists in Berlin.	118	128
Aug. 22	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Outlines statements proposed to be made to various European Powers respecting German policy towards them in event of hostilities with Poland.	189	196
Aug. 23	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> Sends list of cases of excesses against Reich Germans and Volksdeutsche in Poland and instructs Missions to make appropriate use of this information.	218	233

GENERAL POLICY—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939			
Aug. 24	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassies in Great Britain and France</i> Reich Germans who seem to be in particular danger should be advised to leave, but this advice not to be given generally.	249	262
Aug. 25	<i>Circular of the Director of the Information Department</i> Requests greater cooperation from Missions in supplying material, for use in propaganda, indicating weaknesses in British and French foreign and economic policy.	295	304
Aug. 25	<i>Circular of the Director of the Political Department</i> In view of discussion in foreign press, states that there can be no question of continued existence of Franco-Soviet Pact after entry into force of German-Soviet Pact; latter not reached at expense of Baltic States, but will enable those States to reach more satisfactory relations with Soviet Union.	297	306
Aug. 26	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> Situation must still be regarded as very serious.	343	348
Aug. 29	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records enquiries about situation by Slovak, Lithuanian and Swiss Ministers, whom he informed that a public statement on exchange of views with Britain might be expected, and that situation still very grave.	433	426
Aug. 29	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> Informs Heads of Missions briefly of Hitler's statements contained in document No. 265 and of British reply in document No. 884 (see under <i>Great Britain</i>), which last at present being studied in Berlin.	439	434
Aug. 30	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> States that though sceptical as to prospects, Germany has accepted British proposal for direct German-Polish negotiations and has agreed to immediate despatch of Polish plenipotentiary, through British mediation.	470	459
Aug. 31	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> As instructed, has handed text of German communiqué (attached) and proposals (document No. 458—see under <i>Great Britain</i>) to British, French, Japanese, U.S. and Soviet diplomatic representatives. Communiqué reviews course of recent exchanges between German and British Governments and states that, in view of non-arrival of Polish plenipotentiary, German Government regard their proposals as rejected.	482	468
Sept. 1	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> Informs all Missions that, in view of non-arrival of Polish plenipotentiary and of Polish general mobilization, situation has further deteriorated.	495	480
Sept. 1	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> Instructions that action of German troops against Poland not to be described as war, but as engagements caused by Polish attacks.	512	491

GENERAL POLICY—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939 Sept. 1-6	<i>Editors' Note</i> Declarations of neutrality made in Berlin by various countries.		504
Sept. 2	<i>Circular of the Foreign Minister</i> States that complete agreement on policy exists between Hitler and Mussolini; no criticism of Italy's attitude permissible.	559	528
Sept. 3	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> Describes sequence of events leading to British and French declarations of war and points out that this shows Britain to be solely responsible for outbreak of war.	569	542
Sept. 3	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Department</i> States that question of unrestricted submarine warfare already submitted to Hitler according to Operations Division of Naval Staff, who have sent representative to discuss with Foreign Ministry. Submits memorandum setting out political considerations involved in adopting such methods of warfare.	575	546

GREAT BRITAIN AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

1939 Aug. 10	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with Halifax who enquired whether exchange of Notes between Danzig Senate and Polish Diplomatic Representative and sharp tone of German press had caused further deterioration in Danzig situation. On being told that recent Polish conduct supported German view that irresponsible Polish authorities held decision on war or peace, Halifax emphasized that British Government were exerting influence for moderation in Warsaw.	13	11
Aug. 14	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Has learned from a reliable source that Strang's report on the Moscow negotiations was optimistic, forecasting the conclusion of an agreement. British and Soviet Governments have agreed to press on with military negotiations, recognizing that formula to be chosen for indirect aggression need only cover eventuality of a German attack, and after study of strategic possibilities, formula should be comparatively easy to find.	55	61
Aug. 14	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Has informed Ambassador Dirksen, who has arrived from London, that he is not to return there without explicit instructions from Ribbentrop.	58	65
Aug. 15	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Conversation with British Ambassador, who stated that in event of German-Polish clash, his Government were committed to, and resolved on, aid to Poland. Henderson enquired whether Danzig question could not be postponed till atmosphere calmer, and suggested German-Polish negotiations on German initiative.	66	72

GREAT BRITAIN AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Aug. 16	<p><i>Note by the Head of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP</i> Conversation with Baron de Ropp, who claimed to have been selected as political adviser on Germany to British Air Ministry in event of war, and considered it absurd for Germany and Britain to go to war on account of Poland. He described feeling in France as much more warlike and anti-Italian.</p>	74	81
Aug. 16	<p><i>Minute by an Official of the British Section of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i> Submits to Hewel a letter from British Labour Party's foreign policy expert, Charles Roden Buxton, making suggestions for complete settlement between Germany and England.</p>	87	97
Aug. 17	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports has learned from reliable source that Anglo-Franco-Soviet military negotiations in Moscow have reached stage where conversations with Polish General Staff can begin, Poland having expressed readiness to open conversations.</p>	99	107
Aug. 18	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records conversation with British Ambassador who said that Britain would restrain Poland from provocation, but gave emphatic warning against assumption that Britain would not give Poland armed assistance.</p>	114	123
Aug. 18	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Has informed Ambassador Dirksen that latter's conversation with Italian Ambassador has become known to Ribbentrop, who requests him to refrain completely from holding such political conversations.</p>	115	123
Aug. 19	<p><i>Ambassador Dirksen to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Letter enclosing a memorandum of his views on Britain's attitude in event of a German-Polish conflict for transmission to Ribbentrop.</p>	130	138
Aug. 21	<p><i>Note by the Head of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP</i> Records further conversation with Baron de Ropp, concerning persecution of Germans in Poland and British policy towards Poland; in event of war de Ropp wants to maintain contact from Geneva.</p>	151	163
[Aug. 24]	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records conversation on August 23 between Hitler and British Ambassador, who brought letter from British Prime Minister; letter explains reasons for recent British precautionary measures, stresses British determination to fulfil obligations to Poland and proposes direct German-Polish negotiations. Hitler informs Ambassador that, if Britain takes further measures, he will order general mobilization, that his efforts at German-Polish agreement have been thwarted by British guarantee, and that, if Poland makes any further move against Germans or Danzig, he will intervene at once. In subsequent interview Hitler gives Ambassador written reply to British Prime Minister (document No. 201).</p>	200	210

GREAT BRITAIN AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939			
Aug. 23	<i>The Führer and Chancellor to the British Prime Minister</i> Letter in reply to British Prime Minister's letter; recapitulates substance of statements in document No. 200, made orally to Ambassador.	201	216
Aug. 23	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records has rejected suggestion by a Mr. Cotton that Göring should come to London incognito.	221	235
Aug. 24	<i>The Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on final measures to be ready for action, taken by British Air Force.	283	250
Aug. 24	<i>The Consulate General at Calcutta to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on probable attitude of India in event of war.	251	263
Aug. 24	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i> Confidential report on statement by British journalist that British view that Italy would not afford Germany military assistance has been strengthened by interception of telephone conversation between Ciano and Mussolini from which latter's vacillating policy sufficiently plain.	256	269
Aug. 24	<i>Editors' Note</i> Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill passed by both Houses of Parliament.		272
Aug. 25	<i>The Consul General in Ottawa to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits peace appeal to Hitler from Canadian Prime Minister; similar message being sent to Poland.	261	276
Aug. 25	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Records Hitler's statement to British Ambassador that he is determined, in view of intolerable Polish provocation, to solve problem of Danzig and Corridor, after which he will be prepared, if his colonial demands are met and his obligations towards Italy not affected, to guarantee British Empire.	265	279
Aug. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> As instructed, has drawn British Ambassador's attention to press reports of outrage near Bielitz.	267	283
Aug. 25	<i>The Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Counsellor Selzam reports that Government statements, debate in House of Commons and press comment all indicate British people's solidarity with Government.	287	297
Aug. 25	<i>Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Letter enclosing report by German Naval Attaché in Rome on conversation with his British colleague just returned from England; latter's account of British determination to keep promise made to Poland.	293	301
Aug. 25	<i>Editors' Note</i> Signature of Anglo-Polish Agreement regarding mutual assistance.		303

GREAT BRITAIN AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Aug. 26	<i>The British Ambassador in Germany to the Reich Foreign Minister</i>	296	305
	Letter announcing his immediate departure for London in connection with Hitler's reply to British Government.		
Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i>	312	319
	Reports telephone message from Lufthansa that Dahlerus is arriving in Berlin from London.		
Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i>	326	332
	Records has received from British Chargé d'Affaires enclosed <i>aide-mémoire</i> , which states that the British Government are studying Hitler's message, and that the British Ambassador will return to Berlin with reply on August 27.		
Aug. 27	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i>	363	366
	Confidential reports of conversation between a member of British Embassy and American journalist about chances of compromise solution of German-Polish dispute.		
[Aug. 29]	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i>	384	381
	Records conversation on August 28 between Hitler and British Ambassador, in presence of Ribbentrop. Ambassador presented memorandum from his Government, stating that whilst desirous of friendship with Germany, they cannot acquiesce in settlement jeopardizing Polish independence; they propose direct German-Polish discussions to reach settlement safeguarding Poland's essential interests, to be guaranteed by other Powers, which would then open way for general Anglo-German understanding. Reply by Hitler that his attempts to reach reasonable settlement with Poland have failed owing to Polish behaviour; though sincerely desirous of agreement with England, he cannot abandon rights of German people.		
Aug. 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i>	405	401
	Confidential report from London about British views on possibility of "qualitatively limited war."		
Aug. 29	<i>The Führer and Chancellor to the British Government</i>	421	413
	Communication handed by Hitler to British Ambassador on August 29 in reply to British communication of August 28 (document No. 384, enclosure). States that, though sceptical of success, German Government prepared to enter into direct discussions with Poland and expect Polish plenipotentiary in Berlin on August 30.		
[Undated]	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i>	422	415
	Points relating to the British memorandum of August 28 (document No. 384, enclosure) with notes for a German reply.		
Aug. 30	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i>	445	438
	Has been informed by telephone by British Ambassador that German reply (document No. 421) being considered by British Government, who doubted whether they could persuade Polish Government to send plenipotentiary that same day.		

GREAT BRITAIN AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Aug. 30	<i>The British Ambassador in Germany to the Reich Foreign Minister</i> Letter conveying message from British Prime Minister to Hitler: reply to German Note will be sent that afternoon; states British representations being made in Warsaw for avoidance of frontier incidents and requests confirmation of similar instructions from German side; welcomes evidence of German desire for Anglo-German understanding.	450	441
Aug. 30	<i>An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Transmits to Chargé d'Affaires personally text of German 16-point proposals for settlement of Danzig-Corridor problem as well as of German minorities question. Text to be kept strictly secret until further instructions.	458	447
Aug. 31	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of conversation between Ribbentrop and British Ambassador at midnight on August 30. Ambassador presented written reply from his Government (enclosed) and stated that they could not advise Polish Government to send a plenipotentiary to Berlin at once, but recommended that German proposals be handed to Polish Ambassador, and that direct German-Polish negotiations be initiated through normal diplomatic channels. Ribbentrop replied that non-arrival of Polish representative by specified time had nullified intended German proposals which he read out to British Ambassador.	461	451
Aug. 31	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Has been telephoned by British Ambassador who said that, acting on own responsibility, he had suggested to Polish Government that they approach German Government to negotiate, and that he requested German Government to refrain from precipitate action until results of his efforts in Warsaw known.	466	457
Aug. 31	<i>The Führer and Chancellor to the Duke of Windsor</i> Telegram stating that realization of Hitler's desires for future development of German-British relations and avoidance of war depend on Britain.	485	472
Sept. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain</i> Report telephoned to Berlin that, whilst listening to broadcast of Hitler's speech, he was summoned to interview with British Foreign Secretary who had received reports of German troops crossing Polish frontier and of several Polish towns being bombed, and requested information. Replied that he had no information on this.	501	484
Sept. 1	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Report telephoned to Berlin that, on basis of telephone communication from Press Department of Foreign Ministry, he has informed British Foreign Secretary that reports of bombing of Warsaw and other Polish towns untrue; has also informed him of passage in Hitler's speech, heard on radio, that Poles have repeatedly fired across frontier during night, and since that morning Germans have been firing back.	502	483

GREAT BRITAIN AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 1	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Reports that British Embassy have requested that British and French Ambassadors be received together by Ribbentrop, to which replied that British Embassy cannot request interview for French Ambassador.	509	490
[Sept. 2]	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of conversation on September 1 between Ribbentrop and British Ambassador, who handed over communication from his Government stating that, unless the German Government suspended aggressive action against Poland, Britain would fulfil her obligations to Poland. Reply by Ribbentrop that there was no German aggression, nor had he had authority to give British Ambassador text of German proposals for settlement with Poland.	513	492
Sept. 1	<i>The Deputy Director of the Political Department to the Embassies in Great Britain and France</i> Gives brief account of <i>démarches</i> made by British and French Ambassadors, as recorded in documents Nos. 513 and 515 (see under <i>France</i>).	523	501
Sept. 3	<i>The Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Report, for Hitler and Ribbentrop personally, from Press Adviser to Embassy of interview with Sir Horace Wilson, who replied to proposals that as long as German aggression against Poland continued, Britain could not enter into a conference.	558	527
Sept. 3	<i>The British Ambassador to the Reich Foreign Minister</i> States that previous communication (document No. 513) has remained without reply; unless assurances therein requested received from German Government by 11 a.m., state of war will exist between Britain and Germany.	560	529
Sept. 3	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Reply by German Government to document No. 560; refusal to accept demands contained therein, and rehearsal of reasons for German action.	561	529
Sept. 3	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Report telephoned from Embassy in London that British Government have sent three Notes: (1) announcing existence of state of war between Britain and Germany; (2) dealing with reciprocity over departure of consular personnel; (3) stating Anglo-French intentions to restrict bombing to military objectives in accordance with President Roosevelt's appeal (document No. 530—see under <i>United States</i>).	564	535
Sept. 3	<i>The British Ambassador to the Reich Foreign Minister</i> Requests assurance that German Government will observe provisions of Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting gas and bacteriological warfare.	571	543

HOLY SEE

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Aug. 19	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy to the Holy See</i> Requests views on advisability of Spanish and Italian Governments undertaking <i>démarche</i> with Vatican to suggest that influence be brought to bear on American Roman Catholics against Roosevelt's re-election.	129	137
Aug. 29	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Conversation with Nuncio who called attention to a secret agreement between the Curia and Germany, under which certain Roman Catholic clergy and students are exempt from call-up.	432	426
Aug. 31	<i>The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits message to Hitler from the Pope, expressing fervent hope that negotiations may lead to just and peaceful solution and appealing to German and Polish Governments to abstain from any measure which might aggravate present tension.	473	461

HUNGARY

1939 Aug. 19	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Rome</i> Instructs Ambassador to take advantage of Csáky's presence in Rome to induce him to issue <i>démenti</i> of certain rumours regarding Hungary's relations with Germany. Requests report on Csáky's talks in Rome.	124	133
Aug. 19	<i>Minute by the Ambassador in Italy</i> Records telephone conversations with State Secretary who informed him of substance of document No. 124. In a later telephone conversation Ambassador informed Weizsäcker that Csáky had left Rome; the press referred to his having already issued <i>démenti</i> . Information on Csáky's talks in Rome must await Ciano's return from Albania.	126	134
Aug. 22	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that, at German suggestion, M.F.A. has issued official communiqué on Axis-Hungarian relations. Csáky stated that Mussolini was expecting Anglo-French intervention, had stressed Italy's loyalty to German alliance and advised Hungary to bide her time and avoid provocation.	175	185
Aug. 24	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Hungarian M.F.A. has read out to him telegrams from Hungarian diplomats reporting on attitude of other Powers to German-Soviet Pact, and told him that, in view of Rumanian troop movements, Hungarian Government taking defence measures.	236	251
Aug. 24	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IV</i> Hungarian Minister has communicated that Hungarian Government have stated to Rumanian Government that they are compelled to take defence measures. Copy of Hungarian statement annexed.	253	267

HUNGARY—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939			
Aug. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records that he pointed out to Hungarian Minister that situation grave owing to recent Polish provocation, and Sztójay's reply.	289	299
Aug. 28	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Has learned from Deputy M.F.A. that Hungary is taking no further military measures at present, and is proposing to Rumania to conclude a minorities agreement, having rejected previous Rumanian proposal for a non-aggression pact.	380	379
Aug. 31	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> As instructed, has informed Hungarian Minister that certain events have aroused mistrust as to Hungary's attitude and that delivery of certain war material is being refused whilst Hungarian attitude in present crisis remains uncertain.	489	475
Sept. 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Hungary</i> Instructions to inform M.F.A. that Germany is not expecting armed assistance from Hungary but is assuming that Hungarian Government will not make declaration of neutrality.	519	497
Sept. 1	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports has raised with M.F.A. German complaints, as contained in document No. 489, and has been informed that Hungarian Minister in Berlin has instructions to give appropriate assurances to Reich Government. With reference to document No. 519, M.F.A. confirmed that Government did not intend to make declaration of neutrality.	520	498
Sept. 1	<i>Memorandum from the Hungarian Legation</i> States that Hungarian Government unable to understand why German Government should not consider Hungary reliable, since loyalty to Germany is basic principle of Hungarian policy.	538	508
Sept. 3	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Enquiry by Hungarian Minister whether embargo on certain armaments deliveries to Hungary has been lifted in consequence of Hungarian statement.	572	544

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMUNICATIONS

1939			
Aug. 18	<i>Memorandum by an Official attached to the Staff of the Foreign Minister</i> On Ribbentrop's instructions the State Secretary is requested, on basis of secret memorandum on economic activities of Auslandsorganisation, to ascertain from Göring what instructions he has given them in economic matters.	116	124
Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> States that OKW is enquiring of Hitler whether ban on communications with Poland, Lithuania and Slovakia can now be lifted; Foreign Ministry to be informed of decision.	334	340

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMUNICATIONS—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939 Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> Message from OKW that Hitler has decided that communications with Poland and Lithuania are to remain interrupted.	335	340
Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> Information from OKM that Polish reports of British naval forces in the North Sea are unconfirmed; that German naval forces in Baltic are so stationed that foreign naval forces cannot enter unobserved; that cruiser <i>Schleswig-Holstein</i> is to remain at Danzig.	338	342
Aug. 31	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VIII</i> Points out that publication in White Book of that passage in Hitler's conversation with British Ambassador which contains offer to guarantee and cooperate in defence of British Empire may have awkward repercussions in Japan.	492	477
Sept. 3	<i>Decree by the Führer and Chancellor</i> For duration of war civilian and Party representatives abroad to come under authority of Head of the German Mission concerned.	574	546

ITALY

1939 Aug. 11	<i>Editors' Note</i> Conversation between Ciano and Ribbentrop in Salzburg.		35
Aug. 12	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Conversation between Hitler and Ciano with Ribbentrop present: military position of Germany, Western Powers and Poland; liquidation of "unreliable neutrals"; Danzig question; Italy's military and economic position; Mussolini's desire for a communiqué reaffirming peaceful intentions of Axis Powers; urgency of solving Polish problem.	43	39
Aug. 13	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of further conversation between Hitler and Ciano. Hitler abides by his rejection of communiqué proposed by Mussolini; reasons why action against Poland must not be delayed should there be further Polish provocation or Poland not make her political attitude clear by, at latest, end of August.	47	53
Aug. 16	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i> Records telephone conversation with State Secretary in Berlin, who informed him that Italian Ambassador was on his way to Rome for discussions on results of Salzburg conversations and the German communiqué issued about them.	71	77
Aug. 16	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> Instructions to Ambassador to inform Ciano that the German talks with Moscow are proceeding and that response from there seems entirely favourable.	76	85

ITALY—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939 Aug. 16	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Conclusions reached at an interdepartmental discussion about South Tyrol operation; in spite of Italian opposition entire <i>Volksdeutsche</i> population of provinces of Bolzano, Trento, Belluno and Udine should be transferred; reply to Italian draft transfer agreement to be in form of counter proposals.	83	98
Aug. 17	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i> Records telephone conversation with State Secretary to whom he said that he would shortly be conveying to Ciano the information in document No. 76, and would, as requested, telephone Weizsäcker the upshot of this conversation.	90	100
Aug. 17	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with Ciano about Mussolini's reception of results of the Salzburg conversations. Ciano stated Mussolini did not think a German-Polish conflict would remain localized; he saw no further possibility of a peaceful settlement and after rejection of his suggestions for a conference and a communiqué, would make no further proposals, decision now lay solely with Berlin.	98	106
Aug. 20	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 124 (see under <i>Hungary</i>) and reports that Ciano believes the primary object of Csáky's visit was to obtain information about European situation and Italy's views. On Csáky asking about prospects of a peaceful solution, Ciano told him he believed Hitler's decision to act to be unalterable.	145	159
Aug. 20	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records private conversation with Italian Chargé d'Affaires who asserted that Germany had never acquainted Italy with issues involved in the German-Polish dispute but was maintaining that dispute was a German affair, that war would be localized, and that Germany would forgo Italian military aid. But, should war become general, Italy would be faced with the consequences of the Italo-German Alliance without prior conditions having been fulfilled.	146	160
Aug. 21	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> Informs Ambassador that Italian Chargé d'Affaires has conveyed Ciano's urgent request to see Ribbentrop on August 22.	154	165
Aug. 22	<i>Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Letter giving his personal views about Ciano's statements as reported in document No. 98.	190	198
Aug. 23	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Ciano asked to be informed as soon as date of Ribbentrop's return known.	211	223
Aug. 23	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with Ciano who said that, according to report from Tokyo, indignation over German-Soviet Pact likely to cause fall of Government and change in Japanese policy. Ciano had instructed Ambassador to make reassuring statements to Japanese.	212	224

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Aug. 23	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records has been informed by Italian Ambassador that British Ambassador in Rome had stated that Britain prepared for conference on Polish question, to be attended by Poland herself, if proposal for conference came from another quarter, and if U.S.S.R. invited. Proposals handed over on August 20 by Sir Percy Loraine annexed.	220	234
Aug. 23	<i>Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Reports has learned from confidant that in Italian view German-Italian Alliance based on verbal agreement postponing war for three years; Germany now provoking a war for which Italy economically and militarily unprepared and in which she expected Britain and France to intervene; the German-Soviet Pact, however, had greatly improved Axis position; if it did come to a conflict, Italy would propose plan of action.	226	240
Aug. 23	<i>Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Transmits letter from Reich Finance Minister, Schwerin-Krosigk, to Ribbentrop, on his conversation with Ciano, who maintained that, in spite of German-Soviet Pact, Britain and France would intervene in a German-Polish war, and that Axis not yet prepared for war.	227	244
Aug. 24	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Italian Ambassador has informed him of contents of report from Italian Embassy in Tokyo referred to in document No. 212.	252	266
Aug. 25	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> States Ribbentrop intends, in order to prevent Italy from referring to unexpected developments, to inform Ciano of gravity of situation.	263	278
Aug. 25	<i>The Führer and Chancellor to the Head of the Italian Government</i> Letter explaining that general political situation, Japan's delay in taking definite attitude, and worsening of German-Polish relations, have led him to hasten conclusion of German-Soviet Pact, which will now prevent Rumania from taking part in any conflict against Axis and cause Turkey to revise her attitude.	266	281
Aug. 25	<i>The Head of the Italian Government to the Führer and Chancellor</i> Letter stating he approves German-Soviet Pact and has understanding for Germany's attitude to Poland; but in event of Poland's allies intervening in a German-Polish conflict, Italy can participate actively and immediately only if Germany supplies arms and raw materials.	271	285
Aug. 25	<i>The Führer and Chancellor to the Head of the Italian Government</i> Letter enquiring what implements of war and raw materials Mussolini requires.	277	289
Aug. 25	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports has given Hitler's letter (document No. 266) to Mussolini; latter's comments thereon.	280	291

ITALY—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939			
Aug. 25	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on Mussolini's preliminary estimate of requirements.	282	294
Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Italy</i> Note of telephone enquiry from Foreign Minister's Secretariat concerning document No. 280, which is stated to be in contradiction to a letter just received in Berlin from Mussolini (document No. 271).	298	306
Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Italy</i> Note of telephone enquiry from Foreign Minister's Secretariat concerning promised list of Italian requirements and requesting further information concerning document No. 280.	299	307
Aug. 26	<i>The Head of the Italian Government to the Führer and Chancellor</i> Letter listing Italian requirements in raw materials for a war lasting twelve months and pointing out that unless such supplies received, Italian participation in war would only compromise common cause; offer to assist in finding political solution.	301	309
Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i> Note of action taken in response to telephone conversation with Foreign Minister's Secretariat; has ascertained from Ciano that two lists of Italian requirements in event of war have already been telephoned to Italian Ambassador in Berlin.	302	310
Aug. 26	<i>The Führer and Chancellor to the Head of the Italian Government</i> Letter stating that though Germany can supply part of Italian requirements (listed in document No. 301), it will be impossible to supply total before beginning of hostilities as requested by Italian Ambassador in Berlin; therefore asks Mussolini to pin down Anglo-French forces by means of propaganda and military demonstrations.	307	318
Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i> Note of action taken in response to telephoned instructions to verify figures of Italian war requirements supplied by Italian Ambassador in Berlin; has called on Ciano and reported results to Berlin.	308	315
Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Italy</i> Reports information telephoned from Berlin that only after transmission of Hitler's letter to Mussolini (document No. 307) had Ribbentrop learned that Italy did not desire full delivery of requirements before outbreak of war; Ambassador to explain matters to Ciano.	311	319
Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i> Has informed Berlin, in response to further telephone enquiry, that he has ascertained that Italian request for immediate delivery applies only to anti-aircraft batteries; in respect of remainder of supplies has, as instructed, asked Ciano for precise details as to dates and quantities via latter's <i>Chef de Cabinet</i> .	316	322

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Aug. 26	<p><i>The Head of the Italian Government to the Führer and Chancellor</i></p> <p>Letter explaining that, apart from anti-aircraft batteries, he had only required material to be delivered within twelve months; nevertheless, in view of impossibility of Germany filling gaps in Italian armaments, will confine himself to immobilizing British and French forces; insists anew on possibility of a political solution.</p>	317	323
Aug. 26	<p><i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports in detail remarks made by Mussolini to whom he handed Hitler's third letter (document No. 307); Mussolini undertook to reply to Hitler forthwith (document No. 317).</p>	320	324
Aug. 27	<p><i>An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy in Italy</i></p> <p>Transmits to Ambassador text of Hitler's reply to Mussolini's letter (document No. 317); requests Mussolini not to let Italy's attitude be known till outbreak of war; to afford support by propaganda; to tie down British and French forces by military demonstrations; and to supply Germany with Italian labour.</p>	341	346
Aug. 27	<p><i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i></p> <p>Instructions telephoned by Ribbentrop that, in forthcoming conversation, Mussolini be requested to treat the whole of his recent correspondence with Hitler as strictly secret.</p>	344	348
Aug. 27	<p><i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i></p> <p>Further instructions telephoned by Ribbentrop to emphasize, in forthcoming conversation with Mussolini, Hitler's request concerning propaganda contained in document No. 341.</p>	345	349
Aug. 27	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i></p> <p>Reports telephone communication from Ambassador in Rome that he has carried out his instructions with Mussolini, who promised to fulfil Hitler's requests and maintain complete solidarity with him.</p>	346	349
Aug. 27	<p><i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Refers to document No. 341 and reports conversation with Mussolini, who promised full compliance with Hitler's requests but again expressed the view that all objectives could be attained without resort to war.</p>	349	351
Aug. 27	<p><i>The Head of the Italian Government to the Führer and Chancellor</i></p> <p>Letter in reply to document No. 341 undertaking to fulfil Hitler's requests and describing measures already taken.</p>	350	353
Aug. 27	<p><i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i></p> <p>Instructions telephoned by Ribbentrop that Mussolini and Ciano must not be allowed to attach credence to a rumour, circulating in Rome, about a <i>détente</i> in the situation; the exact opposite was the case.</p>	357	361

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Aug. 27	<i>State Secretary Weizsäcker to Ambassador Mackensen</i> Letter explaining care taken to avoid any show of animosity at Italy's present attitude, Axis solidarity being an asset in impressing third parties.	364	367
Aug. 28	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Encloses a memorandum from Italian Ambassador requesting provision of sufficient railway waggon for despatch of coal consignments to Italy; states that on Ribbentrop's instructions this request to be complied with despite mobilization measures.	394	391
Aug. 28	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Conversation with Italian Ambassador, who said that Mussolini had in mind a plan to solve present crisis but was reluctant to put this forward in view of rejection of his two previous proposals.	395	392
Aug. 28	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Has told the Italian Ambassador, who asked for text of Hitler's communication to Chamberlain, that he is not aware of any letter but only that discussion took place between Hitler and British Ambassador.	398	394
Aug. 28	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Has informed Italian Ambassador, who enquired about results of German-Turkish conversations, that Germany's impression of Turkey's attitude in event of conflict in Mediterranean is not favourable.	399	394
Aug. 28	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Has informed Italian Ambassador that a declaration of sympathy by German Army to Japanese Army is not at present under consideration.	400	395
Aug. 29	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of conversation between Ribbentrop and Italian Ambassador; latter given an account of recent exchanges with Britain, informed that latest British communication still being studied, Hitler determined to solve Polish problem one way or another, and that time no longer permitted of further mediation proposals by Mussolini.	411	405
Aug. 29	<i>The Head of the Italian Government to the Führer and Chancellor</i> Letter expressing view that British proposals contain prerequisites for reaching a solution favourable to Germany.	417	410
Aug. 29	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Oral message to Hitler from Mussolini, sent through Italian Ambassador in Berlin, stating that, though Mussolini could take no action in Paris, Italy's relations with Britain were such as to enable her to take any action in London which Germany might desire.	418	411
Aug. 29	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports information supplied to his Air Attaché by Chief of Staff of Italian Air Force, Gen. Valle, concerning general mobilization of Italian Air Force, operational strength, and prospects for air warfare in various theatres; shortage of petrol a dangerous factor.	423	417

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Aug. 29	<p><i>Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Letter expressing concern at strain developing in German relations with Italy and enclosing secret report from his confidant on factors which are influencing Mussolini and Ciano.</p>	438	430
Aug. 30	<p><i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conversation with Ciano to whom, as instructed, he communicated summary of document No. 411, and who stated he now believed peaceful settlement impossible in view of military preparations made by both sides.</p>	444	437
Aug. 30	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Has been informed by Italian Ambassador that latter has heard from his British colleague that, failing arrival of Polish negotiator in Berlin, there might be a fresh initiative by the Pope.</p>	452	442
Aug. 30	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Although Hitler's and Ribbentrop's instructions that coal deliveries to Italy are to be maintained have been conveyed to Ministry of Transport, latter point out that owing to military transports, German railways can at present handle barely half promised total.</p>	464	455
Aug. 31	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Has received urgent message through Italian Ambassador that Mussolini has informed London that he can do nothing further for peace unless a new factor arises, such as immediate cession of Danzig before other conversations are embarked on.</p>	467	457
Sept. 1	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Conversation on August 31 between Ribbentrop and Italian Ambassador, who communicated Mussolini's desire that Hitler should receive Polish Ambassador, and further asked for text of German proposals, which were promised him for later.</p>	474	462
Sept. 1	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Conversation on August 31 between Hitler and Italian Ambassador, who was given copy of the German proposals, but informed by Hitler that they no longer held good owing to Polish attitude. On Ambassador asking whether Hitler would agree to Mussolini acting as mediator, Hitler expressed conviction that Poles would pay no attention.</p>	478	465
Aug. 31	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> States that after further efforts by Ministry of Transport maximum amount of coal which Germany can deliver to Italy by rail is somewhat higher than previously stated.</p>	490	476
Aug. 31	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Refers to document No. 490, and states that figures for coal deliveries to Italy cannot be maintained in event of war with France.</p>	491	476

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Sept. 1	<p><i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy</i> Transmits text of a letter from Hitler to Mussolini thanking him for his recent diplomatic and political support and stating that he does not expect to need military support from Italy.</p>	500	483
Sept. 1	<p><i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy</i> Transmits text of message from Hitler to Mussolini to be held pending further instructions by telegram. Message states that latest attempt at British mediation has failed, Polish general mobilization has been declared, and further Polish acts of terrorism have occurred. Hitler has therefore decided to answer force with force.</p>	504	485
Sept. 1	<p><i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i> Note of various telephone conversations with Berlin concerning the transmission to him of documents Nos. 500 and 504 and of his giving the messages contained therein to Mussolini.</p>	505	486
Sept. 1	<p><i>Editors' Note</i> Official announcement in Rome on Italy's attitude over starting hostilities.</p>		487
Sept. 1	<p><i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to documents Nos. 500 and 504 and reports has handed the two letters from Hitler contained therein to Mussolini, who gave his own assessment of the situation and promised full support. Ciano took a less optimistic view.</p>	507	488
Sept. 1	<p><i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with Ciano, who mentioned that British Ambassador had repeatedly been to see him and gave conflicting accounts of conversations with French Ambassador.</p>	508	489
Sept. 1	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Conversation with Italian Ambassador, whom he informed that British and French Ambassadors had not yet communicated attitude of their Governments. Ambassador believed that France would like to attack Italy, but was being restrained by Britain.</p>	529	505
Sept. 2	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> States that Italian Ambassador has given him a communication from Mussolini to Hitler. Communication states that, whilst leaving the decision to Hitler, Italy wishes it known that she might still be able to obtain agreement of France, Britain and Poland to a conference based on three specified conditions, and which would enable Germany to achieve all her aims whilst avoiding a war.</p>	535	509
Sept. 2	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of conversation between Ribbentrop and Italian Ambassador, who enquired about Germany's attitude to proposal in document No. 535, and was informed by Ribbentrop that this must depend on whether the French and British communications in documents Nos. 513 (see under <i>Great Britain</i>) and 515 (see under <i>France</i>) were ultimata or not</p>	539	512

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 2	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of further conversation between Ribbentrop and Italian Ambassador, who had ascertained from his British colleague that British communication in document No. 513 (see under <i>Great Britain</i>) was not an ultimatum. Ambassador requested to make further enquiry in Rome and to report there that German reply to Anglo-French communication could only be negative.	541	514
Sept. 2	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of conversation between Ribbentrop and Italian Ambassador, who stated that Italian mediation proposal unacceptable to Britain; latter insisted on total withdrawal of German forces from Poland and Danzig as precondition for negotiations. Mussolini therefore considered his proposals as invalidated.	554	524
Sept. 3	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Transmits text of letter from Hitler to Mussolini, explaining reasons for declining Italian mediation offer, expressing thanks for assurances of aid, and reviewing course of Polish campaign.	565	538

LATIN AMERICA

1939 Aug. 17	<i>Memorandum by an Official attached to the Staff of the Foreign Minister</i> Instructions from Ribbentrop to State Secretary that Heads of Missions in Latin America to be summoned to a meeting, and given directives on methods of cooperation between Reich Missions and Auslandsorganisation centres in Latin America.	103	111
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THE LOW COUNTRIES AND LUXEMBOURG

1939 Aug. 22	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Speculates on probable purpose of Conference of Oslo Powers; although a senior official has denied that any set programme exists, suspects that primary object of Conference may prove to be a peace appeal.	185	192
Aug. 23	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 185 and reports that primary purpose of Conference of Oslo Powers was to issue peace appeal which the King of the Belgians is to broadcast on August 23.	208	221
Aug. 24	<i>Minute by an Official of Political Division I</i> Has learned from OKW that Netherlands will remain neutral in event of conflict, and are making preparations for restrictions on exports and for minelaying.	255	269

THE LOW COUNTRIES AND LUXEMBOURG—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Aug. 24	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i> Confidential report on statement by Belgian Ambassador in Berlin to Belgian press representative that prospects of peace did not appear good, and that, in event of war, Belgium would defend her neutrality.	257	270
Aug. 25	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Belgium</i> Instructs Ambassador immediately to state to the King of the Belgians that Germany will in no circumstances infringe integrity of Belgium provided she observes strict neutrality.	272	286
Aug. 25	<i>The Embassy in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on certain Belgian military security measures.	273	287
Aug. 25	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports is informed by Netherlands M.F.A. that Royal Decree of 1931 allowing aircraft carriers to enter certain Netherlands waters without permission from Government to be cancelled.	275	288
Aug. 25	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Belgian Minister President affirmed determination to continue policy of independence and denied rumour that French troops would be allowed to march through Belgium in event of war.	279	290
Aug. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Has replied to enquiry from Netherlands Minister that there is no improvement in situation, and has informed Minister privately that Netherlands Government might be requested to take over German interests in event of hostilities.	290	299
Aug. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records delivery by Netherlands Minister of an official statement by his Government announcing their intention of maintaining absolute neutrality in event of war.	291	300
Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Has informed Minister in Luxembourg, in response to his enquiry, that there is no objection to Luxembourg Government informing French Government of German statement respecting Luxembourg neutrality, but that publication in press should preferably await similar publication by other countries recipient of German assurances.	305	312
Aug. 26	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports has conveyed German assurances on respecting Netherlands neutrality to the Queen who stated Netherlands resolved to observe strict neutrality; Netherlands Government prepared to take over German interests in Poland if required.	313	319
Aug. 26	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 272 and reports instructions carried out with King, who stressed determination to carry out Belgian policy of independence towards all sides. Belgian Minister President affirmed that Belgium would defend herself against any violation of her neutrality.	315	321

THE LOW COUNTRIES AND LUXEMBOURG—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939 Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Telephone conversation with Minister in Luxembourg, who stated that Radio Luxembourg had broadcast the official Belgian and Dutch reports on German <i>démarche</i> respecting their neutrality, and considered it essential that a similar Luxembourg communiqué be sanctioned.	319	324
Aug. 26	<i>The Minister in Luxembourg to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits official Luxembourg statement given him by M.F.A. in reply to German assurance respecting Luxembourg neutrality. Statement confirms Government's intention of maintaining neutrality of Grand Duchy.	321	326
Aug. 26	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to documents Nos. 185 and 208, and reports information from Belgian Minister President as to objects and achievements of Conference of Oslo Powers in Brussels. Conference gave final shape to peace appeal by the King of the Belgians, but, apart from final communiqué, took no resolutions of any kind.	323	329
Aug. 26	<i>Note from the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the German Embassy in Brussels</i> Acknowledges German communication on respecting Belgian neutrality and confirms policy of Belgian Government not to tolerate any violation of neutrality.	325	331
Aug. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Telephone report from the Legation in The Hague that Netherlands Government have informed them of decision to mobilize.	371	372
Aug. 28	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Is reliably informed that Oslo Powers Conference did not deal with economic questions; Belgian Foreign Ministry studying formulation of policy of economic neutrality.	374	373
Aug. 28	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that British and French Ambassadors have now made declarations concerning Belgian neutrality similar to that made by Germany.	379	378
Aug. 28	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports second stage of Belgian mobilization now ordered and defensive measures taken on French frontier.	389	387
Aug. 28	<i>The Legation in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> Is informed by M.F.A. that the Queen of the Netherlands and the King of the Belgians prepared to offer their good offices jointly.	390	387
Aug. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Ambassador in Brussels has telephoned that, on enquiry of Minister President, has ascertained that report that Belgium intends to stop all transit traffic to Germany is without foundation.	391	388

THE LOW COUNTRIES AND LUXEMBOURG—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Aug. 28	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i></p> <p>In order to safeguard imports from neutral countries in event of war, submits proposals for sending special diplomatic representatives to Northern States, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, immediately after outbreak of hostilities, to state German views on maintenance of economic relations. Encloses draft instructions for these representatives.</p>	402	396
Aug. 28	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i></p> <p>Confidential report on views of Belgian Embassy in Berlin on prospects of peace.</p>	404	399
Aug. 29	<p><i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Has been informed by Minister President that the King of the Belgians and the Queen of the Netherlands prepared to offer their good offices to Germany, Italy, Britain, France and Poland.</p>	408	403
Aug. 29	<p><i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division II</i></p> <p>Reports information received by telephone from Minister at The Hague that there has so far been no Anglo-French <i>démarche</i> about respecting Netherlands neutrality.</p>	435	427
Aug. 29	<p><i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Belgium and the Legation in the Netherlands</i></p> <p>Refers to documents Nos. 408 and 390, and states that Governments of Belgium and the Netherlands to be informed that German Government have gratefully noted offer of good offices by Sovereigns, although they cannot at present make use of it.</p>	441	435
Aug. 30	<p><i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division II</i></p> <p>Information telephoned by Brussels Embassy that, according to the press, Britain, France and Poland have accepted offer of good offices by Sovereigns of Belgium and Netherlands; Embassy request authority to make suitable press statement on German attitude immediately after carrying out instructions in document No. 441.</p>	443	436
Aug. 31	<p><i>Minute by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i></p> <p>In response to enquiry from War Economy Staff, Foreign Ministry has consented to delivery, even in event of war, of 20 howitzers promised to Netherlands.</p>	469	459
Sept. 1	<p><i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Recommends methods of conducting propaganda in Belgium, on basis of analysis of Belgian social and economic structure.</p>	521	499
Sept. 2	<p><i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Luxembourg</i></p> <p>Instructions to inform Minister of State Dupong that Germany cannot accept Luxembourg proposal to shut down whole metallurgical industry in event of war as a contribution to neutrality, and to state German intention to send special plenipotentiary to Luxembourg to make clear Germany's views on the continuation of economic relations.</p>	542	515

THE LOW COUNTRIES AND LUXEMBOURG—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 2	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports reaction of public opinion to start of hostilities between Germany and Poland; has gained impression so far that Belgium's military and political attitude completely satisfactory.	544	516
Sept. 2	<i>The Legation in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> Report by Ambassador Ritter, on special mission, of his conversations with Minister President and M.F.A. concerning German views on economic neutrality.	545	517
Sept. 3	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Report of his conversation in Brussels with Minister President concerning German views on economic neutrality. [See also under <i>Northern States</i> .]	573	544

MILITARY DIRECTIVES AND CONFERENCES

1939 Aug. 22	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Account of speech by Hitler to Commanders-in-Chief: review of political situation and of factors which have decided him to act forthwith against Poland.	192	200
Aug. 22	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Account of second speech by Hitler to Commanders-in-Chief: iron determination and greatest harshness required; propagandist reason to be given for starting war; military aims: complete destruction of Poland as first priority.	193	205
Aug. 25	<i>Editors' Note</i> Directive issued by the Chief of the OKW on the Führer's order for mobilization without public proclamation and its application to the civil administration.		302
Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> Meeting of Reich Defence experts to discuss various matters arising from mobilization.	337	341
Aug. 27	<i>Editors' Note</i> Address by Hitler in private meeting.		367
Aug. 31	<i>Directive by the Führer</i> Directive No. 1 for the conduct of the war: timetable for attack on Poland, instructions to respect neutrality of Low Countries, Luxembourg and Switzerland; plan of operations should Britain and France open hostilities against Germany.	493	477
Sept. 3	<i>Directive by the Führer</i> Directive No. 2 for the conduct of the war: lays down plan for operations against Britain and France.	576	548

NORTHERN STATES

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Aug. 18	<p><i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Has been informed by Finnish M.F.A. that British Government have informed Finnish Government that a German attack on Danzig would constitute <i>casus belli</i> for Britain.</p>	107	117
Aug. 21	<p><i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports has been informed by Danish M.F.A. that latter will attend Brussels meeting of Oslo Powers and Switzerland but will not participate in any action for mediation not desired by both sides.</p>	161	169
Aug. 22	<p><i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that M.F.A. has left for Brussels to attend Oslo Powers Conference, for which, according to Cabinet Secretary, there is no set programme.</p>	179	188
Aug. 23	<p><i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports anxiety in Finland as to whether German-Soviet Pact, which is regarded as skilful counter move to Western Powers' policy, will prove disadvantageous to Baltic States.</p>	203	219
Aug. 24	<p><i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legations in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.</i> Desires Missions in Scandinavian countries to ascertain unobtrusively extent to which economic cooperation in event of war decided on at Brussels conference and whether policy of economic neutrality envisaged.</p>	248	261
Aug. 25	<p><i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comments on attitude of Social Democrats and Communists to German-Soviet Pact.</p>	268	283
Aug. 25	<p><i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Has learned from M.F.A. that Oslo Powers Conference empowered the King of the Belgians to take steps towards mediation.</p>	269	284
Aug. 25	<p><i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Has learned from M.F.A. of general decisions taken by Oslo Powers on economic cooperation, neutrality etc., but no details.</p>	270	284
Aug. 25	<p><i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports M.F.A. has told him that Finnish Minister in U.S.S.R. has replied to Soviet enquiry that Finland would observe neutrality towards Germany. M.F.A. expressed fear that Germany would give U.S.S.R. free hand in Baltic.</p>	276	289
Aug. 26	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Has assured Finnish Minister, in response to his enquiry, that Germany and the U.S.S.R. have made no agreement concerning Finland.</p>	332	338
Aug. 26	<p><i>Minister Blücher to Senior Counsellor Grundherr</i> Letter commenting on Finnish reactions to German-Soviet Pact; in recent conversation M.F.A. showed concern lest secret agreements had been reached affecting Finland; business circles also perturbed by consequences of Pact for Finnish economy.</p>	339	343

NORTHERN STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Aug. 28	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits statement made by M.F.A. to press that Denmark is resolved to maintain neutrality in the event of war and hopes to be able to continue normal trade with both Britain and Germany.	372	372
Aug. 28	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> As instructed, has informed Danish Minister that Germany confirms her attitude to Denmark as defined in the Non-Aggression Treaty of May 1939, and expects Denmark to preserve absolute neutrality, opposing any possible infractions with all means at her disposal.	396	392
Aug. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> The Minister in Copenhagen has reported that he has made similar statement to M.F.A. as made by State Secretary to Danish Minister in Berlin (document No. 396). Danish press to be informed of German <i>démarche</i> .	397	393
Aug. 29	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statement by M.F.A. that Denmark will adhere strictly to absolute neutrality and tolerate no violations; M.F.A. did not expect any British violation of Danish neutrality.	407	402
Aug. 29	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports cancellation of Northern Foreign Ministers' Conference, and mobilization of Norwegian forces at vulnerable points.	412	408
Aug. 29	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports arrival of British and U.S. naval vessels at Bergen to take on board British delegation from Moscow and U.S. citizens respectively. Considers permission to enter harbour granted to these foreign warships to be contrary to previous Norwegian attitude.	420	412
Aug. 29	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Records telephone conversation with German Minister in Copenhagen to inform him of reasons for not adopting his suggestion that German <i>démarche</i> to Denmark be made to the King, as in the case of Belgium and the Netherlands.	437	430
Aug. 30	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 407 and reports has learned officially that, in response to hope expressed by M.F.A. that Britain would respect Danish neutrality, British Minister in Copenhagen has given assurances to that effect.	460	450
Aug. 31	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Suggests that, since Britain's declaration of neutrality to Denmark is being interpreted as counter move to German declaration, similar German <i>démarche</i> be made to Norway, to test British reaction.	472	461
Sept. 1	<i>The State Secretary to the Legations in Norway, Sweden and Finland</i> Instructions to state to Governments to which accredited that Germany will respect their territorial integrity but expects them in their turn to observe strict neutrality.	525	502

NORTHERN STATES—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939 Sept. 2	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Denmark</i> States that in view of undesirable repercussions of an appeal by Möller, leader of German national group in Denmark, to inhabitants of North Schleswig, Möller should publicly emphasize loyalty of North Schleswigers to Danish Government.	536	510
Sept. 2	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports military and naval measures taken by Norway.	537	511
Sept. 2	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Finnish Government have issued declaration of neutrality, and that he has carried out with M.F.A. instructions in document No. 525.	543	515
Sept. 2	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 525, and reports instructions carried out with M.F.A., who stated that Norway had already publicly announced desire to maintain complete neutrality.	546	518
Sept. 2	<i>The Legation in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Report by Ambassador Hassell, on special mission, on conversations with Minister of State Stauning and M.F.A. concerning German views on economic neutrality.	552	522
Sept. 3	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Report by Ambassador Hassell, on special mission, on conversations with Swedish Minister of State and M.F.A. concerning German views on economic neutrality. [See also under <i>Low Countries and Luxembourg.</i>]	568	541

POLAND AND DANZIG

1939 Aug. 9	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Telephoned instructions to State Secretary that on Ribbentrop's orders Ambassador in Poland is to remain in Berlin until further notice and is not to have contact with any Polish authority or telephone the Embassy in Warsaw; Embassy also to be instructed to maintain complete reserve.	2	1
Aug. 9	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V</i> Reports information from President of Danzig Senate Greiser that Gauleiter Forster has left Obersalzberg by air and will inform Greiser of results of discussion with Hitler. Fresh decision to be taken on whether Greiser is to meet Polish Diplomatic Representative, Chodacki, on Customs Inspectors question.	4	3
Aug. 9	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records interview with Polish Chargé d'Affaires, to whom he read a German statement protesting against Polish Note to Danzig Senate (document No. 774 in vol. VI) and pointing out that repetition of such demands will lead to aggravation of German-Polish relations, and that retention of Polish measures to interfere with import of Danzig goods into Poland must oblige Danzig to explore other possibilities for exports and imports.	5	4

POLAND AND DANZIG—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Aug. 9	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i> Confidential report on the impression made on foreign diplomats and journalists in Berlin by changed attitude of German press towards Poland.	6	5
Aug. 10	<i>Minute by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Telephone message from State Secretary that Polish M.F.A. desires German Ambassador to call on him that day; since Ambassador remaining in Berlin by Ribbentrop's permission, suggestion that German Counsellor call on Polish Under-Secretary of State, Arciszewski, instead.	8	8
Aug. 10	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Telephone message from Counsellor of Embassy in Warsaw recording statement made to him by Polish Under-Secretary of State in reply to the German statement of Aug. 9 (document No. 5): Polish Government see no legal grounds to justify German intervention; they will continue to react as hitherto to any Danzig attempts to impair Polish rights and interests in the Free City and will regard any intervention by Reich Government as act of aggression.	10	9
Aug. 10	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation between Italian and Polish Ambassadors in Moscow, at which former expressed view that Anglo-Franco-Soviet military discussions would succeed only if Poland associated with them or agreeable to accept Soviet armed assistance, to which Polish Ambassador replied that Poland would never allow Soviet troops to set foot on Polish territory.	15	13
Aug. 10	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V</i> Records information from President of Danzig Senate, Greiser, that Gauleiter Forster in a speech that evening intends to stress right of Danzig to return to Germany; no surprises need be expected. Forster will make similar speech at Nuremberg.	19	20
Aug. 11	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Notes that Ambassador Moltke, who is being detained in Berlin on instructions, feels his presence in Warsaw would be desirable in case of emergency.	32	31
Aug. 11	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Informs State Secretary that Foreign Minister's instructions forbidding contacts with Polish authorities apply only to political conversations and not to normal business or current economic affairs.	36	34
[Aug. 11]	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Telephone message for Ribbentrop at Fuschl proposing that Missions abroad be informed of Polish-German exchanges, be asked to report any propaganda use made of them by Poles, and be instructed to emphasize Poland's aggressive tone.	37	34
[Aug. 11]	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Telephone message for Ribbentrop at Fuschl requesting information on instructions given to President of Danzig Senate, Greiser, for his forthcoming discussions with Polish Diplomatic Representative Chodacki.	38	35

POLAND AND DANZIG—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939			
Aug. 12	<i>The Deutsche Stiftung to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Polish Government official stated, in conversation, that German intentions for partition of Poland between Germany and U.S.S.R. were known in Warsaw and that Poles would defend themselves with all means at their command.	42	38
Aug. 12	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Note for Ribbentrop of conversation between Secretary of German-Polish Society Boening, Polish Consul General in Berlin, and member of Polish Embassy. Poles suggested that Boening go to Warsaw for political conversations and emphasized that Danzig, Corridor highway, and other questions could be discussed with Poland at any time.	44	49
Aug. 13	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland</i> Instructions that Embassy's most urgent task is to expand reports on Polish press and on significant events in Poland, which can be turned to political advantage in German press.	46	52
Aug. 14	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland</i> Informs Head of Mission that texts of documents Nos. 5 and 10 have been communicated to German Missions principally concerned, with instructions not to initiate conversations on German and Polish statements but, if questioned, to describe Polish statement as further proof of warmongering policy of Poland's rulers.	57	64
Aug. 14	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Encloses memorandum, given him by the Italian Ambassador, of information received from Rome about plan being mooted in Warsaw for compromise solution of Danzig question.	59	65
Aug. 15	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Suggestion that, in view of danger of violence against German minority in Poland in event of war, German aircraft should drop leaflets threatening penalties against Poles who attack German life or property.	63	69
Aug. 15	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V</i> According to information telephoned from Danzig Consulate General, discussion between President of Danzig Senate Greiser and Polish Diplomatic Representative Chodacki is to take place on August 16 in Professor Burekhardt's office.	67	74
Aug. 15	<i>Counsellor of Embassy Wühlisch to Senior Counsellor Schliep</i> Letter explaining circumstances leading up to his call on Arciszewski, to receive Polish statement of Aug. 10 (document No. 10).	69	75
Aug. 16	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V</i> Submits memorandum by President of Danzig Senate Greiser on his conversation with Polish Diplomatic Representative Chodacki about Customs Inspectors dispute and Poland's economic measures.	72	78
Aug. 16	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Poland</i> In view of increasingly difficult position of Reich Germans in Poland, begs to be allowed to return to his post in Warsaw.	82	93

POLAND AND DANZIG—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Aug. 17	<p><i>Unsigned Memorandum from the Information Section of the News Service and Press Department</i></p> <p>Gives text of telegram sent to Hitler from East Upper Silesia appealing for protection for Germans persecuted there. Ribbentrop requests State Secretary to make use of this telegram, which will be published at a suitable moment, in conversation with foreign diplomats.</p>	91	101
Aug. 17	<p><i>The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Has learned that Polish Ambassador told the Cardinal Secretary of State that Poland would refrain from any provocation but would oppose any territorial change in Danzig and was convinced that Britain and France would come to her aid, though, failing such aid, Poland would act alone.</p>	95	104
Aug. 17	<p><i>Minute by the Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Danzig Senate</i></p> <p>Reports conversation with League High Commissioner, who spoke of press leakages about his visit to Hitler; Professor Burckhardt also had information that Lord Halifax had expressed satisfaction with Hitler's handling of Danzig situation.</p>	104	113
Aug. 18	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Urgently requests, in interests of German national group, complete suspension of activities of diversionary groups directed from Germany which have led to arrests of <i>Volksdeutsche</i>.</p>	106	117
Aug. 18	<p><i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V</i></p> <p>Submits a minute by President of the Danzig Senate Greiser on latter's further conversation with Polish Diplomatic Representative Chodacki about Customs Inspectors dispute.</p>	117	126
Aug. 19	<p><i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i></p> <p>Sends report from Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig, Veessenmayer, that Gauleiter Forster seeks Ribbentrop's approval for intensifying pressure on Poland and for rendering agreement on Customs Inspectors question, over which Poland appears ready to give way, impossible by constantly increasing demands. Weizsäcker suggests replying that these methods approved but that the negotiations must be so conducted that responsibility for their breakdown falls on Poland.</p>	119	129
Aug. 19	<p><i>The Consul General in Toruń to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports that Danzig Gestapo said to have instructed certain <i>Volksdeutsche</i> to carry out explosions in Briesen and Wittenburg for purposes of provocation on receipt of a password from Danzig radio. Explosives to be brought from Danzig in Polish lorries.</p>	128	137
[Aug. 20]	<p><i>The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Enquires whether he is to accompany Gauleiter Forster who is leaving that afternoon to visit Hitler at Berchtesgaden.</p>	188	154

POLAND AND DANZIG—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939			
Aug. 20	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig</i> States that Ribbentrop approves proposed method of conducting negotiations in Customs Inspectors dispute, but that responsibility for their failure must be made to fall on Poland.	139	155
Aug. 21	<i>The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> Requests instructions for a conversation with Senator Wiesner, recently released by Poles and now in Danzig.	150	162
Aug. 21	<i>An Official of Political Division V to the Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig</i> Requests immediate transmission of proposals for handling Danzig question, of which State Secretary has no knowledge.	153	164
Aug. 21	<i>The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> Recommends that State Secretary see Heydrich, with reference to document No. 153, since latter is fully informed.	155	165
Aug. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V</i> Outlines measures for protection of Reich Germans in Poland and of Embassy and Consulates in case of emergency.	166	174
Aug. 21	<i>Minute by an Official of Political Division V</i> Order of precedence proposed by Consulate General in Danzig for official visits by Commanding Officer of cruiser <i>Königsberg</i> , in conformity with Hitler's decision as to precedence to be accorded to Gauleiter Forster.	167	176
Aug. 22	<i>The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits statement drawn up jointly by himself and Senator Wiesner on grievances of German national group in Poland, and requests permission to publish.	172	181
Aug. 22	<i>The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 172 and states Gauleiter Forster still hesitant about making use of Senator Wiesner for possible broadcasts.	173	184
Aug. 22	<i>The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> Informs State Secretary of proposed plan for series of increasingly provocative measures against Poles.	176	186
Aug. 22	<i>The Head of Political Division V to the Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig</i> Refers to document No. 172 and states that Head of Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle requests that Senator Wiesner refrain from making proposed statement.	182	190

POLAND AND DANZIG—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939			
Aug. 22	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V</i> Report from Vice Consul in Danzig that negotiations on Customs Inspectors question being conducted in dilatory manner, and that, according to Gauleiter Forster, Hitler has decided against visit of German cruiser <i>Königsberg</i> .	188	195
Aug. 23	<i>The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> States that Head of Central Office of Information of Reich Press Service, now in Danzig, requests confirmation of information that British Ambassador is delivering message from Chamberlain to Hitler.	194	206
Aug. 23	<i>Minute by the Head of Political Division V</i> States that Head of Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle has turned down Senator Wiesner's plan to play role of a Henlein in German-Polish conflict, and requests that Wiesner come to Berlin at once.	195	206
Aug. 23	<i>The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> States that Gauleiter Forster has decided that Senator Wiesner should not proceed to Berlin but should remain in Danzig, and assumes full responsibility for this decision.	196	207
Aug. 23	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V</i> The Consulate General in Danzig reports that Gauleiter Forster is to be offered post of Head of State by Senate; in Customs Inspectors question Danzig negotiator to make demands that Poles are expected to refuse, when blame for failure of negotiations will be placed on Poles; battleship <i>Schleswig-Holstein</i> to come to Danzig instead of <i>Königsberg</i> .	197	207
Aug. 23	<i>An Official of Political Division V to the Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig</i> Refers to document No. 194 and confirms that British Ambassador has gone to Berchtesgaden; object of his visit to Hitler not known.	199	209
Aug. 23	<i>The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports discussion with Gauleiter Forster whether latter should call upon the Germans in Poznań and Pommerellen who are without arms to resist or go into hiding in the event of emergency.	202	219
Aug. 23	<i>The Head of the Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP to the Embassy in Poland</i> Orders all Party documents to be destroyed.	204	220
Aug. 23	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that news of German-Soviet Pact, which press trying to belittle, has not shaken Poland's confidence in British and French assistance. Diplomatic circles expect Britain to urge Poland to come to agreement with Germany.	217	232
Aug. 23	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V</i> Records resolution passed by Danzig Senate declaring Gauleiter Forster Head of State of Free City of Danzig.	224	238

POLAND AND DANZIG—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Aug. 23	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V</i> Records Consulate General, Danzig, has telephoned to say that battleship <i>Schleswig-Holstein</i> is going to Danzig on August 24 without Polish Government being notified.	225	239
Aug. 24	<i>Minute by the President of the Danzig Senate</i> Records has informed League of Nations High Commissioner of Gauleiter Forster's acceptance of post of Head of State of Free City of Danzig, leaving it to Burckhardt's discretion to inform Committee of Three, whose reaction would, however, no longer have any effect.	231	248
Aug. 24	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V</i> Records Consulate General, Danzig, has reported that Poles have broken off negotiations on Customs Inspectors question.	232	249
Aug. 24	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig</i> States, in reply to document No. 202, that OKW do not consider it advisable to arm <i>Volksdeutsche</i> .	235	251
Aug. 24	<i>The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> Informs State Secretary that approval received from the Berghof of points 1, 2, 3, and 5 of plan conveyed in document No. 176.	244	258
Aug. 24	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V</i> German Consul General, Danzig, has reported that British Consul General has left; French Consul General intends to remain; in Customs Inspectors negotiations, Danzig has demanded withdrawal of all frontier officials and 90 per cent reduction of Customs Inspectors.	254	268
Aug. 25	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V</i> Encloses two Notes from Polish Diplomatic Representative to Danzig Senate, one protesting against Forster being made Head of State of Free City, the other against recent violations of Polish rights in Danzig.	259	273
Aug. 25	<i>The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits enquiry from Gauleiter Forster whether on key date High Commissioner and the President of Polish Harbour Board may be informed that their missions are at an end.	264	278
Aug. 25	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy and Consulates in Poland</i> Sends instructions that all Reich Germans must be sent immediately to Germany or to neutral countries.	286	296
Aug. 25	<i>Editors' Note</i> Signature of Anglo-Polish Agreement regarding mutual assistance.		303
Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Encloses two Notes, presented by Polish Ambassador, protesting at German frontier violations.	380	336

POLAND AND DANZIG—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1989			
Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records Polish Ambassador's complaint at being cut off from telephone communication with Warsaw and Polish consulates in Germany, and his request that these facilities be restored.	331	338
Aug. 26	<i>Note by an Official of Political Division I</i> In response to request from Foreign Ministry, OKW will not now arrest certain Polish consular officials suspected of espionage, but proposes to prevent their leaving Germany.	336	341
Aug. 27	<i>An Official of Political Division V to the Embassy in Poland</i> Instructions to lodge strong protest with Polish Government about cases of Polish anti-aircraft batteries firing on German aircraft.	355	359
Aug. 27	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 355 and reports that, in reply to German protest, Polish Foreign Ministry drew attention to numerous cases of frontier violations by German aircraft, but promised enquiry into present complaint.	359	362
Aug. 29	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports restraint shown by Polish press over German military measures in Slovakia and over Hitler-Daladier correspondence.	415	409
Aug. 29	<i>Exchange of Teleprint Communications between the Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig and the Foreign Ministry</i> Announces that Gauleiter Forster, who is arriving in Berlin next day, wishes to be accompanied by Veesenmayer; Ribbentrop's consent finally obtained.	427	421
Aug. 30	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V</i> Records information telephoned by Embassy in Warsaw that general mobilization ordered in Poland for August 31.	451	442
Aug. 30	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Consulate General in Danzig</i> States that prolongation of visit of cruiser <i>Schleswig-Holstein</i> to Danzig is not to be publicized, and sends instructions how to reply to possible enquiries.	457	446
Sept. 1	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Conversation with Polish Ambassador on August 31 whom, on Ribbentrop's instructions, he asked whether, in requesting to be received, Ambassador came as plenipotentiary; Lipski replied that he came as Ambassador to make a communication from his Government.	475	462
[Sept. 1]	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Conversation between Ribbentrop and Polish Ambassador on August 31. Latter read out communication from his Government that they were favourably considering suggestion of British Government regarding possibility of direct conversations between Polish and German Governments and would reply within a few hours. Questioned by Ribbentrop, Ambassador stated that he had not himself plenary powers to negotiate.	476	463

POLAND AND DANZIG—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Sept. 1	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Report by telephone from Consul General in Danzig on movements of League High Commissioner, foreign Consular officials, and Polish Diplomatic Representative.	498	481
Sept. 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in the Netherlands</i> Instructions to request Government to notify Polish Government via Netherlands Legation in Warsaw that German air forces have orders to attack only military objectives but will resort to severe reprisals should Polish air forces fail to observe same rule.	526	503
Sept. 2	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> States Ribbentrop has agreed to abolition of Foreign Affairs Department of Danzig Senate.	555	525

RUMANIA

1939 Aug. 11	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Conversation with Rumanian Minister, who called to enquire about situation. Drew Minister's attention to press reports that Rumania had called up ten classes, and reminded him that, after accepting British guarantee, Rumania would have to prove her neutrality afresh by her conduct.	31	30
Aug. 12	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that, as a result of the State Secretary's conversation with Rumanian Minister in Berlin, M.F.A. has sent circular to all Rumanian Missions stating that Rumanian troop concentrations have no aggressive purpose but are merely in preparation for August manoeuvres.	40	36
Aug. 15	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> In reply to an enquiry by Rumanian Minister, has informed him of causes of acute deterioration in German-Polish relations.	68	75
Aug. 16	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> As normal petroleum quota for export to Germany exhausted, and difficulties in the way of Rumania releasing further supplies to Germany, recommends making use of possibilities of buying through the Protectorate.	77	85
Aug. 17	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> States that Reich Air Ministry agree that treatment of German-Rumanian Air Armaments Protocol of July 8, 1939, should be carried out. To obtain urgently required release of blocked quantities of petroleum it should suffice to make declarations to the Rumanian Air Ministry about Junkers engine transaction and Heinkel fighters.	93	102
Aug. 17	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Rumania</i> Refers to document No. 93 and states Junkers representative will arrive in Bucharest on August 18 with draft agreement on delivery of engines, and has instructions to negotiate quickly.	94	103

RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Aug. 17	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Rumanian Minister President asked for release of machine guns held up in the Protectorate and evinced surprise at statement that Rumania behind in deliveries of petroleum to Germany.	97	105
Aug. 19	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Rumania</i> Refers to document No. 97 and authorizes Legation to make release of machine guns dependent on outcome of negotiations for release of further supplies of petroleum.	121	131
Aug. 19	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 94 and reports that Rumania is to release 4 million RM worth of petroleum in return for delivery of certain German war material; will release further 1½ million RM worth as soon as Junkers and Heinkel contracts complete and aircraft ready to take off.	127	136
Aug. 21	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Rumania</i> Refers to document No. 127 and states that conclusion of contract for aero-engines depends on negotiations by Junkers representative in Bucharest; some Heinkel fighters already despatched, others to follow; discussion of contracts with guaranteed delivery dates for bombers and other air armaments should be avoided.	162	170
Aug. 24	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Rumanian M.F.A., after being reminded that conditions for release of outstanding petroleum now fulfilled by Germany, has informed him that release effected by Minister President.	230	247
Aug. 24	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 162, reports release of petroleum, and requests early despatch of Junkers and Heinkel representatives.	243	253
Aug. 24	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Has learned from Rumanian M.F.A. that latter has just made Hungary offer of non-aggression pact.	245	259
Aug. 27	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with M.F.A. who stated that Rumania would remain neutral unless attacked by Bulgaria or Hungary; Rumanian Government welcomed German-Soviet Pact, but M.F.A. much interested in Bessarabian problem and possible German-Soviet agreements thereon.	361	363
Aug. 28	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that release of machine guns, which contrary to assurances he was instructed to give to Rumanian authorities, still being held at Brno, is prerequisite for obtaining further releases of petroleum.	365	368
Aug. 28	<i>The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Rumania</i> States that machine guns destined for Rumania have been released.	373	373

RUMANIA—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939 Aug. 28	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Has learned from Hungarian Minister in Bucharest that Hungary has rejected Rumania's offer of non-aggression pact and proposed instead minorities agreement. Rumanian Government considering this.	385	385
Aug. 28	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Air Attaché's conversation with King Carol; latter pleased with German arms deliveries and promised to maintain petroleum supplies; Rumanian call-up due to concern over attitude of Hungary and Bulgaria; views on German-Soviet Pact; Anglo-French plan for sabotaging Rumanian oil-fields in event of war rejected.	386	385
Aug. 29	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Recommends that, to avoid the mistakes of 1914-16, more skilled and extensive propaganda be conducted in Rumania to influence press and public opinion; requests appropriate funds.	426	420
Aug. 29	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on reasons for recall of Rumanian Ambassador in Paris, Tatarescu.	480	423
Aug. 30	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits report by Air Attaché that King and Ministers pressing for deliveries of war material which Germany has contracted to supply, and have pointed out that Rumania has already supplied Germany with petroleum in excess of agreed quantities.	454	443
Aug. 31	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to tendentious report broadcast from London about Rumania's attitude, and reports has been informed by M.F.A. that Rumano-Polish Alliance did not apply against Germany; Rumanian relations with Turkey governed solely by Balkan Pact. M.F.A. offered, on own initiative, to exert influence on Poland should Germany so desire.	483	470
Sept. 1	<i>The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Rumania</i> Refers to document No. 454 and explains arrangements made for supplying various categories of military material; states all departments agreed that deliveries to Rumania will be maintained in all circumstances.	497	481
Sept. 1	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports for Air Ministry about position on obtaining further supplies of Rumanian petroleum and on alternative possibilities of transport. Requests immediate decision.	506	487
Sept. 1	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Is reliably informed that Reich War Ministry has sent German army personnel to Budapest to accompany Hungarian troops in advance into Rumanian territory, and that appropriate instructions have been sent to German minority there. Warns of undesirable repercussions in Rumania, and recommends exerting moderating influence on Hungary.	517	496

RUMANIA—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939 Sept. 1	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 483 and reports that Minister President renewed assurances of Rumanian neutrality and non-applicability of Rumano-Polish Assistance Pact to Germany; further expressed hope that German influence would be used to induce Hungary to conclude non-aggression pact with Rumania.	518	497
Sept. 2	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 517, and reports that, according to reliable information emanating from Hungarian Intelligence, Hungarian divisions stationed on Rumanian frontier and are to be accompanied by German units in advance into Rumanian territory. Points out that such action must result in stopping supplies of Rumanian petroleum to Germany.	547	518
Sept. 3	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports considerable British activity over obtaining petroleum, and proposes to remind Minister President of undertakings to keep up supplies to Germany. Believes these can only be secured by Government control of Rumanian exports.	566	540

SLOVAKIA

1939 Aug. 9	<i>The Minister in Slovakia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Slovak Minister President and M.F.A. have rejected various points of German draft treaty on Zone of Protection.	3	2
Aug. 12	<i>The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Military Mission at Bratislava</i> States Hitler has decided it is not necessary to make Slovaks agree to maximum limit for their war-time army; they may retain arms for 125,000 men, but no replacements will be available. Slovak army will be re-equipped on German model. Agreements on this basis to be concluded with Slovak Government.	41	37
Aug. 12	<i>Editors' Note</i> The German-Slovak Treaty on the Zone of Protection.		50
Aug. 17	<i>Minute by an Official of the Legation in Slovakia</i> Report of an interdepartmental meeting in Vienna on August 17, where attitude of German Armed Forces towards Slovakia in event of war was reported on and discussed.	100	108
Aug. 21	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Transmits draft of note for German Minister in Bratislava to hand to Slovak Government should occasion arise. Note states that, since Polish violation of Slovak territorial integrity is imminent, German troops will march into Slovakia to protect her independence, and Slovak Government will be expected to take certain administrative and military measures accordingly.	165	172

SLOVAKIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Aug. 22	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Has informed Slovak Minister, who called to enquire about German intentions, that no promises of any kind about Slovakia have been made to Hungary.</p>	187	195
Aug. 23	<p><i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Slovakia</i> Instructions to request Slovak Government, in order to protect Slovakia from Polish surprise operations, to agree to German Cs-in-C taking control of Slovak armed forces; if Slovakia cooperates, Germany prepared to guarantee Slovak-Hungarian frontier and to make certain territorial and other promises.</p>	214	229
Aug. 23	<p><i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IVa</i> Records Slovak Minister has requested German <i>démenti</i> of rumours representing Slovakia as a bargaining counter in German policy, and has handed over draft of proposed <i>démenti</i>.</p>	222	236
Aug. 24	<p><i>The Minister in Slovakia to the Foreign Ministry</i> In reply to document No. 214, reports Slovak Government have accepted Germany's military demands unreservedly, and have requested German support for reincorporation of territory ceded to Poland in 1920, even if there is no German-Polish conflict.</p>	237	252
Aug. 24	<p><i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Slovakia</i> Directs Legation, when carrying out instructions in document No. 165, enclosure 1, to request Slovak Government immediately to issue decree making Slovakia a prohibited flying area.</p>	250	262
Aug. 27	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Minister in Bratislava has reported by telephone that General Barckhausen, on instructions, has conveyed certain military demands to Slovak Government; Minister is therefore likewise presenting prescribed German diplomatic note.</p>	362	365
Aug. 28	<p><i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Has been informed by German Legation in Bratislava that German Note, as prescribed in document No. 165, enclosure 2, has been accepted by Slovak Government with one reservation.</p>	401	395
Aug. 30	<p><i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Slovakia</i> States that Slovak Minister has requested that promise concerning Slovak territory lost to Poland in 1938 be extended to cover territory lost in 1920 also; that Germany deny rumours that Slovakia has been promised to other countries, and that Slovaks be kept currently informed on conversations with Britain.</p>	468	458
Aug. 31	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Has informed Slovak Minister that situation is deteriorating, but evaded answering question as to when hostilities might start. Has taken friendly note of Slovakia's territorial desires but postponed giving precise reply.</p>	488	474

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Aug. 13	<i>Ambassador Stohrer to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Letter enquiring about likelihood of visit to Berlin by Franco, and raising objections to possible appointment of Richthofen as Air Attaché in Spain, on grounds that this would lead to formation of a new bloc, opposed both to Embassy and Foreign Ministry.	48	57
Aug. 17	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with Spanish Foreign Minister who hoped for peaceful solution of Danzig question and did not think Poland would resort to provocation unless incited thereto; such incitement was unlikely to come from Britain under Chamberlain.	96	105
Aug. 19	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Instructions to take steps to correct Spanish Foreign Minister's conception of Polish attitude and make clear true character of Polish acts of provocation, on basis of material supplied to Embassy.	136	153
Aug. 21	<i>Minute by the Head of Political Division III</i> Enquiry from Ministry of Interior as to formal procedure required for Reich Minister to extend invitation to Spanish Minister of Interior, Suñer, to visit Germany.	169	178
Aug. 25	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports has learned that Spanish Ambassador has informed Portuguese Minister President that if Portugal did not maintain neutrality, Spain would be compelled to revise her policy.	278	290
Aug. 28	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with new Spanish M.F.A. who denied French press reports that Spain had promised France to remain neutral in event of war, and drew attention to Spanish military measures which would benefit Axis.	392	388
Aug. 29	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits Havas report from Lisbon of assurances that Portugal would remain loyal to her alliance with Britain.	416	410
Aug. 30	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Has learned that Portuguese Ambassador in Spain has instructions to inform Spanish Government that although Portugal will try to remain neutral she may not be able to withstand British pressure.	449	441
Aug. 31	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forecasts that although Spanish Government, on outbreak of war, will be compelled by Anglo-French pressure to proclaim neutrality, this will be benevolent towards Germany. Recommends care not to make too obvious demands on Spanish good will at outset, lest Anglo-French pressure on Spain increase.	479	465

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939 Aug. 31	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Portugal</i> Refers to documents Nos. 278 and 416, and states that, in view of information reaching Berlin as to Portuguese attitude, Minister President should be at once informed that Germany will refrain from any aggressive act against Portuguese territories provided Portugal observes impeccable neutrality towards Germany. Question should be put whether, in event of war between Britain and Germany, latter can count on impeccable Portuguese neutrality.	487	473
Sept. 1	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 487, and reports that Minister President denied that alliance with Britain placed any obligation on Portugal to render Britain assistance.	522	500
Sept. 1	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports has called on M.F.A. and Minister of Interior to discuss Spanish attitude in impending war. M.F.A. assumed Spain would declare herself neutral, but gave assurance of all possible assistance to Germany. Minister of Interior stated Germany could count upon Spanish support.	524	501

SWITZERLAND

1939 Aug. 14	<i>The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits statements made publicly by Federal Counsellor Motta on Swiss neutrality remaining unfettered.	53	60
Aug. 24	<i>The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Federal Counsellor Motta expressed satisfaction over Hitler's assurance to Buekhardt that Germany would respect Swiss neutrality, and believed France and Britain would fulfil obligations to Poland should need arise.	242	257
Aug. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records has informed Swiss Minister that situation is grave owing to fresh Polish acts of provocation.	288	298
Aug. 26	<i>The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports has conveyed to Federal Counsellor Motta assurance that Germany would respect Swiss neutrality in event of war; Motta replied that Switzerland would endeavour to maintain strictest neutrality.	304	312
Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Department</i> Encloses memorandum handed to Swiss Minister, which defines principles German Government will apply to neutral ships transporting Swiss goods in event of war.	333	339
Aug. 29	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Has been informed by Swiss Minister that Swiss Federal Council have ordered calling out of frontier guard and that extraordinary plenary powers are to be conferred on Federal Council.	434	427
Sept. 1	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Has received two <i>notes verbales</i> from Swiss Minister declaring neutrality of Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Informed Minister that in German view a true state of war did not exist.	528	504

TURKEY

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Aug. 13	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports growing scepticism in Turkey about prospects of Anglo-Turkish alliance and various reasons for believing Turkey might revise her foreign policy. Requests latitude in his instructions regarding supply of German war material to Turkey in order to take advantage of situation.	45	51
Aug. 14	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 45 and states that failure to supply engines for submarine due to be launched on August 28 would have a detrimental effect on political relations with Turkey.	52	60
Aug. 16	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Proposed instructions for economic negotiations with Turkey: Trade and Payments Agreement can be extended provided satisfactory arrangement reached on cancellation of certain contracts for war material. Credit Agreement cannot be ratified in present form.	80	91
Aug. 18	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Turkey</i> States that Ribbentrop agrees to State Secretary's proposals for economic negotiations with Turkey. Detailed arrangements for military deliveries are left to discretion of OKW.	109	118
Aug. 20	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports information from the Italian Military Attaché that Russians, during the military conversations in Moscow, are said to have expressed desire to participate in defence of Dardanelles by establishing in peacetime a naval base on Sea of Marmora.	137	154
Aug. 20	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey to Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 109 and reports has informed Turkish Secretary General that purpose of German economic proposals was to tide over present critical period in relations, and has demanded acceptance in principle of proposals before conversations can be continued.	141	155
Aug. 23	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Turkey</i> States Hitler has agreed to conclusion of new contracts with Turkey for deliveries of war material.	219	233
Aug. 24	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports has suggested to Turkish M.F.A. that, in view of changed situation resulting from German-Soviet Pact, Turkey return to policy of neutrality; Saracoğlu rejected German economic proposals and suggested a compromise.	247	260
Aug. 27	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with President, who stated that, although Turkey hoped to remain neutral, she would fulfil her obligations should war spread to Mediterranean and Italy become a belligerent.	342	247
Aug. 28	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports more fully about his recent actions referred to in documents Nos. 247 and 342.	398	389

TURKEY—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939 Aug. 28	<i>Ambassador Papen to the Turkish Foreign Minister</i> Letter requesting confirmation that Turkish Government agree to extend provisionally for one month German-Turkish Clearing, Trade and Payments Agreements, whilst leaving in suspense questions arising from contracts for war material.	406	401
Aug. 30	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that, in conversation with Hungarian Minister in Ankara, M.F.A. said that, if Italy entered the war, Turkey would act according to her own interests; he considered it unlikely that Italy would be able to remain neutral.	448	440
Sept. 2	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with M.F.A. to whom he denied British assertion that German offer to Poland not intended seriously. M.F.A. expressed wish that Turkey might remain neutral, but believed Italian intervention inevitable, in which case Turkey would support Britain.	553	523

UNITED STATES

1939 Aug. 10	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on attitude of American press, which is predicting early outbreak of European war, placing responsibility therefor on leaders of Germany and exploiting all diplomatic and other events in Germany as German preparations for war.	9	8
Aug. 11	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discusses Roosevelt's statement that, in event of European war, he would immediately summon Congress to pass legislation to protect American neutrality; regards this as confirmation that U.S. foreign policy aims to abolish present neutrality legislation.	26	26
Aug. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Encloses copy of letter sent to honorary German Consul in Detroit by Father Coughlin, giving his views on attitude of Christians in United States to National Socialist persecution of Churches.	35	32
Aug. 16	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i> Confidential report on views expressed by American Chargé d'Affaires, who warned against underestimating German threats, and said he had advised British Ambassador to ensure that British Government state plainly what would be their attitude in event of a German-Polish conflict.	86	97
Aug. 18	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that American press continue to hold German policy and propaganda towards Poland responsible for critical situation in Danzig.	108	117

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Aug. 22	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports that American press completely taken by surprise at impending conclusion of German-Soviet pact, and regard it as decisive alteration of balance of power in favour of Axis; news has created consternation in State Department.</p>	171	180
Aug. 24	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports that, with U.S.S.R. now in German camp, public opinion fears Britain and France may suffer a defeat, which would constitute threat to U.S.A.; Roosevelt determined to support democracies morally and materially and has addressed peace appeal to King of Italy.</p>	239	254
Aug. 25	<p><i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>The Military Attaché reports that American Army and Air Force will not be able to send units to fight overseas for another year; expects President will take measures to supply Britain and France with arms, raw materials, motor fuels and finished equipment.</p>	260	275
Aug. 26	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports that American press deriving hopes of peaceful solution from Hitler's overtures to Britain. Believes purpose of Roosevelt's peace appeals is to isolate Germany and place responsibility for war on German leaders.</p>	306	813
Aug. 26	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i></p> <p>Has informed U.S. Chargé d'Affaires that Hitler has received President Roosevelt's two telegrams and has requested Chargé to convey this provisional communication to his Government.</p>	328	334
Aug. 28	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>States that he agrees with his Military Attaché's views as reported in document No. 260, and reviews probable course of U.S. policy in event of war.</p>	378	376
Aug. 30	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>States that, in accordance with instructions, arrangements made to circulate as widely as possible the Hitler-Daladier correspondence, and requests funds.</p>	442	486
Aug. 31	<p><i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States</i></p> <p>Instructions to convey to State Department Hitler's appreciation of Roosevelt's two messages, but to state that, owing to Polish attitude, all Hitler's attempts at amicable solution have been unsuccessful.</p>	486	473
Sept. 1	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports American reactions to Germany's 16-point proposals for an understanding with Poland; President holding back since Britain's attitude not yet known.</p>	494	479

UNITED STATES—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939 Sept. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Conversation with American Chargé d'Affaires, who delivered message from his President appealing to Governments engaged in hostilities to declare that they would refrain from bombing civilians or unfortified cities and requesting immediate reply. Drew Chargé's attention to German announcement that only military objectives were being attacked.	530	506
Sept. 1	<i>The Reich Foreign Minister to the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin</i> Transmits Hitler's reply to President's message in document No. 530 which states that he agrees to declaration proposed and that German air forces have orders to confine operations to military objectives, provided enemy observe same rule.	531	507
Sept. 2	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that greater part of American public opinion takes view that Germany never intended her 16-point proposals to Poland seriously, and holds German leaders responsible for outbreak of hostilities.	549	520

U.S.S.R.

1939 Aug. 10	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Has learned from reliable source that, in negotiations in Moscow, British have conceded to Soviets right to move troops into Baltic States in event of direct attack, even in absence of a request for aid from Baltic State concerned. No agreement yet reached on guaranteeing Baltic States against indirect attack.	14	12
Aug. 10	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records conversation with Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, Astakhov, who had again received instructions to emphasize that his Government desired improvement in relations with Germany. Schnurre replied that, while welcoming this, Germany first required to know attitude of U.S.S.R. to question of Poland and what were objectives being pursued by Moscow in military negotiations with Britain and France.	18	17
Aug. 10	<i>Senior Counsellor Schnurre to Ambassador Schulenburg</i> Letter enclosing account of his conversation with Astakhov (document No. 18) and announcing departure of German delegates to attend the Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow.	20	20
Aug. 10	<i>Ambassador Schulenburg to Senior Counsellor Schliep</i> Letter referring to departure of Mr. Strang and announcing arrival of new American Ambassador in Moscow.	21	21

U.S.S.R.—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939			
Aug. 11	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports has learned from reliable source that British Military Attaché stated British Military Mission would support early conclusion of a pact with argument that, after defeating Poland, Germany might offer Western Powers a separate peace to obtain free hand in the East.	27	27
Aug. 11	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that information from travellers about transports of Soviet war material and troops eastwards have led American Embassy to conclude that Soviet Government not expecting military developments on their Western frontier.	28	27
Aug. 11	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports arrival of British and French Military Delegations in Moscow.	29	28
Aug. 12	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 29 and briefly reports Tass communiqué on arrival and reception of British and French Military Missions in Moscow.	39	36
Aug. 14	<i>An Official of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> States that Soviet Chargé d'Affaires has communicated that Soviet Government would be interested in discussing certain questions, besides economic negotiations, such as press, cultural exchanges, Poland and old Soviet-German treaties. Discussion to be by stages, in Moscow.	50	58
Aug. 14	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to Ambassador to arrange an interview with Molotov for August 15, on which further instructions follow.	51	59
Aug. 14	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Refers to document No. 27, and requests that arguments advanced by British officers in favour of an Anglo-Soviet alliance be emphatically refuted. Use should be made of argument that only an understanding with Germany will prevent the U.S.S.R. from being isolated and afford the desired security.	54	61
Aug. 14	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to Ambassador that, at his interview with Molotov, he should state that ideological differences do not preclude cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union, since no real conflicts of interest between them; that crisis in German-Polish relations and English policy make speedy clarification of Russo-German relations necessary and that Ribbentrop prepared to come to Moscow for discussions.	56	62
Aug. 14	<i>Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Letter advising against any hasty measure in relations with the Soviet Union, and suggesting that, in view of present situation, instead of attending Party Rally at Nuremberg, he should remain at his post to be available for further conversations with Molotov.	61	67
Aug. 15	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Refers to document No. 56, and states that instructions contained therein cancel previous intention to send Reich Minister Frank and Schnurre to Moscow, of which Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin had been informed.	62	68

U.S.S.R.—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Aug. 16	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 56 and reports interview with Molotov, who stated that Soviet Government welcomed Germany's intention to improve German-Soviet relations. Molotov expressed personal view that Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow required adequate preparation, and wished to know the German views on a German-Soviet non-aggression pact, on a joint guarantee of the Baltic States, and on whether Germany prepared to influence Japan towards improving Russo-Japanese relations.	70	76
Aug. 16	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to Ambassador to arrange another interview with Molotov immediately, on which further instructions follow.	73	81
Aug. 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to the Ambassador to inform Molotov that the German reply to his three questions (transmitted in document No. 70) is affirmative, and to state that, as speedy clarification of German-Russian relations desirable, Ribbentrop prepared to go to Moscow any time after August 18, with full powers to negotiate.	75	84
Aug. 16	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 70 and transmits fuller account of his interview with Molotov on August 15.	79	87
Aug. 16	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the News Service and Press Department</i> Reports information that, in independent conversations, both Soviet Counsellor of Embassy and Press Attaché said Moscow intended to draw out still further negotiations for military pact with Western Powers, and to enter into political discussions with Germany as soon as latter had solved the Danzig problem.	84	94
Aug. 16	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i> Confidential report on conversation between Berlin correspondent of <i>New York Herald Tribune</i> and Soviet Press Attaché; American Embassy believe a peaceful settlement of Danzig question possible; Russian Embassy do not think Paris and London will stand by their agreements with Poland, but are expecting a "Second Munich"; thereafter gain in German prestige at expense of Britain and France would open way for closer relations between Russia and Germany.	85	95
Aug. 16	<i>Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Letter stressing that Molotov was quite unusually compliant and candid in conversation on August 15, and remarking on surprising moderation of his demands on Germany.	88	99
Aug. 17	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Informs Ambassador that Ribbentrop wishes to know when Molotov was asked for an interview and when it will take place.	89	100

U.S.S.R.—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Aug. 17	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 89 and reports that interview with Molotov will take place at 8 p.m.	92	102
Aug. 18	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 75, and reports that Molotov read out Soviet reply to German proposals of August 15; first step towards improvement of German-Soviet relations could be conclusion of trade and credit agreement; second step could be either conclusion of non-aggression pact or reaffirmation of Neutrality Pact of 1926. On proposed visit by Ribbentrop, Molotov said such a visit would require thorough preparation and his Government disliked attendant publicity.	105	114
Aug. 18	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Refers to document No. 105, and requests Ambassador, who will be receiving further instructions, to seek audience with Molotov on morning of August 19.	111	120
Aug. 18	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Refers to document No. 105 and instructs Ambassador, in conversation with Molotov, to say that, in view of acute deterioration of German-Polish relations, Hitler considers speed essential in clarifying German-Russian relations. Ambassador to request immediate response to Ribbentrop's proposal to come to Moscow; latter would come with full powers to negotiate, and to sign special protocol settling spheres of influence of either party.	113	121
Aug. 19	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits Tass démenti of Polish press reports of differences between Soviet Military Delegation and British and French Military Delegations about alleged Soviet demand for military assistance from Britain and France in event of war in the Far East.	120	130
Aug. 19	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> States that, although full agreement reached on text of Credit and Economic Agreement with Russians, latter delaying signature, on pretext of awaiting instructions from Moscow.	123	132
Aug. 19	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 113, and reports that Soviet Government agree to Ribbentrop coming to Moscow on August 26 or 27.	125	134
Aug. 19	<i>Credit Agreement between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</i> Text of German-Soviet Credit Agreement for placing of additional Soviet orders in Germany to the amount of 200 million RM, together with Confidential Protocol, Final Protocol and enclosures.	131	142

U.S.S.R.—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939			
Aug. 20	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 125 and reports two interviews on August 19 with Molotov who, at first interview, insisted that Ribbentrop's visit required thorough advance preparation and that economic agreement must be signed first. At second interview Molotov, presumably on Stalin's intervention, stated his Government agreed to Ribbentrop coming to Moscow on August 26 or 27 and presented Soviet draft for non-aggression pact.	132	149
Aug. 20	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 132 and transmits Soviet draft of non-aggression pact.	133	150
[Aug. 19]	<i>An Official of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Records signature of German-Soviet Economic Agreement at 2 a.m. on August 20. Joint communiqué to be issued to DNB and Tass.	135	152
Aug. 20	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Refers to document No. 132, and instructs Ambassador that, in view of extreme urgency, any further particulars of last two conversations with Molotov should be sent by telegram.	140	155
Aug. 20	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Transmits telegram from Hitler to Stalin to be given at once to Molotov. Telegram states that Hitler accepts Soviet draft for non-aggression pact; question of supplementary protocol desired by U.S.S.R. can be rapidly clarified if responsible German statesman comes to Moscow; again proposes that Ribbentrop be received not later than August 23.	142	156
Aug. 20	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructs Ambassador to seek immediate appointment at Foreign Ministry in order to deliver urgent message from Hitler to Stalin.	143	158
Aug. 20	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 140, and states has nothing to add to previous reports of his conversations with Molotov.	144	158
[Aug. 20]	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Provides comments on advantages deriving for both parties from new German-Soviet Economic Agreement.	147	161
Aug. 21	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 143 and states this telegram received too late for instructions contained therein to be carried out before August 21.	148	161
Aug. 21	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructs Ambassador to do utmost to ensure that Ribbentrop's journey materializes.	149	162
Aug. 21	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 148 and reports is seeing Molotov at 3 p.m.	152	164

U.S.S.R.—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939 Aug. 21	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to documents Nos. 142 and 149 and reports has given Molotov Hitler's message for Stalin, and stressed necessity of immediate visit by Ribbentrop to Moscow.	157	167
Aug. 21	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 157, and reports Molotov has given him Stalin's reply to Hitler's message, to effect that Ribbentrop's arrival in Moscow on August 23 is agreeable. Soviet Government wish to publish communiqué on August 22 and request German assent.	158	167
Aug. 21	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 158 and transmits text of Stalin's reply to Hitler's message.	159	168
Aug. 21	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 158 and transmits text of communiqué proposed by Molotov.	160	168
[Aug. 22]	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> Notes on telephone conversation with Gaus in Berlin about proposed communiqué on German-Soviet non-aggression pact and about arrival in Moscow of Ribbentrop and suite.	170	179
Aug. 22	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> Instructs Missions on recent developments in German-Soviet relations leading up to present pact, which nevertheless implies neither abandonment of principles of Anti-Comintern Pact nor relaxation of German campaign against any renewed infiltration of Communism into Germany.	180	188
Aug. 22	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports reactions of foreign diplomats to news of Ribbentrop's impending visit to Moscow and of negotiations for German-Soviet non-aggression pact.	181	190
Aug. 22	<i>Full Powers</i> Terms of authority granted by Hitler to Ribbentrop to negotiate with U.S.S.R. and sign non-aggression treaty and other agreements.	191	200
Aug. 23	<i>An Official of the News Service and Press Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> According to Havas reports from Moscow, Soviet authorities have stated that conclusion of non-aggression pact with Germany not incompatible with continuation of Anglo-French military negotiations, nor with conclusion of Three-Power pact, and that German-Soviet Pact not related to questions of Danzig and Corridor.	198	208
Aug. 23	<i>The Reich Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> Requests Hitler's consent to recognition, desired by U.S.S.R., of ports of Liepāja and Ventspils as within Soviet sphere of interest.	205	220
Aug. 23	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> States Hitler wishes it put on record in agreements under negotiation that Eastern European problems to be regarded as belonging exclusively to spheres of interest of Germany and U.S.S.R.	206	221

U.S.S.R.—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939			
Aug. 23	<i>An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Transmits consent to recognition of ports of Liepāja and Ventspils as belonging to Soviet sphere of interest.	210	223
Aug. 24	<i>Memorandum by an Official attached to the Staff of the Foreign Minister</i> Records conversation between Ribbentrop, Stalin and Molotov about improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations, Italian territorial aspirations, German-Turkish relations, military weakness of Britain and France, Anti-Comintern Pact, and welcoming attitude of German people to German-Soviet Pact.	213	225
Aug. 23	<i>Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</i> The Contracting Powers undertake to refrain from attacking each other, or supporting an attack by a third Power or group of Powers on the other, to consult on all questions of common interest, and to settle disputes by friendly means.	228	245
Aug. 23	<i>Secret Additional Protocol</i> Determines boundaries of German and Soviet spheres of interest in Eastern Europe. Question of maintaining independent Polish State to be decided later by friendly understanding.	229	246
[Aug. 24]	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Records statement by Reich M.F.A., before departure from Moscow, that Pact is firm foundation for German-Soviet cooperation and that it will have good effects on both Soviet-Japanese and German-Japanese relations.	234	250
Aug. 25	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports British and French Military Missions about to leave.	283	295
Aug. 25	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Molotov requested amendment to point 2 of Additional Secret Protocol (document No. 229) to German-Soviet Pact.	284	295
Aug. 25	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> States Ribbentrop requests that Molotov be asked to send new Soviet Ambassador and military representative to Berlin without delay.	285	296
Aug. 25	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Repeats instructions that Secret Additional Protocol of August 23 (document No. 229) to be kept strictly secret; all officials concerned must sign written pledge of secrecy.	309	317
Aug. 26	<i>Confidential Protocol between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</i> Provisions for adjusting terms of German-Soviet Credit Agreement of August 19 (document No. 131) to possible changes in gold value or purchasing power of Reichsmark.	340	345

U.S.S.R.—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939			
Aug. 27	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Has been informed by Molotov that ratification of Non-Aggression Pact will be submitted to Supreme Soviet meeting on August 28.	347	350
Aug. 27	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Refers to documents Nos. 284 and 347, approves Molotov's proposed amendment, and states when German ratification can take place.	353	356
Aug. 27	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructs Ambassador to ascertain whether U.S.S.R. has withdrawn troops from Polish frontier and, if so, whether this can be cancelled.	360	362
Aug. 28	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Repeats instructions to Ambassador in document No. 285, as a matter of urgency in view of extremely tense situation.	381	379
Aug. 28	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Refers to document No. 360 and requests immediate report.	382	380
Aug. 28	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 360 and reports that Molotov ridiculed press reports of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Polish frontier.	383	380
Aug. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> Telephone enquiries from Ribbentrop about (1) alleged withdrawals of Soviet troops from Polish frontier, and (2) posting to Berlin of two Soviet military representatives.	387	386
Aug. 28	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> With reference to Ribbentrop's enquiry (document No. 387) suggests some Soviet press announcement about troops on the Polish frontier.	388	386
Aug. 29	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to documents Nos. 383 and 387 and reports all Military Attachés in Moscow believe Soviet troops to be concentrated at full war strength on Western frontier.	413	408
Aug. 29	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Military Attaché reports information from Red Army that no special measures have been taken on Polish frontier, since state of readiness has always existed there.	414	409
Aug. 29	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to documents Nos. 388, 413 and 414 and reports has made urgent representations to Molotov about issuing <i>démenti</i> of reported withdrawal of Soviet troops from Polish frontier.	424	419
Aug. 29	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 381 and reports has made further representations to Molotov, who replied that four Soviet military representatives ready to leave for Berlin; but suitable person for post of Ambassador not yet found.	425	419

U.S.S.R.—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939			
Aug. 30	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records conversation between Ribbentrop and Russian Chargé d'Affaires Ivanov. Latter informed of recent course of Anglo-German negotiations over Polish questions and over reaching understanding with Britain; stipulation by Hitler that neither German-Soviet agreement nor mutual obligations of Germany and Italy to be affected.	481	425
Aug. 29	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Reviews provisions of German-Soviet Trade Agreement concluded on August 19 (document No. 131) and Confidential Protocol of August 26 (document No. 340) and estimates total movement of goods to be expected therefrom.	486	427
Aug. 30	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Transmits summary of Hitler's reply (document No. 421—see under <i>Great Britain</i>) to the British communication of August 28, with instructions to inform Molotov.	440	435
Aug. 30	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits Tass statement denying foreign press reports of troop withdrawals from Soviet Western frontier.	446	438
Aug. 30	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that ratification of German-Soviet Pact is likely to be discussed and approved by Supreme Soviet on September 1.	447	439
Aug. 30	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that, in Molotov's temporary absence from Moscow, has arranged to have him informed of substance of documents Nos. 431 and 440, reminded of Ribbentrop's wish for immediate arrival of Soviet military representatives, and given reasons for German anxiety to have Pact speedily ratified.	453	443
Aug. 30	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 453 and reports has been officially informed that new Military Attaché and other officers to leave for Berlin on August 31.	456	446
Aug. 30	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to obtain information about Turco-Russian negotiations which, according to reliable information reaching Berlin, are directed towards achieving Turco-Soviet pact.	465	456
Aug. 31	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Refers to document No. 456, and states that, on enquiry, he has been informed by Ambassador in Moscow that Soviet Military Delegation will leave Moscow on September 1. Has informed Ambassador that Ribbentrop wishes identical communiqués on their arrival published in Berlin and Moscow. Ambassador has learned from Molotov that Pact would be ratified that day.	471	460

U.S.S.R.—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Aug. 31	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Has been informed by telephone by Ambassador in Moscow of composition and time of arrival of Soviet military delegation, and that Supreme Soviet has ratified German-Soviet Pact.	480	466
Sept. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> Message telephoned from Air Ministry, Berlin, that Chief of General Staff of Luftwaffe requests Soviet authorities to arrange that Minsk broadcasting station send out a particular call sign at definite intervals.	496	480
Sept. 1	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> States that German Minister in Helsinki authorized to inform M.F.A. there that no German-Russian agreements have been made about Finland. Before authorizing Minister in Riga to make similar reply about Latvia, wishes to know whether Soviet Government have given similar reply.	511	491
Sept. 1	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Records telephone communication from German Ambassador in Moscow about arrival of Soviet officers posted to Berlin and stating Soviet Government do not wish public announcement made until after officers' arrival in Germany.	514	494
Sept. 1	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> States it is assumed in Berlin that Turkey will remain neutral unless war spreads to Eastern Mediterranean, Greece or Rumania is attacked, or Italy joins in. Requests Soviet Government to use their influence to keep Turkey neutral.	516	496
Sept. 2	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports has been informed by Molotov that Soviet Government do not consider it desirable to issue communiqué about Soviet officers arriving in Berlin.	534	509
Sept. 2	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Has telephoned Ambassador in Moscow to instruct him to inform Soviet Government of German <i>agrément</i> for new Soviet Ambassador; appointment already announced in Soviet press.	540	513
Sept. 2	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 511, and reports that Stalin and Molotov agree with proposed German reply to Latvia, and that Soviet representatives abroad will be instructed to make similar statements.	550	521
Sept. 2	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to documents Nos. 465 and 516 and reports reply by Molotov that views are being exchanged with Turkey. At later interview Molotov stated that U.S.S.R. were prepared to accede to German request and endeavour to keep Turkey neutral.	551	522

U.S.S.R.—Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939 Sept. 2	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Reviews questions left open in negotiations on Credit Agreement with U.S.S.R. and proposes that he be sent to Moscow to discuss them with Mikoyan.	557	526
Sept. 3	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Anticipates rapid defeat of Polish army, after which territory specified at Moscow as German sphere of interest will be occupied, but military considerations will require German action against Polish forces located in Soviet sphere. Instructs Ambassador to ascertain from Molotov whether U.S.S.R. would not prefer to act against such Polish forces and occupy Soviet sphere themselves.	567	540

YUGOSLAVIA

1939 Aug. 10	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to documents Nos. 733 and 745 in vol. VI, and reports conversation with M.F.A. on whom he urged Yugoslav withdrawal from League of Nations. Cincar-Marković replied that Yugoslavia had already severed herself in spirit from League, but was awaiting suitable opportunity for withdrawal.	16	14
Aug. 10	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports information from M.F.A. that Prince Regent, during his purely private visit to Britain, gained the impression that in case of friendly negotiations with Germany, Chamberlain and Halifax would be prepared to make considerable concessions.	17	17
Aug. 16	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Yugoslav Minister has requested that two contracts for supplying aircraft for Yugoslavia be signed, or that, if signature is being delayed for political reasons, he be informed.	81	92
Aug. 17	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> On instructions from Göring, Yugoslav Military Attaché has been told that signature of contract for delivery of 100 aircraft must await clarification of certain questions, but that manufacture is proceeding and delivery will be made after satisfactory settlement of these questions.	102	110
Aug. 18	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Has learned from his Air Attaché that Chief of Yugoslav General Staff has emphasized his country's intention to remain neutral, but feared an Italian advance on Salonika through Yugoslav territory, in which case Yugoslavia would have to defend her neutrality.	112	120
Aug. 22	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on reception of news of German-Soviet Pact, which is regarded as marking collapse of encirclement policy and has led to speculation about a new partition of Poland.	178	187

YUGOSLAVIA--Continued

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Doc. No.</i>	<i>Page</i>
1939 Aug. 24	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records that Reich Air Ministry have informed Foreign Ministry that contracts for delivery of armaments to Yugoslavia can now be signed. Italians now demanding anti-aircraft guns previously offered.	240	256
Aug. 24	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Yugoslavia</i> Instructs Legation to report whether Yugoslav Government have been informed that armaments contracts can now be signed, and to suggest that Yugoslav Government take over Trepča mines, entire output of which Germany is prepared to take.	241	256
Aug. 25	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> In reply to document No. 241, reports that Yugoslav Government have been informed that armaments contracts can now be signed and that production shortly to be resumed at Trepča works.	274	288
Aug. 26	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with M.F.A. who expressed satisfaction at forthcoming signature of armaments contracts.	318	323
Sept. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Conversation with Yugoslav Minister, who expected his country to remain neutral, and stated that his M.F.A. was trying to induce States of the Balkan Entente and Bulgaria to adopt similar attitude.	532	508

No. 1

5558/E396016

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 115 of August 9

SOFIA, August 9, 1939—8:30 p.m.

Received August 9—11:30 p.m.

W 1302 g.

The outcome of today's conversation between the Military Attaché¹ and the War Minister² was as follows:

The latest military situation in Bulgaria requires the most rapid despatch of at least 1000 [heavy] and 500 light machine guns with ammunition, the release of which has already been promised by the Führer and Chancellor to the Minister President.³ According to information received from the War Minister, the military measures of Rumania, Turkey and Greece in the frontier areas are being substantially increased. I request instructions by telegram in order that I may make a reassuring statement.⁴

RICHTHOFEN

¹ Lt. Col. Bruckmann.

² Maj. Gen. Daskalov.

³ Gheorghe Kiosseivanov. On July 5; see vol. VI of this Series, documents Nos. 617 and 618.

⁴ See document No. 11.

No. 2

799/273745

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

Telephone message from Dr. Brücklmeier from Salzburg at 8.45 p.m. (August 9?).²

For State Secretary von Weizsäcker.

The Foreign Minister has given orders that Ambassador von Moltke is to remain in Berlin until further notice. He is to have no contact whatever with any Polish authority. Neither is he to telephone to his Embassy in Warsaw. At the same time no department in the Foreign Ministry is to establish contact with Polish authorities, and the Embassy in Warsaw is not to discuss by telephone Ambassador von Moltke's further stay in Berlin. The German Embassy in Warsaw

¹ This document was initialled by Woermann.

² The query mark appears in the original.

is to be instructed to maintain a purely receptive attitude, and to confine itself exclusively to sending communications of an informatory character to Berlin.³

³ In telegram No. 211 of Aug. 10 (7951/E574210), Weizsäcker informed the Embassy in Warsaw, for the personal information of the Chargé d'Affaires only: "Ambassador von Moltke will remain in Berlin until further notice. You should make no reply to any questions regarding his return and also hold no conversations by telephone with Berlin on this matter. In dealings with official quarters in Warsaw, you should confine yourself to receiving any communications there may be, and for the rest maintain a completely receptive attitude."

No. 3

8294/E589144

The Minister in Slovakia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 165 of August 9

BRATISLAVA, August 9, 1939—11:00 p.m.

Received August 10—2:30 a.m.

R 19098.

The final version of the Treaty on the Zone of Protection,¹ formulated on the basis of discussions with General Barchhausen in Berlin on August 4, was presented on August 7 to Tuka, the only Minister present, with explanations in writing, and was transmitted by him to the Minister President, Tiso, and the Foreign Minister, Ďurčanský, at their holiday residences, with a request for their approval. This morning, Minister Tuka presented an *aide mémoire*² based on Ďurčanský's views in writing, as approved by Tiso, which rejects various points in the German draft agreement. Senior Counsellor Albrecht has been informed of this today by telephone. At the request of the German Delegation, a discussion will be held tomorrow³ with the competent Slovak Minister, in which Ďurčanský will take part. There is a possibility that the Slovak Government will persist in their rejection of some of the points.⁴

BERNARD⁵

¹ See Editor's Note, p. 50.

² Not found.

³ No record of these discussions has been found.

⁴ In telegram No. 166 of Aug. 13 (8294/E589145), Bernard reported: "The Treaty on the Zone of Protection was signed on Saturday evening, August 12. The agreement on the application of Article 3c was signed by Minister President Tiso today."

⁵ Marginal notes: "Immediate. Legal Department, Senior Counsellor Albrecht, who is requested to handle this. Hei[nburg] 10/8." "After submission to the Deputy Director of the Legal Department: In view of the fact that the points still outstanding in the Treaty on the Zone of Protection are to be discussed with Counsellor Hofmann, Bratislava, and the Reich Minister of Justice tomorrow, no action is to be taken regarding this telegram. Please file. St[ahlberg?] 10/8."

No. 4

97/108477

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, August 9, 1939.
e.o. Pol. V 8446.¹

The President of the Danzig Senate, Greiser, has just informed me by telephone that Gauleiter Forster left the Obersalzberg by air for Prague [*sic*] this morning.² He will learn from Herr Forster by this evening the result of the discussions between the Führer and Forster. It will also probably be decided this evening whether he is now to speak, as was intended, to the Polish Diplomatic Representative in Danzig, Chodacki, on the question of the Customs Inspectors. Herr Greiser has therefore cancelled the discussion he was to have had with Chodacki today.

Contrary to what President Greiser said last,³ namely that Poland would make no reply to the latest Danzig Note⁴ on the Customs Inspectors dispute, he has now told me that, according to a statement by Professor Burkhardt, the League of Nations High Commissioner, the Polish Diplomatic Representative will, after all, give the Senate a reply today, the substance of which, however, will be merely polemical.

Submitted for information to:

State Secretary
Under State Secretary, Political Department
Under State Secretary, Legal Department
Deputy Director, Political Department
Senior Counsellor Schliep
Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Minister Braun von Stumm
Kult. Spez.

BERGMANN

¹ Taken from another copy (7693/E548488).

² Gauleiter Forster visited Hitler at the Obersalzberg on Aug. 8; no record of his conversations there has been found. In a copy of this memorandum (147/78911), which was submitted to Ribbentrop, "Prague" has been corrected to read "Danzig".

³ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 785.

⁴ See *ibid.*, document No. 780.

No. 5

909/294237-38

Memorandum by the State Secretary

SECRET

BERLIN, August 9, 1939.

St. S. No. 616

Today I received the Polish Chargé d'Affaires and began by telling him that I had a serious oral communication to make to him. Then, as instructed, I read out to him the following text:¹

"The Reich Government have learnt with great surprise of the Polish Government's Note to the Senate of the Free City of Danzig² demanding, in the form of an ultimatum, the revocation of an alleged decree—falsely rumoured to have been issued by the Senate—designed to prevent Polish Customs Inspectors from carrying out their duties, which, in fact, was never issued by the Senate of the Free City of Danzig. In the event of a refusal the Free City of Danzig was threatened with reprisals.

"The Reich Government find themselves obliged to point out to the Polish Government that a repetition of such demands in the form of an ultimatum to the Free City of Danzig and threat of reprisals would lead to an aggravation of German-Polish relations, for the consequences of which responsibility would fall exclusively on the Polish Government and for which the Reich Government must now at this stage disclaim all responsibility.

"The Reich Government further call the attention of the Polish Government to the fact that the measures taken by the Polish Government to prevent the importation of certain goods from the Free City of Danzig to Poland³ are liable to cause grievous economic losses to the population of Danzig.

"Should the Polish Government insist on the retention of such measures there would remain, in the opinion of the Reich Government, no other choice for the Free City of Danzig in the circumstances but to explore other possibilities for exports and, of course, also for imports."

I had suggested to Prince Lubomirski that he should take notes and, when I read the statement again, he wrote it down—so it seemed to me—almost word for word. In any case he wrote down word for word all parts in any way important.

When this was done, the Chargé d'Affaires wished to add a personal observation: he wanted to point out that the alleged decree by the Danzig Senate possibly did exist? However, I interrupted Prince

¹ A memorandum by Weizsäcker (not printed, 799/273760-61) shows that this text was telephoned to him by Ribbentrop, at 11:15 p.m., on Aug. 8.

² See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 774, enclosure.

³ On Aug. 1; see *ibid.*, document No. 702.

Lubomirski to say that I did not wish my statement to be followed by either an official or a personal conversation, and showed the Chargé d'Affaires out after he had promised to let me have information from his Government as soon as possible.⁴

WEIZSÄCKER

⁴ On Aug. 9, Weizsäcker telegraphed the text of this memorandum to the Embassies in Warsaw, Paris, London, Moscow and Rome and to the Consulate-General in Danzig (909/294236). On Aug. 10 Woermann telegraphed an abridged version to other European Missions and the Embassies in Washington and Tokyo (909/294240-41). In the telegram to Rome, Weizsäcker added that he would also inform the Italian Ambassador as soon as he saw him. See also *Documents concerning German-Polish Relations and the outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939*, Cmd. 6106 (H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1939) (hereinafter cited as *British Blue Book*, Cmd. 6106), Nos. 46 and 47.

No. 6

43/29547-49

Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop

BERLIN, August 9, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

The trenchant attitude adopted by the German press towards Poland has come as a complete surprise to foreign diplomats and journalists in Berlin. They had apparently become so accustomed to the reserve with which the German press had hitherto treated the Polish question that their astonishment at the change of attitude is all the greater now. British and French journalists seem to be somewhat disconcerted in the face of other foreign correspondents as, even in the last few days, during the whispering campaign in international circles in Berlin, they had been assuring people with great conviction that they had reliable reports that, in the immediate future, Adolf Hitler would mark time in dealing with the Danzig question and the dispute with Poland. Some of them even went so far as to speak of a political retreat by Germany as a result of the determined attitude of Britain and France.

The sudden campaign in the German press and its new militant tone have thus clearly come as an unpleasant surprise. The alarm amongst foreigners in Berlin on Tuesday, and to a certain extent on Wednesday as well, was as great as during the critical days in March. There was a lively exchange of views and news as people did their best to find out what had caused the change of tone in the German press. Opinions on the matter differ. Now that they have found their tongues again, the French and British are pretending that the whole thing is only another piece of bluff on Germany's part. Thus the representatives of the Western Powers are reverting to the tactics of assessing the situation with "purposeful optimism". The Polish

journalists, although associating themselves with their Western colleagues' tactical interpretation, admit confidentially to other foreign correspondents that German-Polish relations have deteriorated further and that therefore any day may bring new and unforeseen incidents. All foreign observers agree that nervousness among the Polish diplomats and journalists is plainly increasing.

Among foreigners with a more neutral outlook the change of tone in the German press has made a different impression. Though they do not believe that there is any danger as yet of a dramatic climax, they regard the more active attitude of the German press as a symptom of a determined German policy to bring about an early solution of the Danzig problem in any case. The Minister of a neutral country remarked at a diplomatic dinner on Tuesday evening that the German Government had obviously only just started on a war of nerves against Warsaw. He said ironically that judging from previous experience they could probably expect to see things happen in the course of the next few weeks. He was curious to see, however, what methods would be employed this time, for he did not think that there would be simply a repeat performance, as hitherto the Germans had always used fresh methods for each move. The other foreign diplomats, among whom, however, there were no Poles or Frenchmen, were highly amused by these witticisms.

On the whole the feeling among foreigners in Berlin seems noticeably more apprehensive this week than recently. This is increased by fresh alarming rumours being continually spread of alleged war preparations by Germany. Neutral foreigners are struck by the fact that the British and French are partly responsible for creating this feeling, although otherwise they would now like to give the impression that there is nothing to fear from Germany in the near future because of the alleged resolute attitude of the Western Powers.¹

L[IKUS]

¹ Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]."

No. 7

174J136039

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 340 of August 10

Tokyo, August 10, 1939—1:51 p.m.

Received August 10—10:30 a.m.

For the State Secretary personally.

With reference to my telegram No. 335 of August 3.¹

¹ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 762.

The Minister of War was successful, though with difficulty and in face of opposition, in bringing about the Five Minister Conference² on August 8, but made no progress with the military alliance. Informants on the General Staff and in the Foreign Ministry report as follows on the situation:

The Minister of War demanded the resumption of the negotiations with the Axis Powers by the sending of fresh instructions to Ambassador Oshima, which, it is said, would meet Germany's wishes by:

1. Yielding to a certain extent in questions involving reservations.
2. Agreeing to merely an oral supplementary declaration being given regarding temporary military weakness.³

The Minister of War gave as a reason for this action the stiffer attitude on the part of the Great Powers towards Japan, Britain's insincere methods of negotiating, the abandonment of American neutrality by the denunciation of the trade agreement,⁴ and Russia's aggressive attitude on the Mongolian frontier.

The Foreign Minister, the Minister of Marine, and the Minister of Finance all refused. In this way the Minister of Finance has recently come more into prominence in view of the danger to the Japanese economic and currency policy should Anglo-Japanese negotiations be interrupted.⁵ The Minister President has kept himself in the background, obviously owing to the strong and probably decisive influence exerted by those near the throne.

However, the four Ministers mentioned above are said to have again declared themselves unanimously in agreement with the alliance proposals of the beginning of June,⁶ as sanctioned by the Emperor. In several preliminary discussions the Minister of War has assured himself of the unanimous agreement of all Army circles, and is determined to insist upon his demands to the utmost, though his most effective weapon, the threat of resignation, could be denied him if the Emperor were to assert his authority.

A further report will follow after discussions which I am to have with other informants.

OTT

² This conference consisted of the Minister President, Baron Hiranuma, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Arita, the Minister of War, General Itagaki, the Minister of Marine, Admiral Yonai, and the Minister of Finance, Ishiwata.

³ See vol. vi of this Series, documents Nos. 538, 548 and 597.

⁴ On July 26, 1939, the United States Government had denounced the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of Feb. 21, 1911. See *Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941* (United States Printing Office, Washington, 1943) (hereinafter cited as *Peace and War*), No. 135.

⁵ See vol. vi of this Series, documents Nos. 735 and 762.

⁶ See *ibid.*, document No. 487.

No. 8

147/78914

Minute by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, August 10, 1939.

At 3 p.m. the State Secretary telephoned that M. Beck desired to see Herr von Moltke at 4 p.m. today in Warsaw. However, as Herr von Moltke is remaining in Berlin today by permission of the Foreign Minister, it was suggested that Counsellor of Embassy Wühlisch might call on Under Secretary of State Arciszewski today or Herr von Moltke might call on him tomorrow, but so far no further communication has been received from the Poles.

Herr von Wühlisch was instructed by the State Secretary to maintain a purely receptive attitude.

In conclusion the State Secretary said that Herr von Moltke's absence might even be an advantage, as it was possible that the Poles merely intended to give a tactless reply to the State Secretary's earlier communication.¹

SONNLEITHNER²¹ See document No. 5.² Unsigned marginal notes: "By teleprinter to Fuschl. For Brücklmeier." "Despatched Aug. 10, 5:15 p.m."

No. 9

7971/E575082

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 259 of August 10 WASHINGTON, August 10, 1939—5: 27 p.m.

Received August 11—2: 20 a.m.

Pol. IX 1714.

Both in reports from correspondents and in leading articles on the situation in Europe, the American press persists in its methods of adding fuel to the fire and of predicting, in its usual sensation-mongering manner, the outbreak of a European war, this time "when the harvest is in." As a precautionary measure, the responsibility is already being thrown on the leaders of Germany, who are said to be obviously determined to plunge the whole of Europe into war on account of the Danzig problem. Though no one here denies the German character of Danzig, its reincorporation into the Reich is represented as the destruction of Poland's independence and therefore as a threat to the peace of Europe. The position recalls the situation during the Czech crisis of September 1938, and Polish acts

of provocation are lightly dismissed as being the deliberate work of the Gestapo and the SS.

Typical of this mood is the attention attracted by the interview given yesterday by the Polish Ambassador,¹ who has just returned from Warsaw, and who said that only a miracle could now bring about a peaceful solution, and that, in view of Poland's forbearance, war or peace depended solely on the leaders of Germany.

As in 1914, British propaganda is readily accepted here. Churchill's radio speeches also serve to establish exclusively Germany's war guilt.

All diplomatic and other events in Germany are exploited by the press here first and foremost as German preparations for war, thus, for example, Csáky's² and Ciano's³ visits, the German army and fleet manoeuvres, the publicity given to the strength of the West Wall, the tour of inspection by the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan,⁴ the new registration ordered by the Reich Minister of the Interior and Forster's journey to Berchtesgaden "to receive orders".⁵ Italy's alleged resistance to Germany's war policy is emphasized at every opportunity.

On the other hand those better informed believe that the British Government are urgently advising moderation in Warsaw.

THOMSEN

¹ This interview with Count Jerzy Potocki appeared in the *New York Times* of Aug. 10, 1939.

² To Hitler on Aug. 8. See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 784.

³ On Aug. 11-13. See Editors' Note, p. 35, and documents Nos. 43 and 47.

⁴ Göring returned to Berlin on Aug. 9 after a tour lasting 25 days during which he inspected, *inter alia*, anti-aircraft defences, aircraft factories and Western fortifications.

⁵ See document No. 4, footnote 2.

No. 10

52/34955

Unsigned Memorandum

Telephone message from Counsellor of Embassy Wühlisch, Warsaw, on August 10, 1939, 6:15 p.m.

Arciszewski, Under Secretary of State in the Polish Foreign Ministry, received me this afternoon and began by telling me that he had a communication of a very grave nature to make to me from the Polish Government. Thereupon he read out the following statement, and then handed it to me to copy:¹

The Government of the Polish Republic have noted with extreme surprise the statement made on August 9, 1939, by the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry to the Polish Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin concerning existing relations between Poland and the Free

¹ From this point onwards the original text is in French.

City of Danzig.² The Polish Government can in fact see no legal grounds to justify Germany's intervention in these relations.

That exchanges of views on the Danzig problem have been possible between the Polish Government and the Reich Government, has been due solely to the goodwill of the Polish Government and did not derive from any obligation.

In reply to the said statement by the Reich Government, the Polish Government are compelled to point out to the Reich Government that they will continue to react as hitherto to any attempt by the authorities of the Free City to impair the rights and interests which Poland enjoys in Danzig under her agreements, and will do so by such means and measures as they alone may deem appropriate, and that they will regard any interventions by the Reich Government to the detriment of these rights and interests as an act of aggression.³

² See document No. 5.

³ This memorandum was submitted by Schliep on Aug. 10 (52/34954) to the recipients listed in document No. 4 and to Senior Counsellor Bergmann. The copy for the Foreign Minister's Secretariat (147/78913) was transmitted to Fuschl at 8:00 p.m. the same day, and a German translation (147/78912) at 9:15 p.m.

No. 11

5558/E396017

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

No. 158 of August 10

BERLIN, August 10, 1939—9: 30 p.m.
zu W 1302 g.

With reference to your telegram No. 115 of August 9.¹

The examination of the 1000 heavy machine guns is now proceeding in Vienna. About 300 will be despatched daily from today.

A further 1500 light machine guns are being assembled in Vienna. They will be examined and despatched with the greatest speed.

All the machine guns were released immediately after the visit of the Bulgarian Minister President. Assembling, packing and transport have been speeded up to the best of our ability, as has examination in cooperation with the Bulgarian commission for passing material, which has repeatedly expressed recognition here of Germany's very great helpfulness and efforts to expedite matters.²

WIEHL

¹ Document No. 1.

² In a memorandum of Aug. 11, St. S. No. 617 (not printed 5558/E396026), Weizsäcker recorded that, on the Bulgarian Chargé d'Affaires again making urgent representations concerning the delivery of machine guns, he had informed him of this telegram.

No. 12

5558/E396019

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 117 of August 10

SOFIA, August 10, 1939—9:45 p.m.

Received August 11—2:20 a.m.

W 1312 g.

With reference to my telegram No. 115 of August 9.¹

At today's discussion between the Minister President, the War Minister, the Military Attaché and myself, the Minister President also emphasized the constantly growing threat to Bulgaria's position. Twenty British aircraft with British crews had arrived in Salonica, up to 200 more were expected; the Rumanians were increasing their forces in the Dobruja to about four divisions at war strength and a Rumanian military delegation was expected in Thrace; Turkish troops had already been issued with live ammunition. All these preparations pointed to the fact that at the slightest sign of a conflict being imminent between the Great Powers, Bulgaria would be attacked, if indeed the opposing parties themselves did not start the conflict in the Balkans. Therefore I again request the speediest possible despatch of the promised coastal defence machine guns, at least one thousand five hundred with ammunition.

The Minister President further told me that recently units of the Russian Fleet had been sighted in the area (group mutilated) Varna. He therefore asked most urgently for the transfer on loan of two German submarines.²

The Military Attaché is arriving in Berlin at the Hotel Esplanade on Sunday. Please inform him there at what time his conversation with the State Secretary is to take place on August 14.³

RICHTHOFEN

¹ Document No. 1.

² See also vol. vi of this Series, documents Nos. 656 and 703.

³ No record of this conversation has been found, but see document No. 60.

No. 13

7967/E575017

The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry

Airgram

No. 289 of August 10

LONDON, August 10, 1939.

Received August 11—12:25 p.m.

Pol. V 7683.

I called on Lord Halifax yesterday to say goodbye before pro-

ceeding on leave.¹ In the course of the conversation which, in general, followed the lines usual on such occasions, Halifax asked whether the exchange of Notes between the Senate and the Polish Representative, Chodacki,² and also the sharp tone of the German press had caused any dangerous deterioration of the situation in Danzig. I referred to the provocative article in *Czas*,³ which had called for an energetic retort, and to Chodacki's challenging language in the exchange of Notes with the Senate. This again showed how right had been Germany's view that in the end the decision as to war or peace would rest in the hands of local Polish authorities—the majority of whom were chauvinistic and irresponsible. These circumstances revealed the internal weaknesses of Poland with her divergent political trends.

Halifax emphasized that the British Government were exerting their influence for moderation in Warsaw. His further remarks were confined to a repetition of the contents of his speech at Chatham House.⁴

DIRKSEN⁵

¹ For Lord Halifax's account of this conversation see *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939* (H.M. Stationery Office, London, *in progress*) (hereinafter cited as *British Documents*), Third Series, vol. vi, No. 609. See also *Documents and Materials relating to the Eve of the Second World War*, vol. II, *Dirksen Papers* (Moscow, 1948) (hereinafter cited as *Dirksen Papers* (Moscow)), No. 25.

² See vol. vi of this Series, documents Nos. 749, 765, 774 and 780.

³ According to a despatch, P 24 of Aug. 12 (not printed, 1724/401055-57) by Wühlisch, reporting on the reactions of the Polish Foreign Ministry and press to Gauleiter Forster's speech on Aug. 10 (see document No. 19, footnote 1), the article in *Czas* had appeared on Aug. 7, and had referred to "guns trained on Danzig," which Forster had sharply denied.

⁴ On June 29, 1939; see *British Blue Book*, Cmd. 6106, No. 25.

⁵ This document was repeated to Warsaw in telegram No. 212 of Aug. 11 (1724/401054).

No. 14

1625/389159

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

A 1715

Moscow, August 10, 1939.

Received August 12.

Pol. II 2867.

Subject: Pact negotiations in Moscow.

I hear from a reliable source that the question of guaranteeing the Baltic States has now reached the following stage:

The British, after having at first made the entry into force of the guarantee dependent on a direct attack *and* on a request for assistance from the Baltic State concerned, are now said to have conceded the Soviets the right, in the event of a direct attack on one of the Baltic States, to move troops in under the terms of the guarantee, even without that State having requested assistance. Even the conversa-

tions on the definition of direct aggression are said to have been successful only after tedious and sometimes extremely theoretical negotiations. No agreement has yet been possible on the question of guaranteeing the Baltic States against an indirect attack, as the exchange of views regarding the concept of indirect aggression has become interminable.

SCHULENBURG

No. 15

1625/389156

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

A 1716

Moscow, August 10, 1939.

Received August 12.

Pol. II 2866.

Subject: The Polish attitude to the pact negotiations between France, Britain and the Soviet Union.

With reference to my other reports.¹

The Polish Ambassador here, Grzybowski, returned from leave at the beginning of August. In a talk between him and the Italian Ambassador, Rosso, the conversation also turned to the pact negotiations between Britain, France and Russia.² The Italian Ambassador said he thought that the military discussions now beginning could only produce real results if Poland were associated with them in some way or other, or at least agreed to accept armed assistance from the Soviet Union. To this the Polish Ambassador replied that Poland's attitude to the pact negotiations remained unchanged. Poland would in no circumstances allow Soviet troops to set foot on Polish territory, even if only in transit. When the Italian Ambassador remarked that that presumably did not apply to Soviet aircraft, the Polish Ambassador stated that Poland would in no circumstances place airfields at the disposal of the Soviet air force.

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

¹ A pencilled registry note refers here to Pol. II 2824, Moscow telegram No. 164 of Aug. 8 (2767/535947), in which Schulenburg reported: "In Polish Embassy circles here the sending of a Polish Military Mission to Moscow, reported again by *Kurjer Warszawski*, is emphatically denied. The Polish Ambassador here asserted to the Italian Ambassador that they were continuing to refuse any armed assistance from Soviet Russia."

² For Rosso's account of this conversation see Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Commissione per la Pubblicazione dei Documenti Diplomatici, *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, Ottava Serie: 1935-39 (hereinafter cited as *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series), vol. XII, No. 804.

No. 16

8418/E592823-27

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

Bled No. 10

BLED, August 10, 1939.

Received August 12, 1939.

Pol. I Vbd. 343.

Subject: Yugoslavia's attitude to the League of Nations.

With reference to your telegram No. 191 of July 29, 1939,¹ and my telegram No. 221 of July 31.²

Yesterday evening when I called on Foreign Minister Cincar-Marković, who had arrived in Bled the previous day, in order to have a somewhat lengthy discussion with him, I at once raised the question of Yugoslavia's withdrawal from the League of Nations. In this connection I referred to the conversation of the Foreign Minister with Counsellor Feine in Belgrade, reported in telegram No. 221 of July 31, 1939, as well as to the conversation between Under State Secretary Woermann and the Yugoslav Minister³ communicated to me in despatch Pol. I Vbd. 329 I of July 28, 1939.⁴ I then stated once again that, as was well known to Cincar-Marković from his conversations in Berlin,⁵ we regarded the present rump organization of the League of Nations as nothing but a body subservient to the British encirclement policy which could no longer in any way claim to be an authority standing above the disputes of the Great Powers. We were therefore of the opinion that for a State which was friendly to us and determined to maintain an honest neutrality in the dispute between the Great Powers, membership of the present League of Nations was a contradiction. We had full confidence in Yugoslav foreign policy, the course of which was naturally determined by compelling grounds of reason and the manifest interests of Yugoslavia, nevertheless we could not close our eyes to the fact that the policy of the Yugoslav Government met at times with rather strong sentimental opposition in some sections of the population. We were now of the opinion that the element of insecurity existing in this state of affairs could be considerably reduced by a really neutral attitude in Yugoslav foreign policy, to be firmly demonstrated to the outside world. Such an attitude in Yugoslav foreign policy as would be shown unmistakably by Yugoslavia's withdrawal from the League of Nations, would doubtless have an enlightening effect also on the public opinion of the country and thus strengthen the foundations

¹ Vol. VI of this Series, document No. 733.

² See *ibid.*, document No. 745.

³ Ivo Andrić.

⁴ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 720.

⁵ See *ibid.*, document No. 474.

of the Government's policy. The more or less unobtrusive withdrawal of Yugoslavia from a few of the functions of the League of Nations could, therefore, not achieve this desired enlightenment of public opinion. For this, it appeared to us, that a gesture such as withdrawal from the League of Nations was essential. The Reich Foreign Minister had therefore instructed me to enquire what the reasons were which, in the opinion of the Yugoslav Government, still delayed Yugoslavia's withdrawal from the League of Nations.

Cincar-Marković, who had followed my statements with great attention, thereupon replied to me somewhat as follows: As a result of his conversations in Berlin he had been of the opinion that the Reich Foreign Minister was in full agreement with the course of Yugoslav foreign policy which he—Cincar-Marković—had discussed at the time. He had always taken care to speak with complete frankness and to avoid creating any false impressions. Therefore, he had already pointed out in Berlin that the choice of methods by which Yugoslavia would achieve severance from the League of Nations must be left to Yugoslavia. In spirit, this severance had already been carried out a long time ago, but the state of public opinion in the country demanded careful treatment, as otherwise the position of the Government would only be made more difficult, which, after all, would not be in Germany's interest either. It was therefore necessary so to choose the time of the withdrawal that the decision would be understood by public opinion. If Britain and France at the September meeting of the League of Nations should attempt to misuse the League for creating an anti-Axis attitude by bringing up the Albanian or Czech events, that would be a good opportunity for Yugoslavia to withdraw.

Cincar-Marković then assured me again that we could have full confidence in Yugoslav policy. This policy of friendship with Germany and strict neutrality in the dispute between the Great Powers had not arisen overnight nor sprung from a whim, but had developed, slowly it was true, but inevitably, from the facts of the situation, in spite of all the difficulties and handicaps well known to us. Neither the Prince Regent nor he himself would ever agree to a zig-zag policy, as they were both convinced that any other than the present policy was out of the question for Yugoslavia. Recently he had repeatedly had the impression from small indications (delays in carrying out the armaments credit and the like) that an attempt was being made in some quarters in Berlin to instil mistrust of Yugoslavia. If this were being done by Italy he would regret it very much, for Italy had really had ample proof of Yugoslavia's loyalty at the time of the occupation of Albania.

I remarked at this point that I had not the slightest knowledge of any mistrust on the part of Italy. I should be more inclined to

think that there might be perhaps some disappointment in Budapest regarding the stagnation in Hungarian-Yugoslav relations, and that perhaps in Sofia there was some uneasiness about Yugoslavia remaining in the Balkan Entente at a time when Turkey had joined the British camp and was threatening the Bulgarian frontier by concentrating troops in Thrace.

Cincar-Marković evaded discussing Yugoslav-Hungarian relations, but regarding Bulgaria's fears about Turkey's attitude he said that he had already had statements made in Sofia which had given complete reassurance there as to Yugoslavia's attitude. He could tell me moreover, in strict confidence, that the Prince Regent when in London had left Halifax in no doubt that Yugoslavia did not wish Turkey's reappearance in the Balkans and would therefore disapprove of any threat to the Bulgarian frontier by Turkey. Halifax had shown himself strongly impressed by these statements.⁶

Summing up, the Foreign Minister also told me that Yugoslavia's withdrawal from the League of Nations was first mentioned to him casually by Ciano in Venice.⁷ Later, in Berlin, it was not the Führer but the Reich Foreign Minister in the presence of the Führer who raised the question anew, whereby it appeared that this was done on Italian wishes. In conclusion the Führer then expressly declared that Germany would not exert pressure on Yugoslavia and that it should be left entirely to Yugoslavia to act in this matter according to her own judgement.

I was unable to offer any opinion on these statements by the Foreign Minister on the course of the Berlin conversations as I had not taken part in them.

HEEREN⁸

⁶ The Prince Regent and Princess Olga had paid a private visit to London, July 17-Aug. 2. For Lord Halifax's account of his conversation with the Prince Regent on July 20 see *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. vi, No. 393.

⁷ See also vol. vi of this Series, document No. 256, and the *Ciano Diaries*, entry of Apr. 22, 1939. (These Diaries have been published in Italian as Galeazzo Ciano, *Diario 1939-1943* (2 vols., Milan and Rome, 1946) and *Diario 1937-1938* (Bologna, 1948); in French as Comte Galeazzo Ciano, *Journal Politique 1939-1943* (2 vols., Neuchâtel and Paris, 1946) and *Journal Politique 1937-1938* (Paris, 1949); in English as *The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943*, ed. Hugh Gibson (New York, 1946) and *Ciano's Diary 1939-1943*, ed. Malcolm Muggeridge (London, 1947) and *Ciano's Diary 1937-1938* (London, 1952) (hereinafter cited as the *Ciano Diaries*). As the texts of these four publications differ considerably in places, reference is here made to entries rather than by page numbers.)

⁸ Marginal notes: (i) "[For] RAM. W[eizsäcker]." (ii) In Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]."

No. 17

215/146893-94

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Bled No. 11

BLED, August 10, 1939.

Pol. IV 4699.

Subject: The return of the Prince Regent from London.¹

The Prince Regent arrived back at Schloss Bordo, near Bled, a few days ago. At the same time Princess Olga's brother-in-law, the Duke of Kent, arrived with his wife on a visit.

As the Foreign Minister told me, the Prince Regent is at present still confined to bed as a result of a rather serious operation on his jaw which he had to undergo in London. Cincar-Marković again assured me that the Prince Regent's visit to England took place for purely private reasons and had no political background whatever. Nor, in fact, had anyone in England tried to influence him with a view to changing Yugoslav policy. From his talks with Chamberlain and Halifax, moreover, the Prince Regent had gained the definite impression that these two British statesmen at least still desired a friendly settlement with Germany. It was true that the whole of Britain today was suffering from a state of war nerves in that the opinion prevailed everywhere that British prestige could in no circumstances submit to another withdrawal in the face of unilateral use of force by the totalitarian States. The Prince Regent's impression, however, was that in case of friendly negotiations, both Chamberlain and Halifax would be prepared to make considerable concessions. The Prince Regent had naturally made efforts to encourage this tendency as far as possible, profiting by the impressions he had gained in Berlin.²

VON HEEREN³

¹ See also document No. 16.

² The Prince Regent paid a visit to Berlin, June 1-5, 1939; see vol. VI of this Series, document No. 474.

³ On Aug. 17 copies of this despatch were sent to the Missions at Ankara, Athens, Budapest, Bucharest, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome, Sofia, Warsaw and the Consulate at Geneva.

No. 18

34/23904-08

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, August 10, 1939.

e.o. W 1301 g.

The Soviet Chargé Astakhov called on me today at 11 a.m. for a conversation lasting an hour. First the journey of the Germans

attending the Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow¹ was discussed (see separate Memorandum on this²). I then asked Astakhov whether he had any news from Moscow regarding the questions which had been discussed between us.³ Astakhov replied in the affirmative and stated as follows:

The question informally discussed between us, as to whether a political idea should be introduced into the preamble to the credit agreement, had also been examined in Moscow. It was thought better not to connect the trade and credit agreement with language of a political nature. This would be anticipating the future. I replied to M. Astakhov that this was our view, too. Astakhov then mentioned that he had *once again* received express instructions from Moscow to emphasize that the Soviet Government desired an improvement in their relations with Germany. The statement he had made to me last time was thereby strengthened. I took advantage of this in the ensuing conversation to tell Astakhov the following:

We had noted with satisfaction that the Soviet Government were anxious to continue the conversations regarding the improvement of German-Soviet relations. We had wished that Molotov would let us know his basic attitude in respect of Soviet interests, in order to facilitate further conversations, and had believed that it was premature for us on our side to bring up concrete problems as long as we did not know exactly what were the interests of the Soviets. But, in any event, one question was now quite actual, namely Poland. The Polish delusion of grandeur, shielded by Britain, drove Poland constantly to new provocations. We were still hoping that Poland would somehow come to reason, so that a peaceful solution could be found. Failing this, it was possible that, against our will and against our desires, a solution by force of arms would have to take place. If, as we had now done on various occasions, we had declared ourselves willing to enter upon a large-scale adjustment of mutual interests with Moscow, it was important for us to know the position of the Soviet Government on the question of Poland. In Moscow, after the political negotiations had brought no result, military negotiations were now being conducted with Britain and France.⁴ We could scarcely believe that, contrary to the direction in which their interests clearly lay, the Soviet Government would align themselves with Britain and make themselves, like Britain, guarantors of megalomaniac Polish aspirations. It would, of course, mean a poor start for German-Soviet conversations, if, as a result of the military negotiations in Moscow, a sort of military alliance against us, with the Soviet Union participating, were intended. These were, therefore, the

¹ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 714.

² Not found.

³ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 729.

⁴ British and French Military Missions arrived in Moscow on Aug. 11.

questions that were of interest to us, at this stage of our conversations, and upon which, indeed, also depended the prospects of achieving a German-Soviet understanding: in the first place the attitude of the Soviet Union to the Polish question, and, in the second place, the objectives that Moscow was pursuing in the military negotiations with Britain and France. I could again assure M. Astakhov, as I had already done on various occasions, that, even in the event of a solution by force of arms, German interests in Poland were definitely limited. There was no need for them to clash with Soviet interests of any kind, but we did need to know what Soviet interests were. If the motive behind the negotiations conducted by Moscow with Britain was the feeling of being threatened by Germany in the event of a German-Polish conflict, we, for our part, were prepared to give the Soviet Union every assurance desired, which would surely carry more weight than any support by Britain, which, in fact, could never become effective in Eastern Europe.

Astakhov was keenly interested, but naturally had no instructions of any kind from Moscow to discuss the subject of Poland or the subject of the negotiations in Moscow. In the course of the conversation, however, of his own accord he went into both subjects in considerable detail. The negotiations with Britain had begun at a time when there had still been no sign of any disposition on the part of Germany to come to an understanding. The negotiations had been entered upon without much enthusiasm, but they had to conduct them because they had to protect themselves against the German threat and had to accept assistance wherever it was offered. The situation had certainly changed since the conversations with Germany had started, but one could not now simply break off something which had been begun for well considered reasons. The outcome of the negotiations was, in his opinion, uncertain and it was quite possible that his Government likewise considered the question to be completely open. Our conversation of today, just as those which had previously taken place, would surely tend to have that effect. On the question of Poland, he said that he thought it doubtful whether he would receive a concrete reply from Moscow on this massive problem. At this stage of the conversations, it was somewhat like putting the cart before the horse to want to bring the question of Poland up now definitely for discussion. Astakhov sought to learn whether any German decisions in the Polish question could be expected in the next few days and what Germany's aims in respect of Poland were. I avoided a reply to this question and at any rate did not attach such urgency to it. Astakhov will report back and revert to these questions. Astakhov was unable to answer an informal question regarding the possible return of his Ambassador. On the contrary, he asked me whether we had not heard anything from Moscow

regarding M. Merekalov.⁵ He emphasized, however, that, as far as our talks were concerned, it made no difference whatever who was acting as the official representative of the Soviet Government in Berlin.

SCHNURRE

⁵ The Soviet Ambassador had left Berlin in April. See vol. VI of this Series, documents Nos. 215 and 437.

No. 19

97/108484

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, August 10, 1939.

Greiser, the President of the Danzig Senate, told me this morning by telephone that Gauleiter Forster, in his speech in the Langer Markt this evening,¹ intended to speak chiefly on the character of Danzig as a purely German State and its right to return to the German fatherland. Greiser does not think that any special surprises are to be expected in this speech.

As Senator Dr. Schimmel has just informed me, Gauleiter Forster will fly from Danzig to Nuremberg tomorrow to make another important speech there, also on Danzig's right to return to the Reich.

Submitted for information to:

State Secretary
Under State Secretary, Political Department
Under State Secretary, Legal Department
Deputy Director, Political Department
Senior Counsellor Schliep
Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Minister Braun von Stumm
Political Division I
Kult. Spez.

BERGMANN

¹ The text of this speech, which was delivered on Aug. 10, is printed in *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik* (Berlin, 1942), vol. 7, Part 2, No. 110.

No. 20

276/178525-26

Senior Counsellor Schnurre to Ambassador Schulenburg

BERLIN, August 10, 1939.

Received August 12.

MY DEAR COUNT: General Köstring¹ will report to you in detail orally about the journey to Schloss Fuschl, which I made in company

¹ Lt. Gen. Ernst Köstring, Military Attaché in the Soviet Union.

with the General on Tuesday.² In accordance with instructions given me there, I asked M. Astakhov to call on me today. A memorandum on the conversation is enclosed for your personal information.³

Yesterday evening I communicated by telephone to the Foreign Minister the passages of particular interest in your letter to Herr Schliep,⁴ which arrived by yesterday's courier.

M. Babarin called on me again this afternoon. I will try to write to Hilger about this as well.

The three gentlemen, Moritz, Meyer and Count Grote, will now leave here for the Agricultural Exhibition on Saturday evening. They will therefore arrive in Moscow on Monday. I assume that the Embassy will arrange for their reception at the station. Tomorrow Astakhov is giving a luncheon at the Embassy for these gentlemen, at which Schliep and I will be present.

With best wishes. Heil Hitler!

Yours etc.

SCHNURRE

² i.e., Aug. 8.

³ Document No. 18.

⁴ Presumably of Aug. 7 (vol. VI of this Series, document No. 779). A letter from Schliep to Schulenburg dated Aug. 9 (not printed, 276/178527-29), thanks him for his "today's letter", adding that he has immediately passed on the most interesting information it contains.

No. 21

276/178523-24

Ambassador Schulenburg to Senior Counsellor Schliep

[Moscow] August 10, 1939.¹

DEAR HERR SCHLIEP: Mr. Strang left here on Monday morning by air.² He sent me a card of farewell, as we are old acquaintances and had also met several times during his present stay in Moscow. I would conclude from this that Mr. Strang himself does not anticipate coming back to Moscow in the foreseeable future.

Mr. Steinhardt, the new American Ambassador, arrived in Moscow on Tuesday. On Wednesday he paid the customary visit to Molotov, in the latter's capacity as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to introduce himself and to ask that he might be received by Kalinin in order to present his credentials. The Russian press published a short communiqué on the reception of the American Ambassador by Molotov. This was not the custom during Litvinov's term of office. The American Embassy themselves were surprised at the communiqué, especially as no political questions had been touched on during the conversation.

Heil Hitler!

Yours etc.,

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

¹ Marginal note: "Sent by the Italian courier on 10.8.39."

² i.e., Aug. 7. See also vol. VI of this Series, document No. 779.

No. 22

1570/380083

The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 413 of August 10

PARIS, August 11, 1939.¹

Received August 11—1:15 a.m.

With reference to my telegram No. 410 of August 8.²

Bonnet received me yesterday at his country home and said with reference to the Abetz case that after mature reflection he had reached the following personal view: He intended to propose to Daladier that Abetz should be given a clear statement of his *bona fides* to the effect that he was neither suspected of espionage, nor that he had in any other way offended against French laws. The statement must be so worded as also to remove any grounds for press attacks such as, for example, those of Kérillis. Nevertheless the complaint made by the French Government concerning Abetz' activities in the last week of June, still stood, namely that by the manner and form of his treatment of the Danzig question he had given the impression in conversations that he was trying to shatter the unity of France and cripple her determination. In this way Abetz had caused the French Government very great difficulties. In times of political tension such as now, no Government could tolerate propaganda with such defeatist effect in their country. This explained the attitude of the French Government, for which we must show understanding. Abetz had not in fact been expelled but his presence in France at the present moment was intolerable, he was *indésirable*. For this reason Abetz had been refused entry. In doing this the Government had exercised a right which is possessed by every Government, an expulsion order not being necessary. When the wave of political excitement had subsided in a few weeks, an entry visa for Abetz might again be considered.

I took note of Bonnet's remarks, but, in reply, put forward our demands as instructed. Coulondre, who called on me yesterday and today, was on the whole of the same opinion as Bonnet and said that he would specially urge Daladier to issue the statement of *bona fides* as he considered this more effective and more satisfactory than a re-entry permit which would endanger the Government and was therefore impossible at present. The time of Daladier's return will not be known until this evening.

WELCZECK

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

² Not printed (2798/548119). In this telegram Welczeck reported that before Daladier's return no decision could be taken in the Abetz case which he had discussed with Bonnet. For previous documents on the Abetz case see vol. VI of this Series, documents Nos. 640, 658, 664, 690, 755, and 767.

No. 23

910/294272

The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 414 of August 10

PARIS, August 11, 1939.¹

Received August 11—1:15 a.m.

Pol. V 1852 g.

With reference to my telegram No. 412 of August 10.²

Bonnet has just telephoned me with regard to the indiscretion published in the *Temps*, from the Fournier Agency, which had taken it from Polish newspapers, concerning the Reich Foreign Minister's letter to him.³ He said that he had issued a short statement to the press to the effect that the Reich Foreign Minister's letter had been in reply to a Note⁴ which he, Bonnet, had transmitted to the Reich Foreign Minister.

When I asked how this indiscretion had been possible, Bonnet gave an evasive answer, and pointed out that it originated with the Polish press.

WELCZECK

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

² Not printed (910/294266). In this telegram the Paris Embassy repeated the text of a report by the Fournier News Agency from Warsaw, as published in *Le Temps*.

³ See vol. vi of this Series, document No. 669.

⁴ See *ibid.*, document No. 602.

No. 24

910/294268-69

The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 415 of August 11

PARIS, August 11, 1939.¹

Received August 11—12:50 p.m.

Pol. V 1851 g.

With reference to my telegram No. 414 of August 10.²

Havas has circulated the following "correction":

"Paris, August 10. According to a report from a foreign source Herr von Ribbentrop is said to have addressed a letter to M. Georges Bonnet defining the position of Germany with regard to the Danzig problems and asking the French Government not to interfere in an Eastern European question which is the exclusive concern of Germany.

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

² Document No. 28.

"It is stated in authoritative French quarters that this report presents the facts in a false light.

"It is definitely stated that on July 1, during a conversation which he had with Count Welczeck, M. Georges Bonnet handed the Ambassador of the Reich a *communication verbale* defining the position of France with regard to the Danzig questions.

"Shortly afterwards Count Welczeck in turn handed M. Georges Bonnet, on behalf of the Reich Foreign Minister, a *note verbale* setting forth the point of view of the Reich in the matter of the Free City.

"Contrary to the impression which the report published this afternoon may give, it is not, however, a case of a recent and personal initiative on the part of Herr von Ribbentrop but of an exchange of Notes dating back more than a month."³

The *Petit Parisien* concludes a statement identical in content with the following sentence:

"All the evidence goes to show that the 'particulars' published here on the basis of a report emanating from Berne are tending to start polemics in France from which one can see only too well who will stand to gain."³

Ordre comments on the contents of the French Note of July 1, the Reich Foreign Minister's personal letter in reply, and the French Foreign Minister's reply thereto.⁴

Several newspapers report that the visit of the Polish Chargé d'Affaires to Bonnet yesterday afternoon was connected with the indiscretion in the Polish press, which has been reported.

WELCZECK

³ The quoted passages are in French in the original.

⁴ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 722.

No. 25

174/136041-42

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 344 of August 11

TOKYO, August 11, 1939—2:05 p.m.

Received August 11—1:30 p.m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

General Machijiri, Chief of the Central Department of the War Ministry, who had asked, on the afternoon of August 10, to be received by the Italian Ambassador¹ and myself jointly, handed us the following communication from the War Minister:²

The Army had most vigorously resumed its struggle for an alliance

¹ Giacinto Auriti. See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XII, No. 834.

² Gen. Itagaki.

at the Conference of Five Ministers on August 8,³ but had made no progress beyond the Japanese proposal of June 5.⁴ The Army was striving urgently for a settlement in order to:

- 1) secure the early and successful termination of the China conflict for which it is responsible to the people;
- 2) accede to the wishes of the broad mass of the people and thus ease the present tension;
- 3) prevent a dangerous setback in the form of an economically attractive settlement with Britain.

These reasons were so cogent that the War Minister was determined to resort to using his last weapon, resignation, which would almost certainly cause the resignation of Oshima and Shiratori. Although this move might gradually improve the Japanese basis for the alliance, it would at first bring about a serious setback. In spite of this, however, resignation was the only decision possible. The decision was to be made on August 15. The War Minister requests that the extremely grave state of tension should be made plain to the Governments in Berlin and Rome and that it should be suggested to them that they render assistance by making concessions.

As the Cabinet has ratified the renewed proposal of June 5, the War Minister considers that a more rapid settlement would be possible if the following concessions were made by both sides:

Berlin and Rome should inform the Japanese Ambassador that the Japanese proposal of June 5 is acceptable but with the provisos that:

- 1) They stipulate that there shall be no mental reservation behind the wording,
- 2) A form is found for the Japanese supplementary declaration which is to be made orally.

The War Minister then expects to obtain:

With reference to 1): an explicit Japanese confirmation of this stipulation.

With reference to 2): a declaration to be made orally, which would be recorded and given prominence in the treaty protocol.

General Machijiri requested, almost entreated, concessions before August 15. The War Minister will inform O[shima] and Shiratori of his *démarche* with us, but is concealing it from the Foreign Ministry. Judging from my observations here—and the Italian Ambassador agrees with me—I would propose that we show an accommodating attitude. I am convinced that the War Minister's threat to resign over the alliance question is not a means of exerting pressure on our Governments but derives partly from the reasons I have set out. In the main, however, it represents a drastic step in the internal struggle for power by the Army against court, financial, naval and Foreign

³ See document No. 7.

⁴ See vol. VI of this Series, documents Nos. 487 and 538.

Ministry circles, who are threatening to gain the upper hand by skilful conduct of the negotiations with Britain.

To this I may add that terrorist pressure by junior officers has, it is generally stated, recently again been taking a more drastic form. The War Minister's determination that the creation of the alliance should not be clouded by acts of violence is in my opinion also in Germany's interests.

Thus the new activity on behalf of the alliance appears to be primarily a weapon in home politics in favour of the Army. Since the Army, however, is the chief advocate of the policy of the alliance, it is of the greatest importance to us that its position in home politics should be strengthened. In addition, the conclusion of the alliance would commit the whole Government in good time to their own previous decision and prevent a reversal. The plans of the Foreign Minister who, in close collaboration with the British Ambassador is staking all on bringing the negotiations with Britain to a successful conclusion, would be effectively thwarted by a conciliatory German initiative, as would also Craigie's efforts, of which you are aware, to frustrate the alliance by means of British conciliation.

OTT

No. 26

2993/586598

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 261 of August 11 WASHINGTON, August 11, 1939—3:22 p.m.

Received August 12—1:30 a.m.

Pol. IX 1716.

Roosevelt's announcement today¹ that in the event of an actual war crisis arising in Europe or the Far East he would immediately summon a special session of Congress to pass legislation for the protection of American neutrality based on international law, confirms that the aim of American foreign policy is the complete abolition of the present neutrality legislation. The conditions aimed at would resemble those prevailing during the period of American neutrality in the world war, apart from a probable precautionary measure for the protection of American lives and shipping. In contrast to 1914, claim will not be made for the freedom of the seas, and a case like that of the *Lusitania* would, according to Roosevelt, not lead to war again. On the most important question of granting credits to belligerents Roosevelt gave a vague hint that he still aimed at a cash-and-carry policy but that it was uncertain whether legislation was necessary now.

THOMSEN

¹ The President made this statement at a press conference.

No. 27

1625/389153

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
No. 167 of August 11MOSCOW, August 11, 1939—4:04 p.m.
Received August 11—7:00 p.m.
Pol. II 2858.

I learn from a reliable source that the British Military Attaché¹ here has stated that, when speaking to the Soviets, the British Military Mission would use the following description of the possible course of a war as an argument for the early conclusion of a pact. In the coming war Germany would remain on the defensive in the West, attack Poland with superior forces and probably overrun her within one to two months. German troops would then be on the Soviet frontier shortly after the outbreak of war. It was not out of the question that Germany would then offer the Western Powers a separate peace on condition that she received a free hand to advance in the East. If the Soviet Government did not conclude a pact now with Britain and France for protection against German attack, she would run the risk of being isolated in the event of war.²

SCHULENBURG

¹ Lt. Col. Firebrace.² On the Moscow draft (361/204496) a marginal note in Hilger's handwriting reads: "The information emanates from the Italian Military Attaché, who had a fairly lengthy and detailed conversation with the British Military Attaché on the impending military negotiations."

No. 28

1256/338523

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 168 of August 11

MOSCOW, August 11, 1939—5:20 p.m.
Received August 11—7:00 p.m.
Pol. V 7690.

All American travellers passing through here from Eastern Asia speak of the transport of war material and troops on the Trans-Siberian railway in an easterly direction from the Western Urals to Lake Baikal. From these observations the American Embassy, as well as the Japanese Embassy, assume that Soviet reinforcements for Buirnor¹ will be drawn, not from the Far East, but from the Western

¹ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 463, footnote 6. Sporadic fighting in the frontier area around Lake Buir on the Manchurian-Mongolian frontier had continued throughout the summer.

Siberian and Eastern European military districts, which form reserves for despatch to the Soviet Western or Eastern front. The American Embassy—rather arbitrarily, in my opinion—regards this as a sign that, for the present, the Soviet Government do not expect military developments on the Western front. In spite of the despatch of reinforcements to Buirnor, the American and Japanese Embassies here assume that the Buirnor fighting will remain localized.

SCHULENBURG

No. 29

7891/E571531

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 169 of August 11

Moscow, August 11, 1939—5:20 p.m.

Received August 11—7:00 p.m.

Pol. II 2861.

The British and French military delegations arrived in Leningrad on the morning of August 10, and were met by the Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District,¹ the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Baltic Fleet,² the Commandant of the city of Leningrad,³ and the French and British Military Attachés.⁴ They went on to Moscow the same evening. They spent the day sightseeing, but inspected no military or naval installations in Leningrad. At the station in Moscow the delegations were met by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff,⁵ several Soviet officers, *Chef de Protocol* Barkov, junior members of the British and French Embassies, and the Turkish Military Attaché.⁶ The "reception" accorded them by the Russians in Moscow and Leningrad was on a small scale (no guard of honour, no high-ranking military personages).⁷

SCHULENBURG

¹ Gen. Chibisov.

² Capt. (2nd Rank) Ramishvili.

³ Maj. Denisov.

⁴ Gen. Palasse and Lt. Col. Firebrace respectively.

⁵ Corps Commander Smorodinov.

⁶ Lt. Col. Türkmen.

⁷ See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 45.

No. 30

621/250798-99

The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 419 of August 11

PARIS, August 11, 1939.

Received August 11—8:50 p.m.

The speeches by Gauleiter Forster¹ and Colonel General Brauchitsch,² and the meeting between Ribbentrop and Ciano,³ are given prominence in the discussion of the Danzig problem in today's press. Press reactions show how great is the propaganda effect of speeches by authoritative German notabilities and of political demonstrations, the meeting of the Ministers being here regarded as such. In conformity with the semi-official rallying-cry an attempt has been made to minimize the immediate importance of Forster's speech, on the grounds that it contained no new decisive factor, but merely continued the campaign of intimidation, trying to shift the blame for the present critical situation on to Poland. At the same time, as is particularly apparent from Brauchitsch's speech, the German people are to be given the impression that Germany will resort to force only if she is compelled to do so by aggressive action on the part of Poland and by the encirclement policy of hostile politicians. But it would be premature to speak of an easing of the tension. The decision will be announced by the Führer at Tannenberg.⁴ In spite of these comments, however, the statements by Forster and Brauchitsch are having a great effect. Obvious embarrassment is being caused by Forster's quotations from the French press of earlier French and English statements favouring the German viewpoint on the problems of Danzig and the Corridor. The Communist *Humanité* writes that the worst of the Forster speeches was that Hitler's mouthpiece, like Henlein a year ago, had been able to turn British and French statements to advantage. The rest of the press seeks to evade the necessity of advancing counter argument by asserting that for one thing those statements were made under entirely different conditions, and for another they seemed to have been superseded, if not contradicted, by the agreement concluded in the meantime by Germany and Poland.⁵

¹ See document No. 19 and footnote 1 thereto.

² Addressing German armament workers in Düsseldorf on Aug. 10, Brauchitsch said the Führer would never lightly risk the lives of Germans but that "should the Führer one day demand from us the final and highest service, then we can be certain that there is no other way out, but that this is an unalterable necessity for the preservation of our nation."

³ See Editors' Note, p. 35.

⁴ The Tannenberg celebrations were due to be held on Aug. 27. Their cancellation was announced on Aug. 26.

⁵ The reference appears to be to the German-Polish Declaration of Jan. 26, 1934; see Republic of Poland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs: *Official Documents concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations 1938-1939*, published by Authority of the Polish Government (London, 1940) (hereinafter cited as the *Polish White Book*), No. 10.

The meeting of Ministers at Salzburg is also given a great deal of attention, and is commented upon with some nervousness. A few papers say that a compromise may be in preparation, to which the Ciano visit might be a pointer, as the Italians are not at all anxious to let themselves be dragged into war for Germany, and even Csáky, in spite of his own strong feelings of friendship for Germany, had to draw attention at Salzburg to Hungary's embarrassment over the German-Polish dispute.⁶

Action Française is the only paper today to mention a German withdrawal, but that is contrary to the Quai d'Orsay's instructions to French and British journalists. Even at the time of the Danzig Note of August 7⁷ in reply to Poland, British journalists had been warned against mentioning a German withdrawal, as I have heard from a reliable informant, but the warmongering anti-Bonnet press had ignored this.

WELCZECK

⁶ For Csáky's conversations on Aug. 8 see vol. vi of this Series, document No. 784.

⁷ See vol. vi of this Series, document No. 780.

No. 31

69/82674

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 618

BERLIN, August 11, 1939.

The Rumanian Minister¹ called on me today to enquire about the situation, as there were so many sinister rumours circulating again in the Diplomatic Corps.

I replied that perhaps the rumours were due to the fact that Rumania, according to today's newspaper reports, had called up ten classes.

When the Minister again made the usual protestations about Rumanian independence and neutrality, I asked him who was actually threatening Rumania; was it perhaps Turkey, or Poland, or Russia, or was it Bulgaria or Hungary that Bucharest was afraid of? Belief in Rumania's neutrality, after she had accepted Britain's guarantee,² was not assured once and for all by the fact that certain reassuring declarations had been made to us in the past. On the contrary, confidence in the neutral attitude of a country like Rumania must be repeatedly won afresh by appropriate actions.

When the Minister asked about German-Polish tension I told him that, as was well known, Germany was not seeking any quarrels.

¹ Radu Crutzescu.

² This guarantee was announced on Apr. 13; see vol. vi of this Series, document No. 189.

But if Rumania wanted to know whether the situation was dangerous or not she must make enquiries in Warsaw from the responsible and non-responsible people who were in power there.

Finally the Minister tried to make it appear as if the attitude of Bulgaria and Hungary towards Rumania depended largely on Berlin. After I had made a fitting reply to this the Minister took his leave, assuring me that he would enquire at home how things stood regarding the call-up of the ten Rumanian classes mentioned at the beginning of the conversation. He would then give me further information.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 32

799/273742

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 619

BERLIN, August 11, 1939.

Ambassador von Moltke has been retained in Berlin according to instructions¹ and is awaiting further orders. He stated personally that while he fully understood the measures taken, he could not help thinking that without him his Embassy could be regarded as a company without its company commander. Herr von Moltke said that I would certainly agree with him that if things became difficult in Warsaw he would not want to leave either his Embassy or the Reich Germans there without his care.

I told Herr von Moltke that I understood his point of view, and would bring it to the notice of the Foreign Minister when further arrangements were being made regarding him.

Submitted to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 2.

No. 33

5558/E396027

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I

BERLIN, August 11, 1939.

zu Pol. I M. 3507 g.¹

Regarding the delivery of submarines to Bulgaria² the Führer decided, when Colonel General Keitel laid the matter before him yesterday, that they should not be handed over for the present. If later it should prove desirable to support Bulgaria, two German submarines were to be despatched if the need arose.

The High Command of the Wehrmacht informs me in this connec-

¹ Not found.

² See document No. 12.

tion that the Navy have some doubts as to whether the rather small submarines could safely be sent, especially through the Dardanelles, in times of tension or conflict. In all probability, therefore, Grand Admiral Raeder will raise the matter again with the Führer.

Submitted herewith to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl.

HEYDEN-RYNSCH

No. 34

5555/E396025

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, August 11, 1939.

With reference to Sofia telegram No. 117¹ received today, I have again made enquiries at the High Command of the Wehrmacht about the position regarding the transfer on loan to Bulgaria of the two German submarines asked for by King Boris. According to earlier statements by the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Admiral Raeder had no objection, but wished to obtain the Führer's decision.

In answer to my enquiry today, the High Command of the Wehrmacht, after further consultation with the Naval Command, stated that the Führer had decided against the transfer.²

Submitted herewith to the State Secretary for the Foreign Minister with the request for instructions on the answer to be given to the Bulgarians.³

WIEHL

¹ Document No. 12.

² See document No. 33.

³ Marginal notes: "W[irtschaftspolitische Abteilung]. Please obtain from the Navy a plausible—preferably technical—reason for refusal. W[eizsäcker] 11 [8]." "Copy of the memorandum and of the [State Secretary's] Note given to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat. Kessel 12/8."

No. 35

533/239103-05

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 11, 1939.

Herr Hailer, the honorary German Consul at Detroit, who was introduced by the German Consul at Cleveland,¹ gave me today the enclosed copy of a letter sent to him by the well-known Father Coughlin.² He showed me the original letter bearing Coughlin's signature. The object of the letter is that Coughlin should be helped in his fight against Roosevelt and the Jews by bringing about a certain alleviation of the position of the Churches in Germany. As

¹ K. Kapp.

² The Rev. Charles E. Coughlin, especially known as a radio preacher.

is well known, Coughlin sent his manager, Leo T. Reardon, to Germany at the beginning of this year, and Herr Sallet³ is familiar with the details of this. Herr Hailer asked whether it would be possible to give him any sort of reassuring message for Coughlin to take with him when he returned to the United States on September 19.

He also referred in general to the need for getting the German point of view recognized in the United States.

Herr Hailer will be calling on me again before he returns to America. I have told him that it will probably be very difficult to formulate any kind of official German declaration for Coughlin.

WOERMANN

[Enclosure]

Copy

July 19, 1939.

.....⁴

Mr. Reardon has retailed to me the conversation you had with him and has also urged me to compose a letter.

After due consideration these thoughts are uppermost in my mind.

1. I am not an official either of the State or of the Church. Consequently, a letter from me is of little or no value.

2. His Holiness Pope Pius XII well understands how necessary it is to combat the international disease of Communism with the supernatural and cure of Christianity. He is most able and diplomatic and understands how to convey important ideas of State far better than do I.

3. From a metaphysical analysis, it appears to me that all doctrines of materialism, although apparently opposed at the moment, inevitably will coalesce and unite. And from a theological analysis it also appears to me that all those who say "Lord, Lord, shall not enter the kingdom of heaven" even though they protest Christianity and that "only those who do the will of My Father Who is in heaven" shall succeed. We are either with Christ or against Christ, as the Scripture says. We either attend to the voice of the apostolic succession or reject it. And "he who heareth you heareth Me".

Certainly there is need for a Christian front to operate under the visible head of Christianity in order to overcome the anti-Christian front operating under the invisible directorate of Satan.

It is a fact that Christians in the United States, generally speaking, do not entertain a friendly attitude towards the Third German Reich because the officers of the Reich have persecuted Christians, if not physically, at least in other ways.

Although the Bolsheviks have persecuted Christians spiritually,

³ Official of the News Service and Press Department of the Foreign Ministry.

⁴ These omission marks appear in the original. The text is in English.

mentally and also physically, we remember that we should fear him who killeth the soul more than the one who killeth the body.

Please do not think that I am argumentative or uncharitable. After all, I am a simple Catholic priest with no jurisdiction outside my parish. As such, I lean implicitly upon the strong support of my ultimate earthly superior, His Holiness Pope Pius XII.

I am just setting down a few reasons why it would be unbecoming for me in my humble position to give counsel when I feel assured the counsel of His Holiness has been rejected in some instances and condemned in others.

Assuring you that it is my constant prayer that the Holy Ghost will enlighten the minds of all rulers and their advisers to the end that mankind will prosper in this world and that human souls will be saved in the next, may I remain,

Cordially yours,

(sgd).....

No. 36

2185/472240

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, August 11, 1939.

Submitted to the State Secretary.

Counsellor Brücklmeier telephoned on behalf of the Foreign Minister to say that the latter's instructions with regard to intercourse with Polish authorities¹ only applied to political conversations, and that on the other hand such normal business as *démarches* on behalf of Reich Germans (arrests, expulsions, indemnification claims) and the handling of current economic affairs are not affected.

ERICH KORDT

¹ See document No. 2 and footnote 3 thereto.

No. 37

52/34957

Memorandum by the State Secretary

[August 11, 1939.]¹

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO FUSCHL FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER, VIA
HERR BRÜCKLMEIER

I assume that the Polish Government's answer of yesterday² as well as our original *démarche* to the Poles³ can be brought to the

¹ Handwritten marginal note: "Sent to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat 11/8.39."

² Document No. 10.

³ Document No. 5.

attention of the more important Missions. However, it seems to me necessary to add supplementary instructions somewhat on these lines:

1. Missions should report if they notice any signs that the Polish Government are making propaganda out of this exchange of views.

2. If our Missions are questioned about the subject of the exchange of views, they should, as usual, emphasize the extremely aggressive tone and line of argument adopted by the Poles.

3. It might be worth considering *taking the initiative* by making use of the exchange of views in a few foreign capitals to stigmatize Polish policy. For this, London, Paris, Madrid and a few small countries could be chosen.⁴

WEIZSÄCKER

⁴ See document No. 57.

No. 38

97/108486

Memorandum by the State Secretary

[August 11, 1939.]¹

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO FUSCHL FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER, VIA HERR BRÜCKLMEIER

According to information here discussions between Greiser and Chodacki are to start on Monday² in the presence of the High Commissioner. I would be glad to be informed of the instructions³ given to Greiser for these discussions. It seems to me that, starting with minor points, the discussions might lead up to the central problem.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Handwritten marginal note: "Sent to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat 11/8.39."

² i.e., Aug. 14; a conversation took place on Aug. 16. See documents Nos. 67 and 72.

³ No record of such instructions has been found.

[EDITORS' NOTE: On August 11 Ciano had a conversation with Ribbentrop in Salzburg before his two interviews with Hitler at Berchtesgaden (for which see documents Nos. 43 and 47). No German record of this Ciano-Ribbentrop conversation has been found; for Ciano's account see *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 1, also the *Ciano Diaries*, entry of Aug. 11.]

No. 39

7891/E571536

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 170 of August 12

Moscow, August 12, 1939—7:13 p.m.

Received August 12—7:30 p.m.

Pol. II 2872.

With reference to my telegram No. 169 of August 11.¹

Today's Soviet press publishes in the forefront of the foreign political news and under large headlines, the Tass communiqué on the arrival of the British and French Military Missions in Moscow, the reception of the Heads of the Military Missions by Molotov in the presence of the British and French Ambassadors² and of Potemkin,³ the reception of the British and French Military Missions by Voroshilov⁴ and Shaposhnikov,⁵ and the dinner given by the Soviet Military Delegation⁶ in honour of the members of the British and French Military Missions, which was attended, not only by five members of the Soviet Military Delegation, but also by Budenny, Commander of the Moscow military district, Kovalev, Commander of the White Russian military district, Timoshenko, Commander of the Kiev military district, the British and French Ambassadors, and the British and French Service Attachés in Moscow. The communiqué on the dinner mentions that friendly toasts were exchanged between Voroshilov and the Heads of the British and French Military Missions.

The opening session took place this morning.⁷ The actual discussions are to begin on Monday, August 14.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 29.

² Sir William Seeds and M. Paul Naggiar.

³ Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

⁴ People's Commissar for Defence.

⁵ Chief of the General Staff.

⁶ The delegation also included Admiral Kuznetsov, People's Commissar for the Navy, General Loktionov, C-in-C. of the Air Force, and Smorodinov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

⁷ See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. vi, No. 638.

No. 40

169/82675

The Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 334 of August 12

BUCHAREST, August 12, 1939—7:45 p.m.

Received August 13—2:00 a.m.

Gafencu has just shown me a circular telegram sent to *all* Embassies and Legations as a result of State Secretary von Weizsäcker's con-

versation with Minister Crutzesco.¹ This telegram states that the troop concentrations have no aggressive purpose whatever, and are only a preparation for the August manoeuvres, the date of which was fixed months ago.² The Rumanian army, it says, is an instrument of peace.

Referring to the King's tour,³ Gafencu informed me that the King's stay at Istanbul, on the return journey, had been considerably shortened so as to make it clear that it was a pleasure trip. There had been a conversation with the President of Turkey, as the latter was staying at Istanbul at the time. Gafencu denied the rumour that the British Ambassador⁴ had been received.

The King arrives in Bucharest at 4 o'clock this afternoon.

STELZER

¹ See document No. 31.

² In telegram No. 335 of Aug. 15 (not printed, 169/82679), Stelzer stated that the present troop concentrations were greater than those in March and that, by Aug. 20, 600,000 men would be under arms.

³ King Carol left for a cruise in Greek waters in the latter half of July. He visited Istanbul on July 27 and again on Aug. 11.

⁴ Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen.

No. 41

350/202127

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Military Mission at Bratislava

High Command of the Wehrmacht BERLIN, August 12, 1939.
No. 8636/39 geh. Ausl. III L/d.

After a report by the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht on August 10, 1939, the Führer and Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht has decided that:

1. a) It is not necessary to make the Slovaks agree to a definite *maximum limit for the strength of their war-time Army.*

b) They may also be allowed to retain arms for a maximum strength of 125,000 men, plus reserves for losses (for 25,000 men).

2. In transmitting the above, however:

a) It should be pointed out to the Slovaks quite plainly how far-reaching these concessions are; furthermore, it should be stated clearly that:

b) There will be no reinforcements and replacements for arms and ammunition at present in the hands of the Slovak Armed Forces, as manufacture has been discontinued.

c) It is still intended to re-equip the Slovak Armed Forces on the German model in the near future. Replacements and supplies of ammunition for this purpose will remain in German hands.

3. Appropriate agreements are to be concluded with the Slovak Government on this basis.

4. Subsequently discussions on: *a*) the development of the Slovak Armed Forces, and *b*) their cooperation with those of Germany, will have to be conducted with the Slovak military authorities by the Military and Air Force Missions.¹

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht:
KEITEL

¹ Copies of this document were circulated for information to the Wehrmacht offices concerned, the Naval War Staff, and to the Foreign Ministry.

No. 42

2318/548702-03

The Deutsche Stiftung¹ to the Foreign Ministry²

2092

BERLIN, August 12, 1939.

Received August 14.

Pol. V 7787.

Senator Hasbach³ had a conversation in Warsaw with Ministerialdirektor Zyborski⁴ at which he had intended to discuss the complaints made by the German national group about the present oppression and persecution, making use of a memorandum⁵ which had been given to him. However, no discussion of these details was possible because M. Zyborski, referring to the general political situation, refused to enter into any discussion of this kind. For over an hour he expounded to Senator Hasbach the view that it was surprising that the German national group thought they could bring up any kind of individual complaints at this moment. After all, the Poles knew very well what were Berlin's intentions. They had long ceased to be concerned with the questions of Danzig and the *Autobahn* which the Führer had once broached,⁶ but intended a complete partition of Poland. By means of a map of Poland showing the areas where the different nationalities were settled, Zyborski explained what, according to reports in Warsaw, were Berlin's intentions for partition. He said that Berlin intended to carry out a new delimitation by a curved line running from East Prussia to Upper Silesia, and passing close to the gates of Warsaw; after that Galicia, as one of the old Austrian Crown Lands and, naturally, the Duchy of Teschen were the German objectives.

¹ The Deutsche Stiftung, of which the signatory of this document, Erich Krahmer-Möllenberg, was the head, was an organization which provided school funds for *Volksdeutsch* groups. See also vol. v of this Series, document No. 85, footnote 2.

² Addressed to the Cultural Policy Department, Division A (dealing with *Volksdeutsche*), with a copy for Pol. V; this report was also addressed to the Minister of the Interior and to the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle.

³ A member of the Polish Senate, and a leading representative of the German national group.

⁴ Marginal note in Bergmann's handwriting: "Of the [Polish] Ministry of the Interior."

⁵ Not found.

⁶ See vol. v of this Series, document No. 119, and vol. vi, documents Nos. 61 and 101.

The Germans were prepared to hand over the remaining territories to Russia. When Hasbach objected that there were, after all, some twenty million Poles, who must be allowed the right to exist politically, Zyborski answered quite seriously that Warsaw was convinced that, in agreement with Moscow, it was planned to resettle the Poles in Siberia. Hasbach tried to explain to him the absurdity of these alleged Berlin plans, but met with determined opposition and the often repeated argument that Warsaw had its own information, and that it was surprising that a man like Hasbach, who had such good connections in Berlin, apparently knew nothing of these German plans. Zyborski said that Hasbach must surely realize that, in face of the fourth partition of Poland started by the Reich, the Polish people would defend themselves with all the means at their command. It was, in these circumstances, quite self-evident that any individual desires which the German national group in Poland might have could not be discussed in any way.⁷

KRAHMER-MÖLLENBERG

⁷ Marginal notes: "First submitted herewith for information through Under State Secretary, Political Department, to the State Secretary and the Foreign Minister's Secretariat. Bergmann 15/8." On a separate sheet (2818/548704) is stamped: "Submitted to the Foreign Minister", and in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]".

No. 43

F5/0084-102

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

SALZBURG, August 12, 1939.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, COUNT CIANO, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE OBERSALZBERG ON AUGUST 12, 1939.¹

The Führer opened the conversation by explaining to Count Ciano, by means of maps, the present position of Germany from the military point of view. In particular he stressed the strength of Germany's Western fortifications. In the West there were three points for a break through, and in former times the French had always attempted to break through there for geographical and strategic reasons; but these points had now been protected with special care, so that a break through appeared impossible there too. Besides, Western defences had also been constructed along the Luxembourg-Belgian frontier right up to the Dutch frontier, so that a violation of Belgian neutrality would no longer mean any military advantages for France, but at most would entail the risk of Belgium joining Germany in order to

¹ See also Editors' Note, p. 35.

defend Belgian neutrality and also on account of pressure from the Flemish section of the population. Thus, in theory, the only remaining possibility of attack was through the Netherlands. But, in the Führer's opinion, the Netherlands, too, would defend their neutrality energetically, because they knew that by participating in a general conflict they would lose to Japan their Far Eastern colonies, which were practically undefended. Moreover, because of the numerous rivers and canals and the possibility of flooding large stretches of the land below sea level, the Netherlands were completely unsuitable terrain for the deployment of a major army. In the event of any violation of Dutch neutrality, Germany would naturally enter the country at once, and, in view of the very slight distance from the German frontier to the Meuse, Germany would be able to advance right up to the Meuse within a few hours. Besides, the Rhine, which in Holland was 1 to 1½ kilometres wide, provided a natural defence against attacks from this direction.

The third possibility of attacking Germany was a blockade by the English Navy. However, it should be borne in mind that the blockading ships could be attacked from the air from Germany, since, as a result of the long range of the latest German bombers, the whole of England was within reach of attack by the German Luftwaffe. There were no further possibilities of any kind for attacking Germany. The Northern countries would doubtless remain neutral, and were also safe from attack from any quarter because the occupation of such large territories as Norway and Sweden could scarcely enter into consideration. In the same way Switzerland would be certain to defend her neutrality to the utmost against any intruder.

Germany had also constructed strong fortifications in the East. The Führer showed Ciano the various systems of fortifications in East Prussia (Königsberg, the Heilsberg triangle and the frontier fortifications). There were also strong fortifications under construction on the remaining Reich frontiers (Grenzmark, Silesia), which, especially on the Polish frontier opposite Berlin, had been extended to form an impregnable system of lines one behind the other. Berlin, however, which was only 150 kilometres from the Polish frontier, was very much exposed to air attacks, especially since the great expanse of Berlin (28 kilometres north to south and 45 kilometres east to west) rendered possible the bombing of the city from a very great height (8000 to 9000 metres) without any definite targets being attacked, but with the certainty that the bombs would fall somewhere in the city area.

Passing on to the military situation of the Western Powers and Poland, the Führer again drew attention to England's vulnerability from the air. Although aircraft production had made progress, anti-aircraft defence was nevertheless still greatly in arrears. He knew

that England had not decided upon a certain type of anti-aircraft gun until last autumn, and, from his own seven years of rearmament, he had enough experience to know that production on a major scale was only possible a considerable while after a prototype had been selected, so that an effective anti-aircraft defence could not emerge in England under from one to two years' time. Besides, the same disadvantage applied to London, and the big cities and industrial centres, as to Berlin in relation to Polish air attacks: namely that bombing from great heights, which would certainly find its mark within the general target area, could be carried out with complete impunity out of range of England's anti-aircraft guns, dating as they do from the last war.

At sea, England had, at the moment, still achieved no increase. Of the ships under construction, the first units could not be put into commission for some time. As far as the army was concerned, since the introduction of conscription, 60,000 men had now been called up. If England retained the requisite troops on her own soil, she would be able, at most, to place two infantry divisions and one armoured division at the disposal of France. In addition, she would be able to transfer a few bomber squadrons but no fighter squadrons to France, since, at the outbreak of war, the German fleet would immediately attack England, and English fighter planes would be urgently required for the defence of their own country.

With regard to the position of France, the Führer observed that, in the event of a general conflict, after the defeat of Poland, which could be expected within a short time, Germany would be in a position to concentrate 100 divisions on the West Wall, which would force France to concentrate all her available forces from the colonies, the Italian frontier, and elsewhere, on her own Maginot Line for the life and death struggle which would then commence. Furthermore, he was of the opinion that it was no more possible for the French to overrun the Italian fortifications than the West Wall.

At this point Count Ciano showed signs of being very doubtful.

The quality of the Polish army was extremely uneven. Alongside a few crack divisions there was a host of units of inferior quality. Poland's anti-tank and anti-aircraft defences were very weak. At present France and England could send her no supplies. But, if Poland were given economic assistance by the West over a fairly long period, she could secure these arms, and Germany's superiority would thereby be diminished. Over and against the fanatics in Warsaw and Cracow there was a rural population in other districts which was quite indifferent. Furthermore, the composition of the population of the Polish State should be taken into account: of the 34 million inhabitants there were 1½ million Germans, some 4 million Jews and approximately 9 million Ukrainians, so that considerably less than the total population were actual Poles, and, as he had already said, even the

fighting qualities of the Poles could not be considered uniform. In these circumstances, Poland would be defeated by Germany in a very short time.

As Poland's whole attitude made it plain that in any conflict she would always be on the side of the opponents of Germany and Italy, her speedy liquidation could only be an advantage at the present moment in the inevitable clash with the Western democracies. If a hostile Poland remained in existence on Germany's Eastern frontier, then there would be tied up not only the eleven East Prussian divisions, but also further contingents in Pomerania and Silesia, which would not be the case if Poland had been previously liquidated. Speaking in purely general terms, it would be much the best if the false neutrals were liquidated one after the other. This could be done comparatively simply if one Axis partner covered the other each time one partner was engaged in disposing of an unreliable neutral, and *vice versa*. For Italy, Yugoslavia should probably be regarded as one of these unreliable neutrals. On the occasion of the visit of the Prince Regent,² the Führer, with Italy particularly in mind, had suggested to Prince Paul that he should clarify his political attitude towards the Axis by means of some gesture. The Führer had had in mind a closer link with the Axis and Yugoslavia's withdrawal from the League of Nations. The latter Prince Paul had promised. The Prince Regent had been in London recently³ and had sought guarantees from the Western Powers. This was a repetition of experiences with Gafencu, who had also been extremely reasonable on his visit to Germany⁴ and had disclaimed any interest in the aims of the Western democracies. Afterwards, however, as was learned later, he had adopted the opposite point of view when in England. The only one of the Balkan countries on which the Axis could entirely depend was Bulgaria, who was, as it were, the natural ally of Italy and Germany. For this reason Germany had helped Bulgaria as much as possible with supplies of arms, and would also continue to do so. Yugoslavia would only remain neutral as long as it was dangerous to go over openly to the side of the Western democracies. As soon as matters took a turn for the worse for Germany and Italy, Yugoslavia would go over openly to the other side in the hope of thereby giving the course of events a final turn to the disadvantage of the Axis. Rumania was afraid of Hungary, and was extremely weak militarily and corrupt internally. King Carol would doubtless not abandon his neutrality unless it was necessary.

Hungary was friendly, and Slovakia was under German influence and even had German garrisons in some parts of the country.

² June 1-5, 1939. See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 474.

³ July 17-Aug. 2, 1939. See document No. 17.

⁴ Apr. 18-20. See vol. VI of this Series, documents Nos. 227 and 234.

Reverting to the Danzig question the Führer explained that it was impossible for him to yield here. He had agreed with Italy that the Germans should be withdrawn from the South Tyrol,⁵ but for this very reason he was now obliged to avoid at all costs anything which might give the impression that the withdrawal of the Germans from the South Tyrol constituted a precedent which could be applied in other territories. Besides, his justification to the German people for the withdrawal of these Germans from Italy was the general trend of German policy towards the East and North-East. The East and North-East, i.e., the countries on the Baltic Sea, had been Germany's undisputed sphere of influence from time immemorial, just as the Mediterranean was Italy's peculiar sphere. For economic reasons, too, Germany needed the grain and timber producing lands of these Eastern regions. In the case of Danzig, it was not purely material interests which were at stake, although this city was the greatest Baltic port. The turnover in tonnage amounted to 40 per cent of Hamburg's. Danzig, the Nuremberg of the North, was an ancient German city, which aroused sentimental feelings in every German, and it was precisely this psychological element which also forced the Führer to take popular feeling into account. In order to make the situation more comprehensible to the Italian mind, Count Ciano should try to imagine Trieste in Yugoslav hands and a strong Italian minority on Yugoslav soil being treated with brutal force. It could hardly be assumed that Italy would tolerate that for long.

Count Ciano replied to the Führer's statement by referring first to Italy's great surprise at the entirely unexpected gravity of the situation. No indication had been given by Germany, either in the conversations at Milan,⁶ or in the talks during his visit to Berlin,⁷ that the situation in respect of Poland was so grave. On the contrary the Reich Foreign Minister had stated that, in his opinion, the Danzig question would be settled in due course. On the basis of this state of affairs, the Duce, faithful to his conviction that a clash with the Western democracies was inevitable, had set himself the task of making his preparations for this contingency, and had made his plans to spread over a definite period of from two to three years. If a conflict now were inescapable, Italy, as the Duce had again emphasized on Count Ciano's departure, would naturally be entirely on Germany's side, but for various reasons, which had been set forth in detail, she would welcome the postponement of a general conflict to a later date.

Count Ciano then described, with the aid of a map, the position of Italy on the outbreak of a general conflict. Italy, he explained,

⁵ See *ibid.*, documents Nos. 143, 163, 318 and 562.

⁶ On May 6 and 7. See *ibid.*, document No. 341.

⁷ May 21-22, for the signing of the German-Italian Pact of Friendship and Alliance. See *ibid.*, document No. 426. See also the *Ciano Diaries*, entries of May 21 and 22.

believed that a conflict with Poland would not remain limited to that country but would develop into a general European war.

In reply, the Führer observed that this was the point on which opinions differed. He personally was absolutely convinced that the Western democracies would, in the last resort, recoil from unleashing a general war.

Count Ciano replied that he hoped the Führer would prove right but he did not believe it. In any case they ought, in their calculations, to allow for the most unfavourable contingency, i.e., a general conflict. Since the conflict in Abyssinia, Italy had, as a matter of fact, constantly lived in a sort of state of war, and was therefore in urgent need of a respite. By means of detailed figures, Count Ciano demonstrated how great Italy's material efforts had been, especially in the Spanish war. Italy's stocks of raw materials were completely exhausted. She must have time to replenish her stores.

Italy would also have to transfer her war industries to the South in order better to defend them, as they were all in exposed positions. In the same way Italian artillery, especially the anti-aircraft branch, was very much in need of modernization. The long coastline and other exposed places were quite inadequately defended.

The strength of her fleet was also extremely unfavourable. At the moment, Italy had only two battleships to set against the eleven or twelve battleships of England and France combined, whereas in a few years' time a total of eight battleships would be available.

Here the Führer interposed that England and France too would certainly have additional battleships of 35,000 and 40,000 tons at their disposal.

Count Ciano drew attention to the long Italian coastline which was difficult to defend, and the numerous bases available to the Anglo-French fleets, with special reference to the Greek ports.

Italy was especially vulnerable at present in her colonies. Libya was indeed difficult to attack from Egypt, but afforded the possibility of advancing towards Mersa Matruh. On the other hand, the situation in Tunis was quite different. The ratio of the Italian and French Arab population was 1:20, while the strength of the white troops was 1:5 against Italy. Furthermore, the Italian fortifications facing the French frontier were completely inadequate. New armoured turrets had only been delivered a short time ago.

Abyssinia was practically pacified except for certain districts along the frontier facing English territories, where the English were fomenting difficulties among the population by means of money and propaganda; only on the surface was everything calm. In a general conflict, leaflets dropped by a few English aircraft over Abyssinia, saying that the world had risen against Italy and that the Negus would return, would be sufficient to cause a revolt by the Abyssinians to

flare up again. Furthermore, in the event of a conflict, Abyssinia would be completely cut off from the mother country, and the fate of the 200,000 Italians in Abyssinia would be entirely uncertain. In a few years' time an army of 400,000 to 500,000 men would be available to be stationed in Abyssinia, and, in the event of a conflict then, such an army could advance successfully against the Sudan, Kenya and French Somaliland.

The Dodecanese Islands would be in difficulties because of the attitude of Turkey. Leros and Rhodes would, however, defend themselves for years.

Albania was a completely undeveloped country, and would only provide an effective base for operations against the Balkans in some years' time. Roads would first have to be built, and the mineral wealth (iron, copper, chrome and petroleum) developed, then, as the Führer had briefly hinted, a successful advance on Salonika and in other directions in the Balkans, as it were along the five fingers of an outstretched hand, could be contemplated.

In the economic field, Italy had plans for autarky which could only be realized after some years, and would then place Italy in a position to last out even a lengthy war without difficulties. A further reason for the Duce's desire to postpone the conflict was the Italians abroad, who were to be systematically brought back to Italy. There were a million Italians living in France, approximately 700,000 of whom were lost to Italy for good. The remaining 300,000 would be used by France as hostages in the event of a conflict, as had already become evident from several measures adopted in France last September.

Furthermore, the Duce personally attached great importance to holding, according to plan, the World Exhibition of 1942, for which Italy was making great preparations and from which she was hoping for favourable results in the economic sphere, especially with regard to receipts of foreign exchange.

However, apart from these considerations based on Italy's position itself, considerations of a general political nature also favoured the postponement of a general conflict. The Duce was convinced that the Western democracies' system of encirclement would doubtless function at the present moment. But once a certain period of time had elapsed, the sources of friction and the seeds of disunity among the partners in the encirclement front would again become very apparent and would gradually cause the front to disintegrate.

Furthermore, the Duce was convinced that the present confident mood in England and France could not last for long. Soon the *union sacrée*, particularly in France, would give way to party strife provided that the Axis remained quiet for a time. At all events it was at present due to the Axis alone that domestic quarrels were buried in the countries concerned.

Japan's position would also be considerably strengthened by the ending of the China conflict which was to be expected in two years' time, while Roosevelt's position in America would be greatly shaken after a period of calm in foreign affairs, so that he could not be elected President for a third term, as would assuredly be the case if a conflict were to break out in the immediate future.

Spain, which had just got a pro-Axis Government (Serrano Suñer, Beigbeder),⁸ needed a respite after the Civil War, but in two to three years' time she would be on the side of the Axis as a power factor that could not be ignored. Thus, for example, within two years Spain would build four battleships of 35,000 tons, plans for which had recently been brought to Spain by an Italian General. They were to be built at El Ferrol.

For these reasons the Duce was most anxious (*le Duce insiste*) that a gesture should be made by the Axis which would reaffirm the peaceful intentions of Italy and Germany. This could be done by issuing a communiqué, which Count Ciano had already transmitted to the Reich Foreign Minister the day before, and which he submitted anew in the following English (and French) version:⁹

"The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Reich, Mr. von Ribbentrop, and the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Galeazzo Ciano, have examined—in the course of their conversations at Salzburg—the general situation in Europe and the problems concerning the common policy of the two allied countries.

"The two Foreign Ministers were able to realize once again on this occasion, the perfect identity of views existing between their Governments, and reaffirm the common decision of Germany and Italy to resist the policy of encirclement promoted by the great democracies and to defend their vital rights, opposing by force any attempt of aggression directed against them.

"At the same time the Foreign Minister of the Reich and the Italian Foreign Minister wished to reaffirm the peaceful intentions of their Governments, and thoughtful of the destinies of Europe, they agreed to state that, according to their opinion, it is still possible to reach—through normal diplomatic negotiations between the various interested Governments—a satisfying solution of the problems which trouble, in such a serious way, the life of Europe."

With regard to his draft communiqué Count Ciano stated that at first the Duce had had in mind the proposal for a conference.¹⁰ He

⁸ Ministers of the Interior and Foreign Affairs respectively in the new Government, which was formed on Aug. 10.

⁹ The text which follows is in English in the original; no French version has been found. See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. xii, Nos. 808 and 810.

¹⁰ See vol. vi of this Series, documents Nos. 718 and 737.

had not remained deaf to the Führer's misgivings¹¹ and was now submitting another more moderate proposal which the Duce was very anxious to have accepted.

Concerning the plan for a conference, the Führer stated that Russia could no longer be excluded from future meetings of the Powers. During the Russo-German talks the Russians, referring to Munich and other occasions on which they had been excluded, had let it be understood that in future they would not tolerate this. Besides the four Great Powers, not only Russia but also Poland would have to be included at such a conference. But this meant that Italy, Germany and Spain would face a front consisting of England, France, Russia and Poland, which was certainly an unfavourable position.

Count Ciano replied that the Duce was of the opinion that the one who would gain at a conference was the one who was prepared, if need be, to let the conference fail and accept the consequences, even if that meant war. Furthermore the Duce had taken the Führer's misgivings into account and had modified his proposal. In a gesture for peace by Italy and Germany such as that contained in this proposal, he saw an advantage in that the Western Powers, who internally were certainly not prepared for war, but would, the Duce was convinced—on the basis of very reliable reports from the democracies—certainly start one at the present moment if they were, so to speak, driven to the wall by the Axis and saw no other way out [*sic*]. The proposed gesture by Germany and Italy constituted an honourable way out for the Western Powers of which they would assuredly make use; for warnings against war were being widely circulated and such views would naturally be considerably strengthened by a peace gesture. That meant, however, that Poland, from whom the Western Powers would then doubtless draw away, would after a time be isolated and would be obliged to accept reasonable solutions of existing difficulties.

The Führer replied that no time should be lost in solving the Polish problem. The further autumn advanced, the more difficult military operations in Eastern Europe would become. Because of the weather conditions, very little use could be made of the Luftwaffe in these territories from the middle of September, while it would also be impossible to employ motorized forces owing to the state of the roads, which rapidly became a morass after the rains which start in the autumn. From September to May, Poland was one vast swamp and completely unsuitable for any military operations. Thus Poland could simply occupy Danzig in October—and she probably intended to do so—without Germany being able to do anything at all to prevent it; for there was naturally no question of bombing and destroying Danzig.

¹¹ No record has been found in the German archives, but see *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XII, Nos. 717 and 732.

Count Ciano asked by what date the Führer thought the Danzig question would have to be settled. The Führer replied that this settlement would have to be made one way or the other by the end of August. In reply to Ciano's question as to what solution the Führer envisaged, the latter said that Poland must give up Danzig politically, but that at the same time her economic interests would naturally be safeguarded, and that, furthermore, she must also by her general attitude contribute towards removing the tension. He doubted whether Poland would be prepared to do this, for hitherto she had rejected Germany's proposals. The Führer had personally made these proposals to Beck on the occasion of the latter's visit to Obersalzberg.¹² They had been extremely favourable to Poland. In exchange for the political return of Danzig to Germany, with full preservation of Polish economic interests, and the establishment of a link between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany had promised a frontier guarantee, a twenty-five-year pact of friendship, and that Poland should have a share in influence on Slovakia. At the time Beck had taken cognizance of the proposal with the remark that he would study it. The brusque rejection of this had come only as a consequence of English intervention. What Poland's other objectives were could be seen quite clearly from the press. The whole of East Prussia was to be taken, it was intended to advance as far as Berlin, etc. It was unbearable for a Great Power to have to tolerate perpetually such a hostile neighbour only 150 kilometres from her capital. The Führer was therefore determined to utilize the opportunity provided by the next act of political provocation—be it in the form of an ultimatum, brutal maltreatment of Germans in Poland, an attempt to starve Danzig out, an entry of Polish troops into Danzig territory, or anything of that kind—to attack Poland within forty-eight hours and solve the problem in that way. This would constitute a considerable strengthening of the Axis, just as the liquidation of Yugoslavia by Italy would constitute a considerable increase in Axis power.

Count Ciano asked when such an operation against Poland was to be expected, since Italy would naturally have to be prepared for all eventualities. The Führer replied that in the present circumstances a move against Poland must be expected at any moment.

During this exchange of views the Führer was handed a telegram from Moscow¹³ and one from Tokyo.¹⁴ The conversation was interrupted for a short time and Count Ciano was then informed of

¹² Jan. 5, 1939. See vol. v of this Series, document No. 119.

¹³ No telegram from Moscow corresponding to the ensuing description has been found. The document in question may have been a teleprint from the Foreign Ministry reporting Schnurre's conversation with Astakhov, which took place on Saturday, Aug. 12. See document No. 50.

¹⁴ Possibly document No. 25.

the contents of the Moscow telegram. The Russians agreed to a German political negotiator being sent to Moscow. The Reich Foreign Minister added that the Russians were fully informed about Germany's designs on Poland. He himself, on orders from the Führer, had informed the Russian Chargé d'Affaires.¹⁵

Regarding this, the Führer remarked that in his opinion Russia would not be prepared to pull the Western Powers' chestnuts out of the fire. Stalin's position was just as much in danger from a victorious as from a defeated Russian army. Russia was at the most interested in extending her access to the Baltic Sea. Germany had no objection to this. Besides, Russia would probably never intervene on behalf of Poland whom she thoroughly detested. The sole purpose of sending the Anglo-French Military Mission to Moscow was to conceal the catastrophic state of the political negotiations.

After further conversation on Count Ciano's proposal for a communiqué, the Führer stated that he wished to think over this proposal for a day, as also Count Ciano's remarks on the general situation, and therefore proposed that the negotiations should be resumed the next day.¹⁶

[SCHMIDT]¹⁷

¹⁵ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 760.

¹⁶ For Ciano's record, which gives the time of this conversation as 2:30-5:45 p.m., see *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 4; see also the *Ciano Diaries*, entry of Aug. 12, 1939.

¹⁷ Taken from another copy (66/46650-65).

No. 44

2822/548934-35

Unsigned Memorandum

August 12, 1939.
e.o. Pol. V 7974.

NOTE FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER

The Secretary of the German-Polish Society, Party Member Boening, met Colonel Kara, the Polish Consul-General here, and the Secretary of Legation at the Embassy, Kraczkiewicz, at the Eden Hotel today. They at once engaged him in conversation. Boening tried to divert the conversation to a few technical questions of publication connected with the German-Polish Society. Kara seized this opportunity to persuade Boening that he must certainly go to Warsaw to clear up this question. When Boening agreed, the two Poles tried to convince him of the necessity of conducting a few political conversations in Warsaw. They said that in these critical times the German-Polish Society should certainly not neglect its most important function of establishing contacts in order to clear up misunderstandings.

Kara emphasized that it was possible at any time to discuss Danzig, the Corridor highway and other questions with Poland, but that because of its form and timing the Reich Foreign Minister's offer had at the time been unacceptable to Poland for reasons of prestige.

Therefore new ways of getting over this matter of prestige would have to be found. Poland had long realized that a new and final formula must be found between Germany and Poland both for Danzig and for transit through the Corridor.

Boening said that he had no authority to conduct conversations of this kind, but Kara tried to convince him that these conversations could be arranged in Warsaw as purely chance meetings. He would mention this in suitable form to his friend, Under State Secretary Arciszewski and to *Chef de Cabinet* Count Lubinski, or even to the Deputy Director of the Western Department, Kunici.

Boening broke off the conversation assuring them that he would be very glad to see the three gentlemen, whom he knew, again but that he himself could make no decision about his visit, and moreover he did not believe that he could undertake such an important part in the present political dispute.¹

¹ This memorandum was sent to Bergmann for information on behalf of Dr. Kleist of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop on Aug. 14 (2822/548933), and passed on by Bergmann through Schliep to Under State Secretary Woermann for information.

[EDITORS' NOTE: On August 12, 1939, the Treaty on the Zone of Protection was signed at Bratislava by Minister Bernard and Lt. General Barckhausen on behalf of the German Reich, and by the Slovak Minister President, Tiso (not printed, 8296/E589162-82 and 8296/E589192-99).

The Treaty consists of four Sections, Section I demarcating the zone of protection. Within this zone, Section II defines the military sovereign rights of the German Wehrmacht and the sovereign rights left to the Slovak State and provides for Germany's jurisdiction over her nationals, Section III lays down rules on the employment of personnel and material in, and on the payment for, the construction of fortifications, and Section IV contains provisions for the settlement of differences arising from the application of the Treaty.

The German Wehrmacht's military sovereign rights specified in Section II include the right to requisition public and private premises, to use all means and lines of transportation, and to supervise armaments factories working for Germany.

The rights of the Slovak armed forces within the zone of protection were, as provided for under Section II of the Treaty, defined in a special agreement which was signed on August 13 (not printed, 8296/E589155-61).]

No. 45

96/107941-42

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 230 of August 13

TARABYA (Beyoglu),

August 13, 1939—5:10 p.m.

Received August 13—9:35 p.m.

The Italian Ambassador¹ agrees with me in noting an ever-increasing scepticism regarding the Anglo-Turkish alliance² owing to the Western Powers' inability to deliver war material, and above all because of the uncertainty as to the outcome of the Moscow negotiations.

Assuming a decisive victory for German arms at the beginning of a possible conflict, it is quite conceivable that Turkey, who is as yet not bound by written agreements, might revise her policy, especially if there were no need for us to intervene in the Balkans.

In order not to destroy this possibility, I request that, in instructions relative to negotiations concerning the war material which is not to be delivered, a certain amount of latitude be given me. The Naval Attaché³ reports that engines in Denmark⁴ for the submarine under construction here are not to be delivered. In contrast to the refusal to deliver war material constructed in Germany, a refusal easily explained by the present situation, it would cause exceedingly bad blood here if work on the half-finished submarine had to be stopped.

General Assim⁵ asked the Military Attaché⁶ to avoid anything which would inevitably lead to ultimate Turkish-German estrangement. The Naval Attaché believes that after all this submarine will not be ready to put to sea for nine months, and that continuation of our deliveries would not be prejudicial to us from a military point of view.

PAPEN

¹ Ottavio de Peppo.

² The Anglo-Turkish Declaration of May 12 (see vol. vi of this Series, Editors' Note, p. 483) envisaged the conclusion of a definite long-term agreement.

³ Rear-Admiral von der Marwitz.

⁴ The Ankara draft (2361/488855) here reads "ordered in Denmark". See also vol. vi of this Series, document No. 782.

⁵ Lt. Gen. Asim Gündüz, Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

⁶ Col. Rohde.

No. 46

52/34973-74

*The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland*¹

Telegram

No. 215

BERLIN, August 13, 1939.

Drafting Officer: Legationssekretär Dr. Staudacher²

In view of the present political development in German-Polish relations the establishment and wide extension of a system of daily press telegrams as well as the most assiduous collection and transmission of news will be the most urgent task of the Mission.

Press reports should give not only a short survey of the attitude of the press in general, but above all reproduce as extensively as possible opinions expressed in the Polish press which could be turned to political advantage in our press, and in this connection smaller newspapers and periodicals in your district are also to be included. What is useful for our press policy can be seen by careful study of the German press. Accordingly reports are to be made of all anti-German utterances, war-mongering, and aggressively annexationist opinions, defence of Versailles, abandonment of earlier political points of view, effects of Anglo-French incitement, relevant quotations from the foreign press in Polish papers, as well as reports of action against the German community in Poland, etc.

Furthermore, without prejudice to the general political reports from the Embassy, information of particular interest for our press policy—such as significant domestic events, popular feeling, persecution of Germans, oppressions of Ukrainians, public speeches, assemblies, proclamations, etc.—is to be transmitted without delay in report form to Referat P.V Spez. of the Foreign Ministry, either by telephone or telegram. By night transmission should be to the Press Department's night service.

Closest coordination in work with German correspondents and DNB representatives on the spot is required so that the burden of their positions and their work of reporting may be eased to a certain extent. The most important reports from the point of view of press policy are to be transmitted by your Mission as far as is practicable.

You should at once so intensify and organize the collection of news from all available sources, that, in the event of difficulties arising from a state of tension, your Mission will at least be in a position to give current information. The introduction of an augmented courier service is being considered. Repeated to consulates.

¹ Also sent to the Consulates General in Toruń, Poznań and Katowice, and to the Consulates in Teschen, Lodz, Cracow and Lwów.

² Head of Division V of the News Service and Press Department (P.V).

Extra expenses arising from, or necessitated by, the execution of the above instructions will be borne by the Foreign Ministry and are to be charged with reference to the above order.³

WEIZSÄCKER

³ Typewritten marginal note: "This telegram is issued in execution of an urgent special order from the Foreign Minister to Secretary of Legation Dr. Staudacher to organize all information from Poland in a special section in the Foreign Ministry in such a way that from here the most comprehensive material best suited for purposes of press policy can from now on be submitted to the Foreign Minister and then to the Führer. At the same time measures are to be taken at once to ensure that the flow of news from Poland is kept up, even though, as is already being experienced, German press representatives and agencies should be increasingly hampered or their work completely paralysed. Woermann."

No. 47

F5/0055-60

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

SALZBURG, August 13, 1939.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND COUNT
CIANO IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AT
OBERSALZBERG ON AUGUST 13, 1939.¹

In his opening remarks the Führer stated that he had once more fully considered the whole situation since the last conversation. The Reich Foreign Minister had informed him in the meantime that, in the prevailing circumstances, Count Ciano agreed that no communiqué should be issued at the conclusion of the conversation. The Führer was also of the opinion that this was the best course. The door would thus remain open for all parties, no one would be committed, and no project would be prevented.

Besides, after reflection, he had come in principle to the same conclusion as that which he had stated in yesterday's conversation, namely that there was a risk of drifting too far into the autumn, so that Poland would find the way open for the achievement of her comparatively limited objectives. She could, by slow blackmail, reduce Danzig to a state of submission, and for such action the terms of the Treaty were extremely favourable for Poland. Danzig could be slowly strangled and exposed to economic ruin, even famine. Danzig could be occupied by Poland without difficulty from the second half of September and especially from the beginning of October onwards. The reconquest of the Corridor and Danzig by Germany would follow, but major military operations would no longer be possible at that time of the year. This would reduce Danzig to ruins. It would no longer be possible for Germany to employ the heavy motorized forces which were required for a deep thrust into Poland.

¹ For the record of the previous conversation see document No. 43.

In the event of a hard winter it might indeed be possible to carry out certain military operations, but the fact that both the advanced landing grounds and the normal airfields would become fogbound and waterlogged rendered any commitment of the Luftwaffe impossible. If German airfields were used, flights would be greatly lengthened, the petrol consumption increased and bomb loads considerably reduced. It was therefore of decisive importance, firstly, that within the shortest possible time Poland should make her intentions plain, and secondly, that no further acts of provocation of any sort should be tolerated by Germany. If acts of provocation were passed over now they would have to be tolerated all the more in October, when the tanks and the Luftwaffe could no longer be used. This weakness of Germany, conditioned by the seasons, was very well known to the Polish General Staff and that was why Poland was playing for time. The Führer had thus arrived at two conclusions:

1. If there were any fresh act of provocation, he would take swift action.

2. If Poland did not make her political attitude clear and unmistakable, such a statement of attitude would have to be brought about.

It should not be forgotten that the war of nerves which the Poles had started, by causing constant incidents and acts of provocation, had now been in full swing for three months. Any sign of yielding would, in view of the Slav mentality, be just the thing to cause an outburst of Polish insolence. Any yielding would therefore not strengthen the position as a whole, but would be generally interpreted by other countries as a sign of weakness. If the Western democracies were already firmly resolved to take action against the Axis, they would in no circumstances wait three or four years to put their plan into effect, attacking only after the Axis Powers had finished making their necessary preparations, but would bring about the conflict earlier. But if they had not yet come to a definite decision—as he, the Führer, was inclined to believe, in view of the state of the Western countries' armaments—the best means of restraining them from taking action was to move swiftly against Poland.

Moreover, every successful individual action by one of the Axis partners was tantamount not only to a strategic but also, above all, to a psychological strengthening of the other partner and of the whole Axis. Italy had carried out a series of successful individual actions in Abyssinia, Spain and Albania, and these against the wishes of the democratic *entente*. These individual actions had not only promoted Italy's local interests in each separate instance, but also greatly strengthened her general position. The same was true of Germany's actions in Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, etc. Here, too, not only had her local interests improved, but also the general position had been

consolidated. The Axis, as such, had gained considerably by this. If one were to imagine that such individual actions had not taken place and what the position of Italy or Germany would then have been, one would come even more definitely to the above conclusion that materially and psychologically these individual actions had benefited the general position in the greatest possible way. The strengthening of the Axis which had thus resulted was of the greatest importance for the inevitable clash with the Western Powers. As matters stood at present, Italy and Germany simply could not go on living in the world owing to lack of space. Now, it was not a question of lack of space, but only that the available space was being completely blocked by its present owners. They sat like misers on their heaps of gold, wallowing drunkenly in their riches without being able to put them to productive use. The Western democracies were guided by the desire to dominate the world and did not regard Germany and Italy as equals. This psychological factor of contempt was perhaps the worst feature of the whole situation. It could only be removed by a life and death struggle, which the two Axis partners could all the better survive, as their interests did not conflict at any point. For historical and geographical reasons, the Mediterranean was incontestably Italy's peculiar sphere, and here she must be accorded supremacy. The Duce had described the situation to him in a striking manner on board the *Conte Cavour*,² by saying that Italy was already the predominant Power in the Mediterranean solely through her geographical position; in reply to which the Führer said that Germany would follow the old Germanic trail to the East, which appeared to be appropriate for economic reasons. That Italy was the predominant Power in the Mediterranean for geographical and historical reasons had, moreover, been clearly realized by Bismarck, the founder of the Second Reich, and expressed in the famous letter to Mazzini.³ Thus the interests of Germany and Italy lay in quite different directions, and there could never be a conflict of interests.

The Reich Foreign Minister here interpolated that if the two problems referred to by the Führer in yesterday's conversation were solved, Italy and Germany, in a fight against the West, would be free from attack in the rear.

The Führer said that Poland would have to be suppressed to such an extent that she would in no circumstances be capable of fighting for ten years. In this event it would be possible to settle accounts with the West.

Count Ciano thanked the Führer for the extremely clear exposition

² Presumably during Hitler's visit to Italy in May 1938, when he attended a review of the Italian fleet at Naples.

³ See E. Diamilla-Müller, *Politica Segreta Italiana 1863-70* (Turin, 1880), p. 346 ff. cit. Federico Chabod: *Storia della Politica Estera Italiana 1870-1896* (Bari, 1951), vol. I, p. 45.

of the situation. He had nothing to add for his part and would report to the Duce all the details of the information given by the Führer. There was one point perhaps on which he would like to have more precise information, in order to provide the Duce with all the data necessary for assessing the situation. The Duce would probably not have to make any decision, since the Führer had expressed his conviction that the conflict with Poland could be localized. From long experience Count Ciano could say that, so far, the Führer had always been right in his judgement of the situation. But even if Mussolini did not have to make any decision, he would nevertheless want to take certain precautionary measures, and for this reason Count Ciano wished to ask the following question:

The Führer had given two reasons for taking action against Poland. Firstly, if Poland were to commit an act of grave provocation, and secondly, if she did not clarify her political attitude. The acts of provocation would not be dependent on the Führer's will and might occur at any time, thus causing German counter action at any moment. The second case implied, however, a certain time limit. He wished therefore to ask what was the latest date by which, in Germany's view, Poland must clarify her political attitude, and in this connection he fully understood the seasonal conditions governing the situation.

The Führer replied that Poland's political attitude must be clarified by the end of August at the latest, for although the principal and decisive part of the military operations could be carried out within a fortnight, final liquidation would nevertheless still require a further two to four weeks and could therefore not be concluded before the end of September or the beginning of October. Hence, the end of August must be the time limit.

In conclusion the Führer again assured Count Ciano that since his youth he had always supported German-Italian cooperation, and nothing to the contrary could be found in any of his published works. From the very beginning, he had been of the opinion that Germany and Italy were destined by nature to collaborate, because there was no clash of interests between them. He personally was fortunate to live at a time when, apart from himself, there was another statesman living who would stand out in history as a great and unique figure. It was a source of great personal happiness to him that he could be the friend of this man. When the hour struck for the common fight he would always be found at the side of the Duce, come what may.

SCHMIDT⁴

⁴ For Ciano's record, which gives the time of this conversation as 11:30-12 a.m., see *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 21; also the *Ciano Diaries*, entry of Aug. 13, 1939.

No. 48

472/228793-94

*Ambassador Stohrer to State Secretary Weizsäcker*¹SECRET
PERSONAL

ROTTACH-EGERN, August 13, 1939.

DEAR WEIZSÄCKER: While I am on leave may I trouble you briefly with two questions:

1. Are Franco and his wife expected to come to Berlin in the late autumn?² It will probably be possible to ascertain in Rome whether Señora Fr[anco] is expected there with her husband in September, and our invitation could be extended accordingly to include Señora Fr[anco], if the occasion arises. As the new Spanish Foreign Minister³ will probably speak to me about Franco's visit, I should be grateful (should the matter be already settled) if you would telegraph me instructions⁴ before my return to San Sebastián (August 25).

2. The tragic death of Air Attaché von Scheele will perhaps again bring up the idea of sending a military mission under General Freiherr von Richthofen,⁵ or his appointment as Air Attaché with special powers. I have already stated, both in a private letter⁶ and orally, my objections to this on practical and personal grounds.

In view of the relations which have recently developed between Messrs. Richthofen and Bernhardt,⁷ we would in addition have to expect the formation of a new bloc opposed to the Embassy and the Foreign Ministry. Now that we have succeeded in removing the "Counter-Embassy" of the Promi, and have put Herr Bernhardt back in his place,⁸ this would again cast doubts on the uniformity of our policy in Spain. In any case I should have to decline to accept responsibility for the prompt execution and application of the Foreign Ministry's instructions, if, instead of at last being able to deal with Spaniards alone, I have to continue squabbling with "parallel agencies" who are hostile to the Embassy and the Foreign Ministry.

With best wishes and Heil Hitler!

Yours ever,

STOHRER

P.S. I opened this letter as I have just heard that General Gambara, the last commander of the Italian volunteers in Spain, will be appointed Ambassador there.⁹

¹ The letter is in Stohrer's handwriting.

² See vol. vi of this Series, document No. 634.

³ Col. Beigbeder.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Former Commander of the Condor Legion in Spain.

⁶ Possibly the letter of Apr. 27, printed in vol. iii of this Series, document No. 787.

⁷ Johannes Bernhardt, a German businessman in Spanish Morocco; see vol. iii of this Series, Editors' Note, p. 1.

⁸ See vol. iii of this Series, chapter viii, document No. 791 ff.

⁹ Gen. Gastone Gambara, subsequently appointed Italian Ambassador in Spain.

Whatever solution may be found for the question mentioned under 2 above, which has now become extremely acute, there *can and should* be only *one authority* in Spain.

No. 49

2798/548120

The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, August 14, 1939.

No. 428 of August 14

Received August 14—11:10 a.m.

With reference to my telegram No. 413 of August 10.¹

The morning press publishes the following official announcement on the Abetz affair and the text was also communicated to the Embassy by the Foreign Ministry:²

"M. Daladier, President of the Council, and M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs, have received Count Welczeck, the German Ambassador in France, who called to discuss with them the case of Herr Otto Abetz.

"The President of the Council and the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the Ambassador that no case of espionage had been proved against Herr Abetz. Nevertheless they have indicated that the presence of Herr Abetz on French territory was not desirable and that in these circumstances no visa for entry into France could be issued to him."³

BRÄUER

¹ Document No. 22.

² From this point the original is in French.

³ According to a memorandum by Rintelen of Aug. 14 (1570/380065) recording a telephone message from Bräuer, the latter had informed Bonnet's *Chef de Cabinet*, Bressy, that the statement in this communiqué was regarded as insufficient to settle the Abetz case.

No. 50

127/69514-15

An Official of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 171 of August 14

BERLIN, August 14, 1939—1:52 p.m.

Received August 14—5:00 p.m.

[e.o. W 1331 g.]¹

For the Ambassador for his information.

Astakhov called on me on Saturday² in order to communicate to me the following:

¹ Taken from the Berlin draft of the telegram here printed (34/23909-10).

² i.e., Aug. 12.

He had received instructions from Molotov to state here that the Soviets were interested in a discussion of the individual groups of questions that had been raised before. A[stakhov] said that such questions were, *inter alia*, besides the pending economic negotiations, press questions, cultural collaboration, the Polish question, and the question of the old German-Soviet political treaties.³ Such a discussion, however, could be undertaken only *by degrees* [stufenweise] or, as we had expressed it, by stages.⁴ The Soviet Government proposed Moscow as the place for these discussions, since it was considerably easier for the Soviet Government to continue the conversations there. In this conversation, A[stakhov] left the matter open as to who was expected in Moscow to conduct the conversations, whether it would be the Ambassador or someone else to be sent out.

To my question as to the degree [of priority] which the Soviets assigned to the subject of Poland, A[stakhov] replied that he had received no special instructions about the sequence, but that the chief emphasis in his instructions lay on the phrase "by degrees".

These communications of A[stakhov]'s were probably the amplified instructions to the Chargé of which you notified us.⁵

Further instructions are reserved.

SCHNURRE

³ See vol. VI of this Series, documents Nos. 490 and 614.

⁴ See *ibid.*, document No. 729.

⁵ See *ibid.*, document No. 775.

No. 51

695/260356

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, August 14, 1939—2:15 p.m.

No. 172 of August 14

Received August 14—5:58 p.m.

For the Ambassador personally.

Please arrange for an interview with Molotov tomorrow, Tuesday, August 15.¹ Instructions on the statement to be made to Molotov follow by telegram.² Please telegraph the time of your reception by Molotov.³

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Marginal note: "Done through Herr Hilger at 6:25 p.m. Secretary promised early reply. v. T[ippelskirch] 14/8."

² In telegram No. 174 of Aug. 14 (695/260355), sent at 8:30 p.m., Weizsäcker informed Schulenburg that instructions would follow in a few hours. See document No. 56.

³ In telegram No. 173 of Aug. 15 (34/23925), Schulenburg replied: "Molotov will receive me at 8 o'clock tonight in the Kremlin."

No. 52

2950/576544

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

TARABYA, August 14, 1939—3:40 p.m.

No. 232 of August 14

Received August 14—5:55 p.m.

With reference to my telegram No. 230 of August 13.¹

The Germania shipyard here states that the launching of the submarine under construction is fixed for August 28, and that the President has indicated he might be present. This would have to be considered as a political gesture which, however, would be changed into an anti-German demonstration if, when the steamer *Norburg* arrives on August 18, it transpires that engines, for which bills of lading are already in Turkish hands, were unloaded in Italy. The Naval Attaché requests that the Naval Staff be informed that, in his opinion, the advantage derived from any such loss to the fighting strength of the Turkish Navy would bear no comparison with the political damage to be expected. If, as I hope, fresh instructions are issued about continuing supplies for the submarine under construction here, I request instructions before August 18, in any case.

PAPEN

¹ Document No. 45.

No. 53

183/85937

The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 85 of August 14

BERNE, August 14, 1939—5:10 p.m.

Received August 14—8:30 p.m.

With reference to despatch Pol. II 2633 of July 29.¹

In his speech at Zürich at the 18th Convention of Swiss Abroad, on August 13, Federal Counsellor Motta stated his views on the question of unfettered neutrality. Concerning the British and French understanding about a guarantee he declared:

“Our neutrality must remain unfettered. We have placed ourselves under an obligation to no one for its defence. The negotiations which may have taken place regarding us between foreign Governments were conducted without us, and they will not affect our attitude. We place our trust primarily in our arms.

“Our trust is based on solemn promises which have been made to us.

¹ This despatch (8286/E588320-21/1) forwarded a Weizsäcker memorandum of July 20 (see vol. VI of this Series, document No. 692) to the principal Missions in Europe.

Should we one day be compelled to ask for help from those who have undertaken to assist us, it would obviously be for us to request it. We shall never agree to assistance being rendered automatically."

For the full text of the speech cf. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, No. 1470, of August 14.

KÖCHER

No. 54

1625/389155

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 173

BERLIN, August 14, 1939—7:30 p.m.
zu Pol. II 2858.¹

For the Ambassador.

With reference to your telegram No. 167 of August 11.¹

I request you and the Military Attaché² to refute most emphatically the arguments used by British officers to Soviet departments and personages in Moscow, as reported by you. It is precisely the kind of war described by the British Military Attaché³ which must show unmistakably the value and significance of a Soviet understanding with Germany. How is Britain to intervene effectively in favour of Russia after Poland is overrun? If Russia chooses to side with Britain she will certainly face Germany alone, as in 1914. If the Soviet Union chooses understanding with us, she will attain the security she desires, and for which we are prepared to give all guarantees. I should also like to mention, for your information, that this argument has been dealt with in detail several times in conversations with Astakhov here.⁴

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 27.

² Lt. Gen. Köstring.

³ Lt. Col. Firebrace.

⁴ Typewritten marginal note: "Based on instructions by telephone from the Foreign Minister."

No. 55

1625/389174

The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

LONDON, August 14, 1939—8:37 p.m.

TOP SECRET

Received August 14—11:30 p.m.

No. 292 of August 14

Pol. II 2915.

I learn from a most reliable source that Strang's report on the Moscow negotiations is optimistic; it states that the Soviet Government have given so many signs of their desire to conclude the agree-

ment that there can no longer be any doubt that it will be definitely achieved.

The British and Soviet Governments have agreed to press on with the military side of the negotiations with the utmost speed for the reason, which they have expressly stated, that, in the negotiations on the question of indirect aggression (the only question still outstanding in the political agreement), the two Governments have recognized that the formula to be chosen for indirect aggression need merely cover the possibilities which might actually arise in the event of a German attack. A careful study of all these strategic possibilities should make it easier for the two Governments to find a formula which would only cover such eventualities of direct and indirect attack as are militarily practicable. When these various possibilities have once been determined, according to the judgement of the military experts, the two Governments think it will be comparatively easy to find a formula which does not need to be nearly so elastic as one having to cover every purely theoretical possibility.

KORDT

No. 56

127/69510-13

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 175 of August 14

BERLIN, August 14, 1939—10:53 p.m.

Received August 15—4:40 a.m.

For the Ambassador personally.

I request you to call upon M. Molotov and communicate to him the following:¹

1. The contradiction between the national idea, exemplified by National Socialist Germany, and the idea of world revolution, exemplified by the U.S.S.R.,² has in past years been the sole cause for the alignment of Germany and Russia in ideologically separate and hostile camps. The developments of the recent period seem to show that differing philosophies do not prohibit a reasonable relationship between the two States, and the restoration³ of new, friendly cooperation. The period of opposition in foreign policy could therefore be

¹ The Moscow copy here printed contains a number of changes handwritten by Schulenburg presumably before the interview with Molotov: the terms "U.S.S.R." and "Soviet" are consistently substituted for "Russia" and "Russian"; other changes by him are noted in footnotes. In addition, the Moscow copy has textual corrections in a different handwriting, which corresponds with the text as sent to Berlin from Fuschl on Aug. 14, with instructions to Weizsäcker to transmit it to Moscow the same evening (34/23917-19); these corrections are not noted here.

² Changed to: "The ideological contradiction between National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union . . ."

³ The Berlin draft here reads: "the restoration of friendly cooperation".

brought to an end once and for all and the way opened to a new future for both countries.

2. There exist no real conflicts of interests between Germany and Russia. The living spaces of Germany and Russia touch each other, but in their natural requirements they do not overlap. Thus there is lacking all cause for an aggressive attitude on the part of one country against the other. Germany has no aggressive intentions against the U.S.S.R. The Reich Government are of the opinion that there is no question between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea which cannot be settled to the complete satisfaction of both countries. Among these are such questions as: the Baltic Sea, the Baltic States, Poland, South-Eastern questions, etc. Over and above such matters political cooperation between the two countries can only have a beneficial effect.⁴ The same applies also to the German and Russian economies, which are complementary in every sphere.

3. There is no doubt that German-Russian policy today has come to an historic turning-point. The decisions with respect to policy to be made in the immediate future in Berlin and Moscow will be of decisive importance for the development of relations between the German and the Russian peoples⁵ for generations. On these decisions will depend whether the two peoples will some day, again and without any compelling reason, take up arms against each other, or whether they pass again into a new friendly relationship. It has gone well with both countries previously when they were friends and badly when they were enemies.

4. It is true that Germany and Soviet Russia, as a result of years of ideological opposition, today face each other distrustfully. A great deal of accumulated rubble will have to be cleared away. It must be said, however, that even during this period the natural sympathy of the Germans for the Russians⁶ never disappeared. The policy of both States can be built anew on that basis.

5. The Reich Government and the Soviet Government must, judging from past experience, take into account that the capitalistic Western democracies are the implacable enemies of both National Socialist Germany and Soviet Russia. They are today trying again, by the conclusion of a military alliance, to drive Russia into war against Germany. In 1914 the Russian regime collapsed as a result of this policy.⁷ It is the compelling interest of both countries to avoid for all future time the destruction of Germany and of Russia in the interests of Western democracies.

⁴ The Berlin draft here reads: "... political cooperation can only have a beneficial effect on both countries."

⁵ Changed to: "relations between the German people and the peoples of the U.S.S.R."

⁶ The Berlin draft here reads: "of the German people for the Russian people".

⁷ This sentence has been changed by Schulenburg to: "In 1914 this policy had serious consequences for Russia."

6. The crisis which has been produced in German-Polish relations by English policy, as well as English agitation for war and the attempts at an alliance which are bound up with that policy, make a speedy clarification of German-Russian relations necessary. Otherwise matters might, without Germany contributing thereto, take a turn which would deprive both Governments of the possibility of restoring German-Russian friendship and in due course clarifying jointly territorial questions in Eastern Europe. The leadership of both countries, therefore, should not allow the situation to drift, but should take action at the proper time. It would be fatal if, through mutual ignorance of views and intentions, the two peoples should finally drift apart.

As we have been informed, the Soviet Government also feel the desire for a clarification of German-Russian relations. Since, however, according to previous experience this clarification can be achieved only slowly through the usual diplomatic channels, I am⁸ prepared to make a short visit to Moscow in order, in the name of the Führer, to set forth the Führer's views to M. Stalin. In my view,⁹ only through such a direct discussion can a change be brought about, and it should not be impossible thereby to lay the foundations for a final settlement of German-Russian relations.

Annex: I request that you do not give M. Molotov these instructions in writing, but that you read them to him verbatim. I consider it important that they reach M. Stalin in as exact a form as possible and I authorize you, if occasion arises, to request from M. Molotov on my behalf an audience with M. Stalin, so that you may be able to make this important communication directly to him also. In addition to a conference with Molotov, a detailed discussion with Stalin would be a condition for my making the trip.

RIBBENTROP

⁸ Changed to: "Foreign Minister Ribbentrop is . . ."

⁹ Changed to: "In his, Herr von Ribbentrop's, view . . ."

No. 57

909/294245

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland

Telegram

No. 218

BERLIN, August 14, 1939—11:35 p.m.
e.o. Pol. V 1829 g. Ang. II.¹

With reference to my telegram 209.²
For the Head of the Mission.

¹ Under Ang. I (909/294242-44), the text of the Polish statement of Aug. 10 (document No. 10), with the addition reproduced here, was communicated to all the Missions (except Warsaw) who had previously been informed of the German statement of Aug. 9 (see document No. 5 and footnote 4 thereto).

² The text of document No. 5 was sent to Warsaw as telegram No. 209.

The German statement of August 9 and the Polish statement of August 10³ have been communicated with the following addition to the Missions mainly concerned:

"You are requested not to initiate any conversation in your capital on the German and Polish statements. If you are questioned about it, the Foreign Minister asks you to say that the Polish communication is a further proof of the megalomania and the warmongering policy of the Polish rulers. If Poland chooses to run amok now she will have to bear the responsibility and the consequences. We cannot understand how any Powers could still be prepared to further such an insane policy or even to encourage it, thereby making themselves jointly responsible."

End of addition.

WEIZSÄCKER

³ Document No. 10.

No. 58

259/169748

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 621

BERLIN, August 14, 1939.

Ambassador von Dirksen arrived here from London today. I told him that he should not return to London before receiving explicit instructions from the Foreign Minister and having a conversation with him.¹

Herr von Dirksen is staying a few days more in Berlin and then probably going to Silesia. He has offered to go at once to Fuschl at any time if he is wanted.

Regarding the assessment of Britain's attitude in the German-Polish question, Herr von Dirksen repeated to me the views already known to the Foreign Ministry from his reports.²

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See vol. vi of this Series, document No. 674.

² For these reports see *ibid.*, *passim*.

No. 59

910/294310-11

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 623

BERLIN, August 14, 1939.

Pol. V 1889 g.

The Italian Ambassador today handed me the enclosed memorandum on a certain compromise plan over Danzig which is being mooted in Poland.

The information was sent to Attolico from Rome, leaving it to him whether he should inform us of it.¹

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

According to a confidential source in Warsaw, considered to favour a policy of cooperation between Poland and Germany, a plan has been submitted for solving the Danzig question.

In outline, the plan itself would award Germany the whole City of Danzig and the territory lying east of the river Mottlau, which, as is known, flows through the City, and as far as the present frontier between the territory of the Free City and Poland.

Further, the territory between the Vistula and the Nogat would remain with the Reich in such a way as to form a continuous stretch of territory between East Prussia and the City. This would represent much more than half the whole territory of the Free City, and would bring about 300,000 inhabitants back to the Reich.

Poland would be left the territory lying west of the river Mottlau and the Free City, as well as the territory north of Danzig, and the sort of island on which the Westerplatte is situated.

There are some grounds for believing that the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw does not regard the matter unfavourably on the whole, though it is said to have raised difficulties as a matter of form.

¹ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. xii, Nos. 794, 816 and 822, and vol. xiii, No. 97.

No. 60

585/242469

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 14, 1939.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bruckmann, German Military Attaché in Sofia, told me today that leading Bulgarian officials expected that Bulgaria would soon (about August 25) receive an ultimatum from Turkey and Rumania demanding that she join the Balkan Pact. These Bulgarian officials had requested the Military Attaché to ascertain in Berlin whether in this event Germany would give Bulgaria direct military assistance by sending German troops. Herr Bruckmann emphasized that this was primarily a political question, but requested our assent to his reporting the matter direct to Colonel General Keitel.

I did not express an opinion on the matter and raised no objection to a direct report to Colonel General Keitel.¹

WOERMANN²

¹ See also document No. 101.

² Marginal note: "Under State Secretary, Political Department: Recommend getting Richthofen's opinion on this strange piece of news. W[eizsäcker] 14."

No. 61

472/228752-55

Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weizsäcker

Moscow, August 14, 1939.

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: May I thank you most heartily for your kind letter of the 7th instant.¹

I am still of the opinion that any hasty measure in the matter of our relations with the Soviet Union should be avoided; it will almost always be harmful. So I consider it entirely right that our treatment of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin should be relaxed only slowly.

The following were the main points in my last conversation with M. Molotov:² the statements about the Baltic States satisfied him to a certain extent, but he wanted to know whether we also included Lithuania among the Baltic States. My statements on the Polish question visibly impressed him, too; he followed my words with the greatest attention. His comment on this point is perhaps worth noting: "Compliance with the desire of the Germans that, in the Polish matter, no 'solution' be *forced* on the Reich, depends, above all, on Germany itself." M. Molotov apparently meant thereby that—whatever might happen—the fault would be ours. Finally—and this seems to me the most important point—M. Molotov demanded that we cease to support Japanese "aggression". In this connection, it is perhaps not uninteresting to note that a member of the American Embassy here, which for the most part is very well informed, stated to a member of our staff that we could at any moment upset the British-French negotiations, if we abandoned our support of Japan, sent our military mission back to China and delivered arms to the Chinese. I am afraid that these American ideas are very optimistic, however, and not readily workable, but the Reich Foreign Minister, after all, had some ideas of his own on this point. Something in this line may, perhaps, have to take place if we want to make any progress.

The British and French Military Missions have been in Moscow for three days now. The Soviets made no great fanfare over their arrival. Only a very few conferences of the military men have taken place so far, and of their subject-matter and outcome nothing is yet known. I assume that the negotiations will last a long time.

With reference to the foregoing, I should like to mention the following: I received instructions³ to participate in the Nuremberg Party Rally, and am supposed to leave Berlin for Nuremberg on September 1, with the other gentlemen of the foreign service. I must also have the new grey uniform made for me for this purpose. Al-

¹ Vol. VI of this Series, document No. 778.

² See *ibid.*, document No. 766.

³ See *ibid.*, document No. 779, footnote 2.

though all preparations have been made, I shall nevertheless have to make a three-day stop in Berlin in order to make the final arrangements and purchases. This means that I shall have to leave here on August 26th, at the latest. The instructions I have received from the Foreign Ministry are circular instructions, such as apparently every one of us has received. Would it not, as things stand, be better and more necessary for me not to go to Nuremberg this time, but to remain here? I am unable, of course, to judge of these matters with certainty, but I wanted at least to address an inquiry to you in the matter. As matters now stand, I consider it very proper that our political conversations with the Soviet Union be carried on in Berlin. In view of conditions here, however, it seems certain to me that from time to time, in order to expedite matters, I shall have to speak to M. Molotov, the highest personage that can be reached. Certainly I am the person who can best and most easily carry on conversations with M. Molotov. This strange man and difficult character has now grown accustomed to me and has, in conversations with me, in great measure abandoned his otherwise always evident reserve. Any new man would have to start from scratch. But, as I have stated, I am unable to judge whether this viewpoint should prevail or whether participation in the Nuremberg Party Rally should have priority. I would therefore be very grateful to you if you would have a short telegram sent to me on this subject.⁴

With very best regards and Heil Hitler! I am, my dear Herr von Weizsäcker,

Yours etc.,

F. W. SCHULENBURG

⁴ According to a memorandum by Weizsäcker, St. S. No. 630 of Aug. 16 (34/23914-16), this letter, omitting the first two paragraphs and the closing phrase, was repeated by telephone to Ribbentrop at Fuschl.

No. 62

695/260348

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 177 of August 15

BERLIN, August 15, 1939—11:48 a.m.

Received August 15—3:50 p.m.

For the Ambassador's personal information.

With reference to my telegram No. 175 of August 14.¹

Before the instructions given to you in the telegram under reference were decided upon, we intended to send to Moscow, as being particularly qualified, the Reich Minister and Reichsleiter Dr. Frank.²

¹ Document No. 56.

² Dr. Hans Frank, Minister without Portfolio in the Reich Cabinet, and Director [Leiter] of the Reichsrechtsamt, the Reich Legal Office of the National Socialist Party.

Frank was to be accompanied by Schnurre. The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires was informed of this on Sunday evening.³ This, of course, is now cancelled by yesterday's instructions.

WEIZSÄCKER

³ i.e., Aug. 13. No other record has been found.

No. 63

2842/549666-87

The Chargé d'Affaires in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Mob/8.39

WARSAW, August 15, 1939.

Received August 16.

Pol. V 7856.

Subject: Dangers to the German minority in the event of the outbreak of war.

A general conviction prevails among the German minority that, if war breaks out between Germany and Poland, acts of violence against the German minority may be expected. It has therefore, I believe, already been suggested in Berlin by *Volksdeutsche* that, the moment war breaks out, German aircraft should drop leaflets over the minority areas, threatening the severest penalties against all Poles who make an attempt on the lives of Germans.

Seeing that, especially in the area of the Corridor, which is expected to be cleared by Polish troops, it is also anticipated that German property will be destroyed and houses and industrial buildings set on fire, I think it would be a good thing to include in the text of any such leaflets a threat to punish also those who lay hands on German property. In the Prussian Stargard Kreis during the last few days German owners have been ordered by the Starostei¹ to give exact details of the livestock they own. From this it is concluded that the intention is to take movable property from the farms there to the eastern provinces if war breaks out.²

WÜHLISCH

¹ i.e., the Polish State authority in a district.

² Marginal notes: (i) "Immediate". (ii) "To be submitted first to Senior Counsellor Schliep. B[ergmann]." (iii) "Submitted to Counsellor von der Heyden-Rynsch, with reference to the memorandum g.Rs. No. 980 Pol. V [not found]. Copy available. Schl[iep] 21.viii."

No. 64

1625/389161-64

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 624

BERLIN, August 15, 1939.

Pol. II 2897.

The French Ambassador called on me today after his return from leave. We first discussed the Abetz case.¹ The Ambassador then

¹ See document No. 65.

turned to general politics, expressing himself somewhat as follows, and speaking calmly and decisively: France had taken her stand. Her relations with Poland and with Britain were well known. A conflict between Germany and Poland would automatically involve France. This was a fact, not a desire on the part of France. On the contrary, France desired nothing more ardently than a German-Polish settlement, especially with regard to Danzig. She hoped that a settlement of this special question would lead to a general German-Polish *détente*. Such, in brief, was his impression from his latest talks with Daladier and Bonnet. In Berlin, however, his latest impression was that there was a certain deterioration in the situation. He was especially concerned by the fact that in the latest German pronouncements the words "point of honour" occurred repeatedly; that obviously meant a serious worsening of the situation.

I agreed with Coulondre that the situation had changed since before he went on leave in July. Then I cast my net fairly wide and drew in all kinds of arguments to characterize Poland's unbridled suicidal policy. I spoke to Coulondre of Poland's Note in the form of an ultimatum to Danzig of a week ago last Saturday,² of the aggressive nature of the exchange of views between Berlin and Warsaw in the past week,³ of the provocative statements of the controlled Polish press, of the continued measures of oppression, repression, expulsion and such like by the lower-level Polish authorities (I then showed Coulondre a list of these just handed to me), and explained all these as the actual result of the promises made by France and Britain to Poland. This was how the seed sown by the Western Powers in Poland had sprung up.

Coulondre then tried to make a brief excursion into the past, representing the Anglo-French guarantee to Poland as the inevitable result of Germany's establishment of the Protectorate in Czechia. Moreover, the Ambassador maintained that according to French reports from Warsaw, there was no bravado there; on the contrary the Polish Government were remaining perfectly calm.

I contradicted this most emphatically. The Polish Government, moreover, were not governing at all. Paris apparently did not know what "Polish muddle"⁴ was. The Government were not at all in their right mind, otherwise threats amounting to ultimata, such as had recently been made in Danzig, could not have been uttered by Polish diplomats. Such excesses merely demonstrated Poland's belief in her two big brothers in the West, who would help in any case. We neither could nor would continue to tolerate further Polish behaviour of this kind. By running amok, Poland was bringing her fate upon herself.

² i.e., Aug. 5. See vol. vi of this Series, document No. 774.

³ See documents Nos. 5 and 10.

⁴ *Polnische Wirtschaft* (lit. "Polish economy"), currently used as a term of abuse.

I then went on to say that like all stupidity, even Poland's would do a certain amount of good:

1) Poland's friends would see from this what they themselves had brought about, and

2) Poland would thereby free her friends from their obligation to assist her.

For it was inconceivable that France or Great Britain would be willing to stake their existence in favour of their friend who had run amok. I could not therefore understand either how, at the beginning of our conversation, Coulondre could have described French help to Poland as natural and automatic.

Coulondre then said briefly that the Franco-Polish Treaty of Alliance⁵ had been strengthened even more by this year's guarantee,⁶ but the legal obligation to Poland was not the decisive factor. For her own security, France required a balance of power in Europe. If this were disturbed in Germany's favour, i.e., if Poland were overrun by us now, then in the foreseeable future it would be France's turn or she must sink to the level of Belgium or Holland. This would make France practically the vassal of Germany and that she would not have.

I urgently recommended the Ambassador to enquire into the actual conduct of Poland, and to let himself be cured of his total misconception about the behaviour of his friends, and then he would certainly arrive at the right conclusions.

When Coulondre asked what these conclusions were, I told him two things: Poland must yield to Germany's legitimate claims, and she must completely revise her attitude towards Germany.

Finally the Ambassador said that his Government would never consent to pressure being applied to Warsaw as was done to Prague last year. The situation now was different from then.

I answered Coulondre dryly that I had no advice to give either him or his Government. They should study the facts and let them speak for themselves.

In conclusion the Ambassador assured me of his willingness to cooperate in any way in preserving peace. A European war would end with the defeat of all, even present-day Russia, and the victor would not be Stalin, but Trotsky.⁷

WEIZSÄCKER

⁵ The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between France and Poland, concluded at Locarno, Oct. 16, 1925. For the text see British White Paper, Cmd. 2525, of 1925.

⁶ On April 13. See Ministère des Affaires Étrangères: *Documents Diplomatiques 1938-39, Pièces relatives aux événements et aux négociations qui ont précédé l'ouverture des hostilités entre l'Allemagne d'une part, la Pologne, la Grande Bretagne et la France d'autre part* (Paris, 1939) (hereinafter cited as the *French Yellow Book*), No. 99.

⁷ For Coulondre's account of this interview see the *French Yellow Book*, No. 194.

No. 65

121/119547

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 626

BERLIN, August 15, 1939.

The French Ambassador told me today that he, too, had concerned himself with the Abetz affair in Paris, and had found M. Daladier willing to obtain moral satisfaction for Herr Abetz. This came out in the published Havas statement.¹ In reply to Ambassador Coulondre, I said that that did not settle the Abetz affair for us. I did not mention to the Ambassador the counter measures we shall take, as they have not yet been decided upon in detail.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 49.

No. 66

1625/389165-67

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*¹

St.S. No. 628

BERLIN, August 15, 1939.

Pol. II 2898.

After some lapse of time the British Ambassador came for a conversation with me today. He asked me rather abruptly about the result of Ciano's visit to Salzburg.²

In my reply I did not go into the subject of Ciano and the conversations with him. I described to him, however, the deterioration in the situation between Berlin and Warsaw, and kept more or less to the line of argument I had followed this morning with the French Ambassador.³ My remarks about Polish policy were chosen so as to be perhaps slightly sharper in tone in my conversation with Henderson than in that with Coulondre.

In connection with the question of the Customs Inspectors, Henderson made some assertions concerning German smuggling of arms and an extensive militarization of Danzig, which had affected Polish rights and interests without Poland having remonstrated. I denied in the most energetic terms that the military measures in Danzig were

¹ On Aug. 16-17, Weizsäcker telegraphed the substance of this document, and of document No. 64, to the Missions at Tarabya, Brussels, Buenos Aires, London, Moscow, San Sebastian, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, Santiago, Tokyo, Warsaw, Washington, Athens, Belgrade, Berne, Budapest, Bucharest, Dublin, The Hague, Helsinki, Cairo, Copenhagen, Kovno, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Oslo, Pretoria, Tallinn, Riga, Sofia and Stockholm, and the Consulates General at Calcutta, Ottawa, Sydney, and Geneva (1625/389168-73). Weizsäcker added that, in conversations on the situation, the same arguments should be used, and, in particular, the assertion contradicted that Poland was behaving reasonably and calmly.

² See Editors' Note, p. 35, and documents Nos. 43 and 47.³ See document No. 64.

unjustified. Danzig was only protecting herself against her protector. That, after all, was surely still permissible. Moreover, I again remarked how British policy had created for the Polish Government a fool's paradise in which the Poles were now living unrestrained. Britain must now realize whither her so-called encirclement policy had led, and she would hardly be inclined or obliged to let herself be led into disaster by her Polish friends who had run amok.

Also, in this conversation with Henderson, a fundamental difference in the interpretation of the Polish attitude was again apparent. Henderson, i.e., his Government, maintained that Poland was reasonable and calm, and denied that Poland was in a position to commit an act of aggression against Germany. In any other case of a German-Polish clash, however, the British Government were committed to give military assistance and were firmly resolved to do so. For the rest, Poland would not take any steps of great consequence without making sure of London's approval.

Thereupon I asked the Ambassador whether London had perhaps approved the threatening Note to Danzig,⁴ or the Polish statement to us,⁵ in the middle of last week, or all the provocative speeches and articles, and the continued oppression of the German minority. The measure of our patience was full to overflowing. The policy of a country like Poland was made up of a thousand acts of provocation. Did Britain really count on being able to restrain Poland from every fresh act of recklessness? It was a mere illusion, surely, for Britain to think she could keep Poland in hand as long as Warsaw felt protected by London. The contrary was the case.

I had then also to deny the statement that instructions aggravating the situation had reached Danzig through our Consul General there. I described this assertion as a downright lie.

The Ambassador then went on to ask whether the Danzig question could not be postponed until it could be solved in a calmer atmosphere. In that case he anticipated greater success for us too. Henderson remarked that I would probably not be able to answer this question. I answered him, however, by saying that his question was purely theoretical, for a postponement would only be made use of by Poland to aggravate the mischief already being made, so that there could be absolutely no question of any improvement in the atmosphere.

Henderson next asked if German-Polish negotiations might not perhaps be conducted on our initiative. Thereupon I reminded Henderson that in his last speech in parliament,⁶ Beck, like some pasha on his throne, had declared that if Germany conformed to

⁴ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 774.

⁵ See document No. 10.

⁶ On May 5. For the text see the *Polish White Book*, No. 77.

Poland's principles, he would be graciously pleased to receive proposals on those lines. Furthermore, the Polish Government had declared only last week that any initiative by Germany at the expense of Polish claims was to be regarded as an act of aggression. I therefore saw no room for German initiative.

Henderson then alluded to possible comprehensive German-British discussions later, on such major questions as colonies, raw materials, etc., but said, at the same time, that the situation was certainly much more difficult and serious than in the preceding year; Chamberlain could not come flying to us with his umbrella once again.

I said that I was unable to give any advice other than that Poland must, without delay, adopt a reasonable attitude in the acute problem of Danzig and in her entire conduct towards us.

Henderson left me, conscious of the gravity and urgency of the situation.⁷

WEIZSÄCKER

⁷ See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 32.

No. 67

97/108494

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, August 15, 1939.

Vice Consul von Grolman of the Consulate General in Danzig has just reported by telephone that the discussion envisaged between President Greiser and the Polish Representative in Danzig, Chodacki, on the Customs Inspectors question,¹ will take place tomorrow (August 16) at 12 noon at the Office of the League of Nations High Commissioner for Danzig, Professor Burckhardt.

On this occasion Herr von Grolman also said that Consul General von Janson had yesterday discussed with Professor Burckhardt the latter's visit to the Führer.² Consul General von Janson will report on this personally.³

Submitted herewith for information to:

State Secretary

Under State Secretary, Political Department

Under State Secretary, Legal Department

Deputy Director, Political Department

¹ See document No. 38.

² This visit took place at Salzburg, on Aug. 11. See Professor Burckhardt's report to the League of Nations, dated Dec. 27, and printed in: *League of Nations, Official Journal*, C.42.M.38, 1940, VII (Geneva, Mar. 19, 1940). See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VI, No. 659, and *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 51.

³ No record has been found, but see document No. 104.

Senior Counsellor Schliep
Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Minister Braun von Stumm
Minister Dr. Altenburg.

BERGMANN

No. 68

169/82677/2

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 15, 1939.

In reply to a question by the Rumanian Minister¹ about the state of German-Polish relations, I said that the situation had become more acute in the last two weeks, particularly as a result of the Polish ultimatum and the threats of reprisals against Danzig, the attitude of the press and the campaign of extermination against the German community.

WOERMANN

¹ Radu Crutzescu.

No. 69

1818/415654-57

Counsellor of Embassy Wühlisch to Senior Counsellor Schliep

WARSAW, August 15, 1939.

DEAR SCHLIEP: In our telephone conversations last Thursday,¹ I did not manage to tell you the further developments leading up to my call on M. Arciszewski.² May I just recapitulate briefly. In the morning the Foreign Minister's Secretariat telephoned to say that M. Beck asked the Ambassador to call at 4 p.m. I told the Secretary that the Ambassador had left for Berlin the previous evening, that I was expecting a telephone message about his return any moment, and that it was possible that he would even arrive back in Warsaw on Friday morning. Thereupon I immediately put through a call to Berlin. Before the call came, the Under Secretary of State's secretary rang up to say that M. A[rciszewski] asked me to call at 4 p.m. After the telephone conversation with Herr von Moltke, and as Count Michal Lubinski³ was not available, I again rang up the Foreign Minister's Secretariat and, as instructed, I asked M. Ragoyski, whom I know well, to inform M. Beck that Herr von Moltke would arrive in Warsaw on Friday morning, and would then be at the Minister's disposal. I added that I thought that this information might per-

¹ i.e., Aug. 10. See document No. 8.² Assistant Under Secretary of State in the Polish Foreign Ministry.³ *Chef de Cabinet* to Foreign Minister Beck.

haps alter the arrangements which I had already made to meet M. Arciszewski, and I asked to be informed about this. After only half an hour, M. Ragoyski again rang up to tell me that the arrangement with M. A[rciszewski] was to stand.

I think that M. Beck's decision can be attributed to the fact that:

1) he wanted to give a reply to our statement⁴ as soon as possible,
2) he was probably quite glad that the Polish statement⁵ was formally also made in the same way by the State Secretary to the Chargé d'Affaires (Count Szembek⁶ only returned from leave the day after). I assume that

3) M. Beck intended to hand the Ambassador also only the formal statement, and therefore probably did not want the Ambassador to come to Warsaw merely to receive this statement.

Perhaps, if convenient, you will also inform Herr von Moltke of the contents of this letter.

As to the facts of the matter, it must be added that, on the same day as M. Arciszewski transmitted the statement to me, M. Beck received the British and French Ambassadors.⁷ He obviously attached importance to obtaining the *placet* of the allies before making the statement to us.⁸

With best wishes and Heil Hitler!

Yours,

WÜHLISCH

⁴ See document No. 5.

⁵ See document No. 10.

⁶ Count Jan Szembek, State Secretary in the Polish Foreign Ministry.

⁷ Sir Howard Kennard and Léon Noël. See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. vi, Nos. 606 and 645.

⁸ Marginal note: "Submitted for information, through the Deputy Director of the Political Department, Senior Counsellor Rintelen, to the Under State Secretary, Political Department. Schliep 16/viii."

No. 70

34/23920

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SECRET

No. 175 of August 15

Moscow, August 16, 1939—2:48 a.m.

Received August 16, 4:25 a.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 175 of August 14.¹

Molotov received with greatest interest the information I had been instructed to convey, designated it as extremely important, and declared that he would report it to his Government at once and give me an answer shortly. He could already state that the Soviet Government warmly welcomed German intentions of improving rela-

¹ Document No. 56.

tions with the Soviet Union and, in view of my communication of today, now believed in the sincerity of these intentions.

In the matter of the Reich Foreign Minister coming here, he wanted to state tentatively, as his own opinion, that such a trip required adequate preparation in order that the exchange of opinions might lead to results.

In this connection, he was interested in the question of how the German Government were disposed towards the idea of concluding a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, and further, whether the German Government were prepared to influence Japan for the purpose of improving Soviet-Japanese relations and eliminating border conflicts, and whether a possible joint guarantee of the Baltic States was contemplated by Germany.

With regard to the sought-for expansion of economic relations, Molotov admitted that negotiations were progressing successfully in Berlin and approaching a favourable conclusion.

Molotov repeated that if my communication of today included the idea of a non-aggression pact, or something similar, this question must be discussed in concrete terms, in order that, should the Reich Foreign Minister come here, it will not be a matter of an exchange of opinions but of making concrete decisions.

Molotov recognized that speed was necessary in order not to be confronted with accomplished facts, but stressed that adequate preparation of the problems mentioned by him was indispensable.

A detailed memorandum on the course of the conversation will follow on Thursday by special air courier.²

SCHULENBURG³

² See document No. 79.

³ Typewritten marginal note: "Moscow telegram No. 175 has been telephoned to the Foreign Minister at Fuschl this morning, on instructions from Senior Counsellor Kordt. Hübscher, 16.8, 6:40 [a.m.]."

No. 71

2131/466180

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy

ROME, August 16, 1939.

State Secretary von Weizsäcker telephoned me at 9:15 a.m. to inform me that Ambassador Attolico had flown to Munich yesterday and had continued his journey from there by train to Rome during the night. He would arrive here in the course of the morning. He had no fresh instructions on the situation as it was when I left Salzburg at midday on Sunday,¹ and presumably was going to Rome chiefly to learn the Duce's impressions of the Salzburg discussions, so as to be able to inform Berlin on the matter. I told Herr von

¹ i.e., Aug. 13. See Editors' Note, p. 35, and documents Nos. 43 and 47.

Weizsäcker that Ciano had originally intended Attolico to fly here direct with us. The arrangements had been altered at the last moment, however, and Attolico had gone to Berlin on Sunday afternoon with Magistrati, only a few hours after us, in the Reich Foreign Minister's aeroplane (but without him). Herr von Weizsäcker replied that he knew about this.

He added in conclusion that, for reasons which, as I informed him, were known to me, the communiqué² on the Salzburg discussions would play a part in Attolico's discussions in Rome in so far as it was stated therein that there would be no further talks of any kind.

MACKENSEN

² Of Aug. 13 by DNB; see *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, Nos. 28, 29, 35 and 36.

No. 72

97/108507-11

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

BERLIN, August 16, 1939.

[Pol. V 8504.]¹

The proposed conversation between Greiser, President of the Danzig Senate, and the Polish Diplomatic Representative in Danzig, Chodacki, took place this morning, not at the home of Professor Burckhardt, League of Nations High Commissioner in Danzig, but at Herr Greiser's house.² The course of the discussion can be seen from the enclosed minute by President Greiser.

Submitted for information to:

State Secretary
Under State Secretary, Political Department
Under State Secretary, Legal Department
Deputy Director, Political Department
Senior Counsellor Schliep
Minister Braun von Stumm
Minister Dr. Altenburg
Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Political Division I, Military Affairs.

BERGMANN

[Enclosure]

MINUTE

DANZIG, August 16, 1939.

A meeting between Minister Chodacki and myself was arranged originally for 12 o'clock on neutral ground in the house of the High Commissioner, Burckhardt. At 10 o'clock Minister Chodacki rang me up personally and told me that he had to leave by air for Warsaw

¹ Taken from another copy (7633/E548496).

² See also documents Nos. 38 and 67.

by midday and asked that the proposed conference be changed to an earlier hour. We agreed on 10:45. Minister Chodacki was even prepared to come to me at the Senate. The first conversation for many weeks proceeded as follows:

I put the Danzig point of view by emphasizing our claim that a distinction should be made among the Polish Customs Inspectors between the regularly trained Polish Customs officials and those who have merely been sent to their posts in Danzig for military reasons. The Senate's instructions to the Danzig Territory [*Land*] Customs Office on differentiation would therefore have to remain in force until the Polish Ministry of Finance had accepted Danzig's view on the question of personnel. I replied to certain questions interpolated by Chodacki to the effect that, on fulfilment of our wishes in regard to personnel, no further difficulties would be put in the way of the Polish Customs Inspectors' actual performance of their duties.

The question of the Customs Inspectors, however, was not the only one dividing us at present, but questions of economic cooperation between Danzig and Poland occupied first place. Here, the first thing to be disposed of was the so-called margarine-and-herring war. Again, of these two factors the embargo on margarine for Poland was the more important. We must insist that negotiations on the admission of Danzig herring catches and Danzig margarine products to Poland take place at once, and that, in particular, the import of margarine into Poland should be freed prior to these negotiations.

Minister Chodacki replied that on the day that the question of the Customs Inspectors was settled and they could resume their duties, the Polish Customs Inspector would also return to the "Amada"³ and that thereby the market to Poland would be guaranteed.

I replied that I could not risk protracted negotiations, but must have some proof of the Polish Government's good will in cooperation. This good will could be easily demonstrated by lifting the frontier barrier. Continuing, I explained to him the economic cooperation between Danzig and Poland, and the fact that Danzig was dependent on its hinterland for the marketing of its products. If this hinterland restricted the market by forcible measures, the consequence could only be a solution which would assuredly bring in its train complications of the greatest political significance. This would, in the last resort, mean seeking other markets, which was only possible if the existing Danzig-Polish Customs arrangements were by-passed; the ultimate result would be, just as it was four years ago,⁴ that the frontier

³ The Danzig margarine manufacturing company. See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 749.

⁴ In the course of a dispute over Customs matters, which arose between Danzig and Poland in July 1935, the Danzig Senate threw open the Customs frontier between Danzig and Germany, whereupon the Polish Government took retaliatory measures. After an exchange of Notes, agreement was reached on Aug. 8, 1935.

to other countries would have to be thrown open in order to safeguard Danzig's economic life. The blame for the consequences of these political measures would then simply and solely rest with Poland, unless she were sensible enough to meet our wishes beforehand.

Minister Chodacki then expounded his point of view along the lines that Poland could not differentiate between Customs Inspectors now, and that all Polish Customs Inspectors serving in Danzig were trained in the Customs Service. This was the most burning question for Poland and must be settled, if only because, to his knowledge, the Danzig Customs system was no longer functioning. He did not want to discuss the ill-treatment of Polish Customs Inspectors nor even the various arrests. It was also childish to give the smuggling of leaflets as the outward reason for the arrests. He could personally pledge his word of honour that not one of the arrested Customs Inspectors had anything to do with the production or smuggling of illegal leaflets. The real reason for the arrests was to exclude the Customs Inspectors from the unloading of German ships carrying army equipment and ammunition. But Poland would overlook all these things if the old right of inspection by Polish Customs Inspectors were restored.

Beyond that, the question of the admission of herrings caught by Danzig boats was not so difficult if it was considered as a question of a quota in connection with the apportioning of the Danzig share of the Polish part of the catch, and of the total herring imports. As to the question of admitting Amada margarine, he knew that this was a severe blow to Danzig, nevertheless it was not desired to rescind this measure only to be forced to reimpose it in a few days. If it were to be rescinded, it should be rescinded once and for all, and the question of the rights of the Polish Customs Inspectors and the discharge of their duties should be settled at the same time.

Furthermore, it had been reported to him that, in the monthly accounts, the Danzig Customs Administration had retained part of the Customs receipts. Even though he could understand that in the present state of rearmament Danzig needed a great deal of money, yet this question, too, must be discussed in the event of negotiations.

Minister Chodacki then stressed in conclusion that the whole complex of questions was of such great political importance that he personally had no plenary powers to take decisions, and would now, after consulting with me, fly at once to Warsaw to report to Minister Beck. He would try to come straight back from Warsaw tomorrow so as to resume contact with me.

I emphasized in conclusion that it was not our business to discuss particular questions, but that I was anxious to explain the Danzig point of view in general. If the Polish Government were prepared to meet us on these general lines, separate negotiations of a technical

character would result, which would be conducted by experts yet to be appointed by me.

Minister Chodacki intends to call on me again after his return from Warsaw.

GREISER

No. 73

695/260344

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, August 16, 1939—8:45 p.m.

No. 178 of August 16

Received August 16—9:30 p.m.

For the Ambassador personally.

Please arrange for another interview with Molotov immediately.¹ Instructions² for this are now being enciphered and will be sent to you in an hour at the latest.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Typewritten marginal note: "Will Herr Hilger please take the necessary action as soon as possible tomorrow morning? Schulenburg, 16.8, 11:00 p.m." In telegram No. 179 of Aug. 17 (695/260343), Schulenburg replied that Molotov would receive him at 8 p.m. See also document No. 92.

² See document No. 75.

No. 74

7433/E539962-71

Note by the Head of the Ausenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP

BERLIN, August 16, 1939.

THE VISIT OF BARON DE ROPP¹ OF LONDON

At 4 p.m. on August 16, Baron de Ropp called on me. He had been on a visit to the South of France and Corsica and had also been in London. He told me that in the last few days he had spoken to the officers of the British Air Staff and Air Ministry whom we knew. The views in these quarters were exactly the same as before. It was absurd for Germany and Britain to engage in a life and death combat on account of the Poles. As things were, the result could only be the destruction of each other's air forces, and, at the end of such a war, the destruction of the whole of European civilization, leaving Russia with her forces intact as the only beneficiary. The Poles were in fact urging the Foreign Office² to march against Germany in full force in the event of a war with Germany. But precisely in view of the fact that at first the whole weight of the war would fall on the Air Force, the influence of the Air Ministry and the Air Staff was on the increase.

¹ Presumably Baron William S. de Ropp, member of a Baltic family, who had become a naturalized British subject.

² In English in the original.

Baron de Ropp told me that because of their good knowledge, acquired over some years, of Germany and the National Socialist Movement, he and his friends did not believe that Germany—even after a victory in the East—intended to destroy Britain or France. He knew rather that the Führer and our Movement had always regarded the British Empire as an entity. Neither could he and his friends imagine that we wanted to annex any British Dominions, which I confirmed as being the view of the National Socialist Movement hitherto.

Baron de Ropp added that, in the event of war, he had been selected as political adviser on Germany to the Air Ministry, i.e., as intelligence officer to assess the political situation in Germany and the reports on Germany's intentions. He said he was telling me this in confidence on account of our long acquaintance, because he was firmly convinced that everything must be done to prevent war. But, judging from the present situation, he believed that, in the event of a warlike conflict between Germany and Poland, France and Britain would automatically be brought in. Even in this event, however, for the purpose of assessing such a conflict, the possibility of not letting it develop into a war of extermination for both sides must still be kept in mind. It might be that Germany would finish off Poland quickly, and that although at the time there would be a declaration of war, the war at that stage could still be conducted on both sides as a defensive war, i.e., that although the frontiers would be adequately defended by blockade and artillery, there would, however, be no aerial bombardment of open cities, which was bound to lead to irrevocable hatred. In the event of a speedy ending of a German-Polish conflict, there would, in this hypothesis, still be the possibility of a quick liquidation of the war, as the British Empire and Germany could not stake their whole existence for a State which would then have practically ceased to exist in its previous form.

As regards France, the feeling there was extremely warlike as compared with last year. In particular, hatred of Italy had greatly increased; Corsica was filled to overflowing with troops, and there was no doubt that the Corsicans themselves felt they were French. The question arose: if, in the event of a general conflict there were battles between the French and Italian Air Forces, would that automatically lead to general air warfare between Germany and Britain?

I took note of these statements, saying that I had just returned from leave and was not fully informed about the present state of affairs. De Ropp asked me: "Do you think that the Poles would become reasonable if pressure were exerted by Britain? What could be done about it?" At the same time he asked for detailed material, as authentic as possible, on the ill-treatment of Germans in Poland.

I have given orders for this material to be available by tomorrow midday.

I told him that the Führer's first, conciliatory, proposal—the return of Danzig, and a German highway between East Prussia and the Reich—had been brusquely rejected by the Poles, presumably because, through previous visits to London, they had already received from someone promises of firmer support. It could perhaps be said that the Poles were just gambling and had intentionally in the last few weeks intensified the persecutions of Germans to an extreme degree in order to provoke us, because they were not quite sure of Britain's help if they took military action by themselves. Thus, by these constant provocations in word and deed they probably hoped to force Germany to take some step or other, and thereby bring full British and French support automatically into operation. I think that it might well be said in Britain that the guarantee had been given on other conditions than those now prevailing. For as things are now, the German Reich is being deliberately provoked by the Poles, and thus an attempt is really being made to make Britain play Poland's game. In judging the Poles there must also be taken into account a Slav element, which at certain moments loses all restraint and power of clear judgement and then, as it were in despair, lets things slide.

In conclusion, de Ropp emphasized that he himself knew quite well that, after establishing herself in the East—which his friends particularly advocated, because in this they saw for Britain's future not only no harm but an advantage—Germany had no subsequent designs on the British Empire. But, fostered by certain centres, this idea had become firmly fixed among many of the French and British, and it was not easy to eradicate it. He, personally, and his friends also, saw matters clearly, and would do everything to stave off a disastrous outcome.

He said that he would be staying in Germany for about another eight to ten days.

I consider it my duty to inform the Führer of these statements emanating from the British Air Ministry, and of the views of those in the highest levels of the British Air Staff, especially as these views coincide with what they have so far publicly stated in their newspapers.

A. ROSENBERG

No. 75

34/23923-24

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union*¹

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, August 16, 1939—4:10 p.m.²

No. 179 of August 16

[Received August 17—1:00 a.m.]³

For the Ambassador personally.

I request that you arrange to call again upon M. Molotov, with the statement that you have to communicate to him, in addition to yesterday's message for M. Stalin,⁴ supplementary instructions just received from Berlin, which relate to the questions raised by M. Molotov.⁵ Please then state to M. Molotov the following:

1. The points brought up by M. Molotov are in accordance with German desires. That is, Germany is prepared to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and, if the Soviet Government so desire, one which would be undenounceable for a term of twenty-five years. Further, Germany is ready to guarantee the Baltic States jointly with the Soviet Union. Finally, it is thoroughly in accord with the German position, and Germany is prepared, to exercise influence for an improvement and consolidation of Russian-Japanese relations.

2. The Führer is of the opinion that, in view of the present situation, and of the possibility of the occurrence, any day, of serious events (please at this point explain to M. Molotov that Germany is determined not to endure Polish provocation indefinitely), a basic and rapid clarification of German-Russian relations, and of each country's attitude to the questions of the moment, is desirable. For these reasons I am prepared to come by aeroplane to Moscow at any time after Friday, August 18, to deal, on the basis of full powers from the Führer, with the entire complex of German-Russian questions, and, if the occasion arises, to sign the appropriate treaties.

Annex: I request that you again read these instructions word for word to M[olotov] and ask for the views of the Russian Government and of M. Stalin immediately. Entirely confidentially, it is added

¹ This text was sent from the Obersalzberg, at 2:30 p.m., on Aug. 16, with the instructions: "This telegram should be given at once to State Secretary von Weizsäcker personally, who is requested to arrange for the telegram to be despatched to Moscow immediately."

² A marginal note by the Telegram Control reads: "Despatched by teleprinter, parts 1-3 on Aug. 16, 4:00 p.m., parts 4-5 on Aug. 16, 4:10 p.m." See also document No. 92, footnote 4.

³ Taken from the Moscow copy (127/69501-02), which gives the time of despatch from Berlin as 4:15 p.m.

⁴ See document No. 56.

⁵ See document No. 70.

for your guidance that it would be of very special interest to us if my Moscow trip could take place at the end of this week or the beginning of next week.⁶

RIBBENTROP

⁶ Marginal note: "Despatch immediately. Weizsäcker, 16/8." (See footnote 2 above.)

No. 76

2131/466158

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

SECRET

BERLIN, August 16, 1939—9:16 p.m.

No. 379 of August 16

Received August 16—9:40 p.m.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to our previous communications about the conversations we have started with Moscow, I request you to tell Count Ciano the following: The conversations are proceeding. The response from Moscow seems to us entirely favourable. Certain ideas from our exchange of views are beginning to crystallize.

For your personal information I will add that the Italian Chargé d'Affaires today gave me the opportunity to say something about this.¹ However, I remained silent.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ No other record of this conversation with Count Magistrati has been found in the Foreign Ministry archives, but see *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 56.

No. 77

7895/E573178

The Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 338 of August 16

BUCHAREST, August 16, 1939—9:20 p.m.

Received August 17—1:10 a.m.

W 1359a g.

With reference to your telegram No. 311 of August 16.¹

The normal petroleum quota for the third quarter has been exhausted since July 20.² An additional three million Reichsmark were released at the end of July for the air armaments transactions,³

¹ Not printed (5556/E395406). This requested an immediate report as to the possibility of the release by Saturday, Aug. 19, of the petroleum so far withheld. See also vol. VI of this Series, document No. 742.

² See *ibid.*, document No. 639.

³ The Protocol on the delivery of air armaments, for the signature of which see vol. VI of this Series, document No. 632. Under the terms of this Protocol, the Rumanian Ministry of Air and Marine was to conclude separate contracts with individual German firms.

although, in execution of this transaction, the separate contracts have not yet been concluded. The Minister of Economics⁴ has just promised, nevertheless, to advocate to the National Bank the release of the steamer held in custody. To do so, the Minister requires confirmation from the Rumanian Air Ministry that progress is being made in respect of the air armaments contract. He therefore urgently expects the Junker contract to be signed with the representative arriving on Friday. The release by Saturday of larger quantities of petroleum on the strength of the statement from the Reich Ministry of Economics submitted here yesterday evening,⁵ is not possible as the National Bank so far still disputes it.

In view of this state of affairs, I recommend making use of the possibility of buying by way of the Protectorate, since there are no restrictions on deliveries there.

STELZER

⁴ Ion Bujoiu.

⁵ Not found.

No. 78

5558/E390028

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

No. 166 of August 16

BERLIN, August 16, 1939—10:10 p.m.
zu W 1346 g.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 117 of August 10.²

In cooperation with the Military Attaché³ very energetic steps have been taken in the competent quarters, including the highest military authorities, for speeding up armaments deliveries. Transfer on loan is offered of 244 light 8 mm. machine guns, which are ready for despatch in Vienna, or of 1500 light 7·92 mm. machine guns, which are being collected with all speed. Twenty-six armoured cars from Czech stocks are being sent today to Pilsen for inspection by a commission for passing material, and for speedy despatch, if necessary after overhaul. The High Command of the Wehrmacht is sending an officer to Vienna today to speed up the transport question, and, if possible, to arrange bulk transport for machine guns, rifles and ammunition ready for despatch. Further details will be communicated as available to the War Ministry in Sofia by the commission for passing material. In view of our own requirements, the transfer of

¹ Not printed (5558/E396024). This is a report, dated Aug. 14, from the OKW to the Foreign Ministry giving details about the existing position on the material required by the Bulgarians. It stated, *inter alia*, that Hitler had refused to permit the immediate delivery of two submarines.

² Document No. 12.

³ Lt. Col. Bruckmann.

two submarines presents difficulties, but if necessary will be considered for a later date.⁴

The Military Attaché is leaving on Thursday⁵ and arrives in Vienna on Saturday.

WIEHL

⁴ See footnote 1 above; also vol. vi of this Series, document No. 703.

⁵ i.e., Aug. 17.

No. 79

34/23934-41

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

Moscow, August 16, 1939.

A 1773

With reference to my telegram of August 15, 1939.¹

Subject: Conversation with Molotov on August 15, 1939.

I have the honour to enclose a memorandum of my conversation of yesterday with Molotov.

The conversation took a very friendly course and Molotov was more candid than ever before.

Molotov did not mention the intended despatch to Moscow of Reich Minister and Reichsleiter Dr. Frank.²

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

[Enclosure]

SECRET

Moscow, August 16, 1939.

MEMORANDUM

I began the interview with Molotov on August 15 at 8:00 p.m. by stating that, according to information which had reached us, the Soviet Government were interested in continuing the political conversations, but that they preferred that these be carried on in Moscow.³

Molotov replied that this was correct.

Then I read to M. Molotov the contents of the instructions which had been sent to me⁴ and the German text was immediately translated into Russian, paragraph by paragraph. I also informed Molotov about the contents of the annex to the instructions which I had received. Molotov took note of my communication that on the instructions of the Foreign Minister I was, if occasion arose, to ask for an audience with M. Stalin, as well as my statement that in addition to the conference with Molotov, a detailed discussion between the

¹ Document No. 70.

² See document No. 62.

³ See document No. 50.

⁴ See document No. 56.

Foreign Minister and Stalin was a condition for the proposed visit. With regard to the desire of the Foreign Minister that the contents of the instructions should reach M. Stalin in as exact a form as possible, Molotov made a gesture of assent.

Molotov listened to the reading of the instructions with close attention, and he directed his secretary to make as detailed and exact notes as possible.

Molotov then declared that, in view of the importance of my communication, he could not give me an answer at once, but he must first render a report to his Government. He could state at once, however, that the Soviet Government warmly welcomed the intention expressed on the German side to bring about an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union. Reserving a further communication which he would make to me shortly, after informing his Government, he wanted, at the moment, to express the following as his personal view of the proposals of the German Government:

A trip by the Foreign Minister to Moscow would require detailed preparation if the intended exchange of views was to produce any result. In this connection, he asked me for information as to whether the following was in accordance with the facts.

The Soviet Government at the end of June received a telegraphic report from their Chargé d'Affaires in Rome⁵ about his conversation with the Italian Foreign Minister, Ciano. In this conversation Ciano had said that there was a German plan which had as its goal a decisive improvement in German-Soviet relations. In that connection Ciano had referred to the following items in the plan:

1. Germany would not be disinclined to exercise influence on Japan for the purpose of improving her relations with the Soviet Union and eliminating frontier conflicts.

2. Further, the possibility was envisaged of concluding a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and jointly guaranteeing the Baltic States.

3. Germany was prepared for an economic treaty with the Soviet Union on a broad basis.

The contents of the foregoing points had aroused great interest on the part of the Soviet Government and he, Molotov, would very much like to know how much of the plan which Ciano had outlined in the form just mentioned to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires was true.

I replied that the statements of Ciano apparently rested on a report by the Italian Ambassador here, Rosso, of which we had already heard.⁶ The contents of this report rested principally on Rosso's deductions.

⁵ Leon Helfand.

⁶ The reference is uncertain, but see vol. vi of this Series, document No. 540; *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. xii, No. 386; and Mario Toscano: *L'Italia e gli Accordi Tedesco-Sovietici dell' Agosto 1939* (Florence, 1952), pp. 49-50.

To a question interjected by Molotov as to whether Rosso was inventing his information, I replied that that was only partly correct. We did indeed, as Molotov knew, desire an improvement in German-Soviet relations and naturally had considered how such an improvement could be brought about. The result of these deliberations was contained in my instructions which were known to Molotov, and in the statements of the Foreign Minister⁷ and of Herr Schnurre⁸ to M. Astakhov.

Molotov replied that the question as to whether Rosso had informed his Government correctly did not really interest him. The Soviet Government at the present moment were interested above all in knowing whether plans such as those which were contained in Rosso's report, or something similar, had actually existed and whether the German Government were still following such a line of thought. He, Molotov, after the report from Rome had come to his knowledge, had seen nothing improbable about it. The Soviet Government all through recent years had been under the impression that the German Government had no desire to bring about an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union. Now the situation had changed. From the discussions which had taken place in the last few weeks, the Soviet Government had gained the impression that the German Government were really in earnest in their intention to bring about a change in relations with the Soviet Union. He regarded the statement which had been made today as decisive and as one in which this wish was especially pregnantly and clearly expressed. As regards the Soviet Government, they had always had a favourable attitude with regard to the question of good relations with Germany and were happy that this was now the case on the German side also. Whether or not the details as contained in Rosso's report were actually what the Germans had in mind was not of such decisive importance. He, Molotov, had the impression that there must be a great deal of truth in them, since these ideas paralleled those which for some months had been developing in Germany. In this connection he stated with satisfaction that the economic discussions in Berlin were progressing and apparently promised good results.

I remarked that the course of the economic negotiations was satisfactory to us as well, and I asked how he envisaged the further *modus procedendi* in the political conversations.

Molotov repeated that he was interested above everything else in an answer to the question of whether, on the German side, there was the desire to make more concrete the points which had been outlined in Rosso's report. Thus, for example, the Soviet Government would like to know whether Germany saw any real possibility of

⁷ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 760.

⁸ See *ibid.*, documents Nos. 729 and 761.

influencing Japan in the direction of a better relationship with the Soviet Union. "Also, how do things stand with the idea of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact? Are the German Government sympathetically inclined to the idea, or has the matter not yet been discussed in detail?" were Molotov's exact words.

I replied that, as regards the relationship with Japan, the Foreign Minister had already said to M. Astakhov⁷ that he had his own views on the matter. From that it might be assumed that the Reich Foreign Minister was prepared to interest himself in this matter also, since his influence upon the Japanese Government was certainly not slight.

Molotov said that all this interested him very much and, at this point, he interjected that Ciano had told the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires that he would fully support the ideas in the Rosso report. He continued that it was very important for the Soviet Government, in connection with the intended trip of the Reich Foreign Minister to Moscow, to obtain an answer to the question of whether the German Government were prepared to conclude a non-aggression pact or something similar with the Soviet Union. On an earlier occasion there had been mention of the possibility of "a resurrection and revival of earlier treaties".

I confirmed to M. Molotov that we really were considering a new order of things [*eine Neuordnung der Dinge*], either in connection with what had gone before, or perhaps on an entirely new foundation. I then asked him whether I might conclude that the questions which had been put by him would constitute the substance of the talks with the Reich Foreign Minister in Moscow, and that he had only communicated them to me so that I might prepare the Foreign Minister for these questions.

Molotov replied that he would still have to make a further reply to me with regard to the question of the visit here by the Foreign Minister. It seemed to him, however, that for such a journey, a previous clarification and preparation of certain questions would be necessary, so that it would not be just conversations which were carried on in Moscow, but that decisions could be made as well. He fully subscribed to my statement that a prompt clarification was desirable. He was also of the opinion that haste was desirable, so that the march of events would not confront us with accomplished facts. He must, therefore, repeat that, if the German Government were favourably inclined to the idea of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, and if my statement of today included this or a similar idea, more concrete discussions of these questions should first take place. He requested me to inform my Government in this sense.

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

No. 80

2950/576545-48

Memorandum by the State Secretary

BERLIN, August 16, 1939.

W 1338 g.

To be forwarded by teleprinter to the Foreign Minister.

Subject: Turkish economic negotiations.

I agree with Ministerialdirektor Wiehl's two memoranda of August 7¹ and 14,² and suggest giving Counsellor of Embassy Kroll,³ who leaves here by air for Ankara tomorrow, the following instructions for negotiations:

1. The Trade and Payments Agreement⁴ can be extended, provided that a satisfactory arrangement can be reached regarding the cancellation of contracts for war material.

2. Of the contracts for war material, those for Krupp and Skoda guns, and also Messerschmidt and Heinkel aircraft, are to be cancelled in any case on Turkey renouncing her claims to guarantees and demands for compensation. The following should apply in the case of the four submarines: The contract for the one already delivered is to be concluded. The contract for the one ready for delivery in Kiel is to be cancelled. Of the two under construction at Istanbul, one is almost finished, and the Turks could complete it without any difficulty in a short time, even without our aid; our deliveries for this submarine have so far proceeded unhindered. The completion and delivery of this boat according to contract can be promised at the negotiations. The second submarine under construction at Istanbul is, on the other hand, only 70 per cent completed. In particular the Diesel engines intended for it, which should have reached Istanbul by sea on August 18, have been held up on the way and were unloaded in Italy on August 9. Our Navy estimates that without delivery of these engines, Turkey will need about two years to complete the submarine alone. An attempt should be made to cancel the contract for this submarine as well—in any case the negotiator would be empowered to negotiate for the continuation of deliveries for this submarine only after previously obtaining the express approval of the Foreign Minister.

In the case of the other less important contracts for arms, efforts

¹ Vol. VI of this Series, document No. 782.

² Not found.

³ A copy of this document in the files of the German Embassy in Ankara (8342/E590168-69) bears the marginal note: "Given to me by M[inisterial] D[irektor] Wiehl. Sanctioned in the meantime, by the Foreign Minister. Kr[oll]."

⁴ Not printed (7237/E531294-305); signed on July 25, 1938, this Agreement expired on Aug. 31, 1939. See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 454, and vol. V, document No. 549.

should be made to secure their cancellation also, though the negotiator is empowered, if Turkey makes sufficient concessions on other matters, to agree to their being further carried out to the extent necessary for this.

3. The Credit Agreement,⁵ at any rate, cannot be ratified with the 60 million RM worth of military supplies in it. Ratification to the extent of 90 million RM of supplies of industrial products is also undesirable. On the other hand, the Turks could be promised delivery of industrial products in the form of separate credit transactions (in particular also the continuation of the Krupp contract for harbour construction at Gölcük) to the extent absolutely necessary for the attainment of our aims in the negotiations under 1 and 2. The amalgamation of these separate transactions to this amount in an overall credit agreement could, if necessary, also be considered.

WEIZSÄCKER

⁵ Signed on Jan. 16, 1939; see vol. VI of this Series, document No. 435 and vol. V, document No. 557.

No. 81

230/152005

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 629

BERLIN, August 16, 1939.

The Yugoslav Minister¹ today spoke to me about two orders each for 50 Messerschmidt and 50 Dornier aircraft, of which five specimen models of each had been delivered to Yugoslavia, with apparently successful results. Now, however, the factories were refusing to sign the final contract. When the Yugoslav Military Attaché² tried to obtain an explanation at the Air Ministry, reference was made to the political situation.

The Minister asked me to ensure that the contracts would still be signed. Cincar-Marković, his Foreign Minister, attached special importance to the matter and indeed for the particular reasons [*sic*]. But if political reasons really did exist, which he did not believe, he asked to be informed.³

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Ivo Andrić. See also vol. VI of this Series, document No. 683.

² Col. V. Vauhnik.

³ Typewritten marginal note: "To the Director of the Economic Policy Department, for further action." See also document No. 102.

52/35007

No. 82

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Poland¹

BERLIN, August 16, 1939.

The position of the Reich Germans in Poland becomes daily more difficult. Surrounded by hatred and Germanophobia, they see themselves being robbed of the essentials of their livelihood to an ever-increasing degree. Deportations and arrests are daily occurrences.

It can indeed be said without exaggeration that if a serious conflict were to break out every German would be exposed to very great danger. Little reliance can be placed on protection from the Polish police, as was very clearly shown, for instance, by the complete—and obviously intentional—failure of the police in the demonstrations outside the Warsaw Embassy building in the spring of this year.² It can be expected, however, that as long as the Ambassador remains at his post there will at least be a certain unwillingness to allow the worst to happen. But, above all, the presence of the Ambassador gives the greatest moral support to the Reich Germans themselves, whereas his absence during a crisis must make a really disastrous impression.

Moreover, in my capacity as Head of my Mission I have come to the conclusion that it is not possible for me to be away from Warsaw during this period of tension. I feel like a captain who deserts his company at the critical moment. I ask you to be good enough to take this point of view into consideration.

Submitted to the State Secretary.

VON MOLTKE

¹ At that time in Berlin; see document No. 2.

² In February; see also vol. v of this Series, document No. 137.

No. 83

2059/447976

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, August 16, 1939.

An inter-departmental discussion took place in Under State Secretary Woermann's office yesterday on the further treatment of problems arising from the South Tyrol operation, which was attended by representatives of the Reichsführer-SS, the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Finance, and the Reich Railway Board.

The principle was accepted that in spite of the opposition, already apparent, from official Italian quarters, we should continue to abide

by the directive by the Reichsführer-SS,¹ that the entire *Volksdeutsch* population of the provinces of Bolzano, Trento, Belluno, and Udine be taken over.

The problems of transfer and advance financing arising from this were discussed in detail by the departments.

It was decided that action for the present be confined to replying to the Italian draft transfer agreement² by counter proposals, which would take into account the objections expressed in the memorandum submitted,³ and entering into discussion with the Italian Embassy here on the question of the rate of exchange and/or premium.⁴

For submission to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl.

The counter proposals will be drafted by the Ministry of Economics, and probably discussed at an inter-departmental meeting here next Monday.⁵

JUNKER

¹ Not found, but see vol. vi of this Series, document No. 562.

² According to a memorandum by Woermann (591/244561-62), Magistrati handed him the German and Italian texts (591/244563-70) of such a draft on Aug. 10.

³ Not found.

⁴ Whereas in the discussion of June 23, 1939 (see vol. vi of this Series, document No. 562), the Italians had promised a specially favourable rate of exchange, in August, according to telegram No. 27 of Aug. 5, sent by Woermann to the Consulate General in Milan (584/242394), the Italian Embassy in Berlin had proposed instead an automatic increase by a certain percentage of the prices fixed by a mixed commission (i.e., for sales of South Tyrolean properties).

⁵ No record has been found.

No. 84

34/23928-29

Memorandum by an Official of the News and Press Department

BERLIN, August 16, 1939.

M. Legrenier¹ informed me, on August 16, that Mr. Barnes,² a former correspondent in Moscow, and Herr Süß,³ both of whom enjoy excellent relations with the Soviet Union's Berlin Embassy, have given him independent but absolutely similar accounts of their conversations with Counsellor of Embassy Georgi Astakhov and the Press Attaché, Andrei Smirnov. These two Russian diplomats are said to have stated that Moscow firmly intended to protract further the negotiations with the Western Powers. The reincorporation of Danzig in the Reich was expected there, as Moscow was firmly convinced that, as at Munich, Britain and France would avoid war at all costs. As the two Western Powers would not fight over the Danzig question it was intended to draw out the negotiations for a military pact as long as possible. After successfully settling the Danzig question, Germany would have gained such prestige that the small

¹ Not identified.

² Berlin correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune*.

³ Not identified.

countries of Eastern Europe and the Danube basin would certainly comply with all Germany's wishes, since they would realize that they would get just as little protection from the Western Powers as did Czecho-Slovakia last year. After her tremendous gain in prestige in the Danzig question, Germany would be able to rest on her laurels for a time. Russia would use this period for entering into political discussions with Germany.

It seems worth noting that, if MM. Astakhov and Smirnov really did make these statements, the two Soviet representatives must have expected that Herr Süß would be fairly certain to report this conversation to the French Embassy, with which he is on very good terms, and that Mr. Barnes would probably tell the American Embassy.

Submitted to Senior Counsellor Dr. Schmidt and Minister Braun von Stumm.⁴

PLATZER

⁴ This document was also submitted to Weizsäcker, who initialled it on Aug. 17.

No. 85

43/29562-64

Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop

BERLIN, August 16, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT¹

In a conversation² which the Berlin correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune* had on Wednesday morning³ with M. Smirnov, the Press Attaché of the Russian Embassy, who is a close friend of his, Mr. Barnes was asked how American official circles viewed the situation after the Salzburg meetings.⁴ Mr. Barnes replied that in a conversation with the Press Attaché of the American Embassy on Tuesday evening he had gained the impression that the leading officials of the Embassy, especially the Chargé d'Affaires,⁵ still firmly believed that a peaceful solution was possible. They said it was about a fifty-fifty chance between war and peace. The members of the American Embassy gave as their reason for this, that, for instance, in spite of the Germans' talent for organization, German precautions against gas warfare were not being carried out in the way one would have expected of the Germans if things were serious.

The Russian Press Attaché, Smirnov, then gave a brief outline of the views of the Russian Embassy, which were roughly as follows:

We believe that Hitler will succeed in solving the Danzig question

¹ A heading, added in Likus's handwriting, reads: "From the Russian Embassy."

² See also document No. 84.

³ i.e., Aug. 16.

⁴ See documents Nos. 43 and 47.

⁵ Alexander C. Kirk.

without war. We do not think that Paris and London will stand by their agreements with Poland. We believe there will be a second Munich in view of the attitude and personality of the French Foreign Minister, Bonnet, and of Mr. Chamberlain, neither of whom we trust. Herein can also be seen the reason for Russia's reserve in her negotiations with Britain.

Smirnov then sketched future developments as envisaged by the Russian Embassy.

If the Führer gained Danzig that would be a tremendous victory in prestige for him. This increase in prestige for him would be as great as the loss of prestige for London and Paris. The small Eastern European countries, the Baltic and Scandinavian States, from sheer fear would then direct their entire policy as desired by Berlin. They would then ask themselves: Why should we go on sending our Foreign Ministers to Paris and London? There had been plenty of examples to show that when things got serious they withdrew, and here Smirnov alluded to the successes of German foreign policy.

Smirnov also spoke of the reports in the British and French press that Mussolini was acting as a restraining influence on the Führer, and would rather have a break in the Axis than wage war jointly with Germany. The Russian Embassy were not of this opinion, as it was plain to them that Mussolini could only realize his foreign political plans and wishes in conjunction with Berlin, and any split in the Axis would have an injurious effect on Italy. Smirnov continued:

"We therefore regard our negotiations with Berlin as a kind of safeguard, for it is plain that, if the democracies suffer such a resounding defeat, the feeling in Moscow will change further and then there will be no more obstacles in the way of our entering into close relations with these countries [*sic*]."

Note: It is beyond all doubt that the foregoing information can⁶ be regarded as somewhat in the nature of a deliberate rumour or *ballon d'essai*, as the Russian, Smirnov, could have had no idea that Barnes, with whom he was talking, might pass the subject-matter of the conversation on to the informant.

L[IKUS]

⁶ Addition in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "not".

No. 86

43/29557

Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop

BERLIN, August 16, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

The American Chargé d'Affaires, Counsellor of Embassy Kirk, this afternoon warned the chief Berlin correspondent of a large American news agency (Lochner)¹ against underestimating the warnings in today's Berlin press. As a diplomat in Rome and Moscow, he (the Counsellor of Embassy) had learned enough about the methods of the so-called "dictators" to know that when great matters were at stake they could not bluff. He was convinced that Hitler meant seriously what was said in the German press on the questions of Danzig and the Corridor. The British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, also regarded the situation in Danzig as grave, though he was always inclined to underestimate the seriousness of the German threats. That was why German Government circles had apparently no exact idea of Britain's attitude. Only a few days ago he had advised Sir Nevile to ensure that the Government in London should again say absolutely plainly what would be their attitude in case of a German-Polish conflict. Ambiguities were highly dangerous to peace. In general the American Chargé d'Affaires appeared extremely pessimistic about the European situation, and feared a dramatic climax.

L[IKUS]

¹ Louis Lochner, Berlin correspondent of the Associated Press.

No. 87

1746/403461

Minute by an Official of the British Section of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop

URGENT

BERLIN, August 16, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL

Note for Senior Counsellor Hewel.

I enclose a letter from Mr. Charles Roden Buxton,¹ the Labour Party's foreign policy expert, who is at present in Berlin. This letter contains proposals which he made to me orally in a conversation and then, at my request, put in writing.

Buxton emphasized that they were personal suggestions. For my part I told him that I also accepted them personally, and that I did not know whether the German authorities concerned would be

¹ Former Labour M.P. and Parliamentary adviser to the Labour Party. Member of the Society of Friends.

interested in such proposals at the present time, especially as it was the holiday period just now.

T. C. P. Catchpool, who is accompanying Mr. Buxton, and whom I mentioned in my last Minute,² indicated at the end of a conversation that Buxton knew Chamberlain and Halifax, and in particular was very closely associated with Butler. It might therefore be assumed that Buxton would not be making such proposals without a certain degree of approval from his Government.

DR. HETZLER

1746/408469-70

[Enclosure]³

CONFIDENTIAL

HOTEL BRISTOL,
BERLIN, August 14, 1939.

DEAR DR. HETZLER: In our conversation today I suggested to you the outlines of a possible settlement between Germany and England, and you asked me to write them down. I spoke purely as a private individual, and I must make it quite clear that I am not authorized to do so by any one else. But I hope I am a good European, I have studied European questions for many years, and I earnestly desire peace. What I said was this:—I believe a settlement is possible if it is a complete settlement of all outstanding questions at the same time; if it is announced to the public as one single whole; if it is on the basis of equality and of mutuality; and if definite and concrete steps are taken, on both sides, which will remove the present mistrust, and create a feeling of confidence that a completely new state of affairs is now beginning in Europe.

I would put my ideas in the following form:—If England agreed:

- a) to recognize East Europe as Germany's natural living space;
- b) to settle the colonial question by recognizing Germany's right to her former colonies, and immediately begin to set up a new system in Central Africa on the basis of the Berlin Conference (1885) with a new distribution of territory;
- c) to withdraw all methods of economic competition in East Europe other than the normal methods of trade and commerce;
- d) to withdraw all so-called "encircling" alliances in East Europe;
- e) to promote direct negotiation between Poland and Germany on Danzig and the Corridor;
- f) to make a new Naval Treaty;
- g) to make a general Disarmament Agreement, on a large scale, on a mutual basis, and with mutual inspection;

² Not printed (1746/408480-81). T. Corder Catchpool, a member of the Society of Friends, had previously been engaged in relief work in the Sudetenland.

³ This letter is in English in the original.

In such a case, would Germany then agree:

a) to recognize the British Empire as England's natural living space;

b) to enter into a system of European cooperation (for example a Conference of Germany, England, France, Italy, Poland, Spain) for the resettlement of Europe, with common guarantees for the new arrangements, and for the independence of all states;

c) to withdraw any "encircling" agreements, if such exist, with Spain;

d) to make a Declaration concerning the autonomy of the Protektorat;

e) to make a new Naval Treaty;

f) to make a general Disarmament Agreement, on a large scale, on a mutual basis, and with mutual inspection?

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES RODEN BUXTON

No. 88

276/178545-47

Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weizsäcker

Moscow, August 16, 1939.

Sent by Air Courier—August 17.

DEAR STATE SECRETARY: With regard to my conversation of yesterday with M. Molotov,¹ I should like, in all haste, to stress especially the following:

M. Molotov was quite unusually compliant and candid. I received the impression that the proposal of the visit of the Reich Minister was very flattering personally to M. Molotov and that he considers it an actual proof of our good intentions. (I recall that—according to newspaper despatches—Moscow at one time requested that Britain and France send a Cabinet Minister here, and that, instead, only Mr. Strang came, because London and Paris had been angry that M. Voroshilov had not been permitted to accept the invitation to the British manoeuvres, which is, in fact, quite another matter, since high-ranking Soviet Russians have heretofore never travelled abroad.)

In M. Molotov's statements yesterday, the surprising moderation in his demands on us also seems to be worthy of note. He did not once use the words "Anti-Comintern Pact", and no longer demanded of us, as he did in the last conversation,² "cessation" of support of Japanese aggression. He limited himself to the wish that we might bring about a Soviet-Japanese settlement.

¹ See document No. 79.

² See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 766.

More significant is his fairly clearly expressed wish to conclude a non-aggression pact with us.

Despite all efforts, we did not succeed in ascertaining entirely clearly what M. Molotov desired in the matter of the Baltic States. It appears that he *mentioned* the question of a joint guarantee of the Baltic States as only one point in Signor Rosso's report, but did not expressly make the demand that we give such a guarantee. Such a joint guarantee seems to me at variance with the behaviour of the Soviet Government in the British-French negotiations.

It actually looks at the moment as if we would achieve the desired results in the negotiations here.

With cordial greeting and Heil Hitler ! I am, dear State Secretary,
Yours etc.,
COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

No. 89

695/200342

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, August 17, 1939—12:40 p.m.

No. 182 of August 17

Received August 17—4:30 p.m.

For the Ambassador.

The Foreign Minister requests a report by telegram regarding the time when you made your request to be received by Molotov,¹ and the time for which the conversation has been arranged.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 75.

No. 90

2131/466184-85

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy

ROME, August 17, 1939.

State Secretary von Weizsäcker telephoned me at 5:20 p.m. to ask whether it was correct that Ambassador Attolico had started on his journey back to Germany, and whether I had been able to get in touch with him. I replied that, according to a telephone communication from Signora Attolico which reached me at 4 p.m., the Ambassador left for Salzburg direct on the 2 o'clock train. I myself had only been able to speak to him on the telephone as he had been unable to see me during the morning, which, as he had stated in the telephone conversation, he had intended to do, because he was detained at the Ministry until almost half an hour before his departure. But I would be seeing Count Ciano at 6:30 and would take the opportunity of

informing him also of telegram No. 379.¹ Herr von Weizsäcker then remarked that that was very fortunate. He could tell me, further to the information in the telegram, but only for my personal use and not for passing on to the Italians, that fresh arguments would be used by us in Moscow today, though otherwise he could only confirm that matters were so far going well. I asked whether there was any connection between these discussions and the arrival in Moscow of a German agricultural delegation² reported in this evening's Italian press, but Herr von Weizsäcker replied that there was no such connection and that the delegation had nothing to do with these discussions.

I also asked Herr von Weizsäcker if he thought that Count Ciano already knew of his conversations with Henderson and Coulondre on August 15.³ He replied that he had given the Embassy a brief account of what had been said. I replied that I would sound Ciano as to whether, and how far, he was informed of the matter, and if he was not, I would make use of the contents of the telegram when speaking to him. Herr von Weizsäcker said he agreed with this.

He asked me to let him know by telephone, if possible this evening, the substance of my conversation with Ciano. I observed that presumably it would depend on the substance of the conversation whether that would be possible; to which he replied that he would in any case be grateful for a general indication, which I could follow up with a detailed telegram.⁴ He himself would be leaving by air for Salzburg at 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

I said I would ring him up between 7 and 7:30 this evening.

MACKENSEN

¹ Document No. 76.

² See vol. VI of this Series, documents Nos. 714 and 757.

³ See documents Nos. 64 and 66, and *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, Nos. 45 and 57.

⁴ See document No. 98.

No. 91

52/35011

Unsigned Memorandum from the Information Section¹

Ref. P.-Inf.¹

August 17, 1939.

We received the following communication by teleprinter at 5:45 p.m.

Urgent message from Dr. Schmidt for the State Secretary:

The Führer received the following telegram today from Eastern Upper Silesia:

"Thousands of German men and women in Eastern Upper Silesia have for days been undergoing the most brutal maltreatment by the

¹ i.e., the Information Section of the News Service and Press Department.

Poles. Yesterday and today hundreds of German men and women were arrested, maltreated, and carried off. Many of our comrades have been beaten up until they have become unrecognizable. In our extreme need we ask our Führer to protect and help us. In loyalty to our Führer, Adolf Hitler.

"Signature"

The Foreign Minister requests the State Secretary to keep this telegram, which is to be published in the press at the right moment, always at hand during the next few days for conversations with foreign diplomats, and for use, if need be. Dr. Schmidt.

No. 92

34/23932

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, August 17, 1939—6:52 p.m.

No. 180 of August 17

Received August 17—8:00 p.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 182 of August 17¹ and my telegram No. 179 of August 17.²

Your telegram No. 178³ after being deciphered reached me yesterday at 11 p.m., so that the instructions could not be carried out until this morning. An interview with Molotov was requested at about 10 a.m., that is, at the earliest possible moment. At about 1 p.m. information was received that he would receive me this evening at 8.⁴

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 89.

² Not printed; see document No. 73, footnote 1.

³ Document No. 73.

⁴ Marginal notes: (i) "When was [telegram] No. 178 handed in to the post here? W[eizsäcker] 18[8]." (ii) "To arrange interview—No. 178 [document No. 73]—at 3.20 p.m. Instructions—No. 179 [document No. 75]—at 4.10 p.m. [no signature]."

No. 93

7895/E573180-81

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, August 17, 1939.

e.o. W 1360 g.

On instructions from Ministerialdirektor Wiehl, and with reference to telegram No. 338,¹ I discussed with Ministerialrat Müller, of the Reich Air Ministry, the further treatment of the German-Rumanian Air Armaments Protocol of July 8, 1939.² Ministerialrat Müller stated that the position was as before, namely that the Ministry

¹ Document No. 77.

² Not printed; see vol. VI of this Series, document No. 632, footnote 3.

agreed to the execution of the Treaty and that he had done nothing to slow this up. The Führer's instructions, which I mentioned, that the deliveries to be made under the armaments contracts with Rumania were not to begin before the winter of 1940/41,³ were not known to him officially. We agreed that nothing had happened to change the attitude of the Reich Air Ministry, and that it was for the Field Marshal to make a report to the Führer about his decision.

Ministerialrat Müller was concerned as to whether there were not objections to the delivery guarantees provided for in some of the transactions. We agreed that for the, at present, most urgent purpose of obtaining the release of blocked quantities of petroleum, it would suffice to make declarations to the Rumanian Air Ministry about the Junkers engine transaction and the Heinkel 112 fighters. I said that the Legation in Bucharest would be instructed to appeal to the Air Minister and the Minister of Economics to this end. Ministerialrat Müller acquiesced in this.

I agreed with Syrup (Reich Ministry of Economics) that he would make use of our offer of foreign exchange only if this should prove absolutely necessary, and then only by stages, and on the basis that payment of foreign exchange be regarded as a token of our good will; in other words: the quantity of petroleum must not be made dependent on the amount of foreign exchange expended.

JU[NKER]

³ See *ibid.*, document No. 703.

No. 94

7895/E573182

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

No. 315

BERLIN, August 17, 1939—8:25 p.m.
zu W 1360 g.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 338.²

I. The Junkers representative arrives tomorrow by air with the draft agreement on delivery of engines. He has instructions to conduct the negotiations speedily so that signing can take place as soon as possible.

Heinkel fighters could also be delivered shortly if further quantities of petroleum can be released in exchange for them. We shall then expect the Minister of Economics to arrange with the National Bank for the release of the steamers held.

II. Only for your information.

¹ Document No. 93.

² Document No. 77.

In order to release the remainder of the petroleum purchased over and above the quota [*ohne Wertgrenze*], it is intended, if necessary, even to spend foreign exchange. Syrup and Schieweck will arrive tomorrow by air to deal with this, and to give you further information.

WIEHL

No. 95

1819/415860

The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 69 of August 17

ROME, August 17, 1939—9:25 p.m.

Received August 17—10:30 p.m.

Pol. V 7948.

In view of the international situation, which the Vatican regards as extremely tense, the Cardinal Secretary of State¹ has postponed indefinitely the leave which he was to have started today.

The Polish Ambassador, Papée, who returned from Poland two or three days ago, had a lengthy conversation in the Secretary of State's office yesterday. According to my informant, he expressed himself in the Vatican approximately as follows on the subject of the present tension between Germany and Poland:

1. Poland will refrain from any act of provocation.
2. Any attempt at a territorial change in the Free City of Danzig will be immediately answered by appropriate measures (military occupation).
3. Poland is convinced that, in such an event, Britain and France would come to her aid. But even if there were no such intervention, Poland would take the same action alone.

Concerning the possibility of a compromise solution, the Polish Government told the Vatican:

1. That Poland will never agree to accept a Four-Power Conference, that is, one from which Poland is excluded.
2. That Poland would only agree to a conference of five or more Powers if this were prepared in such a way that the decisions were acceptable to both parties.

BERGEN

¹ Cardinal Luigi Maglione.

No. 96

1818/415053

The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 792 of August 17 SAN SEBASTIAN, August 17, 1939—9:30 p.m.

Received August 18—1:00 a.m.

Pol. V 7947.

Colonel Beigbeder, the Foreign Minister, on whom I called today at Burgos, referred, in the course of the conversation, to German-Polish relations and said that he was still optimistic about the possibility of a pacific solution of the Danzig question, assuming of course that there was no provocation from Poland which Germany could not tolerate. But Poland would not risk provocation unless incited thereto by a third party. He did not think that such incitement would come from Britain as long as Chamberlain was at the helm.

HEBERLEIN

No. 97

7895/E573184

The Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 340 of August 17 BUCHAREST, August 17, 1939—10:00 p.m.

Received August 18—4:15 a.m.

W 1369 g.

With reference to your telegram No. 311 of August 16.¹

The Minister President² with whom I spoke today in the Foreign Minister's office, referred to 200 [Z]brojovka machine guns destined for Rumania which were being held up in the Protectorate and asked us to secure their release. When I remarked that the quantity of petroleum assured to Germany by treaty³ was not at present being released in sufficient quantities, the Minister President expressed surprise, as the Rumanian Government had not departed from their policy, and did not intend to do so. I emphasized that, so far, we had faithfully carried out our obligations under the Economic Treaties, and drew attention to the delivery of aircraft which was envisaged, and to the proposed signing of the Junkers contract.⁴ The Minister President promised to look into the question of deliveries

¹ Not printed; see document No. 77, footnote 1.

² Armand Călinescu.

³ See vol. vi of this Series, documents Nos. 78, 632, 638 and 639.

⁴ Marginal note: "Bucharest has evidently not yet received yesterday's telegram [document No. 94]."

of petroleum, and repeated that Rumania was resolved, for her part too, to fulfil the treaties with Germany.

I request instructions by telegram as to whether I may expect the machine guns to be released.

STELZER

No. 98

583/242149-50

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

ROME, August 17, 1939—11:00 p.m.

TOP SECRET

Received August 18—2:30 a.m.

No. 352 of August 17

With reference to my two telephone conversations¹ with the State Secretary today: When I asked Ciano, at this evening's interview, how the Duce had received his report on the Salzburg conversations,² he replied that the Duce was unable to share the view that the German-Polish conflict would remain localized. He had also explained this today to Attolico, who would inform the Reich Foreign Minister tomorrow and who also had instructions to remain in closest contact with the latter. As matters stood, the Duce saw no further possibility of reaching a peaceful solution, nor would he submit new suggestions to us on this subject, although it was clear to him that the general embroilment would catch the Axis Powers at a moment which could not be described as ideal from a military point of view. Since his two suggestions (the idea of a conference and a draft communiqué) had met with no response from us, suggestions by which he had wished to stimulate the strong aspirations towards a peaceful solution which certainly existed in the world, he had no further inspiration for such suggestions. The decision now lay solely with Berlin. The Duce, moreover, was completely calm. As officially announced in this evening's press here, he, Ciano, would be leaving for Albania the day after tomorrow as previously arranged, but would probably only stay over Saturday and Sunday.³ If I had any important communications to make to him, he could always be reached quickly, even while there, through his *Chef de Cabinet*, Anfuso, who was staying here, and, if the worst came to the worst, he could be back in Rome in about three hours.

The British Ambassador⁴ had made an appointment with him for this evening, in a manner which, at any rate, did not lead one to expect a *démarche*, but seemed rather to indicate the desire for an

¹ See document No. 90; no record of a second conversation has been found.

² See Editors' Note, p. 35, and documents Nos. 43 and 47.

³ Ciano left on Aug. 19, returning to Rome on Aug. 20; see the *Ciano Diaries*, entries for those dates.

⁴ Sir Percy Loraine. See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, Nos. 55 and 59.

exchange of views. Similarly, the French Ambassador,⁵ who had just returned here, had expressed a desire to be received, but in no way urgently. Since Ciano's return from Salzburg, he had only met the Polish Ambassador⁶ casually on the beach, but had not been troubled by him with any indiscreet questions about Salzburg. Besides, Ciano said, he avoided receiving diplomats, so as not to become involved in awkward conversations, such as, for example, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires⁷ had tried to force upon him by tactless, importunate questions during a chance meeting by the sea.

Ciano was sufficiently well informed, through the Italian Embassy in Berlin, of the State Secretary's conversations with the British and French Ambassadors on the 15th⁸—which he described as *démarches* by both of them—for me to confine myself to outlining briefly their substance.

The information I gave from telegram No. 379,⁹ on the state of the Moscow conversations, was received by Ciano with a "très bien".

Ciano, who gave the impression of being very calm, concluded the conversation, which he conducted in a spirit of comradely cordiality, by asking me to convey his special greetings to the Reich Foreign Minister.

MACKENSEN

⁵ André François-Poncet.

⁶ Bolesław Wienawa Długoszowski.

⁷ Leon Helfand.

⁸ See documents Nos. 64 and 66 and *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, Nos. 45 and 57.

⁹ Document No. 76.

No. 99

1625/389183

The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry

Airgram

MOST URGENT

No. 300 of August 17

LONDON, August 17, 1939.

Received August 20—12:30 p.m.

Pol. II 2955.

I learn from a reliable source: The Anglo-French-Soviet Russian military negotiations are so far advanced that conversations with the Polish General Staff can be opened. Poland, who has hitherto shown reserve towards attempts to offer her Soviet assistance, now declares herself ready to open conversations. The negotiations, which are being treated with the utmost secrecy, will be conducted by the French Military Attaché in Warsaw,¹ who is said to be particularly qualified for this task. The Polish Military Attaché in Moscow² has, so far, been kept informed of all phases of the military conversations.

TH. KORDT

¹ Gen. F. Musse.

² Maj. Maleciński.

No. 100

350/202116-18

Minute by an Official of the Legation in Slovakia

TOP SECRET

August 17, 1939.

Note for Minister Bernard

MEETING IN VIENNA ON AUGUST 17

Present: Colonel Crüwell, Chief of Dept. VI, Army General Staff
Ministerialdirigent Danckwerts of the Reich Ministry of the Interior.

Lieutenant General Barckhausen of the DKM[sic],¹ Bratislava.
Ministerialdirektor Dill, at present of the Reichsstatthalter's Office, Vienna, and his deputy.

Landrat Piesbergen, at present [in the Office of] the Reich Protector, Prague.

Counsellor of Legation Hofmann, of the Legation in Bratislava.

Various officers of the Army Group.

The attitude of the German Armed Forces towards Slovakia in an emergency was reported on and discussed. The guiding principles evolved by the OKH, and approved by the OKW and the Foreign Ministry, were read out.² According to Colonel Crüwell, the substance of these guiding principles is to be made known to the Slovak Government by the Minister, as being the demands by the Reich Government, on Y-day³ or a few hours before. The Legation in Bratislava are being sent further instructions from the Foreign Ministry on this subject.⁴

The German Government regard Slovakia as a friendly State. The functions of head of the civil administration for the Slovak sector of the operational area of AOK⁵ 14 will be assumed by the Slovak Government, who will issue the necessary instructions to the Slovak authorities, and announcements to the Slovak population, ostensibly in their own name.

The AOK 14 does not, therefore, propose to appoint an IdZ⁶ for the region of Slovakia.

An IdZ⁶ is planned for:

¹ Presumably DMK, i.e., Deutsche Militärkommission, German Military Commission.

² See Editors' Note, p. 302.

³ In "Operation White", the military plan concerning Poland (see vol. VI of this Series, document No. 185), this was the code letter for the first day on which operations would take place.

⁴ See document No. 165, enclosure.

⁵ i.e., Armeoberkommando, Army Headquarters, see Appendix VIII.

⁶ The reference is uncertain, but presumably stands for an official of the civil administration (? *Leiter der Zivilverwaltung*).

1. Moravia with headquarters in Brno (Landrat Piesbergen).
2. Enemy territory (Ministerialdirektor Dill), headquarters with the AOK.

Ministerialdirektor Dill will also be adviser for Slovakia to AOK 14.

Barckhausen's Staff, with its headquarters in Bratislava, will serve as the liaison authority between AOK 14 and the Slovak Government.

A liaison officer of the Slovak Government will be attached to AOK 14.

A German expert on administrative questions will be attached to Barckhausen's Staff.

There will be no division of Slovakia into two parts, an operations area, and a free area, for administrative purposes.

The Legation in Bratislava, presumably at the wish of the Foreign Ministry, will not be concerned in the transmission of instructions and requests from the OKH or the OKW to the Slovak Government. All this will pass through AOK 14 and Barckhausen's Staff.

An official of the Legation in Bratislava is to be attached to AOK 14 as a representative of the Foreign Ministry.

The following questions will be further clarified by Col. Crüwell in Berlin:

1. Whether all questions relating to Slovakia (that is, including those relating to the non-operational area and those belonging to the spheres of the other Reich Ministries) should be submitted to the Slovak Government by AOK 14—Barckhausen's Staff.

2. What tasks are to be given to the Slovak Army (e.g. guarding the northern frontier in East Slovakia or the whole of East Slovakia).

General Barckhausen referred to the necessity of allocating a task to them.

3. Attempts are to be made to examine the possible repercussions on the monetary system of Slovakia of pouring German money into the Slovak economy.

Under certain circumstances political consequences will result from this, to which Counsellor Hofmann drew attention.

HOFMANN

No. 101

585/242470

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 17, 1939.

Before his return to Sofia, Lieutenant Colonel Bruckmann gave me the following information about the matter dealt with in the memorandum of August 14:¹

¹ Document No. 60.

1. The request for German military assistance over and above the deliveries of arms was conveyed to him by the Bulgarian Minister of War.² Herr Bruckmann takes it as certain that the Minister of War acted in agreement with the Minister President. Minister von Richthofen was informed by Herr Bruckmann.

2. Lieutenant Colonel Bruckmann brought the matter before the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Commander in Chief of the Army separately. Both asked him to confine himself in further conversations to a general statement of goodwill.

3. Lieutenant Colonel Bruckmann has been instructed to follow up a suggestion made by him, namely that a German General should go to Sofia soon in order to reassure the Bulgarians. The request for his visit, however, should come formally from the Bulgarians and, if possible, should be made through the Minister President and the German Minister.

WOERMANN

² General Daskalov.

No. 102

230/152006-07

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

zu St.S. No. 629¹

BERLIN, August 17, 1939.

On special instructions from the Field Marshal, only five Messerschmidts were recently delivered to the Yugoslavs, and for all practical purposes without contract. The contract for the total consignment of 100 aircraft has so far not yet been signed. Besides this, the Yugoslavs have received three "Taifun" type sports aircraft which, however, have nothing to do with military deliveries.

On instructions given him personally by the Field Marshal, Ministerialrat Müller (Reich Ministry for Air) told the Yugoslav Military Attaché that the signature of the contracts, and thus the delivery of the total of 100 aircraft, was dependent on a decision by the Field Marshal, who was waiting until certain questions were clarified. At the same time Ministerialrat Müller told the Military Attaché that the manufacture of the aircraft ordered by Yugoslavia was nevertheless proceeding, so that when certain questions had been satisfactorily settled, the delivery of the aircraft on the promised date was assured.

As far as the amount of the armaments credit granted to Yugoslavia is concerned, Ministerialrat Müller states that it comprises 200 million RM, 80 million RM of which are allocated for aircraft material and 120 million RM for other army equipment. The value of the 100 aircraft to be delivered, including the ground equipment to

¹ Document No. 81.

be delivered in connection with them, would amount to approximately 65-70 million RM.

In any case the Yugoslav Government were counting on an armament credit of 200 million RM in all. This figure may already have been mentioned to the Yugoslavs by Consul General Neuhausen.

Respectfully submitted to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl.

KALISCH

No. 103

1926/432173-75

Memorandum by an Official attached to the Staff of the Foreign Minister

IMMEDIATE

August 17, 1939.¹

SECRET

For the State Secretary personally.

Subject: Latin American Conference.²

The Foreign Minister requests the State Secretary to summon our Heads of Missions in Latin America to a meeting which the Auslandsorganisation should not attend. The State Secretary is requested to inform the Heads of Missions that owing to pressure of work the Foreign Minister is unable to receive them himself. He therefore informs them as follows, through the State Secretary:³

1. For the present, a practical arrangement must be found for cooperation between our Missions and the Auslandsorganisation centres in Latin America. A definite solution will follow. A directive about this will be issued to the Heads of Missions in due course.

2. On their return to their posts, the Heads of Missions are to come to an understanding with their Hoheitsträger on the following basis:

a) In their field of action the Hoheitsträger are under the obligation to conform to the wishes of the Heads of Missions which are based on considerations of foreign policy, and also, for their part, to keep the Reich representatives currently informed in good time about all questions of Party activity which, according to prevailing circumstances, may have repercussions on foreign policy. On the other hand the Head of a Mission must make it his business to inform the Hoheitsträger on all measures which he intends to take on his own initiative for reasons of foreign policy in questions relating to the German community abroad [*Auslandsdeutschtum*].

¹ This memorandum was received at the Foreign Ministry by teleprinter from Fuschl at 9:10 a.m. on Aug. 18 (8295/E589149-50).

² The Heads of Missions and Party officials in Latin America had been summoned to Berlin for a conference in June; see vol. VI of this Series, document No. 509.

³ Marginal note: "Made use of, on Aug. 19, with the Heads of Missions. W[eizsäcker] 19."

b) The quasi-official functions still being discharged by the Party (for instance in the sphere of the press, propaganda, repatriation and economic questions) must, according to local circumstances, be handed over to the competent Reich Missions in the quickest and most suitable manner. In future, the Reich representative will, as a matter of course, also take steps to secure as far as possible the cooperation of experienced and trustworthy experts from the Party offices in these matters.

c) In countries where the Party is under a ban, as well as in countries where a ban is to be expected, the Reich representative and the Hoheitsträger must agree on the best methods of continuing the work of the Party without prejudice to our foreign relations.

d) As regards the care of *Volksdeutsche*, the regulations hitherto in force still obtain, namely that these duties come exclusively within the competence of the Reich representative.

3) The Foreign Minister looks forward to receiving reports from the Heads of Missions on the arrangements effected, or, as the case may be, on the points upon which agreement has not been reached. Measures by the Party offices which run counter to the aforementioned directives must on no account be permitted by the Heads of Missions.

4) Furthermore, the Heads of Missions shall report at once what measures relating to organization and personnel are necessary to carry out the quickest and most expedient transfer of semi-official functions from the Party offices to the Reich Missions.

5) The Foreign Minister requests that the Heads of Missions be informed again that in future he holds them fully responsible for any prejudice to foreign relations caused by the activities of Party offices.

6) After this meeting, the Heads of Missions may return to their posts.

7) A detailed memorandum⁴ from the Foreign Minister follows by teleprinter. The Foreign Minister leaves it to the discretion of the State Secretary to make use of its contents to our Heads of Missions.

8) The Auslandsorganisation is merely to be told that, owing to pressure of work, the Foreign Minister cannot deal with this question now, and hence, in pursuance of the Berlin discussions, the practical arrangements for cooperation between Reich Missions and Party offices in Latin America is for the time being left to direct agreements between the Heads of Missions and the Hoheitsträger.⁵

HENCKE

⁴ Not printed (1926/432178-84). The substance of this memorandum, drafted in June, is contained in the document here printed.

⁵ Marginal notes in Weizsäcker's handwriting:

"Schacht.

"x x [sic]

"Situation tense.

No. 104

249/E532000-91

*Minute by the Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the
Danzig Senate*

DANZIG, August 17, 1939.

The High Commissioner had asked me today to come over and see him.

He made long statements on interviews he was alleged to have had, on the attitude of the Poles to these, etc.

He first dwelt at length on a conversation with Herr Zarske¹ who had come over to him and discussed with him through what leakages Burckhardt's visit to the Führer² could have got into the world press. The High Commissioner told Herr Zarske straight to his face that he, Zarske, was himself to blame. Herr Zarske denied this, whereupon the High Commissioner said to him: "You yourself told the German journalist Klauss, under the seal of secrecy, that you would accompany the High Commissioner to the Führer." Herr Zarske had again denied this and the High Commissioner had replied in a fury that it was disgraceful that he should always be told lies. Thereupon Zarske admitted having spoken to Klauss. After first denying it, he had also admitted that a reporter of the *Vorposten* might have made the same statement to M. Jouvenel.³ He also mentioned the name of another man who might be concerned.

The High Commissioner then said that when he went to the Obersalzberg, he had sent a message to the Chairman of the Committee of Three⁴ (Lord Halifax) saying that after the visit he would be in Basle on Saturday and Sunday. Halifax had fortunately sent Mr. Makins⁵ there. Now the British Consul in Danzig, Mr. Shepherd, had shown him a telegram from Lord Halifax,⁶ saying that he had been deeply impressed by the information given him and had been very pleased to see how benevolently the Führer had dealt with the matter. He

¹ Editor of the *Danziger Vorposten*.

² On Aug. 11; see document No. 67, and footnote 2 thereto.

³ Presumably Bertrand de Jouvenel, French journalist.

⁴ Set up by the Council of the League to give preliminary consideration to Danzig issues.

⁵ For Makins' account of this conversation with Professor Burckhardt on Aug. 13, see *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. vi, No. 659.

⁶ See *ibid.*, vol. vii, No. 3.

"Foreign Minister's view. Poland no problem militarily.

"Measure brim full. Western Powers leaving Poland in the lurch.

"Questionable. Credit of Poles abroad.

Refusal of negotiations. Big things at stake.

"Bon voyage. Convince of good cause."

These appear to be Weizsäcker's notes for his talk to the Heads of Missions. A memorandum by Weizsäcker, St. S. No. 636 of Aug. 18 (1926/432176), states that Schacht was about to make a private visit to various Central and South American States, and had asked that the Heads of Missions be so informed.

hoped that Burckhardt would continue to be able to render good services as an intermediary.⁷

In conclusion it is worth mentioning that Minister Chodacki had been to see Professor Burkhardt before and after the conversation with President Greiser⁸ and had told him afterwards that the conversation with the President had gone very well. The High Commissioner had then discussed this visit with the Polish Counsellor of Legation, Battaglia, who had called on him. Battaglia had replied that when Minister Chodacki came from seeing President Greiser he always said that everything had gone very well and was all right, and afterwards it turned out that nothing was all right.

VIKTOR BÖTTCHER

⁷ The text of this paragraph was circulated in the Foreign Ministry by Bergmann with a memorandum of Aug. 18 (97/108513-14) which read: "Consul General von Janson has just informed me by telephone that Staatsrat Dr. Böttcher, Director of the Foreign Department of the Danzig Senate, had a lengthy conversation yesterday with Professor Burckhardt about the latter's visit to the Führer. During the conversation, M. Burckhardt told Herr Böttcher substantially the same as he had previously told Herr von Janson. A particularly interesting excerpt from the minute drawn up by Herr Böttcher on his conversation is enclosed."

⁸ See document No. 72.

No. 105

34/23944-47

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SECRET

No. 182 of August 17

Moscow, August 18, 1939—5:58 a.m.

Received August 18—9:00 a.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 179 of [August] 16.¹

After I had read to Molotov the supplementary instructions, Molotov declared, without going into their contents more closely, that he could give me today the answer of the Soviet Government to my communication of August 15.² M. Stalin was following the conversations with great interest; he was informed of all the details, and he was in complete agreement with Molotov.

Thereupon Molotov read out the answer of the Soviet Government, which, in the text given to me, is as follows:

"The Soviet Government have taken note of the statement of the German Government, transmitted by Count Schulenburg on August 15, concerning their desire for a serious improvement in the political relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.

"In view of the official statements of several representatives of the German Government, which have not infrequently had an unfriendly

¹ Document No. 75.

² See documents Nos. 56, 70, 79 and 88.

and even hostile character with reference to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, up till very recently, have proceeded on the assumption that the German Government are seeking an occasion for clashes with the Soviet Union, are preparing themselves for such clashes, and not infrequently justifying the need for their increasing rearmament by the inevitability of such clashes. Not to mention the fact that the German Government, by means of the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact,³ were endeavouring to create, and have created, the united front of a number of States against the Soviet Union, into which, with especial persistence, they enticed Japan.

"It is understandable that such a policy on the part of the German Government has compelled the Soviet Union to take serious steps in the preparation of defence against possible aggression by Germany against the Soviet Union, and consequently to participate in the organization of a defensive front of a number of States against aggression.⁴

"If, however, the German Government now undertake a change from the old policy in the direction of a serious improvement in political relations with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government can only welcome such a change, and are, for their part, prepared to revise their policy in the sense of a serious improvement in respect of Germany.

"Adding to this the fact that the Soviet Government have never had, and will not have, any sort of aggressive intentions towards Germany, and that now, as previously, the Soviet Government consider a peaceful solution of the questions at issue in the field of relations between Germany and the Soviet Union as entirely possible, and that the principle of the peaceful coexistence of different political systems represents a long-established principle of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, the conclusion can be reached that, for the re-establishment of new, improved, political relations between the two countries, there are now at hand, not only a real basis, but also the prerequisites for undertaking serious and practical steps in this direction.

"The Government of the Soviet Union are of the opinion that the first step towards such an improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and Germany could be the conclusion of a trade and credit agreement.

"The Government of the Soviet Union are of the opinion that the second step, to be taken shortly thereafter, could be the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, or the reaffirmation of the Neutrality Pact

³ The Anti-Comintern Pact, signed on Nov. 25, 1936, by Germany and Japan (see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 140, pp. 529-530, and vol. 1 of this Series, document No. 463, footnote 2a) had been signed by Italy on Nov. 6, 1937 (see *ibid.*, No. 17), Hungary and Manchukuo on Feb. 24, 1939, and Spain on Mar. 27, 1939 (see vol. III of this Series, No. 768).

⁴ The Moscow draft of this telegram (695/260336-40) here reads: "such aggression".

of 1926,⁵ with the simultaneous conclusion of a special protocol defining the interests of the contracting parties in this or that question of foreign policy, and forming an integral part of the pact."

Hereupon Molotov gave the following explanations:

1) The economic agreement must be concluded first.

What has been begun must be carried through to the end.

2) Then there may follow, after a short interval, according to German choice, either the conclusion of a non-aggression pact or the reaffirmation of the Neutrality Treaty of 1926. In either case, a protocol would also have to be concluded, in which, among other things, the German . . . (group corrupt)⁶ of August 15 would have to find expression.

3) On the proposed journey of the Reich Foreign Minister,⁷ he declared that the Soviet Government were very gratified by this proposal, since the despatch of such an eminent politician and statesman emphasized how serious were the intentions of the German Government. This stood in noteworthy contrast to England who, in the person of Strang, had sent only an official of second-class rank to Moscow. The journey by the Reich Foreign Minister, however, required thorough preparation. The Soviet Government did not like the publicity that such a journey would cause. They preferred to do practical work without much fuss. To my remark that it was precisely by the journey of the Reich Foreign Minister that the practical goal could be speedily reached, Molotov retorted that the Soviet Government nevertheless preferred the other way, along which the first step had already been taken.

To my question as to how the Soviet Government reacted to my communication of today, Molotov declared that today's favourable German reply had not been known to the Soviet Government when their answer was being prepared, and it would still have to be examined, but that today's Soviet answer already contained all the essentials. He suggested that the German side take up at once the preparation of a draft for the non-aggression pact, or for the reaffirmation of the Neutrality Treaty, as the case might be, as well as for the protocol; the same would be done on the Soviet side.

I stated that I would report these proposals to my Government. With regard to the protocol, it might become necessary to have more exact information about the wishes of the Soviet Government.

The conversation was concluded with Molotov's expressing the desire to be supplied as soon as possible with our drafts.

SCHULENBURG

⁵ i.e., the Berlin Treaty of Apr. 24, 1926; for the text see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 125, pp. 738-741.

⁶ The Moscow draft here reads: "declarations".

⁷ The Moscow draft here reads: "to Moscow".

No. 106

52/35020

The Chargé d'Affaires in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WARSAW, August 18, 1939—11:18 a.m.

No. 167 of August 18

Received August 18—12:30 p.m.

The arrests in Upper Silesia¹ are obviously to be attributed to the organization of diversionary groups which is done from various centres in the Reich. As similar groups exist in Poznań, Pommern, and central Poland, there is the threat of a wave of arrests in these areas also. In the interests, and at the request, of the national group, I urgently request you to ensure that all such further activities are completely suspended until further notice.

WÜHLISCH

¹ See also document No. 91.

No. 107

7967/E575018

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

HELSINKI, August 18, 1939—2:36 p.m.

No. 118 of August 18

Received August 18—3:15 p.m.

Pol. V 7971.

The Finnish Foreign Minister¹ told me in confidence today that the British Government have informed the Finnish Government that a German attack on Danzig would constitute a *casus belli* for Britain.²

¹ Elias Erkko.

² A telegram from Budapest, No. 236, of Aug. 18 (73/51978), reported similar information from the Hungarian Government.

No. 108

1724/401060

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 270 of August 18

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1939—3:23 p.m.

Received August 18—11:50 p.m.

Pol. V 7992.

The American press reports, from all European capitals, that the Danzig question has entered a most critical stage, and that a military conflict in Europe is almost inevitable. Rumours trickle through from the State Department to the press that the American Missions in Europe unanimously share this opinion.

The press here continues to hold German policy and propaganda towards Poland responsible for this state of affairs. It considers that this [propaganda] is being staged in exactly the same way as during the annexation of the Sudeten German territory; that this is, however, so obvious that, this time, it has failed to have a demoralizing effect on the nerves of the democratic Powers, as is also shown by the lull in telephone communications of the British and French Governments [*sic*]. London and Paris are alleged to have taken up their positions and to be determined to give Poland armed assistance in order to check this German attempt to alter the *status quo* in Europe by force.

It is sometimes thought here that the recent extension of the German demands to incorporate not only Danzig, but also wide tracts of the Corridor, is a German attempt to obtain bargaining counters for concessions. The leading papers see in this an intensification of the pressure on Poland—which pressure is said to be largely seconded by the Italian press—and an attempt to create, for German home consumption, a tangible and popular war aim for which Danzig alone would not suffice.

THOMSEN

No. 109

8342/E590167/1

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

No. 187 of August 18

BERLIN, August 18, 1939—4:31 p.m.

Received August 19—10:00 a.m.

[W 1361 g.]¹

For the Chargé d'Affaires.

The Foreign Minister agrees in principle with the State Secretary's proposal for economic negotiations, with which you are acquainted.² You should refer, in particular, to the simultaneous extension of the Agreement and adequate Turkish concessions about the cancellation of contracts for war material. Detailed arrangements for military deliveries are to be left to the discretion of the Wehrmacht.

The High Command of the Wehrmacht is substantially in agreement with the instructions issued, with the proviso that there are no military objections to proceeding with the construction of a military harbour, in accordance with the contract, if this is economically desirable, and also that, in accordance with the repeated decision of

¹ This registry number is taken from a draft in the Foreign Ministry archives (96/107947) which also bears the following typewritten minute: "Based on a telephone communication from U[nder] S[tate] S[ecretary] Gaus, from Fuschl, and on a telephone conversation with Captain Koch (Navy) of the OKW."

² See document No. 80.

the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, there is no question of continuing deliveries, particularly of engines, for the fourth submarine.

WIEHL

No. 110

174/136045

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOKYO, August 18, 1939—6:25 p.m.

SECRET

Received August 18—3:15 p.m.

No. 351 of August 18

For the State Secretary.

With reference to my telegram No. 344 of August 11.¹

Internal political support [*sic* ? struggle] on the alliance question is continuing with undiminished strength. Rumours in the press about alleged possibilities of a compromise between the Foreign and War Ministers are incorrect. At the last Five-Minister Conference, the Foreign Minister was instructed to formulate again, in precise terms, the Japanese alliance proposal of June 5² without any material alterations. This version was to be submitted to the Ministers concerned and, if accepted by the next Five-Minister Conference, was to be sent to the Ambassadors in Berlin and Rome, for transmission verbatim in writing to the Governments.

The War Minister has rejected the Foreign Minister's draft as unacceptable and continues to insist on concessions going beyond the proposal of June 5. As he is unable to carry his point against the united front of the other Ministers, he regards his resignation as inevitable, according to reliable information coming from the War Ministry. He is backed by pressure from junior officers, who demand an unconditional alliance. In view of this unbridgeable solidarity [*sic* ? gulf], the representative of the War Minister and the head of a department in the Foreign Ministry, whom I have frequently mentioned and who is in favour of the alliance, again urgently expressed the hope that a German initiative, which could first be limited to a mere declaration of continued readiness for negotiations, would provide a way out of the deadlock in the Japanese internal situation, and prevent a Cabinet crisis which, initially, would be bound to weaken the advocates of the policy of the alliance.

Reports of an alleged connection between the withdrawal of the Army representatives from the negotiations with Britain, at present

¹ Document No. 25.

² See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 487.

at a standstill,³ and the Army's attitude on the alliance question, are without foundation. More recent information gives the impression that the Army is pursuing the policy of the alliance independently of the outcome of the negotiations with Britain and, predominantly, because of the exigencies of domestic politics.

OTT

³ In telegram No. 354 of Aug. 19 (174/136046), Ott reported that the Japanese press was expecting the Tientsin negotiations to be broken off, and that the Army regarded these negotiations as having failed.

No. 111

695/260335

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, August 18, 1939—6:53 p.m.

No. 184 of August 18

Received August 18—11:30 p.m.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 182.¹

Further very important telegraphic instructions for you are being drafted at present, and will reach you during the night. You are requested, on instructions from the Foreign Minister, to take steps to secure an audience with Molotov for tomorrow, Saturday morning, and to do everything in your power to be received during the morning.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 105.

² Handwritten marginal note: "Submitted to the Ambassador 19.8.39, 12:50 a.m." The Foreign Ministry copy (34/23948) bears the following marginal note in Siegfried's handwriting: "Today is Sunday (day off) in Russia. Request for appointment not possible before Saturday 8 a.m. German time. Mol[otov] probably not at the office before 10 a.m. German time." Schulenburg replied, in telegram No. 185 of Aug. 19 (695/260333), that Molotov would receive him at 2 p.m. that day.

No. 112

230/152009

The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 230 of August 18

BELGRADE, August 18, 1939—7:25 p.m.

Received August 18—11:50 p.m.

I learn from the Air Attaché,¹ who has had a lengthy discussion with the Chief of the General Staff, Simović, that the latter emphasized, in the course of the conversation, that, in the event of war, Yugoslavia would remain strictly neutral and had no intention of allowing herself to be hitched to the British wagon, like Turkey. Anxiety was felt

¹ Lt. Col. von Schönebeck.

because of the possibility that, if war broke out, Italy might advance on Salonika, the road to which lay through Yugoslav territory. In that case Yugoslavia would have to defend her neutrality . . . (group missing).² The Air Attaché is himself bringing a full report . . . (group mutilated)³ on details of the conversation to Vienna by air tomorrow, from where the report will be safely transmitted to Berlin.

FEINE

² According to the Belgrade draft (3647/E032911) this sentence is complete.

³ According to the Belgrade draft this should read "report No. 218" (3647/E032912-15).

No. 113

127/69492-95

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 185 of August 18

BERLIN, August 18, 1939—10:48 p.m.¹

Received August 19—5:45 a.m.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 182.²

Please arrange immediately another conversation with M. Molotov and do everything possible to see that this conversation takes place without any delay. At this conversation, I would ask you to speak to M. Molotov in the following sense:

The Reich Government, to their great satisfaction, have learned, from his last statement, of the favourable attitude of the Soviet Government with regard to the remoulding of German-Russian relations. We, too, under normal circumstances, would naturally be ready to pursue a re-alignment of German-Russian relations further, through diplomatic channels, and to carry it out in the customary way. But the present unusual situation makes it necessary, in the opinion of the Führer, to employ a different method which would lead to quick results. German-Polish relations are becoming more acute from day to day. We have to take into account that incidents might occur any day that would make the outbreak of open conflict unavoidable. To judge from the whole attitude of the Polish Government, the developments in this respect by no means rest with us. The Führer considers it necessary that we be not taken by surprise by the outbreak of a German-Polish conflict while we are striving for a clarification of German-Russian relations. He therefore considers a previous clarification necessary, if only to be able to take into account Russian interests in case of such a conflict, which would, of course, be difficult without such a clarification.

¹ The text of this telegram was originally sent through from the Obersalzberg to Berlin on Aug. 18 at 7:45 p.m. (34/23949-51).

² Document No. 105.

The statement made by M. Molotov refers to . . .³ your first communication of August 15th. My supplementary instructions had gone beyond this and stated clearly that we were in complete agreement with the idea of a non-aggression pact, a guarantee of the Baltic States, and Germany exercising influence on Japan. All factual elements for the immediate commencement of direct verbal negotiations, and for a final accord, were therefore present.

Furthermore, you may mention that the first stage mentioned by M. Molotov, namely, the conclusion of negotiations for a new German-Russian economic agreement, has today been completed,⁴ so that we should now attack the second stage.

We are, therefore, now asking for an immediate reaction to the proposal made in the supplementary instructions regarding my immediate departure for Moscow. Please add, in this connection, that I would come with full powers from the Führer, authorizing me to settle fully and conclusively the total complex of problems.

As far as the non-aggression pact especially is concerned, it seems to us so simple as to require no long preparation. We have in mind here the following three points,⁵ which I would ask you to read to M. M[olotov], but not to hand to him.

Article 1. The German Reich and the U.S.S.R. will in no event resort to war, or to any other use of force, with respect to each other.

Article 2. This treaty shall enter into force immediately upon signature, and shall be valid and not liable to denunciation thereafter for a term of twenty-five years.

Please state, in this connection, that I should be in a position, with regard to this proposal, to arrange details in verbal discussions in Moscow and, if occasion arose, to take Russian wishes into account. I should also be in a position to sign a special protocol regulating the interests of both parties in questions of foreign policy of one kind or another; for instance, the settlement of spheres of interest in the Baltic area, the problem of the Baltic States, etc. Such a settlement, too, which seems to us of considerable importance, will only be possible, however, at an oral discussion.

Please emphasize, in this connection, that German foreign policy has today reached an historic turning-point. This time, please conduct the conversation, except for the above treaty articles, not in the form of reading out these instructions, but by pressing emphatically, in the sense of the foregoing statements, for a rapid realization of my journey, and by opposing appropriately any fresh Russian objections. In this connection, you must keep in mind the decisive

³ These omission marks appear in the Moscow copy here printed; the text is, however, complete, according to the Berlin copy cited in footnote 1.

⁴ See document No. 131.

⁵ In telegram No. 185 (see document No. 111, footnote 2) Schulenburg pointed out that although three points were mentioned here, only two articles were given.

fact that an early outbreak of open German-Polish conflict is probable, and that we, therefore, have the greatest interest in having my visit to Moscow take place immediately.

RIBBENTROP

No. 114

1625/389176

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 637

BERLIN, August 18, 1939.

Pol. II 2934.

The British Ambassador called on me today, to say that he would probably be flying to Salzburg next Tuesday.¹ The main motor cycle race was being held on Wednesday, and a number of British competitors were taking part.

Turning to the political situation, Henderson again said that he was convinced that Poland would not let herself be carried away into committing acts of provocation. The British Government would certainly see to that.

I could not fail to notice that Sir Nevile Henderson was again under a complete misapprehension about Poland's behaviour towards the Germans, and I gave him the real facts of the case. We agreed that there was a fundamental divergence on this subject between British and German information and views. Henderson then repeated most emphatically that Germany should not make the mistake of thinking that Britain would not give Poland armed assistance. After all, he knew the present situation in Britain.

I told Henderson that we could put no faith in these protestations. In this respect too, we found that there was a complete divergence of views on both sides.

I could not gather from the conversation whether Henderson was acting on special instructions, but I rather assume that he was merely speaking according to his general instructions and views.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ i.e., Aug. 22. See also vol. VI of this Series, document No. 770, and *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, Nos. 15 and 36.

No. 115

452/223423

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 638

BERLIN, August 18, 1939.

On instructions from the Foreign Minister, I spoke to Ambassador von Dirksen¹ by telephone today as follows:

¹ Dirksen had arrived in Berlin from London on Aug. 14. See document No. 58.

His conversation with Ambassador Attolico on the attitude of Britain has become known to the Foreign Minister through the usual channels.² The Foreign Minister requested him to refrain completely from such political conversations. Otherwise there would inevitably be repercussions. The Foreign Minister furthermore reserved the right to pursue the matter.

WEIZSÄCKER

² Possibly through the Forschungsamt, for which see Appendix III, Section (B), No. (ii). For a minute by Dirksen on his conversation with Attolico on Aug. 15, see *Dirksen Papers* (Moscow), No. 26. See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 44.

No. 116

53/35973

Memorandum by an Official attached to the Staff of the Foreign Minister

SALZBURG, August 18, 1939.

Subject: Economic Activities of the AO.

The Foreign Minister requests the State Secretary, on the basis of the secret memorandum by Ministerialdirektor Wiehl, to enquire of Field Marshal Göring what instructions he has given to the AO in economic matters.¹

Submitted to Counsellor Siegfried.

Already telephoned, on August 17, to Counsellor von Kessel.

HENCKE

1926/432100-02

[Enclosure]

SECRET

BERLIN, June 30, 1939.

MEMORANDUM ON THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF THE AO ABROAD
AND IN PARTICULAR ITS INTEGRATION IN THE FOUR YEAR PLAN

(1) In preparing this memorandum, for which the Foreign Minister asked, I applied to Gauleiter Bohle for material and was referred by him to the Deputy Gauleiter of the AO, Alfred Hess. I called on the latter today, and discussed the economic activities of the AO abroad for an hour. To my question as to what instructions the Four Year Plan Authorities had given to the AO for these activities, Herr Hess replied: "The AO has received from the Field Marshal, and from the Deputy of the Führer,² instructions in the sphere of supply of raw materials and promotion of exports of which no details can be given."

¹ In a memorandum of the same date, St. S. No. 639 (not printed, 53/35966), Weizsäcker recorded that he had made enquiries from the State Secretary of the Four Year Plan, and had ascertained that Göring had addressed to the Auslandsorganisation, Economic Department, only a general statement of goodwill, and apparently not in writing.

² Rudolf Hess.

When I let it be understood that I knew of a certain amount of cooperation by the AO in preparatory work for war economy, and that, therefore, there was presumably no need to observe secrecy in the matter to me, Herr Hess replied that his obligation to preserve silence prevented him from even confirming that there were any such instructions. The Foreign Minister, who indeed himself belonged to the SS, would certainly understand this.

(2) Other than this, the following emerged from our conversation about the activities of the AO in the sphere of foreign trade:

a) Organization

There is a "Foreign Trade Office" in the AO directed by Hauptamtsleiter Schwarz, with a staff of some 80 persons. It is organized in ten functional and ten territorial sections. Abroad, so-called "leaders of economic agencies"—at the moment 244—are in charge of numerous local groups and centres. These are composed almost exclusively of German businessmen, engaged in commerce, who perform their duties as leaders of economic agencies in an honorary capacity, without pay. Only in a few exceptional cases are Commercial Attachés of the Reich Missions simultaneously leaders of economic agencies—a combination of functions which Herr Hess described as undesirable.

b) Duties

In the first place export *promotion*: Supply of commercial information; elimination of Jewish agents; expansion of the chain of representatives (I was shown a well-organized system of card-indexing containing the names of 110,000 representatives); check-up on the export zeal of German firms; preventing mutual underbidding by German firms; preventing the misuse of export promotion facilities; and so on.

Further, *obtaining raw materials*; looking out for business and for possibilities of exploiting the market.

Finally, *starting special import and export organizations*, wherever conditions warrant them: either for all goods traded with individual countries, for instance Rowak-Hisma³ with Spain, Hapro⁴ with China, and others which are planned with Afghanistan and Iran, or for individual branches of commerce with all countries, for instance combined export organization for the film industry and the automobile industry.

(3) In general, I listened without comment in order not to forestall a conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister, or the State Secretary, and Gauleiter Bohle, but nevertheless, I did every now and then point out that these spheres of activity overlapped with those of

³ Rohstoffe-und-Waren-Einkaufsgesellschaft and Compañía Hispano-Marroquí des Transportes, for the activities of which see vol. III of this Series, Editors' Note, p. 1.

⁴ Handelsgesellschaft für Industrielle Produkte m.b.H., for the activities of which see vol. I of this Series, document No. 500, footnote 52a.

the Foreign Ministry and the Reich Ministry of Economics at home, as well as with those of the official Reich Missions abroad. The Reich Office for Foreign Trade, a section jointly controlled by the Economic Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry and Central Department V of the Reich Ministry of Economics, staffed by 186 persons, has substantially the same duties as the Foreign Trade Office of the AO; the Missions and Consulates abroad and their Commercial Attachés have the same duties as the heads of the economic agencies of the local groups and centres.

To this Herr Hess said that the heads of the economic agencies, who were practical businessmen, were incomparably better able to promote exports than the Commercial Attachés, Consuls and civil servants in the Missions, whose duty was more concerned with the supply of information on commercial policy. Both activities were valuable, but it was in the general interest that they should be kept separate abroad, while they could be coordinated here if necessity arose.

Submitted through the State Secretary to the Reich Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.

WIEHL

No. 117

97/108515-18

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

BERLIN, August 18, 1939.

[Pol. V 8506.]¹

The Polish Diplomatic Representative in Danzig, Chodacki, has now returned to Danzig from Warsaw. M. Chodacki and Herr Greiser have this morning continued yesterday's [*sic*]² conversation on the so-called Customs Inspectors dispute. The course of the conversation is recorded in the enclosed minute by President of the Senate Greiser.

Copies submitted herewith for information to:

State Secretary
Under State Secretary, Political Department
Under State Secretary, Legal Department
Deputy Director, Political Department
Senior Counsellor Schliep
The Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Minister Braun von Stumm
Minister Dr. Altenburg
Political Division I, Military Affairs.

BERGMANN

¹ Taken from another copy (7693/E548499-502).

² The reference is evidently to the conversation on Aug. 16 (document No. 72), as is also indicated by a registry note on the copy cited in footnote 1.

[Enclosure]

DANZIG, August 18, 1939.

Minister Chodacki called on me at 11:15 this morning. He had returned from Warsaw with fresh instructions, and explained to me that, officially, the Polish Government could not make any distinction between frontier guards and Customs officials. However, they had been racking their brains, both in Warsaw and here, and he could tell me unofficially that Poland envisaged a solution somewhat on the following lines:

When the situation came to be discussed by the two experts, Poland would be prepared to order frontier guards to withdraw successively from their posts in Danzig over a period of eight to fourteen days. Some of these posts, on becoming vacant, would then be filled by Polish Inspectors trained in Customs methods. In general, these officials would carry out their duties in civilian dress, but they would wear a special badge on their Customs uniform, showing that they were officials serving in the territory of the Free City of Danzig.

I asked who was likely to be appointed as the Polish expert for these negotiations, and was told that Director Maksymowicz of the Polish Ministry of Finance had been chosen. On being questioned, I named Counsellor of State Kunst as the probable expert for Danzig.

We agreed that I should let him know by telephone by tomorrow morning whether the meeting of experts could take place on Monday.³

I then asked Minister Chodacki what answer he could give me about lifting the Amada ban. He said that he had *carte blanche* in the matter and that he would lift the ban the moment the negotiations on the Customs Inspectors had reached a satisfactory conclusion. I maintained that something would have to be done about it before then, and Herr Chodacki hinted that, if the experts' negotiations appeared to be leading to a satisfactory conclusion, some Amada deliveries could be allowed in.

In answer to a question of mine, he expressly emphasized that this did not mean a lifting of the ban in principle, but that deliveries would merely be let through, as each case arose.

Minister Chodacki then spoke about the question of the arrested Customs Inspectors,⁴ and emphasized that this fact greatly prejudiced the whole situation, especially as I had told him a few days previously that the release of the Customs Inspectors could be expected on the same day as our conversation.

³ i.e., Aug. 21.

⁴ A translation of a Note from the Polish Diplomatic Representation to the Danzig Senate, dated Aug. 14, which protested against the arrest of two Polish Customs Inspectors and their driver on a charge of smuggling some leaflets, was sent to the Foreign Ministry by the Consulate General in Danzig on Aug. 17 (7693/E548511-12). See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, Nos. 11 and 25.

I pretended to be very surprised that the Customs Inspectors had not yet been released, and we arranged that I should let him know by telephone when their release would take place.

Minister Chodacki then told me that, in Warsaw, he had had a conversation, not only with the Foreign Minister, but with the Minister President⁵ as well, and that Poland, though very calm, regarded the situation as grave. The common ground on which agreement could still be reached with Germany was very narrow, but nevertheless Poland would do nothing which might give rise to war. Poland herself would never declare war, but if she were attacked she would stand united as a nation of soldiers.

GREISER

Postscript: I have just telephoned Herr Chodacki and told him that the arrested Customs Inspectors would be released this evening.

GREISER

⁵ Gen. Felician Sklawoj-Skladkowski.

No. 118

43/29570-71

Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop

BERLIN, August 18, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

Nervousness among foreign journalists in Berlin increased further on Friday. It is known for certain that French and British journalists are already making preparations for departure. An old and experienced American journalist said scornfully to the foreign correspondents that this obvious nervousness seemed to be only a big piece of bluff, and not a very convincing one, just as in last September. It is a fact, however, that Georges Blun, Berlin correspondent of the *Journal*, has already left for Zürich this morning, and it is known that other French journalists are leaving during the next few days. None of the English had left by Friday evening, but they are assuring other journalists that they have made all preparations to take to their heels very quickly.

Bojano, the Italian journalist, spoke very pessimistically about the situation to foreign journalists in the Hotel Bristol on Friday morning. He said that he thought one must reckon that within the next few days the situation would be clarified by corresponding German action. He assured them that he had heard that it was extremely doubtful whether the Party Rally would be held at Nuremberg on the appointed date. He had received information that the preparatory work had recently been stopped. Contrary to the assertions of

British and French journalists that, if there were a war over Danzig, Italy would only be neutral, Bojano said that it would be wise to have no illusions about Mussolini's solidarity. However, no one in Italy wanted war. But they hoped that Britain and France would not allow themselves to be drawn into war by Poland. Nevertheless it is worth noting that on Friday, Englishmen and Frenchmen were putting about amongst foreigners in Berlin the theory that Mussolini had no intention of letting himself be involved in a European war on account of the German-Polish conflict.

A British journalist of good repute, who recently returned from London, and who can be regarded as having very sound judgement, told neutral correspondents that Chamberlain and Lord Halifax did not really want war with Germany. They could be expected to do their utmost to avoid a conflict with her. He asserts that there really is no question of a war atmosphere in London. His only fear is that the real decision may lie less with London than with Warsaw. If the Poles remained obdurate and actually became involved in hostilities with Germany, then the course of action would indeed be dictated rather by Warsaw than by London.

L[IKUS]¹

¹ Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]".

No. 119

910/294308

The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, August 19, 1939.
e.o. Pol. V 1888.

Please transmit at once to the Reich Foreign Minister the following report from Veesenmayer¹ with the addition below:

"Gauleiter Forster enquires urgently through me whether the Reich Foreign Minister agrees to pressure on Poland being increased to the maximum permissible. From the negotiations of August 18,² on the question of Customs officials, it appears that Poland is ready to give way. Within eight to fourteen days, Poland intends to with-

¹ Edmund Veesenmayer, hereinafter referred to in this volume as the Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig, was at one time a Referent of Keppler's in respect of economic affairs. According to the evidence given by Weizsäcker and Keppler during the proceedings in Case 11, before the American Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Ribbentrop sent Veesenmayer to Danzig, owing to the inadequacy of the reports from Consul General Janson, who was not on good terms with Gauleiter Forster (see Case 11 Transcript, pp. 7857 and 12928 respectively). Janson had officially complained of the Gauleiter's lack of respect for him as the official Representative of the Reich on June 23, 1939 (1925/432009), and previously on Feb. 15, 1939 (1925/432010). These complaints were submitted by the Personnel Department to Ribbentrop on June 24, 1939 (1925/432007-08), who minuted "For discussion with Hewel." No record has been found of such action or of Veesenmayer's actual assignment to Danzig.

² See document No. 117.

draw about twelve of the Customs officials in question. No further discussion on this matter between Greiser and the Poles has been planned to take place. However, negotiations between Customs experts of both sides begin on Monday, August 21.

Gauleiter Forster intends to raise his demands, made through his representative, to cover about fifty Polish Customs officials and their immediate withdrawal. If the Poles again give way, then it is proposed to increase the demands still further, so as to make agreement impossible. Please submit this at once to the Reich Foreign Minister and send reply.["]

End of message from Danzig.³

I suggest the following reply to Veessenmayer:

"I agree with your views on the conduct of negotiations on the Customs officials controversy. Negotiations must, however, be conducted in such a way, and pressure on Poland in other respects must be so applied, that the responsibility for the breakdown of the negotiations and for all consequences falls on Poland.

"End of message for Veessenmayer. Weizsäcker."

WEIZSÄCKER

³ This was received in the Foreign Ministry at 10:20 a.m. on Aug. 19 (910/294309).

No. 120

1625/389178

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 184 of August 19

Moscow, August 19, 1939.

Received August 19—1:25 p.m.

Pol. II 2939.

Pravda today publishes the following Tass *démenti*: The Polish newspapers *Polska Zbrojna*, *Express Poranny*, and *Kurjer Warszawski* have recently published a report about the differences of opinion which are said to have arisen in the course of the Moscow negotiations, between the Soviet Military Delegation on the one hand, and the French and British Military Delegations on the other, in connection with an alleged demand on the part of the Soviet Union for military assistance from Britain and France in the event of war in the Far East. Tass is authorized to state that this report is pure invention from beginning to end, that differences of opinion, which in fact exist, are concerned with entirely different matters, and have no connection whatever with the question of the Far East.

SCHULENBURG

No. 121

7895/E573186

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

No. 319

BERLIN, August 19, 1939—2:30 p.m.
zu W 1369 g.¹ [Ang.] II.

With reference to your telegram No. 340.¹

In accordance with today's telephone conversation, the Legation is authorized to make the release of machine guns dependent on the satisfactory outcome of the negotiations for the release of further supplies of petroleum.

WIEHL

¹ Document No. 97.

No. 122

2787/535956

The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 441 of August 19

PARIS, August 19, 1939—[3:30 p.m.]¹
Received August 19—3:45 p.m.
Pol. II 2944.

Government circles and the public here regard the development of the international situation as serious. Diplomatic action and military measures by the two Axis Powers give rise to increased anxiety. Particularly disquieting factors are the numerous discussions which Csáky, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, has had with German political leaders² and also later in Rome;³ the departure for Rome of the Italian Ambassador in Berlin;⁴ renewed military requisitioning and calling-up of reservists in Germany, in particular troop concentrations in East Prussia and Upper Silesia; and Mussolini's consultations with the Italian army commanders.

It is concluded from these facts that Germany and Italy are in deadly earnest with their demands, and are determined to go to all lengths to obtain satisfaction. In contrast to this, official circles here, supported by the entire press, are assiduously trying to create an impression of extreme calm and composure. It is stressed over and

¹ Taken from the Paris copy (9887/E693538-39).

² Csáky had conversations with Hitler and Ribbentrop on Aug. 8 (see vol. vi of this Series, document No. 784), and stayed with the Reich Minister of the Interior, Frick, in mid-August (see *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. xii, No. 832).

³ Csáky arrived in Rome on Aug. 18, for conversations with Mussolini and Ciano; see documents Nos. 124, 126, and 145, and the *Ciano Diaries*, entry of Aug. 18.

⁴ On Aug. 15; see document No. 71.

over again that France and Britain would resist any attempt at a *coup de force* with all the means at their disposal, and would fulfil their promises of assistance to Poland irrespective of manoeuvres designed to intimidate. The attitude of the French and British Governments, it is emphasized, remains firm and uncompromising, as has repeatedly been made known officially, the last occasion being a few days ago in Berlin and Rome.

In the last few days, however, Government announcements have scarcely been able to conceal the anxiety described above.

BRÄUER

No. 123

34/23959-60

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, August 19, 1939.

The last discussion with the Russians on the credit and economic treaty¹ ended yesterday evening with complete agreement on the whole text of the treaty. Only one question, the wording of which presented difficulties and might have delayed the conclusion of the agreement, was removed from the sphere of the negotiations and reserved for settlement later. It was intended to sign the treaty today, but even yesterday the Russian negotiators hinted that they would have to refer back to Moscow first. The signature was to take place at noon today.

At 12:00 noon today the Russians informed me by telephone that they would like to speak to me again on a few unimportant matters. They called on me at 12:30 p.m., and raised some irrelevant formal questions, to which they received prompt answers from me. They mentioned, at the same time, that they had not yet had definite news from Moscow, but they hoped to hear at any moment and would again inform me by telephone, at 1:30 p.m., whether the signature could take place today. They rang me up at 1:30 p.m., and said that there was still no answer from Moscow. They would ring me up again at 4 p.m. At 4 p.m. the Russians telephoned that they would not be able to sign today. They requested a further discussion at 10 a.m. on Monday.²

I telephoned the Chargé d'Affaires, Astakhov, at midday, and asked him why we could not finally conclude the agreement, as everything was ready for signature. He too made the excuse that although they had made various enquiries, the relevant instructions had not yet arrived from Moscow.

The Russians' delay and temporization in signing has no longer

¹ For the text see document No. 131.

² i.e., Aug. 21.

anything to do with the economic and credit treaty. The reasons put forward by the Russians are transparent pretexts. It is obvious that they have received from Moscow, for political reasons, instructions to delay the conclusion of the treaty. In these circumstances I doubt whether the Russians will be ready to sign on Monday.

To the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, with the request for immediate transmission by teleprinter to Schloss Fuschl.

SCHNURRE

No. 124

2130/466004-05

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Rome

Telegram

No. 383 of August 19

BERLIN, August 19, 1939—4:25 p.m.

Received August 19—7:30 p.m.

The most nonsensical rumours are circulating about Count Csáky's stay in Germany,¹ his alleged visits to various leading figures of the Reich, and political projects of every kind said to have been discussed there, ranging from Hungary's accession to the Rome-Berlin Axis to her becoming a complete vassal State of Germany. A German *démenti*² has had no effect. In order to put an end to the efforts of the international press to embitter relations between Germany and Hungary, it seems to us that a categorical denial by the Hungarian authorities is required.

The Foreign Minister requests you to take advantage of Count C[sáky]'s presence in Rome³ to call on him as soon as possible, and to urge him to issue a Hungarian *démenti* of this kind.

There is, moreover, keen interest here as to what Count C[sáky] is doing in Rome politically. The Reich Foreign Minister is anxious lest C[sáky] may be acting in a way detrimental to, and apt to weaken, the strong German position in those circles in Rome on which, in any case, the whole of British and French propaganda is at present concentrated. The Foreign Minister requests you to report as soon as possible by telegram all that becomes known about C[sáky]'s talks in Rome.

For your personal information, the Foreign Minister adds that there has been no change in Germany's attitude since you were at the Obersalzberg recently. He therefore requests that you continue to adopt a completely firm, even obdurate, attitude. You should say

¹ See document No. 122, footnote 2.

² Issued by DNB on Aug. 18 (73/52204). This stated that Csáky had had no conversations with either Hitler or Ribbentrop since Aug. 8. A further *démenti* was put out by DNB on Aug. 19 (73/52205).

³ See document No. 122, footnote 3.

that the situation had meantime deteriorated, a solution could not be long delayed, and would be found in one way or another. If Poland did not prove conciliatory she would be eliminated. The Western Powers were by no means in a position to help Poland and attack Germany or Italy, unless they wanted to risk their whole existence.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 125

34/23956

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

MOST URGENT

No. 187 of August 19

Moscow, August 19, 1939—6:22 p.m.

Received August 19—7:10 p.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 185 of August 18.¹

The Soviet Government agree to the Reich Foreign Minister's coming to Moscow one week after the announcement of the signature of the economic agreement. Molotov stated that, if the conclusion of the economic agreement is made public tomorrow, the Reich Foreign Minister could arrive in Moscow on August 26 or 27.

Molotov handed to me a draft of a non-aggression pact.

A detailed account of the two conversations I had with Molotov today, as well as the text of the Soviet draft, follows by telegram at once.²

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 113.

² See documents Nos. 132 and 133.

No. 126

2130/466002-03

Minute by the Ambassador in Italy

ROME, August 19, 1939.

Herr von Weizsäcker telephoned me from Berlin, at 1 p.m. today, and gave me the following information:

He had just started despatching a telegram to me,¹ but for the sake of speed he wished to inform me at once of its essentials: The Foreign Minister was very much disturbed by the rumours associated with Csáky's visit and his stay in Germany.² A German *démenti* had had no effect. I was requested to call on C[sáky] here, and to urge him to issue a clear *démenti* as well. The telegram also asked me to report by telegram all that was known about Csáky's conversations

¹ See document No. 124.

² See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 85.

here. The last paragraph of the telegram contained only general instructions on language to be held.

I told Herr von Weizsäcker that I assumed that C[sáky] had already left Rome, as Count Ciano had left for Albania by air this morning, but that I would immediately verify this, in order to ask him to issue a *démenti*, if he had not yet left. Moreover, I said, the press had just referred to such a *démenti* as having already been issued by Csáky. Herr von Weizsäcker said that he knew nothing about this.

Baron Plessen at once made enquiries of the Hungarian Minister here, Villani, and was informed that C[sáky] had left by air this morning direct for Budapest, intending to land at Graz on the way.

I immediately telephoned Berlin, and informed Herr von Weizsäcker of this, at the same time telling him that the *démenti* by Csáky of which I spoke is mentioned in today's *Messaggero*, as having been given by him, at Salzburg, in the form of an interview to the Berlin correspondent of the Hungarian Government newspaper. Herr v[on] W[eizsäcker] said he would obtain this and also remarked that he could now reach Csáky through Erdmannsdorff. I also said that I would not be able to report on the subject of Csáky's conversations in Rome until after Ciano's return, which was expected on Monday.³

At 7 p.m., Herr v[on] W[eizsäcker] telephoned again and said he had not yet been able to obtain the text of the interview I mentioned, but that it was being pursued. He also wished to tell me, but only for my information and without adding instructions, that Ambassador Attolico was not returning to Berlin from Salzburg,⁴ but was going first to Rome, either this evening or tomorrow. He, W[eizsäcker], had the impression that he [Attolico] had presented the Italian arguments so forcibly that the situation might perhaps have altered. He knew no details. I expressed my doubts and pointed out that I could not imagine that the Ambassador, who after all could only have repeated what Ciano said in Salzburg, would have been more successful than Ciano himself who, as he had himself told me on the way back from the Obersalzberg to Salzburg, had spoken with "franchise brutale". Herr v[on] W[eizsäcker] doubted whether that were so, in view of what he had learned about Ciano's conversations.

MACKENSEN

³ i.e., Aug. 21.

⁴ No German record of Attolico's conversations with Ribbentrop in Salzburg on Aug. 19 has been found; see, however, *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. xiii, Nos. 87, 100-102, 108 and 116.

No. 127

7895/E573187

The Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 344 of August 19

BUCHAREST, August 19, 1939—7:30 p.m.

Received August 20—1:40 a.m.

W 1380 g.

With reference to your telegram No. 315.¹

After the Minister President had again (group mutilated) petroleum delivery in negotiating with me yesterday, the Minister of Economics ordered release of petroleum to the value of four million Reichsmark, in return for the following German deliveries of war material:

- 1) 625,000 Reichsmark, second half Siemens sound rangers.
- 2) 700,000 Reichsmark, Friedrich Wilhelmine.
- 3) 2,600,000 Reichsmark, BMW aircraft engines.

Loading of the steamer at Constanța will be begun today.

The Minister of Economics is, moreover, prepared, in order to remove misunderstandings in the interpretation of the letter of July 18 [*sic*]² concerning the advance delivery of petroleum, to release a further 1½ million when the Legation has stated that the Junkers contract about the delivery of aircraft engines by Germany is complete, and twenty-nine Heinkel bombers are ready to start. To make this release, the Minister of Economics requires the sanction of the Minister President who is away until Monday. The Rumanians, however, appear to want to wait until the aircraft have taken off. I would ask you therefore to despatch the aircraft, and to take steps to expedite the signature of the Junkers and Heinkel contracts, so that I can demand petroleum equivalent to the 20 per cent instalment.³

I again urgently request a table showing the extent to which normal quotas of petroleum have been utilized since 1938, and advice as to war material deals on which additional deliveries of petroleum can be claimed.

STELZER

¹ Document No. 94.

² The reference is presumably to the letter of July 8 printed in vol. vi of this Series, document No. 639.

³ See Section I of the German-Rumanian Secret Protocol, signed on July 8, 1939, printed in vol. vi of this Series, document No. 638.

No. 128

52/35024

The Consul General in Toruń to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 50 of August 19

TORUŃ, August 19, 1939—7:36 p.m.

Received August 19—10:00 p.m.

Ortsgruppenleiter Diekmann, of Brodnica, reports that Erich Brueschke, a *Volksdeutscher* of Wabrzezno, has requested him and Pastor Engel, a *Volksdeutscher* of Wittenburg, to participate in carrying out explosions for provocation purposes, which are shortly to take place. Brueschke, who claims to have been trained by the Danzig State Police, has allegedly been instructed by them to carry out explosions at Wabrzezno and Wittenburg next week, on receiving the password from Danzig radio. In Wittenburg, the church, the vicarage, the deaconesses' house, or the dairy are said to be under consideration. The explosives are to be brought from Danzig in Polish lorries. Repeated to Warsaw and Danzig.

KÜCHLER¹

¹ A copy of this telegram showing what action, if any, was taken on it has not been found.

No. 129

2997/587582-83

The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy to the Holy See

Drafting Officer:

BERLIN, August 19, 1939.

Counsellor of Legation Schlimpert

zu Pol. IX 1565.¹

During Count Ciano's visit to San Sebastian, Generalissimo Franco discussed with him President Roosevelt's extremely hostile attitude towards the authoritarian States. A few days later, Franco told Herr von Stohrer that he had pointed out to Count Ciano that he thought that a vigorous propaganda campaign against Roosevelt was urgently required, to prevent his re-election as President. According to reliable information which he had, influence should be brought to bear on the Vatican, which wields great influence over the American Catholics, who are opposed to a policy of intervention and, therefore, to Roosevelt's war policy. On the grounds that Roosevelt's re-election would endanger the peace of the world, a strong anti-Roosevelt feeling could certainly be created through the agency of the Vatican and the American Catholics.

These two conversations give rise here to the question whether we

¹ Vol. VI of this Series, document No. 678.

should not, through our Ambassadors in Madrid and at the Quirinal, approach the Spanish and Italian Governments and ask them to suggest, through their representatives at the Vatican, that appropriate action be taken to influence the American Catholics. Before we sent instructions to the Missions in question, we would first like to know your opinion as to whether a Spanish and Italian *démarche* to the Vatican to urge it to influence the American Catholics would be advisable, and, if so, what detailed suggestions you could give us for carrying out this plan. I would be grateful for an early reply.²

WOERMANN

² See vol. VIII of this Series, document No. 139.

No. 130

452/223424-30

Ambassador Dirksen to State Secretary Weizsäcker

GRÖDITZBERG, KREIS GOLDBERG, SILESIA, August 19, 1939.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: As a result of our last conversation in Berlin,¹ I have decided to set forth my views on Britain's attitude in the event of a German-Polish conflict, in a memorandum for Herr von Ribbentrop. In so doing, my purpose of getting a hearing will, I think, be more surely achieved than by a letter to the Foreign Minister *again* asking him for an interview.

I therefore enclose the memorandum, and ask you to be good enough to pass it on to the Foreign Minister, if you have no reservations about the contents. If you have, I would be grateful if you would inform me accordingly. However, I hope you will be in agreement, as—conscious of my responsibility—I have endeavoured to express my views with the greatest possible clarity and deliberation.

Finally, I would be grateful if your office would make the necessary number of copies for distribution and send one to the London Embassy. I have not made these copies myself, owing to lack of technical facilities here, and for the sake of the greatest possible speed.

I have not given my views on the information you gave me on the telephone yesterday,² since I am not acquainted with the contents of the statements ascribed to me, and, with the best will in the world, do not know what exception could be taken to the few words I uttered in that conversation, which lasted barely five minutes.

With best wishes and Heil Hitler!

Yours sincerely,

DIRKSEN³

¹ See document No. 58.

² See document No. 115.

³ See also *Dirksen Papers* (Moscow), No. 27.

[Enclosure]

SECRET

GRÖDITZBERG, SILESIA, August 18, 1939.

MEMORANDUM ON BRITAIN'S PROBABLE ATTITUDE IN THE EVENT OF
A GERMAN-POLISH CONFLICT

I. In view of the growing tension in German-Polish relations, the question of the probable attitude of Britain in the event of a German-Polish conflict assumes increasing importance. The answer to this question must emerge from an analysis of the reasons which prompted Great Britain to enter into so close an alliance with Poland.

II. The considerations of foreign policy which prompted this alliance are known and need only be summarized in salient form: the keen concern which Britain already felt in the years 1933 to 1936 over Germany's growing strength was further enhanced by the Austrian *Anschluss* and the return of the Sudetenland to the Reich. The results of Munich were taken as a diplomatic defeat. After the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia last March, the growing apprehension that Britain's world position was being threatened matured the decision to resist any further unilateral actions taken to change the balance of power in favour of Germany. This was to be achieved by means of a new variation of the old concept of collective security, under the new label of the "formation of a non-aggression front", i.e., by an encirclement of Germany. Poland, which a mendacious press campaign in March labelled as the next "victim" of German "aggression", has become the cornerstone of this non-aggression front. As long as Britain adheres to the encirclement policy, she must regard the fulfilment of her assurances to Poland as a matter upon which her reputation in foreign affairs very largely depends.

III. Besides considerations of foreign policy, there are other important factors of a psychological nature which influence Britain's attitude towards Poland. The long series of diplomatic defeats suffered by Britain in the past years (East Asia, Abyssinia, Spain, Austria, Munich, Bohemia-Moravia, collapse of the League of Nations policy) had an ever increasingly depressing effect on Britain's self-confidence. The abandonment of the Negus, Schuschnigg and Beneš gradually came to be taken as evidence of moral inferiority, which must make Britain appear weak, unreliable, and unworthy of political credit in the eyes of the world. Britain pulled herself together in foreign policy after March 15, through redirecting her policy, and at the same time pulled herself together morally. Through her newly assumed commitments, Britain now wants to demonstrate her fidelity to treaties, her strength, and her political good name. At the same time she also wants to overcome her own inferiority complex.

This is the underlying reason for the continual, apparently almost hysterical, reiteration by Chamberlain and other British statesmen of the thesis that, if Danzig is annexed to Germany against Poland's will—to say nothing of further re-incorporations of former German territories—Great Britain cannot remain a passive onlooker but must regard this as a *casus foederis*. Danzig is consequently the point at which the British public stares hypnotically, and as though obsessed by an *idée fixe*.

It is important to take this psychological factor into account, because it permits deductions to be made as to what Britain's attitude will be in the course of further developments in German-Polish relations.

IV. Another circumstance, lying outside the sphere of foreign relations, plays a big role in Britain's attitude towards the complex of German-Polish problems—namely, Britain's ignorance of Poland's true character. The knowledge which, as century-old neighbours, the Germans have gained of the frailty of the Polish State, its megalomania, its lust for conquest and its ruthless oppression of national minorities has, for various reasons, remained unfamiliar to the British: because of their innate disinclination to study the conditions and ways of thought of other nations; because of their present obstinacy towards all evidence favourable to Germany's claims; and, lastly, because, during the five years' truce in the German-Polish dispute from 1934 to 1939, the wrongs inflicted upon the German minority could not be exploited with full emphasis. That is why the British public is at present reserved and distrustful of the reports from Germany and Danzig about the outrageous Polish acts of violence, and is inclined, in case of doubt, to take Poland's side.

V. On the basis of the above exposition of the tangible and emotional factors that influence Britain's attitude towards the complex of German-Polish problems, the question can now be put as to what the probable attitude of Britain would be in a German-Polish conflict.

1) It must be stated, as a general preliminary observation, that Great Britain has not pledged herself in advance one hundred per cent to support Poland in *any* conflict. This would be contrary to the British mentality, which always wants to leave a possible loophole. Hence the stipulation that, for Britain, a *casus foederis* would arise only if Poland's independence were threatened. This assures a certain amount of elasticity. It is also asserted, but has not yet been proved, that Poland has pledged herself to obtain Britain's consent before taking up arms. This would mean that Britain would have a free hand should Poland declare war on her own accord.

Small though the likelihood is that Britain would *automatically* become involved in a German-Polish conflict over Danzig or the Corridor, it would be a mistake to accept the way the question has been posed in the article by the French politician Déat, "Pourquoi

mourir pour Dantzig",⁴ and apply it to Britain. To pose such a question would be to ignore the essence of the problem. Britain is not vitally interested in the fate of Danzig, but she is vitally interested in proving that she honours her political promissory notes.

2) From what has been said under (1), it follows that the question whether Britain will intervene in a German-Polish conflict cannot be answered by a plain yes or no. On the contrary one must attempt, by taking individual cases, to understand what Britain's attitude would be to each. Thus the following possibilities may arise:

(a) Danzig—by Senate decree or by plebiscite—announces its return to the Reich. Poland does not retaliate with military action. There is no fighting, or at most only local skirmishes. In this case Britain would hold aloof.

(b) If Poland replied to a "return to the Reich" resolution by the Senate with military invasion, and declared that the *casus foederis* had arisen, Britain, in conformity with Chamberlain's and Halifax's repeated declarations, would render Poland military assistance.

(c) If the Polish side should stage an act of provocation—such as the shelling of a German village by a Polish battery commander run amok, or the bombing of German villages by a Polish airman—it would be of decisive importance in the determination of Britain's attitude, first, that the facts of the case should be made clear beyond doubt to the peoples of the world, and, secondly, that British public opinion should have time to form a clear judgement of the facts and to convince itself that Poland alone was to blame. Otherwise, there would be the danger that, owing to the prejudice against Germany, Britain would side with Poland and, should military action ensue, respond to Poland's appeal for help (cf. the remarks in IV).

(d) Should Germany, from military considerations of any kind—e.g. in order to forestall a Polish attack believed to be imminent—feel herself forced to take military action against Poland, the fact would have to be reckoned with that Britain would come to Poland's aid. It is also unlikely that Britain would remain neutral if, in such a war with Germany, Poland were very soon defeated. Here, too, Britain would make her decision, not out of regard for Poland's weal or woe, but from considerations of safeguarding her world position.

VI. The British attitude towards Poland and the complex of German-Polish problems, as set out above, is not a constant factor, invariable for all time. In spite of its outward rigidity, the Anglo-Polish alliance is inwardly subject to constant change. This has already been demonstrated in the few months of its existence. The more deeply Britain is drawn into the devious paths of Eastern [European] politics, the more she becomes the prey to doubt and mis-

⁴ Published in *L'Oeuvre* on May 4, 1939; see also vol. VI of this Series, document No. 501.

giving. Poland's insatiable need of money has already led to a partial failure of the financial negotiations. The insolent tone of the Polish press, although carefully hushed up in the British press, meets with disapproval in high quarters. Poland's military strength proves, on closer examination, to be dubious. It is gradually being recognized that the exceptional difficulties of Russo-Polish relations lessen the value of Poland as an ally. Britain's Eastern policy is still in a state of flux, if only because of the continuing negotiations with the Soviet Union. The fact that, on the British side, relations with Germany are not regarded as definitely clarified, contributes to this. The British determination to refute the growing opinion that Britain is decadent, unreliable and weak must be regarded as a constant factor in Britain's general attitude. It is precisely in her attitude towards Poland that Great Britain will continue, for the time being, to be guided by these considerations.

Submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.⁵

VON DIRKSEN

⁵ Marginal note: "I have sent the original of this memorandum to the Foreign Minister, saying that I will state my own opinion later. W[eizsäcker] 22." No record of Weizsäcker's views has been found.

No. 131

8379/E591206-14; 222-24; 227-28; 230-31

Credit Agreement Between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Representatives of the Government of the German Reich and representatives of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have conducted negotiations with each other on placing additional Soviet orders in Germany, and have come to the following agreement:

Article I

(1) The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will cause the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany, or the importing organizations of the U.S.S.R., to place additional orders to the amount of 200 million Reichsmark with German firms.

(2) The additional orders shall be placed exclusively for supplies for capital investment purposes, that is in particular for:

- Equipment of factories,
- Installations,
- Fittings of various kinds,
- Machinery and machine tools of all kinds,
- Construction of apparatus,
- Equipment for the naphtha industry,

Equipment for the chemical industry,
Products of the electro-technical industry,
Ships, vehicles, means of transport,
Measuring instruments,
Laboratory equipment.

(3) The usual spare parts for such supplies are also included. There are further included contracts for technical assistance and bringing installations into operation, where these are stipulated in connection with orders placed under this Credit Agreement.

(4) The value of individual orders shall not be less than 50,000 Reichsmark.

(5) Not included in the additional orders, are orders for so-called current business. Such are, in particular:

Raw materials,
Semi-finished products,
Spare parts (other than those mentioned in paragraph 3),
Chemical products,
Consumer goods,
Articles of daily use.

(6) The Trade Delegation and the importing organizations shall be free in the choice of firms when placing orders. German firms shall likewise be free to decide whether, and to what extent, they wish to accept orders under this Agreement.

(7) Orders from List A¹ will be placed within a period of two years from the date of the conclusion of this Agreement. By the end of the first year from the conclusion of this Agreement, the value of the orders shall not exceed 120 million Reichsmark.

(8) Orders will be placed by the Trade Delegation, or, with joint liability of the Trade Delegation, by the importing organizations of the U.S.S.R.

(9) The German Government undertake to give the Trade Delegation and the importing organizations of the U.S.S.R. the necessary assistance in placing orders, in each individual case where required, particularly in respect of delivery dates and the quality of the goods.

(10) The delivery terms for orders placed under this Agreement shall be the normal ones and the prices for such supplies shall be reasonable.

(11) Article VII of the German-Soviet Agreement on Trade and Payments, of December 19, 1938,² shall also apply to orders placed under this Agreement.

Article II

The German Government declare that the German Gold Discount Bank ("Dego") has given them an undertaking to finance the addi-

¹ See Final Protocol to this Agreement.

² See Appendix III, Section (G).

tional orders to the amount of 200 million Reichsmark on the following terms:

(1) The Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany shall deposit bills of exchange with "Dego". These bills shall have an average term of seven years and shall be drawn for each individual transaction in such a way that

30 per cent of the amount of the order shall run for $6\frac{1}{2}$ years,

40 per cent of the amount of the order— 7 years,

30 per cent of the amount of the order— $7\frac{1}{2}$ years.

The bills of exchange shall be drawn by the importing organizations of the U.S.S.R. and endorsed for acceptance by the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. The bills shall be drawn in Reichsmark and shall be payable in Berlin.

(2) On the basis of the bills of exchange, "Dego" shall make a credit available to the Trade Delegation and the importing organizations of the U.S.S.R., which shall be used to pay the German firms cash in Reichsmark. "Dego" will not require endorsement of this credit by the German suppliers.

(3) The bills of exchange shall bear 5 per cent interest per annum. This shall be paid by the Trade Delegation to "Dego" at the end of each quarter through the Trade Delegation's current account with "Dego". The interest shall be covered by bills of exchange if "Dego" so requires.

(4) The Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany shall have the right to redeem before maturity the bills of exchange deposited with "Dego", in accordance with paragraphs (1) and (3) of this article, in which case interest will be paid only for the period that has elapsed.

Article III

The agreement on the technical method of payment, in accordance with Article II of this agreement, will be concluded between "Dego" and the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R.

Article IV

Orders shall be placed in accordance with the provisions laid down in the General Delivery Conditions, the Arbitration Agreement, and the Final Protocol, signed on March 20, 1935,³ by the Russia Committee of German Industry, on the one side, and by the Trade Delegation, on the other side, with amendments which may be agreed on in an exchange of letters between the appropriate agencies of both sides.

³ Not printed (9375/E664199-213); a summary is printed in the *Deutscher Reichsanzeiger und Preussischer Staatsanzeiger* of Mar. 23, 1935, p. 3.

Article V

(1) The Government of the U.S.S.R. give an undertaking to take measures for the delivery to Germany of the goods set out in List C,¹ to the minimum values indicated therein, within two years from the conclusion of this agreement. The prices of these goods shall be reasonable.

(2) Delivery of, and payment for, the Soviet goods shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the German-Soviet Agreement on Trade and Payments, of December 19, 1938.

(3) Should the Agreement of December 19, 1938, not be extended during the term of this Agreement or, in the event of extension, be amended, it shall continue to apply unless otherwise agreed upon, until such time as all bills of exchange and interest on the credit have been paid up and the amounts paid in for Soviet deliveries of goods have been used for the redemption of all bills of exchange, including also previous ones.

(4) This applies also to Articles VII and VIII of the above-mentioned Agreement of December 19, 1938.

(5) The German Government undertake to issue permits promptly for the import of Soviet goods into Germany, to an amount sufficient to cover at due date the credit provided for in this Agreement, and the payment of interest thereon, as well as to meet all other liabilities on U.S.S.R. bills of exchange in Germany. With this object in view, the two Governments shall, in due time, enter into negotiations for drawing up annual lists of such goods the import of which into Germany meets the requirements of German economy on the one hand and Soviet possibilities and interests on the other.

(6) The German Government further undertake to render assistance to the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany and to the Soviet importing organizations in placing orders and obtaining supplies of other goods set out in List B,¹ against the free amounts resulting from the sale of Soviet goods in Germany.

Article VI

At least 60 per cent of the German supplies shall be carried by German ships, if available, at rates which are usual and normal in view of the freight situation on the Germany-U.S.S.R. run. The remainder of the German supplies shall be carried by Soviet ships, using German seaports.

Article VII

(1) Should difficulties arise in placing and duly executing the orders provided for in this Agreement, or in the delivery of other goods—against the credit as well as against the current proceeds resulting from Soviet exports—the two Governments shall immediately enter into negotiations for the purpose of removing such difficulties. If no

settlement is reached the further obligations of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under Article V of this Agreement, regarding the execution of measures for the delivery of Soviet goods to Germany, as set out in List C,¹ shall be suspended until the ratio provided for in paragraph (3) of this Article is reached.

(2) The same shall apply in the event of difficulties arising in the delivery of Soviet goods to the extent provided for in Article V of this Agreement: the two Governments shall immediately enter into negotiations for the purpose of removing such difficulties. If no settlement is reached the further obligations of the German Government under Article I of this Agreement, in connection with facilitating the placing and due execution of orders against the credit, shall be suspended until the ratio provided for in the following paragraph of this article is reached.

(3) In the cases referred to in this article, the Government concerned shall not be released from their obligations to take all measures to reach, in the shortest time, a ratio between the orders in accordance with Lists A and B on the one hand and the contracts for the supply of Soviet goods, in accordance with List C, on the other hand, corresponding to the totals of these Lists. In this connection the two Governments shall take the necessary measures for the execution of the orders and contracts in accordance with the terms contained therein.

Article VIII

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature.

Done in duplicate in the German and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

BERLIN, August 19, 1939.⁴

For the German Government: For the Government of the U.S.S.R.:
DR. K. SCHNURRE E. BABARIN

CONFIDENTIAL PROTOCOL

In connection with the Credit Agreement between the German Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed today, the undersigned have agreed as follows:

The German Government will refund $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent per annum of the interest agreed upon and paid, so that an actual interest rate of $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent per annum on the credit will remain. This refund will be made at fixed repayment dates, to be agreed upon between "Dego" and the Trade Delegation, in such a manner that 10 per cent of the interest paid by the Trade Delegation for each accounting period will be refunded at the repayment dates. Payment of such amounts shall be made in Reichsmark into one of the special accounts opened

⁴ Signed at 2 a.m. on Aug. 20; see document No. 135.

under the Agreement on Trade and Payments of December 19, 1938, of the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany, or of the National Bank of the U.S.S.R.

The amounts payable may be used in accordance with Article IV of the said Agreement on Trade and Payments.

It is understood that the right, specified in paragraph 17 of Article IV of the above-mentioned agreement of December 19, 1938, of using the balances in the special accounts for payments of interest, extends also to the interest on the credit which is the subject of the Credit Agreement signed today between the German Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

BERLIN, August 19, 1939.

For the German Government: For the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

DR. K. SCHNURRE

E. BABARIN

FINAL PROTOCOL

ON THE GERMAN-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON TRADE AND CREDIT, OF AUGUST 19, 1939

I. After examination of their full powers, which were found to be in due form, the Contracting Parties signed the Credit Agreement between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and exchanged copies of this document.

II. The documents set out below, being integral parts of the Credit Agreement above referred to, were signed and delivered:

1. List A of German deliveries;
2. List B of German deliveries;
3. List C of Soviet deliveries;⁵
4. Confidential Protocol regarding refund.

BERLIN, August 19, 1939.

For the German Government: For the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

DR. K. SCHNURRE

E. BABARIN

[Enclosure 1]

BERLIN, August 19, 1939.

MY DEAR HERR SCHNURRE: I acknowledge receipt of your letter of today,⁶ which reads as follows:

"In connection with the Credit Agreement signed today, you expressed the desire that the German Government should lend their assistance so that the proposed U.S.S.R. orders in Germany may be successfully placed and executed.

"To this I have the honour to declare that the German Government will, as heretofore in individual cases, give assistance to the Trade

⁵ These three lists are not printed (8379/E591215-21).

⁶ Not printed (8379/E591225-26).

Delegation and the Soviet importing organizations in the placing and execution of orders.

"The German Government will further see to it that representatives of the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. and of the Soviet importing organizations may visit such firms as are prepared to undertake deliveries, in order to ascertain the quality of the articles to be ordered. The German Government will also see to it that representatives of the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. and of the Soviet Importing Organizations are given the opportunity, after placing an order, of visiting, upon previous notice, the factories of the suppliers, for the purpose of ascertaining the position on, and progress of, the order, to undertake the requisite inspections in the case of special orders and to effect the expert passing of the goods."

The Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Berlin will in such cases immediately inform the Reich Ministry of Economics of the opening of negotiations on orders with firms, so that the Reich Ministry of Economics may exert its influence in the sense of this letter.

I declare myself in accord with the contents of this letter.

With the assurance of my highest consideration,

E. BABARIN

[Enclosure 2]

BERLIN, August 19, 1939.

MY DEAR HERR SCHNURRE: I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of today,⁷ which reads as follows:

"During the negotiations on the Credit Agreement, it was pointed out most emphatically on the German side that the prerequisite for the now newly regulated German-Soviet foreign trade is a good and smooth functioning of the arbitration procedure of March 20, 1935, agreed upon between the Russia Committee of German Industry and the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany. On the Soviet side, readiness was expressed to ensure, jointly with the German side, the functioning of the arbitration procedure and to take up this question immediately upon the conclusion of the Credit Agreement. The German side took note of this.

"Immediately the Credit Agreement has been concluded, both sides will do their best towards having this question settled between the Russia Committee of German Industry and the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany."

I declare myself in accord with the contents of this letter.

With the assurance of my highest consideration.

E. BABARIN

Dr. K. Schnurre,
Counsellor of Legation,
Foreign Ministry, Berlin.

⁷ Not printed (8379/E591229).

No. 132

34/23961-62

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, August 20, 1939—12:08 a.m.

SECRET

Received August 20—7:00 a.m.

No. 189 of August, 19

With reference to my telegram No. 187 of [August] 19.¹

In my first conversation of today with Molotov—which began at 2 o'clock and lasted an hour—after having made the communications as I had been instructed, I repeatedly tried to convince Molotov of the fact that a visit of the Reich Foreign Minister to Moscow was the only way of achieving the speed that was urgently called for because of the political situation. Molotov acknowledged the positive importance of the proposed trip, stressed the fact that the Soviet Government understood and esteemed the underlying purpose, but persisted in his opinion that for the present it was not possible even approximately to fix the time of the journey, since thorough preparations would be required. This applied both to the non-aggression pact and to the contents of the protocol² to be concluded simultaneously. The German draft of the non-aggression pact³ was by no means exhaustive. The Soviet Government desired that one of the many non-aggression pacts that the Soviet Government had concluded with other countries (for example with Poland, Latvia, Estonia, etc.)⁴ should serve as a model for the non-aggression pact with Germany. He left it to the German Government to choose from among them the one that seemed suitable. Further, the content of the protocol was a very serious question and the Soviet Government expected Germany to state more specifically what points were to be covered in the protocol. The attitude of the Soviet Government towards treaties which they concluded was a very serious one; they respected the obligations which they undertook and expected the same of the other parties to these treaties.

To the reasons I repeatedly and very emphatically advanced for the need for haste, Molotov rejoined that, so far, not even the first step—the concluding of the economic agreement—had been taken. First of all, the economic agreement had to be signed and published, and achieve its effect abroad. Then would come the turn of the non-aggression pact and protocol.

¹ Document No. 125.

² See document No. 105.

³ See document No. 113.

⁴ For the texts of these Non-aggression Pacts, signed on July 25, Feb. 5, and May 4, 1932, respectively, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 135, pp. 711-713, 688-640, 478-480.

Molotov remained apparently unaffected by my protests, so that the first conversation closed with a declaration on the part of Molotov that he had imparted to me the views of the Soviet Government and had nothing to add to them.

Hardly half an hour after the conversation had ended, Molotov sent me word, asking me to call on him again at the Kremlin at 4:30 p.m. He apologized for putting me to the trouble and explained that he had reported to the Soviet Government and was instructed to hand me a draft of the non-aggression pact. As far as the Reich Foreign Minister's journey was concerned, the Soviet Government agreed to Herr von Ribbentrop's coming to Moscow about a week after publication of the signing of the economic agreement. Thus, if publication of this took place tomorrow, Herr von Ribbentrop would arrive in Moscow on August 26 or 27. Molotov did not give reasons for his sudden change of mind. I assume that Stalin intervened. My attempt to get Molotov to accept an earlier date for the Reich Foreign Minister's journey was, unfortunately, unsuccessful.

The text of the draft of the non-aggression pact will follow by telegram.⁵

SCHULENBURG⁶

⁵ See document No. 133.

⁶ Typewritten marginal note: "(i) Strictly confidential: for Hewel at the Berghof, (ii) Strictly confidential: for Brücklmeier at Fuschl."

No. 133

34/23965-66

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MOSCOW, August 20, 1939—12:12 a.m.

No. 190 of August 19

Received—3:15 a.m.

With reference to telegram No. 189 of [August] 19.¹

The Soviet draft of the non-aggression pact reads as follows:

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Germany, desirous of strengthening the cause of peace among the nations and proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the Neutrality Treaty which was concluded in April 1926² between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Germany, have reached the following agreement:

Article 1

The two Contracting Parties undertake to desist reciprocally from any act of violence and any aggressive action whatsoever against

¹ Document No. 182.

² See document No. 105, footnote 5.

each other, or from an attack on each other either severally or jointly with other Powers.

Article 2

Should one of the Contracting Parties become the object of an act of violence or attack by a third Power, the other Contracting Party shall in no manner whatever lend its support to such acts by that Power.

Article 3

Should disputes or conflicts arise between the Contracting Parties over questions of one kind or another, both Parties undertake to settle these disputes and conflicts exclusively by peaceful means through mutual consultation or, if necessary, through the creation of suitable arbitration commissions.

Article 4

The present Treaty shall be concluded for a period of five years with the proviso that, unless one of the Contracting Parties denounces it one year before the expiry of that period, the validity of the Treaty shall be deemed to be automatically prolonged for another five years.

Article 5

The present Treaty shall be ratified in as short a time as possible, whereupon the Treaty shall enter into force.

Postscript

The present Pact shall be valid only if a special Protocol is signed simultaneously, covering the points in which the Contracting Parties are interested in the field of foreign policy. The Protocol shall be an integral part of the Pact.

SCHULENBURG³

³ Typewritten marginal note: "First copy: Strictly confidential for Hewel at the Berghof. Second copy: Strictly confidential for Brücklmeier at Fuschl. Third copy: State Secretary at his home. Cipher Bureau, Aug. 20, 4:30 a.m."

No. 134

910/294314

The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 89 of August 19

TALLINN, August 20, 1939—1:50 a.m.

Received August 20—4:50 a.m.

Pol. V 1905 g.

I discussed the political situation with the Vice Foreign Minister¹ today, making use of the detailed arguments in telegram No. 102²

¹ Oskar Öpik.

² See document No. 66, footnote 1. This circular was sent as telegram No. 102 to Tallinn.

and the Polish Under State Secretary's provocative reply, telegram No. 98³. I pointed out that the Poles in their delusion, over and above the question of Danzig, were themselves keeping all the German-Polish problems alive, by their unbridled oppression of the Reich Germans and *Volksdeutsche* in the Corridor and in East Upper Silesia, which I substantiated with details. The Vice [Foreign] Minister spoke very bitterly about Poland's behaviour. He was now convinced, he said, that for reasons of mistrust and prestige the Poles had set themselves firmly against all cooperation, and clearly considered it as a sort of point of honour to make no concessions without first putting up a fight. The statement that they would fight even if they were entirely alone was characteristic. If Germany, on the other hand, brought about by force the solution, which in itself was urgently necessary, he thought that in the present state of affairs Britain and France would intervene in Poland. There was doubt, however, about the attitude of the Soviet Union, who, as a Tass report today⁴ again made clear, was plainly protracting the Moscow negotiations with the object of delaying a decision. Estonia would, in any case, maintain her neutrality and if necessary defend it, even though, like Latvia, she would not be able to hold out for very long in the case of a Soviet Russian attack. Then, without making an actual request, the Vice [Foreign] Minister hinted at the possibility of help from Germany in such an event.

I referred to the last chance, which I hoped still existed, that Britain and France, finally realizing the consequences, might possibly in the circumstances refuse to help a Poland that had lost all reason, and thus make a lasting peace possible.

FROHWEIN

³ The reference is apparently to telegram No. 99, which transmitted to Tallinn the Polish statement of Aug. 10 and Weizsäcker's instructions; see document No. 57, footnote 1. Telegram No. 98 contained a summary of the German statement of Aug. 9 (document No. 5).

⁴ See document No. 120.

No. 135

34/23963

An Official of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 186

BERLIN, August 19 [sic], 1939.¹

The Economic Agreement² was signed this night at 2 a.m. by Babarin and myself. A joint communiqué will be issued to DNB and Tass on August 20 at 8 p.m. It will be announced on the wire-less on the evening of August 20, and in the press on the morning of August 21.

SCHNURRE

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

² Document No. 131.

No. 136

910/294312-13

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain

Telegram

No. 564

BERLIN, August 19, 1939.
Sent August 20—11:15 a.m.
e.o. Pol. V 1904 g.

For the Chargé d'Affaires.

Judging by his statements to you,¹ the Spanish Foreign Minister² has a completely false conception of the situation in Poland. He says, among other things, that Poland would not dare to commit an act of provocation unless she were incited to it by the other side. But in fact Polish acts of provocation have already reached such a pitch that Germany's honour is affected by them. I would draw your attention to the following known facts:

The Polish ultimatum to Danzig of August 4³ with threats of reprisals. The megalomania of the Polish press. The completely implacable attitude shown in the speeches of Polish statesmen. Continual chicanery of the worst kind against Reich Germans and a campaign of extermination against *Volksdeutsche*. Material on the subject has been sent regularly to the Embassy and is to be found in the German press.

Please ensure, through further conversations at the earliest possible moment with the Foreign Minister and other persons concerned, that this completely erroneous conception does not gain a hold in Spain, and that the true character of the Polish acts of provocation is impressed on the minds of leading Spaniards.

I refer you to the last paragraph of telegram No. 545 of August 14.⁴ Use could be made of the ideas contained therein, though without referring to the exchange of statements between Germany and Poland.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 96.

² Col. Beigbeder.

³ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 774, enclosure.

⁴ This telegram transmitted the text of the Polish statement of Aug. 10 (document No. 10) with Weizsäcker's instructions; see document No. 57, footnote 1.

No. 137

1625/889181

The Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 239 of August 20

TARABYA, August 20, 1939—12 noon.

Received August 20—5:30 p.m.

Pol. II 2948.

The Italian Military Attaché¹ claims to have learnt the following from a reliable source:

At military discussions in Moscow, the Russians are said to have stated that they had learnt of Britain's intention to establish a naval base for the British Fleet at Cesme (near Izmir) for the defence of the Dardanelles. Russia was interested in the defence of the Dardanelles to the same, if not to a greater, extent than Britain. She therefore attached great importance to participating in the defence measures. As attacks on the Dardanelles would in all probability take place with lightning speed, Russia's share in defence would be guaranteed only if she already possessed in peacetime a base in the Straits area, the only place for which was the Sea of Marmora.

The above information is said to have been reported to Ankara by the Turkish Military Attaché² in Moscow, who apparently took part in the military conversations.

KROLL

¹ Col. Boglione.² Lt. Col. Türkmen.

No. 138

116/66546

The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry

Teletype

[DANZIG, August 20, 1939.]

For immediate transmission to the Reich Foreign Minister.

Gauleiter Forster is leaving for the Berghof at 5 p.m. today. Do you wish me to accompany him? Please confirm.¹

VEESENMAYER

¹ Marginal notes: (i) "Received from Danzig 20/8.39, noon. K[üster]." (ii) "1) Transmitted to Fuschl 20/8.39, 12:05 p.m. Küster." (iii) "2) Please also teletype to the Berghof with note: 'For Hewel' E. K[ordt]." (iv) Note by teletyping office: "We had already sent this telegram* at noon today but received no acknowledgment."* Added by hand: "to the Berghof." (v) "Second despatch to the Berghof, 20.8.39, 5:55 p.m." No reply has been found, but see document No. 176 which indicates that Forster was not accompanied by Veessenmayer.

No. 139

7693/E548518

*The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister's Special Representative
in Danzig*

Teleprint

BERLIN, August 20, 1939—12:35 p.m.
e.o. Pol. V 8061.

For Veesenmayer.

The Foreign Minister directs me to inform you that he approves the general view held by you on the conduct of negotiations in the dispute over Customs officials. Negotiations must, however, be so conducted and pressure on Poland in other respects so applied that the responsibility for a breakdown of the negotiations, and for all consequences, falls on Poland.¹

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 119.

No. 140

895/260330

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 187

BERLIN, August 20, 1939—12:35 p.m.
Received August 20—5:05 p.m.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 189.¹

Should you have any further particulars to report from your last two conversations with Molotov, or any other observations to make on Russian intentions, you should in view of the extreme urgency not do so by letter or despatch but immediately by telegram.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Document No. 132.

No. 141

96/107949

The Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 238 of August 20 TARABYA, August 20 [sic], 1939—12:51 p.m.
Received August 21—7:00 p.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 187 of August 18.¹

As the telegram under reference arrived very late, I was not able to carry out the instructions with Numan until yesterday evening

¹ Document No. 109.

when I told him that the aim of Germany's generous and forthcoming proposal was to tide over the present critical period in German-Turkish relations without prejudicing the possibility of more favourable developments in the future. Numan received my communication with considerable gravity, but confined himself merely to the remark that, if war deliveries were immoral, this applied to the agreement for chrome.² I refuted this with the argument that, in that case, cotton, wool, mohair, leather, etc., could also be described as war material, and furthermore stated unambiguously that without chrome we were not interested in an extension of the agreement. Before the conversations were continued I demanded acceptance, in principle, of the German proposal as a basis for negotiations. Numan promised a reply immediately after consulting the Minister President,³ who was at present attending manoeuvres and would not return until Tuesday.⁴ Numan finally asked to have our proposals set down in writing,⁵ to which I agreed.⁶

KROLL

² The Ankara copy in the Ankara Mission files (9792/E687361) here reads: "the same would apply to chrome. . . ."

³ Dr. Refik Saydam.

⁴ i.e., Aug. 22.

⁵ This was done in an *aide-mémoire* of Aug. 21 (8342/E590165-66), which gives the German proposals as follows: I. Given the recent evolution in Turkish foreign policy, cancellation, by mutual agreement, of all outstanding armament contracts remaining unfulfilled; Turkey to waive the right to claim pledges or indemnities. Germany to reimburse Turkish buyers for advance payments on such contracts. II. Non-ratification by Germany of the Credit Agreement of Jan. 16, 1939 [see vol. v of this Series, document No. 557] envisaging RM 60 million credit to Turkey for arms purchases. Continuation of more purely industrial contracts envisaged under that Agreement, on the basis of separate contracts, possibly to be combined into a new global commercial agreement, to be concluded between the interested parties. The Gölcük harbour construction contract could be similarly treated. III. Prolongation of the Payments and Exchange Agreements of July 25, 1938 [see vol. v of this Series, document No. 549] for a year, on condition that both Governments agreed on points I and II.

⁶ Wiehl replied by telegram No. 189 of Aug. 22 (8342/E590167) as follows: "In order to increase pressure on Turkey, import licences for Turkish seasonal produce will be quietly withheld until the Embassy suggests some other procedure. It is considered advisable here that a possible provisional extension of the Agreement during the period of negotiations should, for the same reason, be limited to one month and postponed for as long as possible."

No. 142

644/254844-46

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, August 20, 1939—4:35 p.m.¹

No. 189 of August 20

Received August 21—12:45 a.m.

For the Ambassador personally.

The Führer instructs you to present yourself to Molotov at once and hand him the following telegram from the Führer to M. Stalin:

¹ It appears in fact to have been despatched at 6:45 p.m.; see document No. 148, footnote 2.

"M. Stalin, Moscow. 1) I sincerely welcome the signing of the new German-Soviet Commercial Agreement² as the first step in the re-shaping of German-Soviet relations.

2) The conclusion of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union means to me the establishment of German policy for a long time. Germany thereby resumes a political course that was beneficial to both States during by-gone centuries. The Government of the Reich are therefore resolved in such a case to accept all the consequences of such a far-reaching change.

3) I accept the draft of the non-aggression pact³ that your Foreign Minister, M. Molotov, handed over, but consider it urgently necessary to clarify the questions connected with it as soon as possible.

4) The substance of the supplementary protocol desired by the Government of the Soviet Union can, I am convinced, be clarified in the shortest possible time if a responsible German statesman can come to Moscow himself to negotiate. Otherwise the Government of the Reich are not clear as to how the supplementary protocol could be cleared up and settled in a short time.

5) The tension between Germany and Poland has become intolerable. Polish demeanour toward a great Power is such that a crisis may arise any day. Germany is at any rate determined, in the face of this presumption, from now on to look after the interests of the Reich with all the means at her disposal.

6) In my opinion, it is desirable, in view of the intentions of the two States to enter into a new relationship to each other, not to lose any time. I therefore again propose that you receive my Foreign Minister on Tuesday, August 22, but at the latest on Wednesday, August 23. The Reich Foreign Minister has the fullest powers to draw up and sign the non-aggression pact as well as the protocol. A longer stay by the Reich Foreign Minister in Moscow than one to two days at most is impossible in view of the international situation. I should be glad to receive your early answer. Adolf Hitler."

Please hand to M. Molotov the above telegram of the Führer to Stalin in writing, on a sheet of paper without letterhead.

RIBBENTROP

² See document No. 131.

³ See document No. 133.

No. 143

695/260327

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, August 20, 1939—5:10 p.m.

No. 188 of August 20

Received August 20—8:50 p.m.

For the Ambassador personally.

You should immediately ask for an appointment at the Foreign Ministry for today . . .¹ for the purpose of handing over an urgent message from the Führer to Stalin. The message referred to follows by telegram.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ These omission marks appear in the text of the Moscow copy here printed. The Foreign Ministry draft (34/23968) reads: "Sunday" [i.e., Aug. 20].

² See document No. 142.

No. 144

34/23967

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, August 20, 1939—11:24 p.m.

No. 191 of August 20

Received August 21—1:30 a.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 187 of August 20.¹

I have nothing essential to add to my telegrams Nos. 187, 189 and 190.² It was characteristic of my first interview with Molotov yesterday that in my efforts to influence him I went as far as a foreign representative can go on such an occasion and nevertheless could not achieve anything more. After my second interview yesterday Molotov said as he took leave of me: "That after all a concrete step!"³ By that he obviously meant that the Soviet Government had accomplished a decisive action.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 140.

² Documents Nos. 125, 132 and 133.

³ This sentence in quotation marks was queried on receipt of the telegram in Berlin (telegram to Moscow No. 192 of Aug. 21, 695/260311), and Moscow replied (telegram No. 198 of Aug. 21, 695/250810) that it should read: "That is after all a concrete step."

No. 145

73/52220-21

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 357 of August 20

ROME, August 20, 1939—11:40 p.m.

Received August 21—3:20 a.m.

For the State Secretary, with reference to my telephone conversation of this evening¹ and to your telegram No. 383 of August 19.²

Ciano, who originally was not supposed to come back from Albania till tomorrow, Monday, arrived here unexpectedly this afternoon, because weather conditions in Albania would for several days have prevented him carrying out the scheduled programme which was to be done mainly by air.³ I called on him at the Palazzo Chigi immediately on his return, and, among other things, also mentioned Csáky's visit to Rome. He described Csáky's arrival the day before yesterday as quite unexpected because his visit had been announced for not earlier than August 25 to 28. As he [Ciano] was at the seaside, he had not even been able to receive him personally on landing; and even the Duce had to be brought to town from the seaside after Csáky had arrived. Ciano had had a fairly short talk with him alone before accompanying him to the Duce. It was not very easy to give a short summary of what Csáky said, in view of his well-known mode of expressing himself. The gist of it was that he was still unreservedly an avowed adherent of the Axis, as he had always been, although he gave vent at length to the deep concern he felt in view of developments in the European situation. The primary object of his visit was probably to obtain information about this situation and Italy's views on it, but he had also wanted to find out what effect the interlude of the famous Teleki letters⁴—later withdrawn—had had here. Besides this, Ciano has the impression, from some of Csáky's remarks, that the latter had met with a certain reserve on the part of the Reich Foreign Minister in his conversation with him, and had wished to learn more here about the position and what was planned. In the course of the conversation Csáky had also said tentatively that there still seemed to him to be certain possibilities for a peaceful solution. Ciano had replied that his impression was that the Führer's decision to act was unalterable. In conformity with the sense of the last paragraph of the telegram under reference, No. 383 of August 19, I assured Count Ciano that his last statement was entirely correct.

¹ No record of this conversation has been found.

² Document No. 124.

³ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, Nos. 119 and 120, and the *Ciano Diaries*, entry of Aug. 20.

⁴ See vol. VI of this Series, documents Nos. 712, enclosures 1 and 2, and 784, footnote 9.

As Csáky had already left Rome by air at 9 o'clock the next morning there seems to me little probability that he made contact with other authorities here. If I obtain any further information on this matter I shall report by telegram.⁵

MACKENSEN

⁵ No further telegram on this subject has been found.

No. 146

495/233390-91

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S.

BERLIN, August 20, 1939.

Count Magistrati, at present Italian Chargé d'Affaires, called on me privately today in order to give me an account of the talks in Fuschl and Salzburg on August 18-19.¹ As the conversation was a personal one it has no official significance. However, it contained a train of thought by Magistrati which I should like to record:

Magistrati wanted to establish that the present critical situation had taken Italy by surprise. There was no clear-cut German-Polish dispute with a definite thesis and counter-thesis. We had never acquainted Italy with it. Our alliance, however, demanded close contact and consultation on major questions concerning both of us. Now Germany was maintaining that the Danzig-Poland problem was an isolated German problem and not a general one. It did not affect Italy. The localized war would not touch Italy. Germany was thus forgoing Italy's armed assistance.

Magistrati went on to say that if the German thesis proved to be wrong and a general war resulted, Italy would be faced with the consequences of our Treaty of Alliance when the prerequisites for these did not exist. Magistrati was too cautious to elaborate his ideas beyond this point.

I am leaving out all the objections I raised and am only recording this section of the conversation because it reveals an Italian state of mind which, although it does not surprise me, must in my opinion definitely be considered.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 126, footnote 4. See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 140.

34/23957-58

No. 147

*Unsigned Memorandum*INSTRUCTIONS ON COMMENTS TO BE MADE¹

The German-Soviet economic agreement concluded yesterday² will give new impetus to German-Soviet foreign trade. Both countries complement each other in the most natural way through their national economies: The Soviet Union, the land of inexhaustible raw material wealth, the land of great, long-term investment plans which for years to come will create a demand for industrial finished products of the highest grade; Germany, the land of the most specialized high-grade industries which can, even in view of the already advanced state of industrialization in the Soviet Union, supply the industrial plant and equipment still required there. Besides this, Germany is capable of absorbing unlimited quantities of those Soviet Russian products which are destined for export, and which are used for manufacturing purposes in Germany. The reduction in the volume of goods exchanged between the two countries which has become apparent of recent years, is not in keeping with the trading and natural possibilities which exist in the mutual economic relations of the two countries. The present agreement will certainly contribute quickly towards restoring the natural trade between the two countries to a proper level. At all events, the prerequisites are thus present for a satisfactory development of economic relations between the two countries. Added to this, the Soviet Union can pay for its imports from Germany with its own products. Conversely, Germany pays for her imports of raw materials from the Soviet Union with high-grade German industrial products.

In concluding this economic treaty Germany is consistently following her trade policy of cooperating economically and as closely as possible with all countries who are prepared to do likewise.

¹ Marginal note: "To be submitted to the State Secretary. Schnurre 20/8." Initialed: "W[eizsäcker]".

² Document No. 131.

No. 148

34/23971

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, August 21, 1939—1:19 a.m.

SECRET

Received August 21—3:00 a.m.

No. 192 of August 20

With reference to your telegram No. 188 of August 20.¹

Telegram No. 188 was received here at 8:50 p.m. Moscow time.

¹ Document No. 143.

Despite immediate efforts I have not so far succeeded in contacting the responsible official at the Foreign Commissariat. The instructions therefore cannot be carried out till tomorrow morning.

The telegram advised has not been received so far, 11:45 p.m.²

In our experience official telegrams from Berlin to Moscow take, inclusive of two hours difference in time, four to five hours. To this must be added the time for deciphering.

SCHULENBURG

² Marginal notes: (i) "Minute by the St[ate] S[ecretary] on the working copy: When was it despatched from Berlin? Sgd. W 20/8." (ii) In Siegfried's handwriting: "Despatched at 6:45 p.m."

No. 149

695/260314

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 191 of August 21

BERLIN, August 21, 1939—10:15 a.m.

Received August 21—2:30 p.m.

For the Ambassador.

Please do your utmost to ensure that the journey materializes. Date as in telegram.¹

RIBBENTROP

¹ See document No. 142.

No. 150

2842/549686

The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry

Teleprint

DANZIG, August 21, 1939—12:10 p.m.

For immediate transmission to the Foreign Minister and to State Secretary Weizsäcker.

Senator Wiesner was released by the Poles on Thursday the 17th¹ and arrived in Danzig this morning, August 21, via Tezew. I am meeting him at 7 p.m. today for a detailed discussion. Have you any instructions for me for this discussion?² It is requested at the same time that if any report of this appears in the press, any mention of flight should be avoided. Wiesner crossed the frontier officially in his car. He was held up for half an hour at the frontier station until appropriate instructions for the granting of a permit to enter Danzig arrived from Warsaw.

VEESENMAIER³

¹ He had been detained by the Poles on Aug. 16 for examination in connection with the alleged existence of an espionage organization.

² No instructions have been found.

³ Marginal notes: "First to the Under State Secretary, Political Department. W[eizsäcker] 21/8." "Immediately to Herr Schliep. W[örmann] 21."

No. 151

7433/E589972-73

Note by the Head of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP

BERLIN, August 21, 1939.

BARON DE ROPP'S SECOND VISIT¹

At 12:30 p.m. on August 21, Baron de Ropp arrived and told me that he was now flying to London. He expressed his thanks for the excellent material on the subject of persecutions of Germans in Poland, which he intends to employ to advantage. He asked again what could be done, as things today were exactly as they were before. I told him that here in Germany the impression was more and more gaining ground that what was involved in the persecutions of Germans in Poland was not only Polish hatred for everything German, but, as the British tolerated this without further ado, it was being construed as a political intention on the part of Britain to establish war guilt. It was thought that the British were supporting the intolerable persecutions of Germans on the assumption that Germany could not put up with such acts of provocation, which were even now being intensified by arrests of Reich Germans. Active intervention, however, would then give the desired excuse to lay all the blame on Germany. I told him that if the circles of which he was speaking really had any influence, they could only insist on a statement being made to the effect that Britain's guarantee had been given in circumstances different from those prevailing today, when Poland, by her attempts to wipe out her minorities, was destroying the principles which had led to the recognition of the Polish State. I also added that my purely personal view was that the Dominions had every reason to draw Britain away from her present policy. It was therefore a question of persuading the Dominions, within the framework of the British constitutional system, to make a joint statement in London directed against the whole policy of the Churchill and Eden group.

Ropp said that he would initiate talks along these lines if possible, because Major Winterbottom was the liaison officer between the Air Ministry and all other Ministries and Government Departments. He added that as political adviser to the Air Ministry he would, in a possible war, have to take up his second residence in Geneva, and that, in the event of a conflict, he himself wanted to maintain contact for the sole purpose of preventing the self-destruction of Germany and Britain. He would, if the occasion arose, send messages signed "George" to an unknown collaborator of ours. It looks as if Ropp has already taken up his duties, as he is going to Geneva now and if

¹ See also document No. 74.

nothing else happens he will pass through here again after the Party Rally.²

I again told him that I naturally appreciated the efforts being made by his friends and himself in the Air Ministry, but we did not know to what extent they could influence British policy. For the time being we must reckon with an attitude which would find expression in supporting Poland.

This conversation, by the way, was not of an official nature, but a purely private talk.

A. R[OSENBERG]

² The Party Rally planned for the beginning of September was cancelled on Aug. 26.

No. 152

34/23952

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, August 21, 1939—1:43 p.m.

No. 196 of August 21

Received August 21—1:50 p.m.

With reference to my telegram No. 192 of August 20.¹

I am to see Molotov at 3 p.m. today.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 148.

No. 153

7693/E548517

An Official of Political Division V to the Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig

Teletype

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, August 21, 1939—2:10 p.m.

For Veessenmayer.

Except for the plan concerning the conduct of negotiations on the Danzig-Polish Customs Inspectors,¹ State Secretary von Weizsäcker has no knowledge of any proposals at your end regarding the handling of the Danzig question. The State Secretary requests that these proposals be transmitted to him at once.

BERGMANN²

¹ See document No. 139.

² In the early hours of Aug. 21 two teleprints (97/108526-27) had been received from Danzig, reporting that Veessenmayer had given a detailed oral report on the situation to Bergmann on the evening of the 20th.

No. 154

2281/480616

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 385 of August 21

BERLIN, August 21, 1939—2:31 p.m.

Received August 21—3:00 p.m.

For the Ambassador personally.

For your personal information only, I am letting you know that Magistrati informed me about midday today that Ciano must at all costs see the Foreign Minister tomorrow morning.¹ He would be leaving Rome at 7 o'clock this evening and would be at the Brenner at 7:30 a.m. tomorrow. He asked the Foreign Minister to be at the Brenner at about 9 o'clock or 10 o'clock at the latest . . .² Ciano would also be prepared to come as far as Innsbruck.³

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, Appendix I, Part II, entries for 11:45 a.m., 4 and 10 p.m. on Aug. 21.

² These omission marks appear on the original. The missing words should presumably read: "If need be".

³ Marginal note in Mackensen's handwriting: "The journey did not in fact take place." See also the *Ciano Diaries*, entries of Aug. 21 and 22.

No. 155

7693/E548516

The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry

Teleprint

DANZIG, August 21, 1939—4:35 p.m.

Received August 21—4:50 p.m.

zu Pol. V 8059.¹

For Bergmann

With reference to Bergmann's enquiry at 2:15 p.m.² Veesenmayer recommends that State Secretary Weizsäcker should consult Gruppenführer Heydrich. The Gruppenführer is fully informed.³

VEESENMAYER

¹ Not printed (7693/E548515); this teleprint, timed 2:25 p.m., reported that Veesenmayer was not expected to be back before about 5 p.m.

² Marginal note here in Bergmann's handwriting: "Concerning 'Programme' on the handling of the Danzig question." See document No. 153.

³ Marginal notes: (i) "Urgent. Herr Bergmann. Please obtain programme for me through V[eesenmayer] or in some other way—I will then settle with whom to discuss it. W[eißsäcker] 21/8." (ii) "To Herr v. Kessel. Bergmann 21/8." (iii) "To be filed. B[ergmann] 22/8."

No. 156

7985/E575295

The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 442 of August 21

PARIS, August 21, 1939—[4:20 p.m.].¹

Received August 21—4:40 p.m.

P. 10322.

In the firm attitude adopted by Government circles and the press towards the solution by force of Eastern problems, only very . . . (group missing) [minor] but nevertheless interesting points have emerged which indicate a limitation and therefore a certain element of weakness. There are, for instance, comments on the widely noted hitch[es] in Anglo-Japanese negotiations,² and, above all, Japanese preparations for a blockade in the region of Hong Kong. People see collaboration between the Axis Powers and Japan in this, and hint that the Far Eastern situation may have considerable influence on decisions to be taken at tomorrow's meeting of the British Cabinet on the attitude towards the tension in Europe. Furthermore, Anglo-French military negotiations in Moscow are being followed with scarcely concealed anxiety. *L'Humanité* of August 21 [urges] speed and accuses the French and British Governments of being half-hearted and weak-kneed. In contrast to reports of progress in the Moscow negotiations and agreement on measures in the event of a European conflict, the London correspondent of *Le Jour—Echo de Paris*, in the edition of August 21, reports that the staff talks are encountering the same difficulties and are proceeding just as slowly as earlier political negotiations, so that reports on agreement in principle on the conclusion of the desired Three Power Pact are, unfortunately, devoid of all serious foundation. Anxiety about the progress of the Moscow conversations has been aggravated by the news of the conclusion on August 19 of the new German-Russian trade treaty and credit agreement,³ although the French press, in contrast to reports from London and obviously on official instructions, tries to belittle the fact of the German-Russian economic accord.

BRÄUER

¹ Taken from the Paris draft (9968/E696720-21), from which amendments inserted in the text in square brackets are also taken.

² See also document No. 110.

³ See document No. 131.

No. 157

34/23983

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

Moscow, August 21, 1939—6:22 p.m.

MOST URGENT

Received August 21—7:55 p.m.

No. 197 of August 21

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 189 of August 20¹ and 191 of August 21.²

Strongly stressing its extraordinary importance and the exceptional need for haste, I delivered to M. Molotov at 3 p.m. the Führer's message to Stalin, with a translation. M[olotov] read the document through and was evidently deeply impressed. He stated that he would forward the message and advise me immediately a decision was reached.

I tried with all the means at my disposal to make it clear to M[olotov] that an immediate journey by the Reich Foreign Minister was absolutely necessary in the interests of both countries. I closed with the request that, in any case, I be given an answer today.

I have just learned that M[olotov] wishes to see me again at 5 p.m.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 142.² Document No. 149.

No. 158

34/23984

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, August 21, 1939—6:54 p.m.

SECRET

Received August 21—7:55 p.m.

No. 199 of August 21

With reference to my telegram No. 197 of August 21.¹

Molotov delivered to me at 5 p.m., Stalin's answer, couched in a very conciliatory form, in reply to the Führer's message. Stalin advises that the Soviet Government agree to the arrival of the Reich Foreign Minister on August 23.

Molotov declared that it was the desire of the Soviet Government that tomorrow morning, at the latest, a short factual communiqué on the intended conclusion of a non-aggression pact and "impending" arrival of the Reich Foreign Minister be published in Moscow.

¹ Document No. 157.

Molotov requested German assent to this by midnight. I advise consenting since the Soviet Government will commit themselves by such a publication.

The text of Stalin's letter follows at once by telegram.²

SCHULENBURG

² See document No. 159.

No. 159

34/23985

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, August 21, 1939—7:45 p.m.

SECRET

Received August 21—9:35 p.m.

No. 200 of August 21

With reference to my telegram No. 199 of August 21.¹

Text of Stalin's reply:

"August 21, 1939. To the Chancellor of the German Reich, Herr A. Hitler. I thank you for the letter.² I hope that the German-Soviet non-aggression pact will bring about a decided turn for the better in the political relations between our countries.

The peoples of our countries need peaceful relations with each other. The assent of the German Government to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact provides the foundation for eliminating the political tension and for the establishment of peace and collaboration between our countries.

The Soviet Government have instructed me to inform you that they agree to Herr von Ribbentrop's arriving in Moscow on August 23. J. Stalin."³

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 158.

² See document No. 142.

³ Typewritten marginal note: "The text of the telegram has been transmitted to the Berghof. 21.8. 10:30 p.m. Hübscher."

No. 160

34/23986

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, August 21, 1939—7:46 p.m.

No. 201 of August 21

Received August 21—10:10 p.m.

With reference to my telegram No. 199 of August 21.¹

The text of the communiqué proposed by Molotov:

¹ Document No. 158.

"After the conclusion of the Soviet-German Trade and Credit Agreement, the question arose of the improvement of political relations between Germany and the U.S.S.R. The exchange of views on this question, which took place between the Governments of the two countries, has established the existence of a desire on both sides to relieve the tension in political relations between them and to conclude a pact of non-aggression. In connection with this matter the arrival of the German Foreign Minister Herr von Ribbentrop in Moscow for the necessary negotiations is imminent."²

SCHULENBURG

² Typewritten marginal note: "The text of the telegram has been transmitted to the Berghof. 10 p.m. [sic] H[ü]b[scher] 21.8."

No. 161

26/16154

The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 70 of August 21

COPENHAGEN, August 21, 1939—7:53 p.m.

Received August 21—9:35 p.m.

Pol. VI 1944.

The Foreign Minister told me today that he will himself take part in the Brussels meeting of the Oslo Powers¹ and Switzerland,² which is connected with last year's conversations at Copenhagen.³

Munch stated that he did not yet know details of the agenda, but said that he would not participate in any action for mediation which was not desired by both sides. The deliberations would cover a renewed insistence upon the intention to remain neutral and also political and economic cooperation in case of war.

Munch will be accompanied by the Head of the Economic Department at the Foreign Ministry.⁴

RENTHE-FINK

¹ i.e., the States signatory to the Oslo Convention of 1930, comprising Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. It had been announced in the press that the Belgian Government had invited these States to a meeting in Brussels and that it was understood that the delegates were to consider a peace appeal.

² The conference took place on Aug. 23, without Swiss participation.

³ See vol. v of this Series, Nos. 443 and 444.

⁴ The text of this telegram was repeated on Aug. 22 to the German Missions in the other States signatory to the Oslo Convention and to Berne (26/16155).

No. 162

7895/E573190

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation
in Rumania*

Telegram

MOST URGENT
No. 321BERLIN, August 21, 1939—9:00 p.m.
zu W 1380 g.¹ II

With reference to your telegram No. 344.¹

1. The conclusion of the contract for engines now depends entirely on the progress of negotiations by the Junkers representative on the spot.

2. Ten Heinkel fighters have already left. Departure of the remaining nineteen will be expedited.

For the time being please avoid as far as possible discussing the Heinkel bomber and other contracts for air armaments with a guaranteed date of delivery.

3. The Reich Ministry of Economics states that Syrup has all the necessary documents to hand in Bucharest concerning the utilization of the petroleum quota.

WIEHL

¹ Document No. 127.

No. 163

910/294815

The State Secretary to the Legation in Estonia

Telegram

No. 108

BERLIN, August 21, 1939—9:45 p.m.
zu Pol. V 1905 g.¹

For the Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 89 of August 19.¹

In accordance with our telegram No. 99 of August 14,² you were to conduct conversations on the Polish statement of August 9 [*sic* ? 10] with the Estonian Government only if the latter took the initiative. Did the Estonian Government already know the substance of the German and Polish statements?

On the question of any intervention by Britain and France you are requested to hold firmer language than may be gathered from the last paragraph of your telegram under reference. We are not speaking of a "chance which we hoped still existed, that Britain and France in the circumstances might possibly refuse to support Poland", but

¹ Document No. 134.

² See *ibid.*, footnote 3.

rather we are saying that we are not taking into account intervention by the two Powers, as they would thus be risking their own existence.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 164

1625/389186

The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 444 of August 21

PARIS, August 21, 1939.

Received August 21—11:20 p.m.

Pol. II 2969.

I learn the following from a usually well-informed non-German informant:

1. Sharp discord supervened in the Moscow military negotiations shortly after they had begun,¹ as early as the middle of last week. The Russians had rather suddenly demanded of the British precise details of Britain's military position, which in no wise come within the scope of Anglo-Russian cooperation, such as, amongst other things, exact data on the disposition and strength of Britain's anti-aircraft defences. While the Russian demand could not, however, be ascribed to tactlessness or a desire to wreck the negotiations, the British could not but think that the Russians wanted to turn the knowledge thus gained to good account when dealing with third Powers. The British on their part had entertained the idea of recalling the Military Mission, but had refrained from doing so because of the unfavourable psychological effect.

2. My informant had had the opportunity to glance for a few minutes at a memorandum, of some thirty typewritten pages, on the Russian transport system with particular reference to a military conflict, which had been drawn up by the British and transmitted to the French Government. The conclusion drawn from this memorandum is that Russian transport, whether rail or road, is in no condition to cope with the transport of troops required for deployment against the West, or with the supply of food, ammunition or other war material. The same difficulties would be encountered in any large-scale provisioning of the Polish army by the roundabout route through Russia. The memorandum had obviously made a deep impression in British and French circles.

BRÄUER

¹ On Aug. 12; see document No. 39.

No. 165

350/202106-07

The Foreign Ministry to the High Command of the Wehrmacht

[BERLIN,] August 21, 1939.

Pol. IV 968 g. Rs. Ang. II.

With reference to your communication No. 776/39 g. Kdos. Ausl. III L/d of August 12.¹

With reference to the conference of August 18,² I enclose for your information a copy of the draft of the Note³ which, if necessary, is to be handed to the Slovak Government by the German Minister in Bratislava, together with a copy of the accompanying despatch.⁴

In drawing up the draft, which is based on the guiding principles for the conduct of German troops in the event of a march into Slovakia,⁵ the agreement reached at the conference of August 18 was taken as a starting-point, namely:

1. That AOK 14 will send all communications or instructions intended for the Slovak Government to General Barckhausen, who, in turn, will pass on communications or instructions of a military nature direct to the appropriate Slovak authorities, at the same time informing the German Minister at Bratislava.

2. That, on the other hand, General Barckhausen will send all other communications or instructions direct to the Minister, who, in turn, will pass them on to the Slovak Government.

3. That in both cases, AOK 14 will at the same time also inform Counsellor Hofmann, who is seconded to them.

As regards Counsellor Hofmann's province, his functions are partly determined by what has been said in the foregoing. He will, furthermore, serve AOK 14 as adviser on questions concerning Slovakia and international law, and will be at their disposal for all matters affecting the interests of the Foreign Ministry. He will thus not only be the representative of the German Minister at Bratislava, but also the representative of the Foreign Ministry at AOK 14.

Notification of agreement is requested.

By order:

WOERMANN

¹ Not found.

² No other record has been found, but see document No. 100.

³ Enclosure 2.

⁴ Enclosure 1.

⁵ See Editors' Note, p. 302.

350/202102

[Enclosure 1]

BERLIN, August 1939.
zu Pol. IV 968 g. Rs.

With reference to the conversation at the Foreign Ministry on the 18th of this month, I have to request you to present to the Slovak

Government the enclosed Draft Note at a time which will be notified to you by the competent military authority. Should intervening events render it necessary, you are requested to amend the text of the Note accordingly.

I request you to ensure that the Slovak Government carry out the desired measures without delay.

Directly you have received the relevant communication from the military authorities, you are requested to inform me immediately by telegram that you "will be seeing the Slovak Minister President or Foreign Minister at . . . o'clock". You are requested to report by telegram, and also, if possible, by telephone, on the actual carrying out of the instructions.

By order:
WOERMANN

350/202103-05

[Enclosure 2]

BRATISLAVA, . . .

MR. MINISTER: Acting on the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the following:

The German Government are in possession of definite information that the crossing of the Slovak-Polish frontier by Polish units, and thus a violation of the integrity of Slovak territory, is imminent. In order to carry out the obligations undertaken in the Treaty of March 18 and 23, 1939,⁶ my Government have therefore ordered German troops to move into the national territory of Slovakia for the purpose of protecting the independence of the Slovak State and the integrity of its territory. The advancing troops have received the strictest orders to base their conduct on the fact that the Slovak State is a Power friendly to the German Reich. In order that the German Army may carry out its task, it is necessary that the cooperation of the Slovak authorities and of the Slovak people should be secured, particularly on the following points:

(a) The German Wehrmacht will, in principle, not interfere with the internal administration and jurisdiction of the Slovak State. The German Government expect, however, that the Slovak Government will instruct the Slovak authorities, if requested by the German Wehrmacht, to take all measures which the latter may consider necessary for the execution of their duties. This includes in particular the granting of unrestricted use of public means of communication and transport, as well as of air and ground organizations. In case of need, the German Wehrmacht may also take these measures themselves.

(b) In special cases even persons of non-German nationality may be charged before German military courts, according to German law,

⁶ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 40.

if they have committed an offence against the prestige or security of the German Wehrmacht, its personnel and its employees, or against an order issued by the German military authorities.

(c) When services or supplies are requisitioned (billets, fodder, provisions, vehicles, motor fuel, horses, etc.), payment will be made in German or Slovak currency. The rate of exchange for all payments is laid down as one RM = Kč. 10.

(d) The German Government request that the Commander-in-Chief of the German troops moving in should have the power of entrusting special duties (for example, guarding railways and roads) to the Slovak Armed Forces or detachments thereof. In this connection, the Commander-in-Chief will regulate the freedom of movement of the Slovak Army in the deployment and battle area, and will decide how far administrative orders by the German military authorities should also apply to the Slovak Armed Forces.

(e) In order to secure effective cooperation between the German and the Slovak authorities, it is desirable for the Slovak Government to attach a special official to the Commander-in-Chief of the German troops moving in. His duties would be to advise the Commander-in-Chief, to maintain liaison with the Slovak Government and to inform the Commander-in-Chief in good time of all administrative measures taken by the Slovak Government which affect the area where German troops are stationed.

The Slovak Government are requested to make the necessary arrangements immediately, and in particular to furnish Slovak authorities with the requisite instructions.

I avail etc.

No. 166

799/273705-07

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V

BERLIN, August 21, 1939.

e.o. Pol. V 981 g. Rs.

MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF REICH GERMANS IN POLAND IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

I. General Measures

1. The Embassy has, in agreement with the Landesgruppenleiter and the consulates, organized a system of confidential agents to whom are allotted, to care for and advise, a certain number of Reich Germans, without the individual being previously aware that this organization exists.

2. Through this organization, for some time past it has been unobtrusively suggested to the Reich Germans that in the present

time of tension it is advisable, as far as possible, not to leave women and children in Poland. A large number of women and children have already been sent back through the AO.

3. It is intended in the same way, and without it becoming evident that the Reich authorities are taking the initiative, to take steps towards also getting male Reich nationals out of the country in the next few days in cases where they may already have lost their jobs or are regarded as being in special danger.

4. In case of emergency the agents will hold consultations in the districts assigned to them to see how each individual, according to the circumstances of his particular case, can best protect himself from any anti-German persecution that may take place, or alternatively get himself to a place of safety.

5. In the frontier provinces, where there is a strong intermingling of the *Volksdeutsch* element and where German troops will probably arrive at an early stage, the Reich Germans will be included in the measures prepared there for the protection of the *Volksdeutsche*.

6. Persons in special danger, such as officers of the Party and correspondents of German newspapers, who must remain at their posts up to the last minute, will be advised to seek the protection of neutral friends wherever possible.

7. Immediately after the introduction of German military measures warning should be given, as far as possible by radio and the dropping of leaflets, that attacks on the life and property of Germans will incur penalties and reprisals.¹ Appropriate orders have been issued to the Army.

II. Measures for the protection of the Embassy

1. Orders will be issued for the wives and children of Embassy officials and employees to leave Warsaw at an early date.

2. In consultation with the Personnel Department, the Embassy staff will be inconspicuously reduced in the next few days by a few officials whose services can be dispensed with.

3. The question is now being discussed with the military authorities whether it would be possible to notify the responsible official at the Embassy by wireless at least two hours before the start of military measures.

4. The idea of assembling the staff *en bloc* in the Embassy, in the hope that police protection would be best guaranteed there, does not seem practicable in view of the special conditions in Poland. In particular, if in the first few hours there were German air attacks on Warsaw, causing casualties among the civilian population, there is every probability that the mob would immediately attack the Embassy. In this case police protection could not be counted on,

¹ See also document No. 63.

especially if the Ambassador were away. According to unanimous reports from agents, the Polish military authorities even intend to organize an attack on the Embassy in order to take possession of the documents and the wireless transmitter thought to be there. If the Ambassador does not return to Warsaw, it is therefore planned, after all secret material has been destroyed according to instructions, that the few officials living in the Embassy should leave the building and go to the Netherlands Legation. Officials and employees living outside the Embassy will, where they are in personal danger, likewise make their way to a friendly Mission.

III. *Measures for the protection of the Consulates*

1. Instructions will be issued for the wives and children of consular officials and employees to leave Poland in the near future.

2. The position of Consulates outside Warsaw is different, because there is not a Netherlands Mission everywhere. Hence the Embassy has advised the Consuls to seek the protection of the competent Polish authorities in the first place or, in case of emergency, that of another Consul. The question is at present being discussed with the military authorities whether it is possible to acquaint the responsible official covertly by wireless of the impending start of military measures.

Herewith submitted according to instructions to the State Secretary through the Under State Secretary, Political Department. I refer you to Ambassador Moltke's memorandum of August 16,² a copy of which is enclosed.

SCHLIEF

² Document No. 82.

No. 167

97/108530

Minute by an Official of Political Division V

BERLIN, August 21, 1939.

The German Consulate General at Danzig and the Danzig Senate were informed some time ago by the Danzig Gauleitung that Gauleiter Forster requests that, on the occasion of the visit of the cruiser *Königsberg* to Danzig, from the 25th to the 28th instant,¹ the Commanding Officer of the cruiser should make his first call on him, because he actually holds the office of a Reichsstatthalter in the Free City of Danzig. On this point Dr. Schimmel, the Danzig Senator, informed the Foreign Ministry about a fortnight ago that this question had already been submitted to the Führer who had given a decision in accordance with the wishes of Gauleiter Forster.²

¹ See vol. VI of this Series, documents Nos. 361, 378 and 555.

² No report from Dr. Schimmel has been found, but see document No. 4, footnote 2.

In view of this, the Consulate General at Danzig wishes to arrange the following order of precedence with the Danzig Senate for the *official* visits by the Commanding Officer of the cruiser:

1. Gauleiter Forster.
2. Consul General von Janson.
3. President of the Senate Greiser.
4. League of Nations High Commissioner Professor Dr. Burckhardt.
5. Polish Diplomatic Representative Chodacki.
6. President of the Danzig Port Authority Neederbragt (Dutch).

Following this, an *unofficial* visit will be made to the Chief of the Danzig Police Force, Major General (Police) Eberhardt. (A similar visit was made in former years to the then chief of the Danzig State Police.)

Should M. Chodacki not be in Danzig as Diplomatic Representative of Poland on August 25, but be represented by the Counsellor to the Polish Mission, Perkowski, who is at present on leave, then no visit should be paid to the Polish representative, because the Commanding Officer of the cruiser cannot be expected to exchange visits with a Polish official who is connected with the unjustifiable shooting of a Danzig citizen of German stock (the Kalthof incident), and also because the Danzig Senate has broken off all contact with this Polish official.³

In reply to an enquiry, the Consulate General at Danzig has been informed that the Foreign Ministry approves the proposed method of dealing with the matter.⁴

BERGMANN

³ See vol. VI of this Series, documents Nos. 417, 418 and 470.

⁴ On a minute (97/108529) sent by Bergmann, on Aug. 22, 1939, to the State Secretary submitting a copy of this document for possible transmission by teleprinter to the Foreign Minister, the following marginal notes appear: "To the Under State Secretary, Political Department. As far as I know, the Führer's decision on the visit of the Königsberg to Danzig is still outstanding? W[eizsäcker] 22/8." "Yes. Kessel." See vol. VI of this Series, documents Nos. 635 and 687.

No. 168

585/242472-73

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 21, 1939.

The Bulgarian Minister called on me today on his return from leave and enquired about the state of German-Polish relations. I replied in the usual way that the situation had become more tense and put it to him that Poland was in the wrong. The Minister then remarked that everywhere, even in Bulgaria, Britain and France had declared that the conflict would not remain localized, but that the two Powers would intervene. I assured the Minister once more that we did not share this view.

M. Draganov then explained that according to his information the countries bordering on Bulgaria would, in the event of a localized conflict between Germany and Poland, remain quiet. Should Britain and France intervene in the war, it was assumed in Bulgaria that Britain would at once try, through the countries friendly to her, to detach the Balkans from Germany and thus drag Bulgaria into the war. Bulgaria would then probably be faced with an ultimatum from Rumania, Turkey and perhaps even Greece, which she would not accept, but would defend herself. The Turks had recently moved their troops in Thrace further back from the Bulgarian frontier. This was presumably done on the advice of another Power, probably Britain, in order to avoid any provocation of Bulgaria. Reports about Bulgarian-Turkish frontier incidents were incorrect.

The Minister then expressed his concern that, as a result of King Carol's visits to Turkey,¹ relations between the two countries, despite assurances to the contrary from both sides, might have become still closer and that some kind of alliance might have been concluded. To this I replied that we, too, were rather sceptical about Rumania's reassuring declarations.

The Minister then referred to German deliveries of arms and expressed satisfaction that deliveries had begun at once, at least in limited quantities.

Finally the Minister mentioned all sorts of rumours connected with the visits of Count Csáky² and Count Ciano to Salzburg.³ I described all these as nonsensical and quite contrary to the facts.

WOERMANN

¹ On July 27-28 and Aug. 11; see document No. 40.

² See documents Nos. 124 and 126.

³ See Editors' Note, p. 35, and documents Nos. 43 and 47.

No. 169

186/73830

Minute by the Head of Political Division III

BERLIN, August 21, 1939.
e.o. Pol. 111 3379.

Ministerialdirigent Dr. Medicus of the Reich Ministry of the Interior (Königsplatz) informed me by telephone that the Reich Minister of the Interior intends to invite Serrano Suñer, the Spanish Minister of the Interior, to visit Germany. This had already been discussed by the Reich Minister of the Interior and the Foreign Minister. Herr Medicus asked what the formal procedure would have to be.

I told him that first of all the Führer's assent to the invitation would have to be obtained through the Foreign Ministry and then the invitation extended to Serrano Suñer through the German

Ambassador. At the same time I drew Herr Medicus' attention to the fact that preliminary discussions regarding the plan for inviting Serrano Suñer, and also for a visit by Franco to Berlin, had already taken place,¹ and that the projected invitation to Serrano Suñer from the Reich Minister of the Interior would therefore have to be fitted into a plan, even though the details had not yet been settled.

Submitted herewith to:

Deputy Director, Political Department
Under State Secretary
State Secretary
Protocol Department

SCHWENDEMANN

¹ See document No. 48.

No. 170

695/250303-04

*Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union*¹

[Moscow, August 22, 1939.]

*Telephone conversation with Gaus, August 22, 12:35 a.m.*²

The Communiqué proposed by Berlin

BERLIN, August 21, 1938 [sic].

The Reich Government and the Soviet Government have agreed to conclude a pact of non-aggression with each other. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs von Ribbentrop will arrive in Moscow on Wednesday, August 23, for the conclusion of the negotiations.³

*The Foreign Minister will arrive with a suite of thirty:*⁴

Geheimrat Gaus

Geheimrat Hewel

Schmidt (News Service and Press Department)

Minister Schmidt

Technical Staff

two days

The Foreign Minister approves of the proposed accommodation.

He intends to leave Königsberg by air "very early" on August 23, so that he can be expected to arrive in the forenoon of the same day.

N.B. Herr Schnurre's name is missing from Herr Gaus' list of persons travelling.

¹ This document consists of a mixture of hand and typewritten notes; the passages in italics are in Schulenburg's handwriting. The remainder is in typescript.

² This date originally read "August 21, 11:55 p.m." and has been corrected in blue crayon.

³ This typewritten paragraph is marked with blue crayon.

⁴ A handwritten marginal note here reads: "They won't go in one Ju 52. I told Gaus over the telephone that thirty people were quite a 'swing out of the bottle' but that we would manage it! Sch[ulenburg] 21/8 [sic]."

Moscow, August 22, 1939. 2:15 a.m.

My chauffeur Kirstein reports that he has just heard over the German radio the announcement which is mentioned on the preceding page, and that it tallied exactly with the text marked round in blue pencil.⁵

N.B. In my telephone conversation with Herr Gaus it transpired that up to that moment our telegram [sic],⁶ with the text of the Stalin letter and the communiqué proposed by the Russians, had not arrived. I told him (Gaus) that he could safely publish it: the same would be done here in a thoroughly appropriate form.

I notified Herr Hilger at 1 a.m., and he in his turn informed our "friend" Pavlov (as agreed).⁷

SCHULENBURG

August 22, 1939, 3 a.m.

⁵ cf. footnote 3 above.

⁶ The reference is evidently to the two telegrams printed as documents Nos. 159 and 160.

⁷ Molotov's interpreter.

No. 171

B21/B005075-76

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1939—3:49 a.m.

No. 273 of August 22

Received August 23—1:50 a.m.

That the impending conclusion of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact has caught all the other Powers entirely unawares, and has decisively altered the balance of power, not only in Europe but throughout the world, in favour of the Axis Powers with all that that implies, is the first reaction of the American press, which was itself completely taken by surprise.

The Agreement is described as a masterly piece of diplomacy by the Führer and Reich Chancellor, and as the severest defeat for Britain and France since Munich. In the absence of Roosevelt and Hull,¹ Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary of State, has been inundated with questions about the attitude of the American Government to the changed situation. He has so far refused to express an opinion. The consternation in the State Department is great. Nor did the State Department think it at all possible that such a turn in Russian-German relations was imminent, even though, as I reported on July 31,² they had already abandoned hope of a triple alliance between Russia, Britain and France.

All authoritative circles take the view that the immediate effect of

¹ U.S. Secretary of State.

² See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 750.

the impending agreement will be the weakening of Poland (for whom it is thought resistance will be hopeless) and the collapse of Britain's attempts to harness Russia to the encirclement front against Germany. As to the future consequences of the new agreement, the press here is completely in the dark. Some leading newspapers are attempting to turn this uncertainty to account and to belittle the epoch-making significance of the agreement by speculating on the supposed unreliability of the parties to the treaty. Furthermore, they predict a split in the anti-Comintern front, and hence the complete isolation of Japan.

For the rest, reports about German military measures all along the Polish frontier continue to pour in. The solution of the Danzig question is thought to be imminent; at the same time it is predicted that questions regarding the Corridor and Upper Silesia will inevitably be brought up. The attempts by the Pope³ and by the Oslo States⁴ to bring about a peaceful solution are not rated particularly highly. In the opinion of the press, which is predominantly anti-Isolationist, Roosevelt's foreign policy, in view of the newly created situation, must be to press on with renewed zeal towards doing away with the shackles of the Neutrality Act,⁵ so as to let it be known that even now the "democracies" will not be denied American support.

THOMSEN

³ In an address of Aug. 19, the Pope had referred to his efforts to avert the dangers of war and appealed for the preservation of peace.

⁴ See document No. 161.

⁵ See vol. vi of this Series, document No. 650.

No. 172

2842/549687-92

The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry

Teleprint

DANZIG, August 22, 1939—12 noon.

Received August 22—1:30 p.m.

For transmission to State Secretary Weizsäcker and to Staudacher.¹

Following a detailed discussion with Senator Wiesner, I transmit the following statement which we drew up jointly, and I would suggest its publication in press and radio on Wednesday morning at the latest. We consider the contents to be formulated in such a way as not to give the Poles any grounds for pushing to further extremes their harassing treatment of the German national community. If you are in agreement, please notify us by return:

¹ Of the News Service and Press Department.

In the year 1934 Colonel Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, denounced the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities,² by which the Polish State was bound under the terms of the Peace Treaties and which it had most solemnly accepted. Thus the Polish State violated one of the most fundamental rights recognized as being the due of the national groups living within its frontiers, and which was one of the prior conditions for the assignment of these national groups to the Polish State.

In spite of the denunciation of the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities, which also applied to Germans, the German national group held the view that, with good will and even without special international guarantees, it would have been possible both for it and for the Polish State to establish a tolerable relationship with each other, and thereby assure the right of existence of the German national group. We find the same principle laid down in the German-Polish Minorities Declaration of November 5, 1937.³

From the outset the German national group endeavoured to establish tolerable relations with the Polish State. The principles of such a settlement were set forth at innumerable political meetings and in memoranda, and the Polish State was repeatedly asked to define and lay down at last the rights guaranteed by the constitution to the German national group, to admit that group to collaboration in the State and to ensure its right to existence within it.

Loyalty to the State and to one's race were not irreconcilable ideas to us, for twenty years they had been the outstanding milestones on our political path and in our struggle for this right to existence.

How has the Polish State and its responsible organizations rewarded our loyalty, and how has it met our legitimate demands?

Ever since the German national group was included in the Polish State, its path has been marked by unspeakable sufferings, by oppression, by all kinds of violations of the law and by the withholding of its most elementary rights in the spheres of culture, language, economy and community life [*völkischen Lebens*] in general. The German national group has endured all this with infinite patience and steadfastness in the hope that, after all, better counsels and common sense would one day prevail to ensure for the Germans the rights which are their due in view of their achievements.

Nevertheless, what has befallen the German national group in Poland since the beginning of this year, through no fault of its own,

² On June 28, 1919, the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan concluded with Poland a Treaty providing for the protection of minorities (for the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 112, pp. 225-243). In the League of Nations Assembly of Sept. 13, 1934, Beck stated that Poland refused to cooperate with the international organizations over the system for protection of minorities; see *League of Nations Official Journal*, Special Supplements 125 and 130 (Geneva, 1934).

³ See vol. v of this Series, document No. 18.

represents a national disaster of inconceivable magnitude. Such a wave of terror has surely never before swept over a national community as over our German national group in Poland.

The last remaining German workers and employees have been dismissed and turned out into the street without notice. There is no unemployment relief for them, still less the possibility of getting other work. The German industrial population of Upper Silesia as well as of Lodz, Tomaszów and Białystok is mercilessly exposed to starvation. Merely to profess membership of the German national community is sufficient to destroy the livelihood of whole families and to put them in constant danger of their lives. This brutal Polish will to destruction has damaged and shaken to the utmost the inner strength and health of the Germans. Hunger and privation are stamped on the faces of the Germans in Poland. Thousands of innocent children are pining away, condemned to die in their early youth merely because they are the children of Germans. To give only one figure out of many: according to official statistics the German national community in Volhynia has an infant mortality rate of 17 per cent.

German cooperative societies, built up by diligence and industry, and often with the sacrifice of the people's last penny, have been ruthlessly dissolved, and, by a fresh violation of the law, converted into Polish cooperative societies. The trading licences held by Germans have been withdrawn and their real estate expropriated. This stolen property has been allotted to Polish settlers and the land has in many cases even been left to lie fallow. German tradespeople and skilled workers have been ruined by an exorbitant and arbitrary taxation policy which has destroyed the last remnants of German property.

For decades a systematic campaign has been waged against the German language and German schools. Schools belonging to the German minority have been closed without exception, and on the slightest pretext. Far more than 60,000 German children are forced to attend Polish schools. All the efforts on the part of the German national group, made at great sacrifice to themselves, to re-establish a German educational system at their own expense have been nipped in the bud by the Polish State. Whether in Volhynia, Galicia or elsewhere, the same distress exists wherever German minorities live.

The German community has been torn away from the mother race and isolated, and perpetual warfare has been waged against German customs and traditions. By the passing of the Frontier Zones Law and its extension to more than a third of the Polish State, the German community has been completely deprived of its legal rights. Evictions from house and home were the crowning blow in this terrible campaign of destruction.

All this, however, was surpassed by the measures taken by the

Polish State in recent weeks against the German community. Many were detained for questioning for months on end; thousands of party members and officials of the Young German Party, and of all the other organizations of the German community, were arrested; severe prison sentences amounting to hundreds of years were imposed; the national headquarters of the Young German Party and many of its branches were closed down, while the German press was silenced by means of confiscations carried to the bounds of lunacy.

Nor did this suffice. Violence was done to the health and life of numerous members of the German community. Even now the German community in Poland can point to thousands of beaten, injured and wounded members, while many a one has had to pay with his life for acknowledging his racial ties. These too have fallen on the field of honour for their people and their homeland.

The many thousands who are fighting in the struggle for their homeland and their right to live know that today, as always, they have done their duty to their own people and also to the Polish State. They want to live and to work, and therefore they want peace. They bear their unspeakable sufferings in the sole belief in a common German destiny under Adolf Hitler.

As a final blow the Polish Government have destroyed every kind of organization of the German community. They have not formally dissolved these organizations, but they have deprived them of their leadership and thus to all intents and purposes strangled them.

We therefore solemnly declare today, before our people and the whole world, that we are innocent of the present state of affairs, and that we decline to accept any responsibility for what is to come and must place it on the shoulders of those who have willed this chaos and brought it about.

RUDOLF WIESNER

National Leader of the Young German Party
and former Senator of the Polish Republic.

[VEESENMAYER]

No. 173

2842/549693

The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry

Teleprint

DANZIG, August 22, 1939—1:13 p.m.

Received August 22—1:30 p.m.

Veesenmayer to State Secretary Weizsäcker and to Staudacher.

With reference to the teleprint¹ regarding Wiesner's statement, I

¹ See document No. 172.

would inform you that Gauleiter Forster is still adopting a hesitant attitude, as he cannot yet judge to what extent he will employ Wiesner for any broadcasts that may be made. I am speaking to Gauleiter Forster again this afternoon and will then report.

VEESENMAAYER

No. 174

174/136060

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOKYO, August 22, 1939—1:40 p.m.

SECRET

Received August 22—8:00 a.m.

No. 356 of August 22

For the State Secretary.

The DNB report of the impending conclusion of a German-Russian non-aggression pact and the arrival in Moscow on Wednesday of the Reich Foreign Minister, has let loose a spate of dismayed enquiries by the Army, the Foreign Ministry and the press, with the urgent request for an explanation by the Reich Government. I have described the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis as the basis of German policy.

I request spontaneous [*sic*]¹ instructions.

OTT

¹ This sentence should presumably read: "I request instructions on what language to hold."

No. 175

73/52219

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUDAPEST, August 22, 1939—4:30 p.m.

No. 239 of August 22

Received August 22—9:30 p.m.

In an official communiqué yesterday the Foreign Minister at our suggestion again strongly attacked attempts to poison relations between Hungary and the Axis Powers.¹ He told me that although Mussolini had spoken to him in somewhat anxious and resigned terms concerning future developments, since he positively expected intervention by France and Britain, he nevertheless emphasized most definitely that Italy would in all circumstances honour her obligations towards Germany under the alliance. Mussolini had advised Hungary to hold back for the time being and to avoid provocation. Italy would be able to control the Mediterranean, although only neutrality could be expected from Spain who was exhausted.

Csáky, who repeated his conviction to me that the Axis Powers

¹ See also document No. 126.

would emerge victorious from any war, observed that in the absence of any other suggestion from the Axis Powers Hungary would, in the event of a conflict, first bide her time and only reinforce her frontier guard.

ERDMANNSDORFF

No. 176

52/35059

The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry

Teleprint

TOP SECRET

DANZIG, August 22, 1939—5:07 p.m.

For State Secretary Weizsäcker.¹

Please deliver immediately.

The proposed plan is as follows:

1. A final breakdown after long negotiations on the question of customs officials. Blame on the side of the Poles.

2. Then comes the complete removal of all Polish customs officials and the abolition of the customs frontier with East Prussia.

3. There follow reactions one way or the other on the part of the Poles.

4. Thereupon the arrest of numerous Poles in Danzig territory and the clearing of numerous Polish arms dumps. The discovery of these arms dumps is assured.

5. If this does not produce sufficient action by the Poles in reply, then finally the Westerplatte is to be attacked.

I still do not know whether this plan has undergone any change since Forster's discussions at the Berghof on August 21. The relevant dates have likewise not been fixed yet. Further information will follow after fresh consultation with Gauleiter Forster.

VEESENMAYER

¹ See documents Nos. 153 and 155.

No. 177

910/294321

The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 90 of August 22

TALLINN, August 22, 1939—6:30 p.m.

Received August 22—8:40 p.m.

Pol. V 1911 g.

With reference to your telegram No. 108.¹

In my interview with the Vice Minister I did not seek a conversation on German and Polish statements,² but when he invited dis-

¹ Document No. 163.

² See documents Nos. 5 and 10.

cussion on the possibility of German-Polish negotiations I merely pointed out, in order to characterize Polish unreasonableness, in accordance with the instructions on language to be held contained in your telegram No. 102 of August 16,³ that Poland had stated only recently that she would consider any German initiative as an act of aggression. The Vice Minister had not been informed of the tenor of the statements.

The last paragraph of my telegram No. 89⁴ does not contain all my statements which, as mentioned at the beginning of my telegram, were completely in accordance with the arguments in your telegram No. 102 on the language to be held. In particular I strongly emphasized that Britain and France by intervening would be risking their existence. My final remark was ironical and, in conjunction with what had been said before, could only be understood in a negative sense.

FROHWEIN

³ Not printed (1625/389168-73). This telegram of Aug. 16 was Weizsäcker's circular conveying the substance of documents Nos. 64 and 66 and giving instructions to the principal Missions; see document No. 66, footnote 1.

⁴ Document No. 134.

No. 178

230/152010

The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 231 of August 22

BELGRADE, August 22, 1939—6:40 p.m.

Received August 22—10:45 p.m.

The news of the German-Russian Pact has been a bombshell here. The friends of Germany are triumphant, her opponents are amazed and perplexed. In general the collapse of the encirclement policy is admitted and there is much talk of an impending new partition of Poland.

The State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry¹ emphasized to me, above all, that the Pact justified Yugoslavia's foreign policy to all the world, and that Yugoslavia had proved to be right especially as regards Turkey, whose whole foreign policy was now left suspended in the air.

The Bulgarian Minister² offered his spontaneous congratulations on the Pact, which changes the world situation at one stroke.

FEINE

¹ Miloje Smiljanić, Director of the Political Department and Deputy Foreign Minister.

² Ivan Popov.

No. 179

26/16160

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 71 of August 22

STOCKHOLM, August 22, 1939—7:15 p.m.

Received August 22—8:40 p.m.

Pol. VI 1949.

At the invitation of the Belgian Government, Foreign Minister Sandler left this morning by air for Brussels to attend the conference of the Oslo Powers.¹ Boheman, the Secretary to the Cabinet, who, according to official statements in yesterday's press, was to have accompanied the Foreign Minister, has remained here in consequence of the political situation which has developed meanwhile. He told me that while there was no fixed programme for the conference, all questions of common interest to neutral States in peace and war would be discussed. Regarding the general political situation, the Cabinet Secretary could not perceive any lessening of tension notwithstanding the news of the forthcoming German-Russian pact.

WIED

¹ See document No. 161.

No. 180

388/211527-30

Circular of the State Secretary¹

Telegram

BERLIN, August 22, 1939.

e.o. Pol. V 8133.

For information and guidance on language to be held.

For some months the normalization and improvement of relations between Germany and the Soviet Union have been prepared by slow and steady development. The starting-point was the resumption of the economic and credit negotiations, leading to an agreement on August 19,² which placed German-Soviet trade on a broader and deeper foundation. Concurrently with these negotiations, political soundings were taken which led in recent weeks to an intensive exchange of views between Berlin and Moscow. For some months this trend was expressed in the moderate tone of the German press. Outward signs of it were, in particular, the presence of the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires at the "Day of German Art" in Munich,³ the sending of an

¹ Addressees were all the principal German Missions abroad, except Tokyo, and the Consulate at Geneva (7966/E575007-13). A typewritten marginal note reads: "Tokyo to receive separate telegram." See document No. 186 and footnote 5 thereto.

² Document No. 131.

³ Opened by Hitler on July 16. See also vol. VI of this Series, document No. 729.

official German delegation to the Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow,⁴ and the official attendance of members of the Soviet Embassy and Trade Delegation here at the Eastern Fair in Königsberg.⁵ Our interest in preventing the Soviet Union from ranging herself on the side of Britain arose from the aggravation of the situation evoked by Polish presumption and by continuous and increasing acts of provocation by Poland. We had to dispel the Soviet Government's feeling of being menaced in the event of a German-Polish conflict. The best means of doing this was to continue in concrete form the talks on a non-aggression pact to the point now reached. We thus at the same time realized our original aim of hampering the Anglo-French encirclement negotiations in Moscow.

In doing this we have constantly taken care to leave unimpaired our relations with friendly Powers, particularly Italy and Japan, and we have made this clear to the Soviet Union during every phase of the discussions. We are starting from the expectation that also in Japanese-Russian relations a respite will occur, which is desired by both sides, and which may then lead to a further lessening of tension.

The obvious charge that by concluding an agreement with the Soviet Union we have abandoned the principles of the Anti-Comintern Pact is not apposite. The evolution of the Anti-Comintern Pact has more and more been such that the three Powers chiefly concerned have been forced to realize that Britain is the main enemy. In addition, Russian Bolshevism has undergone a decisive structural change under Stalin. In place of the idea of world revolution there has emerged an attachment to the idea of Russian nationalism and the concept of consolidating the Soviet State on its present national, territorial and social bases. In this connection attention is drawn to the ejection of Jews from leading positions in the Soviet Union (the fall of Litvinov at the beginning of May). Of course opposition within Germany to Communism remains entirely unaffected. The struggle against any renewed infiltration of Communism into Germany would continue to be waged with undiminished severity. The Soviet Union has never been left in any doubt about this during the conversations and has accepted this principle.

The repercussions of this treaty on world politics will shortly become clearly visible. In any case it is already evident that Poland has suffered a severe shock.

Identical text to all diplomatic missions.

WEIZSÄCKER

⁴ See *ibid.*, documents Nos. 714 and 757.

⁵ Opened on Aug. 20. See *ibid.*, document No. 779.

No. 181

388/211532

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 203 of August 22

Moscow, August 22, 1939—9:08 p.m.

Received August 22—10:45 p.m.

Pol. V 8182.

News of the impending journey to Moscow of the Reich Foreign Minister and of negotiations for a German-Soviet non-aggression pact has caused the greatest surprise in diplomatic circles here and has made an extraordinary impression. A number of foreign representatives—especially of Scandinavian States—have called at the Embassy. They were mainly interested in the consequences of a deterioration in the foreign political situation of Poland, who would now have to give way, as well as in the probable attitude of the British and French Military Missions in Moscow.

I hear that the French Ambassador Naggiar has asked for an interview with Molotov this evening, that today's meeting of the Military Missions has been cancelled, and that the Military Missions will decide this evening on their further attitude.

SCHULENBERG

No. 182

2842/549695

*The Head of Political Division V to the Foreign Minister's
Special Representative in Danzig*

Teleprint

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, August 22, 1939—9:35 p.m.

e.o. Pol. V 8260.

With reference to your teleprint to State Secretary von Weizsäcker and to Staudacher regarding the statement by Wiesner.¹

Obergruppenführer Lorenz² urgently requests that Wiesner should be induced to refrain from making the statement in question. A further communication will be made after an oral report has been given to the State Secretary.³

SCHLIEP

¹ Document No. 172.² Head of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle.³ According to a DNB message from Danzig of Aug. 24, published in the German press of Aug. 25, the statement in question had appeared in the *Danziger Vorposten*.

No. 183

174/136058

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Japan

Telegram

SECRET

BERLIN, August 22, 1939—10:25 p.m.

No. 261

For the Ambassador personally.

The Foreign Minister had another thorough discussion with Ambassador Oshima while passing through Berlin¹ today. Oshima hinted in strict confidence, and with the request not to let it go any further, that he had tendered his resignation.

Since we still attach great importance to the continued maintenance of good and close friendly relations with Japan, Oshima's continuance at his post is an asset which we would not like to forgo.

The Foreign Minister leaves it to your discretion to see whether and how you can perhaps ensure in a suitable manner that Oshima remains at his post, without in any way revealing that doubts as to Oshima remaining have come to your knowledge from Berlin.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ The reference is to Ribbentrop, who was passing through Berlin on his way to Moscow; see document No. 186, and also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 152, for the conversation with Magistrati on this occasion.

No. 184

1625/389196

The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, August 22, 1939.

No. 451 of August 22

Received August 23—12:45 a.m.

Pol. II 2978.

The Cabinet meeting held this afternoon under Daladier's chairmanship was taken up exclusively with the international situation and, according to the communiqué issued at the close and reported by DNB, the instructions to be sent by the French Government to their diplomatic representatives abroad were approved. At the conclusion of the Cabinet meeting Daladier spoke for some time with Gamelin, a point which is mentioned in the communiqué.

In the semi-official statements intended for tomorrow morning's *Petit Parisien* it is stressed, by way of introduction, that the *coup de théâtre* created by the German-Russian announcement has clearly altered the European chess-board. The focal point of the Cabinet's deliberations had been Bonnet's *exposé*, which dealt almost exclusively

with the situation created by the forthcoming German-Russian non-aggression pact. In this Bonnet discussed the reasons for the pact and gave his opinion on the conclusions to be drawn from it. He informed his colleagues about the attitude which France must take in the diplomatic field. An exhaustive exchange of views followed Bonnet's *exposé*, in the course of which Daladier—in his special capacity as Minister of War—made supplementary statements of a general nature, and announced a series of measures which would be approved by a Council of Ministers convened for Thursday morning, after which they would come into force.

The mention in the communiqué of Daladier's conversation with Gamelin bears out a report here that the Government have introduced certain military measures, for the nature of which I refer you to the Military Attaché's report.¹

BRÄUER

¹ Lt. Col. von Horn; this report has not been found.

No. 185

26/16156-57

The Chargé d'Affaires in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

A 912

BRUSSELS, August 22, 1939.

Received August 23.

Pol. VI 1947.

Subject: Conference of the Oslo Powers in Brussels.¹

The convening of a conference of the Oslo Powers decided on by the Belgian Government, which is to be opened by Premier Pierlot at the Foreign Ministry tomorrow morning, has caused a certain sensation in political circles here, and, until the news of the forthcoming signature of a non-aggression pact between Germany and Soviet Russia became known, was looked upon as an event of major political significance. Meanwhile it has receded somewhat into the background.

I had a conversation today with Baron van Zuylen, Director of the Political Department, on the purpose and programme of the Conference, which however produced very little result. M. van Zuylen told me, to begin with, that the Conference had already been envisaged at the last meeting of the Oslo Powers at Copenhagen in July last year. Hence there was nothing unusual about its being convened, even though the date had naturally been chosen with regard to the generally tense situation in Europe. It was understandable that, in view of the threat of war, the States of the so-called Oslo Group felt the need to have an exchange of ideas and to discuss all questions of

¹ See document No. 161.

mutual interest. Baron van Zuylen maintained that, as yet, there was no programme; he could therefore not yet say what in particular would be discussed. When I pointed out that the press had nevertheless already published several points of the programme which, in view of the situation, would probably be discussed at the forthcoming Conference, Baron van Zuylen remarked that these were speculations by journalists.

Baron van Zuylen spoke in the same terms about the rumours of mediation by the King or the Belgian Government and of an appeal for peace which the Conference intended to address to the Great Powers. Incidentally, the question of mediation has already been answered in the negative by a Belga² statement. On the other hand, a peace appeal does really seem to be planned. It looks, too, as if this appeal has already been prepared through diplomatic channels, for Baron van Zuylen promised me information tomorrow for which he would ask me to call at the Foreign Ministry. It is possible that this appeal may be the primary object of the Conference.

The representatives of the different countries at the Conference are given in the enclosure.³

I shall have the honour to make a further report.

BARGEN

² The official Belgian News Agency.

³ Not printed (62/16158).

No. 186

174/136047-49

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 644

BERLIN, August 22, 1939.

After the Reich Foreign Minister late yesterday evening had briefly informed the Japanese Ambassador by telephone from the Berghof about the latest turn between Berlin and Moscow, I received Mr. Oshima at midnight for a conference which lasted about one hour. The Japanese Ambassador as usual showed himself well disposed. At the same time, I discerned in him a certain uneasiness, which decreased somewhat only in the later course of the conversation.

I first described to Oshima the natural course of events which had led us to today's conclusion of a non-aggression pact. After Oshima had expressed his own concern, we finally came to an agreement as to how Oshima might convince his Government of the necessity and the advantages of the current proceedings.

Oshima's objections were, as was to be expected, twofold:

1. If Russia were relieved of anxiety in Europe, she would strengthen her East Asiatic Front and put new life into the Chinese war.
2. The jurists in Tokyo (and there were a great many of them)

would dispute the consistency of our present proceedings with earlier German-Japanese agreements.

Oshima added that it was useless to try to change accomplished facts. He did, however, foresee a shock in Japan, and this he would like to soften by making a telegraphic report tonight.

My line of argument was somewhat as follows:

1. We were doing nothing which would call in question our friendly relationship with Japan. On the contrary, we would continue to maintain it, and we had much esteem for personalities, who, like Oshima, had acted and would act most vigorously to that end.

2. The present events were not a cause for surprise, inasmuch as the Reich Foreign Minister had informed the Ambassador some months previously that a normalization of German-Russian relations was worth attempting.¹

3. Such an arrangement would also put us in a position to take steps to bring about a period of quiet in Japanese-Russian relations and to ensure its continuance for a long time. That Japan was at the moment not seeking a Japanese-Russian conflict was certain. I had even received from the Russian side the impression that a Moscow-Tokyo settlement would be welcomed there.²

4. Since the Anti-Comintern agreements (which had been mentioned by Oshima) had been undertaken, the fronts hostile to both Japan and Germany had changed. It was quite clear that, for Japan, England had become Enemy No. 1, just as Germany also was hampered much less by Russian than by British policy. The settlement which was now being sought with Moscow would serve the interests of both of us.

5. If Oshima referred to certain earlier German-Japanese agreements,³ it could not be disputed that we had sought with endless patience to strengthen German-Japanese ties. We had waited for half a year to hear some echo from Japan. It was therefore the Japanese Government who had caused delay, and it was to Oshima's credit that he had always recognized this and had urged greater speed.

6. Our economic, and also certain political, discussions with Moscow had been going on for some time. But the negotiations for a non-aggression pact were of very recent origin. It was only in the last two or three days that the possibility of this had been raised. Polish arrogance might force us into war even in the course of this week. With such a limited amount of time available, we had been absolutely compelled to take action.

The Ambassador took notes of these remarks and in conclusion he

¹ See also vol. VIII of this Series, document No. 11.

² See also documents Nos. 70 and 79.

³ See vol. VI of this Series, Editors' Note, p. 81.

assured me of his unaltered intention to work further for German-Japanese friendship. Moreover, he hoped to be able to have a brief talk with the Reich Foreign Minister today, if the latter passed through Berlin, in order to give his report to Tokyo still more weight. If it were necessary, Oshima would come to the airfield.⁴

WEIZSÄCKER⁵

⁴ See document No. 183. See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 164.

⁵ The substance of this memorandum was telegraphed by Weizsäcker to the Ambassador in Tokyo for information and guidance in conversations, on Aug. 22, in telegram No. 260 (2898/565753-56).

No. 187

2002/442329

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 22, 1939.

Pol. IV 4896.

The Slovak Minister¹ called on me yesterday in order to ascertain, obviously without special instructions, what Germany's intentions are regarding Slovakia, and particularly whether promises of any kind have been made to Hungary.

I denied the latter categorically, and for the rest referred him to the Treaty of Protection² and the Zone of Protection Treaty.³

WOERMANN

¹ Matúš Černák.

² See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 40.

³ See Editors' Note, p. 50.

No. 188

97/108528

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

BERLIN, August 22, 1939.

[Pol. V 8507].¹

Vice Consul von Grolmann, of the German Consulate General at Danzig, has just reported as follows:

1. At the Danzig-Polish negotiations in the dispute over the Customs Inspectors all that happened yesterday was a personal contact between the leader of the negotiations on the Danzig side, Staatsrat Dr. Kunst, and the leader of the Polish delegation, a departmental head in the Polish Ministry of Finance. Concrete discussions only began at 12 o'clock today; in accordance with instructions they will be carried on in a dilatory manner by the Danzig side.²

2. Gauleiter Forster has informed Herr von Janson that, according

¹ Taken from another copy (7693/E548503).

² See documents Nos. 119, 139 and 176. See also *British Documents*, Third Series vol. VII, No. 182.

to the Führer's latest decision,³ the visit of the cruiser *Königsberg*, planned for the period between the 25th and 28th August, will not take place. Political Division I has ascertained that the Naval Staff has as yet no knowledge of this decision.

Copies submitted to:

State Secretary
Under State Secretary, Political Department
Deputy Director, Political Department
Senior Counsellor Schliep
Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Political Division I, Military Affairs

BERGMANN

³ No further material on the communication of this decision has been found; it was presumably given to Forster during his visit to Hitler, for which see document No. 138; see also document No. 167, and footnote 4 thereto.

No. 189

52/35049-52

Unsigned Memorandum

BERLIN, August 22, 1939.

In the event of hostilities with Poland, a proclamation by the Führer may be expected. This would then serve as guidance on language to be held for German Missions abroad and should also be made the basis for conversations with the representatives of foreign Powers here. However, it will probably be convenient to supplement further such general guidance on language to be held to certain Powers by a *special political statement*, which should be used to fill in the outlines of the general guidance on language to be held. Since such statements will be all the more effective the sooner they are made, it will be advisable to lay down the general basic principles for the necessary instructions here and now. Details of these are as follows:

1. *France and Britain*

Both Governments should be told formally that we do not intend any hostile action of any kind against them. If, however, they should on their part intervene in the conflict with military measures, we should regard this as aggressive action directed against ourselves, to which we should of course reply accordingly.

2. *Belgium*

The notification of the German decision not to infringe the inviolability and integrity of Belgium in any circumstances and to respect Belgian territory at all times, as contained in the German-Belgian

Exchange of Notes of October 13, 1937,¹ should be repeated again, and (as Ambassador von Bülow-Schwante suggests)² in the form of an oral statement to this effect to the King of the Belgians.

3. *Netherlands, Luxembourg*

These countries should also be informed that if on their part they maintain neutrality towards us, we are resolved to respect the integrity of their territories. The Ministers should also be instructed to make these statements as far as possible to the Head of the State personally, or, if this is not possible, to the Head of the Government.

4. *Switzerland*

The intention to respect Swiss neutrality should be reiterated to the Swiss Government and reference made to the repeated unequivocal statements by the Führer on this question.³

5. *Holy See*

A statement to the Holy See couched in very friendly terms would doubtless have a beneficial effect. Particular weight would be lent to this if assurances could be given at the same time that there would be no further expropriation, etc., of Church property, especially in the Ostmark,⁴ and that we were prepared for the immediate settlement of several further points of difference, as for example, the question of Bishop Rusch in Innsbruck.⁵ A decision by the Führer in this sense, which should then be communicated to the Reich Minister for Church Affairs⁶ and the Reichsführer-SS, would be necessary and would have to be prepared.

6. *Denmark*

The German-Danish Non-Aggression Treaty of May 31⁷ this year will have to be reaffirmed to the Danish Government.

7. *Lithuania*

In the case of the Lithuanian Government also, only the promise not to use force, in accordance with the Memel Treaty of March 22⁸ this

¹ See vol. v of this Series, document No. 475.

² No record has been found.

³ See vol. vi of this Series, document No. 384.

⁴ *lit.* Eastern March, i.e., Austria; see also vols. i and iv of this Series, chapters 6 and 5 respectively.

⁵ In a despatch of July 14 (3068/612007-11) Woermann instructed the German Ambassador to the Holy See, Bergen, to press for the removal of Bishop Rusch, who had been appointed Apostolic Administrator for Innsbruck-Feldkirch, by the Vatican, contrary to German wishes (see also vol. iv of this Series, document No. 469). Bergen, in a reply to Woermann dated Aug. 16, recommended letting the matter rest for the time being (3068/612017-18).

⁶ Hans Kerrl.

⁷ See vol. vi of this Series, document No. 461.

⁸ The text of this Treaty is printed in vol. v of this Series, document No. 405, footnote 2.

year, need be affirmed for the present. The declaration should, however, be couched in particularly friendly terms and our benevolent attitude towards Lithuanian aspirations to Vilna might also be hinted at.

8. *Slovakia*

The necessary action has already been taken for a declaration to Slovakia.⁹ Over and above this we might consider renewing to Slovakia the guarantee of her territory and promising her those parts of her frontier territory which she ceded to Poland.

9. *Hungary*

The friendly notification of the Hungarian Government about our attitude should be accompanied by a warning not to make events in their neighbourhood an excuse for imprudent decisions, but to remain in closest contact with us regarding all questions connected with the conflict.

10. *Yugoslavia*

Our expectation of benevolent neutrality from Yugoslavia in the event of an extension of the conflict should be stated to the Yugoslav Government.

11. *Rumania*

We should repeat to the King of Rumania the assurance that we have no hostile designs of any sort on Rumania, but wish to continue friendly relations as hitherto, but that at the same time we expect strict neutrality on the part of Rumania and the maintenance in full of German-Rumanian economic relations.

Submitted herewith to the Reich Foreign Minister with the request for instructions as to whether, if the occasion should arise, directives to this effect should be sent to the Missions in question.

⁹ See document No. 165.

No. 190

472/228621-24

Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsäcker

ROME, August 22, 1939.

DEAR FRIEND: I will take advantage of the courier who is leaving today to answer your letter of August 19,¹ which the same courier delivered to me.

¹ Not printed (2131/466186). In this letter Weizsäcker asked Mackensen to comment on Ciano's statements as reported in his telegram No. 352 (document No. 98), as they could be interpreted in various ways and Attolico was not in Berlin.

In my telegram No. 352 of the 17th I purposely refrained from expressing an opinion on Ciano's observations. His statements are directly related to the conversations in Fuschl and at the Berghof, and thus, in my opinion, their trend can best be understood by those who were present at these conversations in person; whereas, although I think I have been informed to some extent of their tenor—and that by both sides—I am, on the other hand, not acquainted with those shades of expression which are nevertheless worthy of consideration in this connection, and do not know how Ciano carried out the Duce's instructions and reacted to the statements made by the other side.

My personal view is that Ciano, not unwillingly, took advantage of the conversation I suggested to make it clear once again that the Duce had made one last attempt to reduce the risk of a general conflagration to a minimum, but now, even though he himself still judges the matter differently, he accepts the fact that the Führer has expressed absolute certainty that the—unavoidable—German-Polish conflict will remain localized. From my conversations with Ciano during the journeys the two of us made by car (Salzburg-Berghof), I think I can assume with certainty that Ciano will have conveyed to the Duce the deep impression which he himself gained from the Führer's statement on the subject of localization. The Führer had given expression, so Ciano told me, not to a *conviction profonde*—that was too weak—but actually to a *foi*. The Duce is obviously not able to share this *foi* but accepts it as an established fact in his calculations, with the result that he is no longer considering the idea of making any further suggestions from the Axis side for moves designed to gain time or achieve a settlement.

I take Ciano's observations on his dealings with diplomats, in particular what he said about the conversations then impending with Percy Loraine and François-Poncet, to mean that he wished it to be understood that he no longer intended to enter into conversations on any suggestions which might still come from third parties.

If in the final paragraph of the telegram I particularly emphasized that Ciano carried on the conversation with friendly cordiality, I did so because, in my opinion, his way of expressing himself justified the assumption that he had meanwhile overcome that considerable disappointment which one could not fail to notice in him at first at Salzburg, and which was caused by his failure to achieve anything with the paper the Duce gave him to take with him.²

I cannot judge to what extent the foregoing observations will prove wide of the mark as a result of today's interview,³ since I know no more than what your most welcome telegram No. 385⁴ of yesterday

² Presumably the draft communiqué, see documents Nos. 43 and 47.

³ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Fell through."

⁴ Document No. 154.

said about it. The fact that the interview is taking place explains for me to a certain extent why Attolico has avoided me here.⁵

With cordial greetings and Heil Hitler,

Yours etc.,

MACKENSEN

⁵ Marginal notes: (i) "For U[nder] St[ate] S[ecretary] Pol[itical] Department]. This has been submitted to the Foreign Minister. W[eizsäcker] 25/8." (ii) "Return to St[ate] S[ecretary's] office. W[ormann] 25."

No. 191

F11/0032-33

Full Powers

OBERSALZBERG, August 22, 1939.

I hereby grant to the Reich Foreign Minister, Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop, full power to negotiate in the name of the German Reich with authorized representatives of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding a non-aggression treaty, as well as all related questions, and to sign both the non-aggression treaty and other agreements resulting from the negotiations, with the provision, if need be, that this treaty and these agreements shall come into force immediately on signature.

ADOLF HITLER

RIBBENTROP

No. 192

Nuremberg Document 798-PS
Exhibit USA-29

Unsigned Memorandum

SPEECH BY THE FÜHRER TO THE COMMANDERS IN CHIEF ON
AUGUST 22, 1939¹

I have called you together to give you a picture of the political situation, in order that you may have some insight into the individual factors on which I have based my decision to act and in order to strengthen your confidence.

After this we shall discuss military details.

It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the spring, but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only after that against the East. But the sequence of these things

¹ According to the prosecution at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg; on May 17, 1946, this document and No. 193 came originally from the files of the OKW see *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuremberg, 1947-1949) (hereinafter cited as *Trial of the Major War Criminals*), vol. xiv, pp. 64-65. Another record of what Hitler said at the Obersalzberg on Aug. 22, made at the time by General Admiral Hermann Boehm, was submitted to the International Military Tribunal as Exhibit Raeder-27 and is printed in *op. cit.*, vol. xli, pp. 16-25. See also document No. 193, and Appendix I, entry for Aug. 22.

cannot be fixed. Nor should one close one's eyes to threatening situations. I wanted first of all to establish a tolerable relationship with Poland in order to fight first against the West. But this plan, which appealed to me, could not be executed, as fundamental points had changed. It became clear to me that, in the event of a conflict with the West, Poland would attack us. Poland is striving for access to the sea. The further development appeared after the occupation of the Memel Territory and it became clear to me that in certain circumstances a conflict with Poland might come at an inopportune moment. I give as reasons for this conclusion:

1. First of all two personal factors:

My own personality and that of Mussolini.

Essentially all depends on me, on my existence, because of my political talents. Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have the confidence of the whole German people as I have. There will probably never again in the future be a man with more authority than I have. My existence is therefore a factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or a lunatic.

The second personal factor is the Duce. His existence is also decisive. If anything happens to him, Italy's loyalty to the alliance will no longer be certain. The Italian Court is fundamentally opposed to the Duce. Above all, the Court regards the expansion of the empire as an encumbrance. The Duce is the man with the strongest nerves in Italy.

The third personal factor in our favour is Franco. We can ask only for benevolent neutrality from Spain. But this depends on Franco's personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and stability in the present system in Spain. We must accept the fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist party with our internal unity.

The other side presents a negative picture as far as authoritative persons are concerned. There is no outstanding personality in England and France.

It is easy for us to make decisions. We have nothing to lose; we have everything to gain. Because of our restrictions [*Einschränkungen*] our economic situation is such that we can only hold out for a few more years. Göring can confirm this. We have no other choice, we must act. Our opponents will be risking a great deal and can gain only a little. Britain's stake in a war is inconceivably great. Our enemies have leaders who are below the average. No personalities. No masters, no men of action.

Besides the personal factors, the political situation is favourable for us: In the Mediterranean, rivalry between Italy, France and England; in the Far East, tension between Japan and England; in

the Middle East, tension which causes alarm in the Mohammedan world.

The English Empire did not emerge stronger from the last war. Nothing was achieved from the maritime point of view. Strife between England and Ireland. The Union of South Africa has become more independent. Concessions have had to be made to India. England is in the utmost peril. Unhealthy industrialization. A British statesman can only view the future with concern.

France's position has also deteriorated, above all in the Mediterranean.

Further factors in our favour are these:

Since Albania, there has been a balance of power in the Balkans. Yugoslavia is infected with the fatal germ of decay because of her internal situation.

Rumania has not grown stronger. She is open to attack and vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since Kemal's death, Turkey has been ruled by petty minds, unsteady, weak men.

All these favourable circumstances will no longer prevail in two or three years' time. No one knows how much longer I shall live. Therefore, better a conflict now.

The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement politically, but militarily it was doubtful, since it was achieved by bluff on the part of the political leaders. It is necessary to test the military [machine]. If at all possible, not in a general reckoning, but by the accomplishment of individual tasks.

The relationship with Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy hitherto was contrary to the views of the people. My proposals to Poland (Danzig and the Corridor) were frustrated by England's intervention. Poland changed her tone towards us. A permanent state of tension is intolerable. The power of initiative cannot be allowed to pass to others. The present moment is more favourable than in two or three years' time. An attempt on my life or Mussolini's could change the situation to our disadvantage. One cannot for ever face one another with rifles cocked. One compromise solution suggested to us was that we should change our convictions and make kind gestures. They talked to us again in the language of Versailles. There was a danger of losing prestige. Now the probability is still great that the West will not intervene. We must take the risk with ruthless determination. The politician must take a risk just as much as the general. We are faced with the harsh alternatives of striking or of certain annihilation sooner or later.

Reference to previous hazardous undertakings.

I should have been stoned if I had not been proved right. The most dangerous step was the entry into the neutral zone. Only a

week before, I got a warning through France. I have always taken a great risk in the conviction that it would succeed.

Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution.

The following special reasons fortify me in my view. England and France have undertaken obligations which neither is in a position to fulfil. There is no real rearmament in England, but only propaganda. A great deal of harm was done by many Germans, who were not in agreement with me, saying and writing to English people after the solution of the Czech question: The Führer succeeded because you lost your nerve, because you capitulated too soon. This explains the present propaganda war. The English speak of a war of nerves. One factor in this war of nerves is to boost the increase of armaments. But what are the real facts about British rearmament? The naval construction programme for 1938 has not yet been completed. Only the reserve fleet has been mobilized. Purchase of trawlers. No substantial strengthening of the Navy before 1941 or 1942.

Little has been done on land. England will be able to send at most three divisions to the Continent. A little has been done for the Air Force, but it is only a beginning. Anti-aircraft defence is in its initial stages. At the moment England has only 150 anti-aircraft guns. The new anti-aircraft gun has been ordered. It will take a long time before sufficient numbers have been produced. There is a shortage of predictors. England is still vulnerable from the air. This can change in two or three years. At the moment the English Air Force has only 130,000 men, France 72,000, Poland 15,000. England does not want the conflict to break out for two or three years.

The following is typical of England. Poland wanted a loan from England for her rearmament. England, however, only granted credits in order to make sure that Poland buys in England, although England cannot make deliveries. This suggests that England does not really want to support Poland. She is not risking eight million pounds in Poland, although she poured five hundred millions into China. England's position in the world is very precarious. She will not take any risks.

France is short of men (decline in the birth rate). Little has been done for rearmament. The artillery is obsolete. France did not want to embark on this adventure. The West has only two possibilities for fighting against us:

1. Blockade: It will not be effective because of our autarky and because we have sources of supply in Eastern Europe.

2. Attack in the West from the Maginot line: I consider this impossible.

Another possibility would be the violation of Dutch, Belgian and Swiss neutrality. I have no doubt that all these States, as well as

Scandinavia, will defend their neutrality with all available means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of these countries. Thus in actual fact England cannot help Poland. There still remains an attack on Italy. Military intervention is out of the question. No one is counting on a long war. If Herr von Brauchitsch had told me that I would need four years to conquer Poland I would have replied: "Then it cannot be done." It is nonsense to say that England wants to wage a long war.

We will hold our position in the West until we have conquered Poland. We must bear in mind our great production capacity. It is much greater than in 1914-1918.

The enemy had another hope, that Russia would become our enemy after the conquest of Poland. The enemy did not reckon with my great strength of purpose. Our enemies are small fry. I saw them in Munich.

I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the English offer. Russia has no interest in preserving Poland, and Stalin knows that it would mean the end of his régime, no matter whether his soldiers emerged from a war victorious or vanquished. Litvinov's replacement was decisive. I brought about the change towards Russia gradually. In connection with the commercial treaty we got into political conversations. Proposal for a non-aggression pact. Then came a comprehensive proposal from Russia. Four days ago I took a special step, which led to Russia replying yesterday that she is prepared to sign. Personal contact with Stalin is established. The day after tomorrow von Ribbentrop will conclude the treaty. Now Poland is in the position in which I wanted her.

We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a mighty aim, which demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last moment some swine or other will yet submit to me a plan for mediation.

The political objective goes further. A start has been made on the destruction of England's hegemony. The way will be open for the soldiers after I have made the political preparations.

Today's announcement of the non-aggression pact with Russia came as a bombshell. The consequences cannot be foreseen. Stalin also said that this course will benefit both countries. The effect on Poland will be tremendous.

In reply, Göring thanked the Führer and assured him that the Wehrmacht would do their duty.

No. 193

Nuremberg Document 1014-PS
Exhibit USA—30

Unsigned Memorandum¹

SECOND SPEECH BY THE FÜHRER ON AUGUST 22, 1939

Things can also work out differently regarding England and France. It is impossible to prophesy with any certainty. I am expecting an embargo on trade, not a blockade, and furthermore that relations will be broken off. The most iron determination on our part. No shrinking back from anything. Everyone must hold the view that we have been determined to fight the Western Powers right from the start. A life and death struggle. Germany has won every war when she was united. An inflexible, unflinching bearing, above all on the part of superiors, firm confidence, belief in victory, overcoming the past by becoming accustomed to the heaviest burdens. A long period of peace would not do us any good. It is therefore necessary to be prepared for anything. A manly bearing. It is not machines that fight each other, but men. We have the better men as regards quality. Spiritual factors are decisive. On the opposite side they are weaker men. The nation collapsed in 1918 because the spiritual prerequisites were insufficient. Frederick the Great only achieved final success by his fortitude.

The destruction of Poland has priority. The aim is to eliminate active forces, not to reach a definite line. Even if war breaks out in the West, the destruction of Poland remains the priority. A quick decision in view of the season.

I shall give a propagandist reason for starting the war, no matter whether it is plausible or not. The victor will not be asked afterwards whether he told the truth or not. When starting and waging a war it is not right that matters, but victory.

Close your hearts to pity. Act brutally. Eighty million people must obtain what is their right. Their existence must be made secure. The stronger man is right. The greatest harshness.

Swiftiness in making decisions is necessary. Firm faith in the German soldier. Crises are due solely to leaders having lost their nerve.

First requirement: Advance up to the Vistula and the Narev. Our technical superiority will shatter the nerves of the Poles. Every newly formed active Polish force is to be destroyed again immediately. A continuous process of attrition.

¹ See document No. 192. A further account of this speech is contained in a document, designated L-3, which was referred to but not submitted in evidence by the prosecution at the International Military Tribunal, and therefore not published in the official record. An English translation will be found in *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 314, enclosure. See also *ibid.*, No. 399.

New German frontier delimitation according to sound principles and possibly a protectorate as a buffer state. Military operations will not be influenced by these considerations. The wholesale destruction of Poland is the military objective. Speed is the chief thing. Pursuit until complete annihilation.

Conviction that the German Wehrmacht is equal to all demands. The order for the start of hostilities will be given later, probably Saturday morning.

No. 194

1818/415667

The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry

Teleprint

MOST URGENT

DANZIG, August 23, 1939—10:51 a.m.

Pol. V 8438.

Please transmit immediately to Geheimrat Bergmann.

Freiherr Duprel, the Director of the Central Office of the Reich Press Service, who is now in Danzig, has received information that Henderson, the British Ambassador in Berlin, is on his way to Berchtesgaden with a message from Chamberlain to the Führer.¹

Freiherr Duprel requests confirmation.² State Secretary Weizsäcker is reported to be accompanying the British Ambassador.

VEESENMAYER

He also asks Geheimrat Bergmann to let him have information on this matter for his personal use.

¹ See document No. 200. See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 167.

² A further teleprint at midday (1818/415668) addressed to Bergmann or Schliep reads: "With reference to the teleprinted enquiry of 10:51 a.m. today, Gauleiter Forster requests through me an immediate reply, as this is important for assessing the situation here."

No. 195

2842/549702

Minute by the Head of Political Division V

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, August 23, 1939.

Obergruppenführer Lorenz has turned down Herr Wiesner's plan¹ to play as it were the part of a Henlein in the German-Polish conflict, as the Führer does not wish to resolve the Polish question on national group lines. Obergruppenführer Lorenz requests that Herr Wiesner

¹ See document No. 182.

should be caused to proceed to Berlin for discussions² by the most expeditious route.

Submitted herewith to the Under State Secretary with the request for instructions.

SCHLIEP

² Marginal note: "Please so inform V[eesenmayer]. W[oermann] 23." This was done by teleprint at 11:10 a.m. (2842/549701).

No. 196

2842/549700

The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry

Teleprint

DANZIG, August 23, 1939—11:35 a.m.

Pol. V 8199.

For Schliep.

I have just submitted to Gauleiter Forster the teleprint¹ concerning Obergruppenführer Lorenz's summons to Wiesner to proceed to Berlin as quickly as possible. Gauleiter Forster has decided that Wiesner is to remain in Danzig. He assumes full responsibility for this. I recommend a telephone conversation between Obergruppenführer Lorenz and Gauleiter Forster.

VEESENMAYER

¹ See document No. 195 and footnote 2 thereto.

No. 197

97/108547-48

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

BERLIN, August 23, 1939.

[Pol. V 8508.]¹

Vice Consul von Grolman, Danzig, has just communicated the following to me by telephone:

1. At noon today the Danzig Senate will pass a resolution to offer Gauleiter Forster the post of Head of the State of the Free City of Danzig. Gauleiter Forster is prepared to accept this office. President of the Senate Greiser will then have the post of Head of the Danzig Government (a sort of Minister President).

This resolution by the Senate is to be kept secret until tomorrow.

2. The Danzig-Polish negotiations on the question of Customs Inspectors will be continued this afternoon.² The Danzig representative will demand the immediate withdrawal of 50 Polish Customs

¹ Taken from another copy (7693/E548504-05).

² See document No. 188.

Inspectors. He expects the Poles to refuse this demand. A statement is then to be made about 6 p.m. saying that the negotiations have broken down through the fault of the Poles.

3. The *Schleswig-Holstein* will come to Danzig instead of the cruiser *Königsberg*, perhaps even tomorrow.² The reason for this is that this ship is armed with 28 cm. guns with which it could reach the Hela peninsula from its berth (near the Westerplatte).³

4. Last week berths were already prepared in Danzig harbour for several more warships. In connection with this, a Lieutenant Commander (E)⁴ has for some time been seconded to Major General Eberhardt's staff in Danzig. Another officer from the High Command of the Wehrmacht (Naval Command) is arriving in Danzig today.

5. A British steamship berthed in the port of Danzig, which was scheduled to stay three days longer in Danzig to take on cargo, has today received orders from Britain to sail immediately.

Copies submitted for information to:

The State Secretary
Under State Secretary, Political Department
Deputy Director, Political Department
Senior Counsellor Schliep
Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Minister Braun von Stumm
Political Division I, Military Affairs

BERGMANN

² For "Operation Order No. 1 for the battleship *Schleswig-Holstein*", issued by Naval Command East and dated Aug. 21, see *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxxiv, pp. 448-456, document 126-C, exhibit GB-45.

⁴ *Ergänzungsoffizier*, i.e., a retired officer recalled for service.

⁵ Chief of the Danzig territorial police [*Landespolizei*].

No. 198

695/260287-88

An Official of the News Service and Press Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 197 of August 23

BERLIN, August 23, 1939—12:16 p.m.

Received August 23—5:40 p.m.

Also for the Foreign Minister.

Havas publishes three reports from Moscow, which have also been taken up by the Associated Press and the B.B.C., London.

1. Competent Soviet Russian quarters gave an assurance on Tuesday morning¹ that the arrival of Herr von Ribbentrop for the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact was in no way incompatible

¹ i.e., Aug. 22.

with the continuation of negotiations between the British, French and Russian military missions for the purpose of organizing resistance against aggression.

2. The highest competent Soviet Russian quarters appear to be convinced that the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany is entirely compatible with the conclusion of the Three Power Treaty between France, Britain and Russia. In their view, these two acts in no wise cancel each other out. Each constitutes a contribution towards work for peace. The Anglo-French-Soviet Russian pact, supplemented by military agreements, was meant as a brake on Germany, should she persist in her aggressive designs. Conversely, if Germany wishes to conclude a non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia, it is, according to these circles, opportune and to the advantage of all that this gesture should be made, which would contribute towards relieving the atmosphere of tension at present existing between the two countries.

3. It is being remarked in Soviet circles that questions such as that of Danzig, and German claims to the Corridor or other territory, have nothing to do with the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact. It is repeatedly stated that there is no question of concluding a pact to support an aggressor. It is recalled that in 1934 the Soviet Union had proposed such a pact to Germany, and that it was Germany's refusal that alone had prevented its conclusion.²

BRAUN VON STUMM

² Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "Schulenburg: Molotov to take action against false reports. Departure of military missions."

No. 199

1818/415669

An Official of Political Division V to the Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig

Teleprint

BERLIN, August 23, 1939—1:20 p.m.

[zu] Pol. V 8438.¹

8439.²

For Veessenmayer.³

With reference to your teleprints of August 23, 1939, 10:51 a.m.¹ and 12 noon.²

Ambassador Henderson has gone by air today to the Führer at the Berghof. The object of his journey is not known here. [The state-

¹ Document No. 194.

² See document No. 194, footnote 2.

³ A note to the teleprint office requests that this message be transmitted to Veessenmayer immediately.

ment that State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsäcker is with the Ambassador is incorrect.]⁴ The foregoing is strictly secret and intended solely for the information of Gauleiter Forster.

BERGMANN

⁴ The sentence in square brackets was deleted from the draft before despatch.

No. 200

52/35069-79; 060-63

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

August 24, 1939.¹

RECORD OF THE INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, SIR NEVILLE HENDERSON, AT THE BERGHOF ON AUGUST 23, 1939

The British Ambassador opened the conversation by stating that he was delivering a letter on behalf of the British Government.² At first a more worthy personage was to have done this. However, the course of events had demanded speedy action especially since the news of the German-Soviet Russian Pact had come as a great surprise to the British Government.

The Führer stated that he already had a translation of the letter before him.³ He was about to prepare a written reply, but in the meantime he wished to make a few oral observations to the Ambassador on the same lines.

Henderson replied that it was to be hoped that a solution might be found to the difficult situation; it was understood in England that Anglo-German cooperation was necessary for the well-being of Europe.

The Führer replied that this ought to have been realized earlier. When the Ambassador objected that the British Government had given their guarantees and must now honour them, the Führer replied: "Then honour them. If you have given a blank cheque you must also meet it." He had, he added, made it clear in his reply that Germany was not responsible for the guarantees given by England,

¹ This document is printed here for the convenience of the reader. Henderson was received shortly after 1 p.m., according to his own record; see *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. vii, Nos. 178, 200 and 248.

² See enclosure.

³ No record of the text of this letter reaching Hitler in advance of this interview has been found. According to Sir N. Henderson (see *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. vii, No. 200), he indicated the main lines to Weizsäcker by telephone the previous evening; no German record of this telephone conversation has been found. The translation in the Foreign Ministry files (8152/E582576-78) appears to have been made in the British Embassy in Berlin; it is identical with that printed in *British Documents*, *ibid.*, No. 207. This translation was also teleprinted by Weizsäcker from the Obersalzberg to the Foreign Ministry at 2:45 p.m. (2780/537075-78) and repeated from Berlin to Moscow for Ribbentrop in telegram No. 200 (461/225157-60), where it was received on Aug. 24 at 7:40 a.m.

but England would be responsible for the consequences of these commitments. It was England's business to realize this clearly. He had informed the Polish Government that any further persecution of the Germans in Poland would immediately entail action by the Reich. As he had learned from other sources, Chamberlain had provided for increased military preparations in England. Germany's preparations were confined to purely defensive measures. "If," said the Führer, "I should hear of further measures of this sort being taken by England today or tomorrow, I shall immediately order general mobilization in Germany."

When the Ambassador remarked that war would then be inevitable, the Führer repeated his pronouncement regarding mobilization.

He then stated that people in England were always talking about the "poisoned atmosphere". The fact was that the "atmosphere" had been "poisoned" by England. If it had not been for England he would have achieved a peaceful settlement with Czecho-Slovakia last year, and would certainly have done the same with Poland this year as regards the Danzig problem. England alone was responsible, and the whole of Germany was firmly convinced of this. Today, hundreds of thousands of *Volksdeutsche* were being ill-treated in Poland, dragged off to concentration camps and driven from their homes. He was in possession of extensive material on this which he had hitherto refrained from publishing. England had given a blank cheque for all this, and now she must pay for it. Since England had given the guarantees, he, the Führer, had been obliged to take a firm stand on this question. He could not allow tens of thousands of fellow-Germans to be slaughtered for the sake of one of England's whims.

He recalled that Germany had previously lived on good terms with Poland, and he had made a reasonable and fair offer to Poland. This offer had been sabotaged by the Western Powers and, as previously in the case of Czecho-Slovakia, largely by reports from the Military Attachés who had spread false rumours about German mobilization.

Here the Ambassador objected that the Polish Government had turned down the German offer before England had given the guarantees.

The Führer went on to say that Chamberlain could not have found a better plan for ranging every German solidly behind the Führer than by supporting Poland and a settlement of the Danzig question in Poland's favour. He saw no possibilities in negotiation because he was convinced that the British Government were simply not interested in such a settlement. He could only repeat once more that general mobilization would be proclaimed in Germany should further military measures be adopted in England. The same applied to France.

When the Führer had emphasized that all this would be set down in writing, he declared that he had done everything humanly possible. England had made an enemy of the man who had wished to become her greatest friend. England would now make the acquaintance of a Germany very different from that which she had imagined for so many years.

Henderson replied that people in England knew that Germany was strong and she had often demonstrated this in recent times.

The Führer declared that he had made Poland a generous offer, but England had interfered.

To this the Ambassador retorted that although the offer was made, it was nevertheless in the nature of a "dictate".

The Führer then described how several months before in this very place he had discussed the same settlement with Colonel Beck⁴ who had described it as too sudden at the time, but had nevertheless seen possibilities in it. He had repeated his proposals in March, and stated in addition that in this case Germany would renounce her interests in Slovakia. At that time, the Führer emphasized, Poland would have declared herself willing if England had not interfered. At the time the English press had said that now the freedom of Poland and also of Rumania was threatened.

The Führer then continued that in the event of the slightest attempt by Poland to make any further move against Germans or Danzig, he would immediately intervene, and furthermore that mobilization in the West would be answered by German mobilization.

Ambassador Henderson: "Is that a threat?" The Führer: "No, a protective measure!"

He then declared that the British Government had given preference to everything else rather than cooperation with Germany. They had turned to France, Turkey and Moscow.

The Ambassador objected that it was now Germany who was coming to terms with Moscow; to which the Führer retorted that he was forced to do so because of the will to destruction of the Western Powers. The Ambassador disputed this and maintained that Britain did not wish to destroy Germany.

The Führer retorted that he was nevertheless firmly convinced; he had therefore built a Western Wall costing nine thousand millions in order to protect Germany from an attack from the West.

Henderson pointed out that the change in British opinion had taken place after March 15, to which the Führer retorted that Poland had become agitated about the Carpatho-Ukraine out of self-interest. Furthermore, conditions within Czecho-Slovakia had become intolerable for Germany. After all, Bohemia and Moravia had received

⁴ For Beck's conversation with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on Jan. 5, 1939, see vol. v of this Series, document No. 119.

their culture from the Germans and not from the English. He was convinced that the Czech solution was the best one. President Hácha had been happy to see a way out of the crisis; it was naturally a matter of indifference to the English whether there was any shooting in the heart of Central Europe.

Finally, the Führer assured the Ambassador that he was not blaming him, and that he had always appreciated his personal efforts on behalf of German-English friendship.

The Ambassador alluded to the great tragedy which would now be enacted, whereupon the Führer declared that, should it come to war, it would be a war of life and death, judging by English intentions in this respect. In this England had more to lose.

Henderson observed that according to Clausewitz, war always brought surprises; he only knew that every one would do his duty.

The Führer said that Germany had never done anything to damage England, nevertheless England was taking her stand against Germany. He referred again to the question of Danzig and Poland, about which England adopted the attitude of "better war than anything to Germany's advantage".

Henderson declared that he had done his best. He had recently written to a Reich Minister saying that the Führer, who had taken ten years to win over Germany, would have to give England a longer period of time.

The Führer declared that the fact that England had taken a stand against Germany in the Danzig question had deeply shaken the German people.

Henderson objected, saying that they had only opposed the principle of force, whereupon the Führer countered by asking whether England had ever found a solution for any of the idiocies of Versailles by way of negotiation.

The Ambassador had no reply to this, and the Führer declared that according to a German proverb it always takes two to make love.

The Ambassador emphasized that Chamberlain had always championed Germany, and the Führer declared that he too had always believed that until the spring.

Thereupon Henderson emphasized that he personally had never believed in an Anglo-Franco-Russian Pact. His view was that Russia only wished to be rid of Chamberlain by procrastination and then to profit from a war. He personally preferred that it should be Germany rather than England who should have a treaty with Russia.

The Führer answered: "Make no mistake. It will be a long treaty."

Henderson said he thought that the Führer knew as well as he did that the Russians always made difficulties. In any case it was certain that Chamberlain had not changed.

To this the Führer replied: "I must judge by deeds in this matter."

The interview ended with the Führer stating that a written reply would be handed to the Ambassador in the afternoon.

Afternoon

The Ambassador first read through the Führer's written reply⁵ and expressed his regret at its contents.

The Führer declared that there were people in the British Government who wanted war.

The Ambassador vigorously denied this and declared that Chamberlain had always been a friend of Germany.

The Führer mentioned the Minister for War,⁶ saying he could not imagine him as one.

Henderson said he thought that the proof of Chamberlain's friendship was to be found in the fact that he had refused to have Churchill in the Cabinet. The hostile attitude to Germany did not represent the will of the British people. It was the work of Jews and enemies of the Nazis.

The Führer assured the Ambassador that he did not include him personally among the enemies of Germany. His, the Führer's, relationship with England had been a series of disappointments. Even before he came to power he had been warned by experts not to cherish too great hopes. However, as far as he was concerned the position was very simple:

He was now 50, therefore if war had to come, it was better that it should come now than when he was 55 or even 60 years old. There could only be understanding or war between England and Germany. England would do well to realize that as a front-line soldier he knew what war was and would utilize every means available. It was surely quite clear to everyone that the World War would not have been lost if he had been Chancellor at the time.

"At the next instance of Polish provocation," continued the Führer, "I shall act. The questions of Danzig and the Corridor will be settled one way or another. Please take note of this. Believe me, last year—on October 2—I would have marched either way. I give you my word of honour on that!"

The Ambassador observed that after all England and Germany were equals and had equal rights, whereupon the Führer replied that, in that case, England ought not to intervene against Germany if she were clearly safeguarding her own rights. He had once before handed the Baldwin Government a definite proposition, but it had met with no response.

⁵ Document No. 201.

⁶ The Rt. Hon. Leslie Hore-Belisha, M.P.

The interview concluded with the Führer stating that the text of the letter would be delivered in London by the Ambassador on the following day.

V. LOESCH

[Enclosure]

August 22, 1939.⁷

YOUR EXCELLENCY: Your Excellency will have already heard of certain measures taken by His Majesty's Government and announced in the press and on the wireless this evening.⁸ These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, been rendered necessary by military movements which have been reported from Germany and by the fact that apparently the announcement of a German-Soviet Agreement is taken in some quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain's obligation to Poland, which His Majesty's Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly and which they are determined to fulfil.

It is alleged that, if His Majesty's Government had made their position more clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that allegation, His Majesty's Government are resolved that on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding.

If the case should arise, they are resolved and prepared to employ without delay all the forces at their command, and it is impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged. It would be a dangerous illusion to think that, if war once starts it will come to an early end, even if a success on any one of the several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been secured. Having thus made our position perfectly clear, I wish to repeat to you my conviction that war between our two peoples would be the greatest calamity that could occur. I am certain that it is desired neither by our people nor by yours, and I cannot see that there is anything in the questions arising between Germany and Poland which could not and should not be resolved without use of force, if only a situation of confidence could be restored to enable discussions to be carried on in an atmosphere different from that which prevails today.

We have been, and at all times will be, ready to assist in creating

⁷ In what would appear to be a confirmatory copy of this letter supplied by the British Embassy (8152/E582573-75), the address is given as "10 Downing Street, Whitehall".

⁸ An official communiqué, issued in London on Aug. 22, had stated that an Emergency Powers Bill would be presented to Parliament on Aug. 24 (see Editors' Note, p. 272) and that in the meantime certain further precautionary measures were being taken.

conditions in which such negotiations could take place and in which it might be possible concurrently to discuss the wider problems affecting future international relations,⁹ including matters of interest to us and to you.

Difficulties in the way of any peaceful discussions in the present state of tension are, however, growing,¹⁰ and the longer that tension is maintained, the harder it will be for reason to prevail.

These difficulties, however, might be mitigated if not removed, provided that there could for an initial period be a truce on both sides—and indeed on all sides—to press polemics and to all incitement.

If such a truce could be arranged, then, at the end of that period, during which steps could be taken to examine and deal with complaints made by either side as to the treatment of minorities, it is reasonable to hope that suitable conditions might have been established for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland upon the issues between them (with the aid of a neutral intermediary if both sides should think that would be helpful).

But I am bound to say that there would be slender hope of bringing such negotiations to a successful issue, unless it were understood beforehand that any settlement reached would, when concluded, be guaranteed by other Powers. His Majesty's Government would be ready, if desired, to make such contribution as they could to the effective operation of such guarantees.

At this moment I confess I can see no other way to avoid a catastrophe that will involve Europe in war.

In view of the grave consequences to humanity which may follow from the action of their rulers, I trust Your Excellency will weigh with the utmost deliberation the considerations which I have put before you.¹¹

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN

⁹ In the confirmatory copy this reads: "the future of international relations".

¹⁰ In the confirmatory copy this word reads: "obvious".

¹¹ A summary of this letter and of the conversation between Hitler and Henderson was telegraphed on Aug. 23 to the Missions in Warsaw, Moscow, London, Paris, Rome, Washington, Tokyo, San Sebastian, Ankara and Budapest (52/35109-12, 14-15, 17-18, 20-23).

No. 201

52/35064-68

The Führer and Chancellor to the British Prime Minister

August 23, 1939.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: The British Ambassador has just handed to me a communication¹ in which Your Excellency draws attention in

¹ See document No. 200.

the name of the British Government to a number of points which in your estimation are of the greatest importance.

I may be permitted to answer your letter as follows:

1. Germany has never sought conflicts with England and has never interfered in English interests. On the contrary, she has for years endeavoured—although unfortunately in vain—to win England's friendship. On this account she assumed in a wide area of Europe voluntary limitations of her own interests which from a national-political point of view it would otherwise have been very difficult to tolerate.

2. The German Reich, however, like every other State, possesses certain definite interests which it is impossible to renounce. These do not extend beyond the limits of the necessities imposed by earlier German history and conditioned by vital economic prerequisites. Some of these questions held and still hold a significance both of a national-political and of a psychological character which no German Government is able to ignore.

To these questions belong the German City of Danzig, and the connected problem of the Corridor. Numerous statesmen, historians, and men of letters, even in England, have been conscious of this at any rate up to a few years ago. I would add that all these territories lying in the aforesaid German sphere of interest, and in particular those lands which returned to the Reich eighteen months ago, received their cultural development at the hands not of Englishmen but exclusively of Germans, and this, moreover, from a time dating back over a thousand years.

3. Germany was prepared to settle the questions of Danzig and of the Corridor by the method of negotiation on the basis of a proposal of truly unparalleled magnanimity. The allegations disseminated by England regarding a German mobilization against Poland, the assertion of aggressive designs towards Rumania, Hungary, etc., etc., as well as the so-called guarantee declarations which were subsequently given, had, however, dispelled Polish inclination to negotiate on a basis of this kind which would have been tolerable for Germany also.

4. The general assurance [*Generalzusicherung*] given by England to Poland, that she would render assistance to that country in all circumstances, regardless of the causes from which a conflict might spring, could only be interpreted in that country as an encouragement thenceforward to unloose, under cover of such a charter, a wave of appalling terrorism against the one and a half million German inhabitants living in Poland. The atrocities which since then have been taking place in that country are terrible for the victims, but intolerable for a Great Power such as the German Reich, which is expected to remain a passive onlooker during these happenings. Poland has been guilty of numerous breaches of her legal obligations towards

the Free City of Danzig, has made demands in the character of ultimata, and has initiated a process of economic strangulation.

5. The Government of the German Reich therefore recently caused the Polish Government to be informed that they are not prepared passively to accept this development of affairs, that they will not tolerate further addressing of notes in the character of ultimata to Danzig, that they will not tolerate a continuance of the persecution of the German minority, that they will equally not tolerate the extermination of the Free City of Danzig by economic measures, in other words, the destruction of the vital bases of the population of Danzig by a kind of Customs blockade, and that they will not tolerate the occurrence of further acts of provocation directed against the Reich. Apart from this, the questions of the Corridor and of Danzig must and shall be solved.

6. Your Excellency informs me in the name of the British Government that you will be obliged to render assistance to Poland in any such case of intervention on the part of Germany. I take note of this statement of yours and assure you that it can make no change in the determination of the Reich Government to safeguard the interests of the Reich as stated in point 5 above. Your assurance to the effect that in such an event you anticipate a long war, is shared by myself. Germany, if attacked by England, will be found prepared and determined. I have already more than once declared before the German people and the world that there can be no doubt concerning the determination of the new German Reich rather to accept, for however long it might be, every sort of misery and tribulation than to sacrifice its national interests, let alone its honour.

7. The Government of the German Reich have received information to the effect that the British Government intend to carry out measures of mobilization which, according to the statements contained in your own letter, Mr. Prime Minister, are clearly directed against Germany alone. This appears to be true of France as well. Since Germany has never had the intention of taking military measures, other than those of a defensive character, against either England or France, and, as has already been emphasized, has never intended, and does not in the future intend, to attack England or France, it follows that this announcement as confirmed by you, Mr. Prime Minister, in your own letter, can only refer to a proposed act of menace directed against the Reich.

I therefore inform Your Excellency that, in the event of these military announcements being carried into effect, I shall order immediate mobilization of the German forces.²

8. The question of the treatment of European problems on a peaceful basis is not a decision which rests with Germany, but primarily

² See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 232.

with those who, since the crime committed by the Versailles dictate, have stubbornly and consistently opposed any peaceful revision. Only after a change of spirit on the part of the responsible Powers can there be any real change in the relationship between England and Germany. I have all my life fought for German-English friendship; the attitude adopted by British diplomacy—at any rate up to the present—has, however, convinced me of the futility of such an attempt. Should there be any change in this respect in the future, nobody could be happier than I.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 202

2842/549704

*The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the
Foreign Ministry*

Teleprint

IMMEDIATE

DANZIG, August 23, 1939—2:10 p.m.

SECRET

Received August 23—2:20 p.m.

Pol. V 8265.

For State Secretary Weizsäcker.

It is established that the Germans in Poznań-Pommerellen are virtually without arms. Gauleiter Forster discussed with me the question whether in "Case A" [*im A-Falle*]¹ these Germans should be called upon to resist, or whether they should be advised in good time to go into hiding during the critical days. Gauleiter Forster will also consult Reichsführer Himmler about this. Am I to expect instructions in this matter for onward transmission to Gauleiter Forster?

VEESENMAYER

¹ Presumably the cover symbol for the issue of the assembly movement orders [*Aufmarschbewegung*].

No. 203

388/211535

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 124 of August 23

HELSINKI, August 23, 1939—3:52 p.m.

Received August 23—5:30 p.m.

Pol. V 8205.

The German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact is regarded here as a skilful counter-move to the policy of the Western Powers. Opinion is divided as to whether the prospects of peace are thereby enhanced. It is hoped that the Baltic Sea at least will not become a theatre of war, but there is anxiety lest the price of the Pact be paid out of the pocket of the Baltic States.

Regarding the Finnish attitude, it must be taken into account that German-Russian cooperation appears the most undesirable grouping for Finnish foreign policy.¹

BLÜCHER

¹ The text was repeated by telegram on Aug. 25 for information to the Missions in Moscow, Warsaw, London, Paris, Rome, Tallinn, Riga, Kovno and Stockholm (388/211536-37).

No. 204

2899/565773

The Head of the Auslandsorganisation to the Embassy in Poland

Telegram

No. 237

BERLIN, August 23, 1939—7:10 p.m.

For Krümmer.¹

I have today sent following order to Toruń, Poznań, Katowice:
"All Party documents to be destroyed without delay."

The same applies in your case.

Schnitzer² cannot return; he has already been seconded to the Gauleitung in Danzig.

BOHLE

¹ An official in the Warsaw Embassy.

² A Party official at Toruń.

No. 205

644/254847

The Reich Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram¹

MOST URGENT

Moscow, August 23, 1939—8:05 p.m.

No. 204 of August 23

Please advise the Führer at once that the first three-hour conference with Stalin and Molotov has just ended. At the discussion—which, moreover, proceeded in a direction favourable to us—it transpired that the decisive point for the final result is the demand of the Russians that we recognize the ports of Libau and Windau² as being within their sphere of interest. I should be grateful for confirmation before 8 o'clock German time that the Führer is in agreement. The signing of a secret protocol on the delimitation of mutual spheres of interest in the whole eastern area is contemplated, for which I declared myself ready in principle.

RIBBENTROP

¹ The Foreign Ministry copy (34/24017) has a typewritten marginal note "Telephoned from Moscow."

² i.e., Liepāja and Ventspils in Latvia.

No. 206

34/24016

*The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union*Telegram¹

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, August 23, 1939.²

No. 201

e.o. RM 422.

For the Reich Foreign Minister.

The Führer would be very glad if within the framework of the present agreements it were put on record that, when agreement has been reached between Germany and Russia on problems in Eastern Europe, these are to be regarded as belonging exclusively to the spheres of interest of Germany and Russia.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Typewritten marginal note: "Telephoned from Salzburg."² The hour of despatch is not recorded.

No. 207

1132/323664

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 23, 1939.

In accordance with instructions I informed the French Ambassador at 8:30 p.m. today of Chamberlain's letter¹ to the Führer and of the Führer's reply.² In doing so, I gave only a comparatively brief outline of the contents of Chamberlain's letter, as we were agreed that this would be known to the French Government.³ On the other hand, I repeated the contents of the German reply in detail, and read out some parts word for word, notably points 5, 6 and 7.

The French Ambassador took detailed notes. At the close he thanked me for the information.

No further discussion took place.

WOERMANN

¹ Document No. 200, enclosure.² Document No. 201.³ See also the *French Yellow Book*, Nos. 214, 216 and 217.

No. 208

26/16163

The Chargé d'Affaires in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 82 of August 23

BRUSSELS, August 23, 1939—9 p.m.

Received August 24—12:20 a.m.

Pol. VI 1956.

With reference to my report of August 22.¹

It is confirmed that the Conference of the Oslo Powers was called

¹ Document No. 185.

to Brussels primarily to issue an appeal to all States to endeavour to seek a peaceful solution to the impending conflict. The Minister President's secretary has just handed me the text of the address which the King will broadcast to the world at 8 o'clock this evening in the presence of the Foreign Ministers of the Oslo Powers.

The text has been distributed to all the Missions accredited here. The complete translation is being transmitted by the DNB. The original text is being despatched by airmail.²

The appeal is in general terms, but in many passages reveals a tendency hostile to us.

The communiqué on the Conference, issued today, emphasizes the identity of interests between the Oslo Powers and expresses their intention of remaining in contact with each other in order to safeguard these interests.

BARGEN

² This was done under No. A 914 of Aug. 23 (26/16162; 164-66).

No. 209

7985/E575384-65

An Official of the News Service and Press Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 199 of August 23

BERLIN, August 23, 1939—9:50 p.m.
e.o. P. 10456.

For submission to the Foreign Minister.

The general opinion expressed in this morning's Japanese press on the Non-Aggression Pact is that Japan is now confronted with an entirely new situation, which will also have its effect on the Far East. Blame for the Non-Aggression Pact is attached in the first place to Britain, who tried to draw Russia into the encirclement front, and secondly to Japan's slow and clumsy diplomacy and the indecision of the Hiranuma Government. The semi-official Domei¹ thinks that the Foreign Minister will instruct Ambassador Oshima to ascertain Berlin's real intentions. In spite of their assumption that the Pact does not run counter to the Anti-Comintern Pact, political circles regret Berlin's unexpected manner of acting, which has jeopardized Berlin-Tokyo friendship. Japan must, it is said, re-examine entirely her established policy towards the Axis Powers in consequence of the new situation. On ascertaining Berlin's intentions, the Cabinet would decide on its attitude towards the Pact. According to Domei, Government circles in Manchukuo are concerned about the possibility of Russian concentrations in the Far East, which might lead to fresh tension there as a result of the Pact.

¹ Japanese news agency.

Miyako comments that on the one hand the tremendous change in the international situation is destroying encirclement; on the other hand, however, the importance of the proposed military pact, as well as of the Anti-Comintern Pact, is being diminished and this is having repercussions on the German-Japanese relationship of mutual trust. *Kokumin* describes Britain as an enemy of the new order. Hence the necessity for a military pact with Germany. Other newspapers see no possibility of resuming Japanese-British negotiations, nor of a compromise, in view of Britain's clearly defined attitude in Tientsin. *Hochi* thinks that the Pact has prevented the conclusion of a tripartite military pact of the Axis Powers.

BRAUN VON STUMM

No. 210

34/24018

*An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy
in the Soviet Union*

Telegram

No. 205

BERLIN, August 23, 1939.¹

e.o. RAM 424.

With reference to your telegram No. 204.²

Answer is Yes, agreed.

KORDT

The following typewritten marginal note appears on the Moscow copy (695/260299):
"Taken down by Counsellor of Embassy von Tippelskirch at 11 p.m. on Aug. 23.
Transmitted by telephone by Hewel."

² Document No. 205.

No. 211

583/242152

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 363 of August 23

ROME, August 23, 1939—11:15 p.m.

Received August 24—3:30 a.m.

With reference to my telephone conversation with Senior Counsellor Hewel.¹

Ciano asked me this evening to let him know without delay as soon as the date of the Foreign Minister's return is known.²

MACKENSEN

¹ No record of this has been found.

² A typewritten minute on this document reads: "Urgent. The State Secretary has requested by telephone that the telegram to hand be answered as soon as possible from Berlin by the Under State Secretary, Political Department. Submitted herewith to the Under State Secretary, Political Department. Berlin, August 24, 1939. Siegfried." Marginal note: "I have informed both Ambassador von Mackensen and Attolico by telephone. W[ö]ermann] 24."

No. 212

583/242153-54

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 364 of August 23

ROME, August 23, 1939—11:30 p.m.

Received August 24—3:30 a.m.

With reference to my telephone conversation with Senior Counsellor Hewel.¹

Count Ciano asked me to call on him this evening in order to inform me about a report from the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo,² which he regarded as so grave that he wished to ask me to transmit it with all possible speed so that our counter measures might be put into effect quickly and energetically. The Ambassador's report is based on information from his Military Attaché³ who was called to the Japanese War Ministry yesterday (evening) and informed of the following: The impending Moscow non-aggression pact had aroused great indignation against Germany in Japan. It meant the betrayal of German-Japanese friendship and the idea of the Anti-Comintern Pact, especially since Japan had not even been informed of such intentions beforehand. The Ambassador foresees as the possible consequences (and here it is not clearly distinguishable how far this derives from the conversation that the Military Attaché had in the War Ministry or represents the personal view of the Ambassador, whom Ciano described in this connection as a particularly sober judge):

1. The fall of the present Government and a new pro-British Ministry.
2. A change of course in Japanese foreign policy.
3. The recall of the Ambassador in Berlin, and perhaps in Rome also.
4. Despatch of reinforcements to Kwantung [*sic*]⁴ to counterbalance Russian reinforcements there.

If, the Ambassador's report continues, the Axis intends to intervene to counteract this Japanese attitude, action must be taken. The Japanese military men had stated that so far they had not had any direct information from Berlin and Rome. Ciano immediately instructed the Ambassador in Tokyo⁵ to tell the Japanese that:

1. Italian policy had not undergone any change; friendship and understanding for Japan were unaltered.
2. When assessing the situation, the Japanese should remember that any weakening of Britain and France in Europe could only be to Japan's advantage.
3. The recall of the Ambassadors would be an unprecedented step,

¹ No record of this has been found, but see document No. 211.

² Giacinto Auriti; see also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 156.

³ Lt. Col. Scalise.

⁴ Presumably the Kwantung Army is meant.

⁵ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 180.

and only calculated to compromise gravely a situation which was in the process of full development and which looked anything but unfavourable for Japan.

Finally the Ambassador was to assure the Japanese that they could continue to have complete confidence in Italy's attitude. Ciano concluded his statement to me with the remark that he regarded the report from his Ambassador as exceedingly grave and urgently requested us, for our part, to do everything possible to reassure the Japanese through our Ambassador, the press, etc.

MACKENSEN

No. 213

F11/0019-30

Memorandum by an Official attached to the Staff of the Foreign Minister

TOP SECRET

Moscow, August 24,¹ 1939.

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION HELD ON THE NIGHT OF AUGUST 23RD TO 24TH, BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, ON THE ONE HAND, AND M. STALIN AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS, MOLOTOV, ON THE OTHER HAND

The following problems were discussed:

1. *Japan:*

The Reich Foreign Minister stated that the German-Japanese friendship was in no wise directed against the Soviet Union. We were, rather, in a position, owing to our good relations with Japan, to contribute to an adjustment of the differences between the Soviet Union and Japan. Should M. Stalin and the Soviet Government desire it, the Reich Foreign Minister was prepared to work in this direction. He would use his influence with the Japanese Government accordingly and keep in touch with the Soviet representative in Berlin in this matter.

M. Stalin replied that the Soviet Union indeed desired an improvement in its relations with Japan, but that there were limits to its patience with regard to Japanese provocations. If Japan desired war, she could have it. The Soviet Union was not afraid of it and was prepared for it. If Japan desired peace—so much the better! M. Stalin considered the assistance of Germany in bringing about an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations as useful, but he did not want the Japanese to get the impression that the initiative in this direction had been taken by the Soviet Union.

The Reich Foreign Minister assented to this and stressed the fact that his cooperation would mean merely the continuation of talks that he had for months been holding with the Japanese Ambassador

¹ This document is printed here for the convenience of the reader.

in Berlin in the sense of an improvement in Soviet-Russian-Japanese relations. Accordingly, there would be no new initiative on the German side in this matter.

2. *Italy:*

M. Stalin enquired of the Reich Foreign Minister as to Italian intentions. Did not Italy have aspirations beyond the annexation of Albania—perhaps for Greek territory? Small, mountainous, and thinly populated Albania was, in his estimation, of no particular value to Italy.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that Albania was important to Italy for strategic reasons. Moreover, Mussolini was a strong man who could not be intimidated. This he had demonstrated in the Abyssinian conflict, in which Italy had attained her aims by her own strength against a hostile coalition. Even Germany was not yet in a position at that time to give Italy appreciable support.

Mussolini welcomed warmly the restoration of friendly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. He had expressed himself as very gratified with the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact.

3. *Turkey:*

M. Stalin asked the Reich Foreign Minister what Germany thought about Turkey.

The Reich Foreign Minister expressed himself as follows in this matter: He had months ago declared to the Turkish Government that Germany desired friendly relations with Turkey. The Reich Foreign Minister had himself done everything to achieve this goal. The answer had been that Turkey became one of the first countries to join the encirclement front against Germany and had not even considered it necessary to notify the Reich Government of the fact.

MM. Stalin and Molotov hereupon observed that the Soviet Union had also had unfortunate experiences with the vacillating policy of the Turks.

The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that England had spent five million pounds in Turkey in order to encourage propaganda against Germany.

M. Stalin said that according to his information the amount which England had spent in buying Turkish politicians was considerably more than five million pounds.

4. *England:*

MM. Stalin and Molotov commented adversely on the British Military Mission in Moscow, which had never told the Soviet Government what it really wanted.

The Reich Foreign Minister stated in this connection that England had always been trying, and was still trying, to disrupt the develop-

ment of good relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. England was weak and wanted to let others fight for her presumptuous claim to world domination.

M. Stalin eagerly concurred and observed as follows: The English Army was weak; nor was the British Navy as important as it had formerly been. England's air arm was being increased, to be sure, but there was a lack of pilots. If England dominated the world in spite of this, that was due to the stupidity of the other countries that always let themselves be bluffed. It was ridiculous, for example, that a few hundred Englishmen should dominate India.

The Reich Foreign Minister concurred and informed M. Stalin confidentially that England had recently put out a new feeler which was connected with certain allusions to 1914. It was a matter of a typically English, stupid manoeuvre. The Reich Foreign Minister had proposed to the Führer to inform the British that every hostile British act, in case of a German-Polish conflict, would be answered by a bombing attack on London.

M. Stalin remarked that the feeler was evidently Chamberlain's letter to the Führer, which Ambassador Henderson delivered on August 23 at the Obersalzberg.² Stalin further expressed the opinion that England, despite her weakness, would wage war craftily and stubbornly.

5. *France:*

M. Stalin expressed the opinion that France still had an army worthy of consideration.

The Reich Foreign Minister, on his part, pointed out to MM. Stalin and Molotov the numerical inferiority of France. While Germany had available an annual class of more than 300,000 soldiers, France could muster only 150,000 recruits annually. The West Wall was five times as strong as the Maginot Line. If France attempted to wage war with Germany, she would certainly be conquered.

6. *Anti-Comintern Pact:*

The Reich Foreign Minister observed that the Anti-Comintern Pact was basically directed not against the Soviet Union but against the Western democracies. He knew, and was able to infer from the tone of the Russian press, that the Soviet Government fully recognized this fact.

M. Stalin interposed that the Anti-Comintern Pact had in fact frightened principally the City of London and the English shopkeepers.

The Reich Foreign Minister concurred and remarked jokingly that M. Stalin was surely less frightened by the Anti-Comintern Pact than

² See document No. 200.

the City of London and the English shopkeepers. What the German people thought of this matter was evident from a joke which had originated with the Berliners, well known for their wit and humour, and which had been going the rounds for several months, namely, "Stalin will yet join the Anti-Comintern Pact himself".

7. Attitude of the German people to the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact:

The Reich Foreign Minister stated that he had been able to determine that all strata of the German people, and especially the simple people, most warmly welcomed the understanding with the Soviet Union. The people felt instinctively that between Germany and the Soviet Union no natural conflicts of interests existed, and that the development of good relations had hitherto been disturbed only by foreign intrigue, in particular on the part of England.

M. Stalin replied that he readily believed this. The Germans desired peace and therefore welcomed friendly relations between the Reich and the Soviet Union.

The Reich Foreign Minister interrupted here to say that it was certainly true that the German people desired peace, but, on the other hand, indignation against Poland was so great that every single man was ready to fight. The German people would no longer put up with Polish provocation.

8. Toasts:

In the course of the conversation, M. Stalin spontaneously proposed a toast to the Führer, as follows:

"I know how much the German nation loves its Führer; I should therefore like to drink to his health."

M. Molotov drank to the health of the Reich Foreign Minister and of the Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg.

M. Molotov raised his glass to Stalin, remarking that it had been Stalin who—through his speech of March of this year,³ which had been well understood in Germany—had introduced the reversal in political relations.

MM. Molotov and Stalin drank repeatedly to the Non-Aggression Pact, the new era of German-Russian relations, and to the German nation.

The Reich Foreign Minister in turn proposed a toast to M. Stalin, toasts to the Soviet Government, and to a favourable development of relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.

9. On parting, M. Stalin addressed to the Reich Foreign Minister words to this effect:

³ On Mar. 10, to the Eighteenth Party Congress; see vol. VI of this Series, document No. 1.

The Soviet Government take the new Pact very seriously. He could guarantee on his word of honour that the Soviet Union would not betray its partner.

HENCKE

No. 214

610/248244-45

The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Slovakia

Telegram

Copy¹

MOST URGENT

No. 134

BERLIN, August 23, 1939.

zu Pol. I 1007 g.Rs.² Ang. I.

Drafting Officer: Counsellor von der Heyden-Rynsch.

With reference to today's telephone conversation.³

Please communicate the following to the Slovak Government immediately:

According to information available here, Polish operations against the Slovak frontier can be expected at any time. In order to protect Slovakia from surprises, the German Government request the Slovak Government to declare themselves at once in agreement that:

1) the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army should at once assume control over the Slovak Army in order to safeguard the northern frontier of Slovakia;

2) the Commander-in-Chief of the German Luftwaffe should assume control of the airfield at Zipser-Neudorf, and, if need be, he may also issue a general order grounding aircraft of the Slovak air force.

In this connection please draw attention to the fact that, in view of a possible conflict with Poland, if the Slovak Government showed us the loyal cooperation we expect, we would be prepared:

1) to guarantee their frontier with Hungary;

2) to work for the return of the frontier regions lost by Slovakia to Poland in the autumn of 1938,⁴ should Poland enter a war against Germany;

3) to give a pledge that, should Poland go to war with Germany, the Slovak armed forces will not be employed outside Slovakia.

You should ensure that the Slovak Government give their assent

¹ The copy here printed was sent to Kordt by Woermann with the following minute (610/248244): "The enclosed telegram of instructions originated as follows: The OKW informed the Foreign Ministry of the Führer's decision, as shown in the present telegram to Bratislava, which General Barckhausen was to transmit to the Slovak Government. At the instigation of the Foreign Ministry the Bratislava Legation was brought in as shown in this telegram. The State Secretary is informed."

² According to the registry, a communication from the Operations Office of the High Command of the Wehrmacht of Aug. 23 received this number, but the communication has not been found.

³ Not found.

⁴ See vol. IV of this Series, documents Nos. 5, 6 and 7.

to the measures requested above immediately and without loss of time. Please make the political communications in strictly confidential form.

When you have made these basic declarations you should refer the Slovak Government to General Barckhausen regarding the details, and especially as concerns the question of employing German air force units for the protection of lines of communication.

Report by telegram.

WOERMANN

No. 215

7985/E575301-04

The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 458 of August 23

PARIS, August 23, 1939—[11:55 p.m.]¹

Received August 24—12:10 a.m.

P. 10480.

This afternoon's press prints the following revealing commentaries and facts on the further development of the attitude here towards the project of a German-Russian non-aggression pact. In a leading article *Le Temps* exhorts its readers to keep a cool head, and complains of the deceitful methods employed by Germany and Moscow. The following passages are especially important: One can love peace without fearing war "if this is forced on one by the enemy". At all events no imprudent act must be committed and no pretext given to the totalitarian States to confuse responsibilities; instead we must champion the defence of justice and peace for all. The current German-Russian Pact negotiations and Ribbentrop's personal visit to Moscow "represent such new factors in the international situation that much that yesterday seemed completely out of the question would now become possible, for good and for evil". Hitler's ideological *volte-face* was calculated to shake the foundations of trust and the prestige of the Third Reich, but, looked at internationally, "it is possible that the German manoeuvre may result in a fundamental change in the international situation".

Journal des Débats sees in Germany's veering towards Moscow merely a manoeuvre to pacify German feeling at home and to intimidate Europe and Poland. The manoeuvre had missed its objective. It had complicated but not substantially altered the international situation. For the rest, the paper indulges in invective against Russia.

The London correspondents of *Paris Soir* and *L'Intransigeant* concur in reporting that the British Government have now no illusions

¹ Taken from the Paris draft (9887/E693545-47).

left about Moscow. The *Paris Soir* correspondent writes that London no longer believes in any further success for the military talks with Russia, even if the German-Russian Pact leaves open the possibility of their continuation; London's confidence in Moscow is dead, once and for all. The correspondent of *L'Intransigeant* even says that in London the latest development is taken to indicate that an effective alliance between Moscow and Berlin is in the making, for which Poland and the Baltic States would have to pay a shameful price. On Tuesday morning Colonel Beck requested the British and French Ambassadors to silence all those who were ascribing the German-Russian *rapprochement* to Poland's refusal to allow the passage of Russian troops, by saying that the protocol of the negotiations with Moscow on this matter would be published. According to this protocol the Soviet Russians had demanded, not only the right of transit, but also the permanent, and, in their eyes, final occupation of the Baltic States, as well as of the Ukrainian provinces of Poland. The document with this protocol now belongs to history.

Reporting on the mood in the capital of the British ally, the London correspondent of *Paris Soir* says that no one there is blind to the difficulties which, following Russia's defection, British military aid for Poland would encounter in the face of a German attack, especially now that Poland's every outlet to the sea is in question. The London correspondent of *L'Intransigeant*, on the other hand, emphasizes that Britain is not showing any sign of weakness or wavering. She took the blow without turning a hair, but, together with France and Poland, is preparing to deliver a fiery reply.

BRÄUER

No. 216

1570/380067-68

The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, August 24, 1939 [1:30 a.m.]¹

No. 459 of August 23

Received August 24—1:45 a.m.

1. The Présidence du Conseil announced on the evening of August 23 that, as a result of the international situation, the Government had decided to complete the military measures already taken² by calling up a further contingent of reservists. According to a Havas report, the call-up is to be announced tonight by placards posted outside town halls and on hoardings [*Anschlagssäulen*]. For details of mobilization measures see reports from the Service Attachés.³

¹ Taken from the Paris draft (2273/479638-39).² See also document No. 184.³ Not found.

2. A reliable confidential agent has learned from circles comprising . . . (group mutilated)⁴ civil servants that, if the mobilization measures adopted were continued, general mobilization would probably already be effective when the Order is published. The arrest of a number of nationals of the Axis Powers, whose names appear on a list, is provided for on the very first day of mobilization.

3. I have heard the following from a well-informed non-German foreign correspondent: The foreign press was urgently requested yesterday not to forward any report, not even a confidential one, to their editors on the mobilization in progress. He had the definite impression that authoritative French circles were not yet clear as to whether, in view of the present strategic position and strength of Germany, Britain and France would be strong enough to undertake military intervention against Germany on the outbreak of a German-Polish conflict. The decision would be decisively influenced by the scope of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact. A factor in this was whether the Russians would reserve the right to denounce the Pact at any time in the event of aggression by Germany. The realization that the position of Britain and France as great Powers was menaced by further German advances was driving them towards a decision by force of arms. On the other hand they were well aware of the weak spots for the democracies in the event of war, and were apparently beginning to have doubts as to America's attitude. The chances of peace or war were regarded as fifty-fifty in French political circles at present. The Foreign Ministry here expects that Germany will present Poland with an ultimatum in a very short time.⁵

BRÄUER

⁴ The Paris draft here reads: "comprising higher civil servants".

⁵ Marginal note: "Telephoned to Salzburg, 24/8 9:40 a.m. Küster."

No. 217

388/211538

The Chargé d'Affaires in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 173 of August 23

WARSAW, August 23, 1939.¹

Received August 24—9:20 a.m.

Pol. V 8251.

The news of the forthcoming conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union has caused the greatest sensation here. The Polish press, it is true, is trying to belittle the importance of this event, and statements by authoritative officials of the Polish Foreign Ministry, which have so far become known, also show that people do not wish to let themselves be upset by this new

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

success for German foreign policy. Still it is plain to all here that, by pulling out this "prop in the structure erected against aggressors", the position of the encirclement Powers is impaired.

Poland's confidence in British and French assistance in the event of war is, notwithstanding, unshaken. The Ambassadors of the two Western Powers gave the Polish Foreign Minister assurances with regard to this again yesterday. It is disputed here that on this occasion pressure was also exerted on Beck by the British in the direction of an agreement with Germany. At any rate, diplomatic circles expect that, in view of events in Moscow, Great Britain will begin to make efforts of this kind here very soon.

WÜHLISCH

No. 218

2821/548915-16

Circular of the Foreign Ministry¹

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, August 23, 1939.
e.o. Pol. V 8139.

Since March of this year information has reached the Foreign Ministry of over 1500 instances of excesses committed against Reich Germans and *Volksdeutsche* in Poland. A list of 39 particularly serious cases is attached² with the request that it should be used in any way that may appear appropriate. The description of the particular attacks and cases of ill-treatment is based on investigations by the official German representatives in Poland.

By order:
WOERMANN

¹ Addressees were the Embassies in Ankara, Brussels, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome, the Holy See, San Sebastian and Washington; the Legations in Athens, Berne, Belgrade, Budapest, Bucharest, The Hague, Helsinki, Copenhagen, Kovno, Lisbon, Oslo, Tallinn, Riga, Sofia and Stockholm, and the Consulate at Geneva.

² Not printed (2821/548918-26).

No. 219

2361/488856

The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Turkey

W 1352 g.

BERLIN, August 23, 1939.

According to a communication from the High Command of the Wehrmacht, the Führer, after hearing a report from Colonel General Keitel, has agreed that new contracts for deliveries of war material may also be concluded with Turkey. Arms such as could be used against us must not be included.

The OKW thereupon agreed to certain deliveries of powder, as well as to the conclusion of a transaction in respect of anti-aircraft predictor equipment.¹

By order:
KALISCH

¹ Marginal note in Papen's handwriting: "As a result of my report made to the Führer on 21/9 [sic]." No record of this interview has been found.

No. 220

52/35130-31

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 23, 1939.

The Italian Ambassador called on me today on his return from Italy. The purpose of the visit was, amongst other things, to give information about the reasons why Count Ciano had wanted to speak to the Reich Foreign Minister on August 21.¹ At noon on August 20 the British Ambassador in Rome had made a communication to the Italian Government stating that the British Government were ready for a conference on the Polish question if such a proposal came from another quarter. Poland would have to take part in such a conference as a State on an equal footing. The Soviet Union would also be invited. In conclusion it is stated that the British Government nevertheless have doubts whether such a conference would have any success, and that the Führer is probably opposed to conferences.

Signor Attolico handed me in strict confidence, and, as he said, without any instructions from his Government to do so, the enclosed document containing the proposals submitted in writing by Sir Percy Loraine on August 20.

WOERMANN

[Enclosure]

August 20, 1939—1:00 p.m.

In these grave circumstances it is the duty of all men who will face the facts, who can foresee and visualize the consequences of general war, to leave nothing undone which may still prevent the outbreak of war.

The Italian Government may rest assured that His Majesty's Government would be glad, as always hitherto to see an agreed solution reached through free negotiations on equal terms between Germany and Poland, and they would at all times lend their influence to create the conditions in which such a negotiation might be possible.

¹ See document No. 154.

In the present state of tension it will clearly be most difficult to create those conditions. The first essential is that time should be given for the atmosphere to improve.

Suggestions have been made in certain quarters for a conference on some basis to be decided on. If such a proposal were authoritatively put forward, His Majesty's Government would hold the view that in any conference that would deal with Polish interests, Poland must participate on an equal footing. In present circumstances His Majesty's Government would also have to propose Soviet participation. If such a proposal were considered at all by the Italian and German Governments, they might wish to propose the inclusion of yet other States. His Majesty's Government therefore, although they certainly do not wish to exclude a proposal for a conference, necessarily have some doubt whether it would in fact lead to a good result. It has moreover been their understanding that Herr Hitler was averse to conferences.²

² The original of this enclosure is in English, see also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, Nos. 117 and 219, and *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, Nos. 79 and 98.

No. 221

259/169777-78

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 23, 1939.

Herr Schoene¹ called on me today accompanied by a British citizen named Cotton, who had originally wanted to see the State Secretary, and said he had been referred to me by Herr Stahmer.²

Mr. Cotton, who, as he said, had flown here in his own plane and intended to fly back to London at once, asked whether he could be put in touch with Field Marshal Göring, in order that the latter might come to England incognito. He had discussed this matter with authoritative Englishmen and had corresponded with Lord Halifax. He showed me a handwritten letter from Lord Halifax in which he, in reply to Cotton's letter, informed the latter, in somewhat cool terms, that he was willing to see the personage referred to should he come to England. The name of the Field Marshal was not mentioned in the letter. Mr. Cotton declared that it referred to him.

I told Mr. Cotton that such well-intentioned private efforts at mediation were nothing new, and that I could not hope for any result from them. Besides it was surely obvious that a private journey to England by the Field Marshal incognito was outside the bounds of

¹ Not identified.

² Presumably Hauptreferent Stahmer of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop and also of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

possibility. Mr. Cotton then discussed several other possible cases in which he wanted to play a part as mediator. I told him that all these things were out of the question, especially as the Führer had today had an official conversation with the British Ambassador³ concerning the German-British question.

WOERMANN

³ See document No. 200.

No. 222

610/248240-41

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IVa

BERLIN, August 23, 1939.

The Slovak Minister¹ called on me today and spoke as follows:

Various rumours representing the Slovak State as a bargaining counter in German policy had of late been circulated from time to time in foreign countries. These rumours had been taken up in a whispering campaign and passed on. The Slovaks for their part had repeatedly taken the opportunity to contradict these rumours. It was thought, however, that the rumours could be dealt with still more effectively if a *démenti* came from the German side.

The Minister added that he requested that the question be treated as a matter of urgency, and asked to be informed of the Foreign Ministry's decision. In the event that the Foreign Ministry were prepared to accept this suggestion, the Minister gave me the enclosed draft of an announcement.

I promised the Minister that his suggestion would be studied here.

HEINBURG

[Enclosure]

The Reich Foreign Ministry categorically denies all rumours which represent the Slovak State as a bargaining counter in German policy.

All too transparent tendentious reports cannot deflect the German Reich from the exemplary German-Slovak cooperation which is firmly anchored in the German-Slovak Treaty of Protection.²

¹ Matúš Černák.

² Of Mar. 18/23; see vol. VI of this Series, document No. 40.

No. 223

174/136063-65

*Unsigned Memorandum*Drafting Officer: Prince Urach.¹

BERLIN, August 23, 1939.

Prince Urach today drew Ambassador Oshima's attention to two points of complaint against Adachi, the Domei representative, namely:

1. An alarmist report sent to Tokyo concerning a partition of Poland secretly agreed upon in the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, the completion of German military preparations, and the impending campaign, which had long been planned and which had received impetus from the Non-Aggression Pact and the consequent neutrality of Moscow.

2. The provocative questions asked by Adachi and his aggressive remarks at the press conference at the Propaganda Ministry, which had encouraged the other foreign journalists to ask further insidious questions.

The Ambassador took note of the alarmist report submitted and explained that, on August 22, he had summoned three Japanese journalists, namely the representatives of Domei (Mr. Eijirir—apparently Adachi could not be contacted), *Asahi* and *Nichi Nichi*, and urgently advised them to be cautious in their reports, since he, Oshima, could not yet ascertain the scope of the Non-Aggression Pact and its repercussions on German-Japanese relations. Moreover the attitude of the Japanese Government towards the conclusion of the Pact was not yet defined. Double caution was therefore advisable in press reports during this difficult period. The journalists had promised to follow this advice. It was very regrettable that Adachi had not been present.

In reply to statements by the drafting officer that Adachi was certainly not doing the Japanese cause any good by this policy of his own, that he was only rousing the Germans against himself and Japan by voicing his anger at the conclusion of the Pact, and was providing foreign journalists with material for tendentious reports, the Ambassador retorted that it was quite clear that the powerful public opinion in Japan, which had come to think more and more in terms of the Anti-Comintern Front, had been most profoundly surprised and disappointed by Germany's sudden conclusion of a pact with Japan's arch-enemy, and that this was only natural, since the Pact was regarded as a moral breach of the Treaty.

Oshima told the drafting officer personally that he, too, was profoundly disappointed at not having been taken into our confidence

¹ Head of Press Division VIII.

regarding the negotiations. He had only learned of the *fait accompli* through the telephone call from the Reich Foreign Minister.² This made his position [as regards] his Government extremely difficult. The Berlin representative of the United Press had appeared at the Japanese Embassy today and asked for confirmation of Oshima's intention to resign. Oshima had, however, caused all reports of this kind to be categorically denied, which, he added confidentially, he would have done even if these rumours had been true. It was his duty not to aggravate the awkward situation outwardly, and first of all to carry out the instructions of his Government and ascertain the scope of the Pact. Therefore he had been present when the Foreign Minister left by air,³ but had not received any satisfactory answer so far.

When the drafting officer asked how the *Asahi* representative had been able to report that Oshima had not been informed about the negotiations, the Ambassador was not very sure of himself and explained that it had not been his intention at all to bring this regrettable fact to the knowledge of the Japanese public. The further arguments put forward by Oshima did not sound very convincing.

In conclusion the Ambassador promised to reprimand Adachi and warn him to stop sending alarmist reports in future, and to refrain from asking invidious questions, and also from making disgruntled remarks directed at Germany.

² See document No. 186.

³ See document No. 183.

No. 224

97/108549

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

BERLIN, August 23, 1939.

In accordance with a suggestion by Gauleiter Forster, the Danzig Senate passed the following resolution at noon today:¹

"The Senate is resolved to declare the Gauleiter of the NSDAP Head of the State of the Free City of Danzig."

Signatures of all the Senators.

Tomorrow morning the Senate will promulgate a decree by which the above resolution amending the constitution will become law.

President of the Senate Greiser will then personally deliver to Gauleiter Forster a letter in which a certified copy of the resolution and the decree will be brought to his notice, with the request that he assume the office of Head of the State of the Free City of Danzig. Gauleiter Forster will accede to this request.²

¹ See also document No. 197.

² For the texts of the letters exchanged between Greiser and Forster on Aug. 24, see *British Blue Book*, Cmd. 6106, No. 62.

The Senate will continue to exercise governmental powers in the Free City of Danzig and President Greiser will continue to be Head of the Senate.

The fact that Gauleiter Forster has become Head of the State of the Free City of Danzig will only be made known through the press, and foreign Governments will not be notified officially.

Copies submitted for information to:

State Secretary
Under State Secretary, Political Department
Deputy Director, Political Department
Senior Counsellor Schliep
Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Minister Braun von Stumm
Minister Dr. Altenburg

BERGMANN

No. 225

97/108550

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

BERLIN, August 23, 1939.

Vice Consul von Grolman of the German Consulate General at Danzig has just telephoned as follows:

The battleship *Schleswig-Holstein* is coming to Danzig tomorrow without previous notification to the Polish Government.¹ The ship will anchor at the Westerplatte and not at the berth prepared by the Chief Pilot (a Pole) for the visit of the cruiser *Königsberg*.

Copies submitted for information to:

State Secretary
Under State Secretary, Political Department
Deputy Director, Political Department
Senior Counsellor Schliep
Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Political Division I, Military Affairs
Minister Braun von Stumm
Minister Dr. Altenburg

BERGMANN

¹ See document No. 197.

No. 226

52/35135-41

Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsäcker

ROME, August 23, 1939.

DEAR FRIEND: I should like today to give you some additional information on the events which have taken place in German-Italian relations since my departure from Salzburg,¹ and in particular on Attolico's outpourings here and at Fuschl or the Obersalzberg since then,² even at the risk of your finding little or nothing that is new in this. As I already told you over the telephone yesterday, I was completely in the dark regarding these happenings, apart from what I learned from your telegram No. 385 of August 21,³ which was then superseded by events. My attempts to approach Attolico were unsuccessful since he evaded every meeting. On her visit to the Embassy today, which I missed, however, because I had to entertain Schwerin-Krosigk⁴ to lunch, Signora Attolico explained this to one of my colleagues by saying that during the few days Attolico was here his time had been so taken up with discussions that he could not see me.⁵ It is immaterial whether this statement is correct. Rather am I inclined to believe that the reason for his keeping out of my way was to be found in the desire of his two superiors that there should, at this stage, be no deviation from the line taken in Salzburg.

It was all the more valuable to me when, last night, reports on what has been happening behind the scenes here during the last few days reached me from a confidant with direct contacts in the Palazzo Chigi, and who has proved reliable for over a decade and a half. I reproduce below in German translation his information just as it reached me. You will see from this that I must correct the information in my letter to you of yesterday⁶ concerning the interpretation of Ciano's observations given in my telegram No. 352,⁷ by saying that, although the Duce is no longer considering any suggestion whatsoever of making a gesture to Paris or London, on the other hand, with regard to us, he has no intention of being satisfied with what Ciano brought from Salzburg.⁸ You will have been right about the view you recently expressed to me, that at the Obersalzberg Ciano did not speak

¹ i.e., on Aug. 13, when he returned with Ciano, see documents Nos. 71 and 126.

² No material on these conversations of Attolico's has been found in the German Foreign Ministry archives, but see *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, Nos. 59, 87, 100-102, 108 and 116.

³ Document No. 154.

⁴ Reich Finance Minister, who had arrived in Rome on Aug. 20; see also document No. 227.

⁵ See document No. 90. Attolico had returned to Rome again on Aug. 20; see *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, Appendix I, Part II.

⁶ Document No. 190.

⁷ Document No. 98.

⁸ See Editors' Note, p. 35, and documents Nos. 43 and 47.

with the "franchise brutale" he described to me⁹ but succumbed, even more than he admitted, to the manner in which the Führer expressed to him his conviction that a German-Polish conflict would be localized.

My informant described the Duce's mood during the days between Ciano's return from Salzburg and the announcement of the impending Moscow non-aggression pact as follows:

The situation had become more critical. Ciano had interrupted his stay in Albania and returned to Rome unexpectedly.¹⁰ Long and very important conversations between Mussolini, Ciano and Attolico ensued immediately in the Palazzo Venezia and the Palazzo Chigi.¹¹

The Italian thesis was that the Pact of Alliance between Italy and Germany had been concluded on the basis of that verbal agreement that war should be avoided during the first three years. But now, at least in the eyes of those directing Italian foreign policy, and of Italian diplomats, Germany was in the act of provoking a war and was thus not honouring this obligation. In this way Germany was acting solely on her own initiative without taking into account the interests and wishes of the other party to the Treaty. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that the other party to the Treaty would follow obediently and allow herself to be drawn blindly into such developments.

As far as Italy was concerned, she was in no position to desire a war this year, because conditions were entirely unfavourable for a successful outcome. Indeed, on the assumption that a war was not imminent, and primarily because she felt certain that allied to Germany she was in a position to impose respect for peace on the whole of Europe, Italy had embarked on a large-scale programme of public works. This extended to Albania, Ethiopia and Sicily and, in view of the International Exhibition, also to Rome. All this meant the investment of many tens of thousands of millions and Italy's finances were in no state to bear the burden of a war this year, especially as the country had actually had to bear the burden of war for five years already. On the other hand the Italian Navy possessed altogether only two battleships at present, and the tonnage under construction required for its completion those years of peace which were provided for in agreement with Berlin. The artillery, too, was far from being ready. The Italians would, moreover, be forced to go to war with guns having a range of 6 km., while that of the French guns was 12 km.

Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop had stated in Salzburg that Germany would withdraw to defensive positions in the West, but, in the Duce's opinion, that would allow the French and British to

⁹ See document No. 126.

¹⁰ See document No. 145, also the *Ciano Diaries*, entries of Aug. 19 and 20, 1939.

¹¹ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, Appendix I, Part II, entries of Aug. 20 and 21.

descend on Italy with all the forces at their disposal. This would result in a situation in which Italy would have to bear the whole brunt of the war, in order to give the Reich the opportunity of liquidating the affair in the East, and Mussolini did not believe that Poland could be liquidated in a few weeks. The reports from the Italian military attachés did not agree with the optimistic expectations expounded by the Reich Foreign Minister to Count Ciano at Salzburg.

Furthermore, what the Italians had learned about the attitude of the Western Powers did not tally with German views. Berlin held the view that France and Britain would not intervene; Rome, on the other hand, considered it beyond doubt that both would intervene at once, and the United States too after a few months.

The first result of English-French intervention would, however, be an aerial and sea attack on those transports which were to take reinforcements and material to Libya. The recent Italian naval manoeuvres carried out with the support of the Air Force had shown that, although Italy was in a position to paralyse English and French merchant shipping, Italian shipping too would be placed in an exceedingly difficult, in fact almost impossible, position, so much so that, of the shipping from Sicily to Libya, at the most one or two vessels out of ten would reach their destination. In short, at the moment Italy was not so favourably placed in any direction that she could face a war. For these reasons she was obliged to oppose a policy which could only lead directly to war.

It should not be forgotten either that the alliance was based on full equality between the two parties, therefore the decision to go to war would have to be made by both of them. On the other hand, Berlin seemed to interpret the alliance in such a way that directives for common policy would be dictated by the Wilhelmstrasse, and Rome as junior partner would merely have to obey.

For all these reasons it was essential to avoid war now, or at least to postpone it for the next few years, in accordance with the verbal agreements reached between Rome and Berlin. The Duce had therefore come to the decision to send Ciano to Germany again without delay, in order to clarify the situation so that all action taken should be by joint agreement. According to what my informant said, the Duce has given Ciano the watchword: "Friends and allies, yes; slaves, no."

Practically all that Ciano told me as having been put forward by him during his conversations at the Obersalzberg recurs in this account by my informant. If, therefore, this second meeting had materialized, he could scarcely have added any new factor now, if he really spoke recently as he claims to have done. The difference between ourselves and the Duce in assessing the situation lies precisely in the initial question: Will Britain and France remain inactive or

not? The Duce seems to deny it with the same certainty as we affirm it, and in spite of the fact that Ciano has certainly not omitted to describe to the Duce, just as he did to me, his impressions of the Führer's unshakable conviction.

It was in the midst of this situation, continued my informant, that the news came of the impending Moscow non-aggression pact. Even though matters had been partly foreseen from the confidential information given by the Reich Foreign Minister to Count Ciano in Salzburg, it immediately produced the impression that the situation had radically changed. This new action by the Reich meant a tremendous success. The policy of encirclement was bankrupt. Britain and France had received a fatal blow, whereas the policy of the Axis had been reinforced. There was nothing left for Poland now but to negotiate with Germany. But even assuming that the Poles still had time for such negotiations, most people here believed that they did not wish to negotiate.

In the new circumstances the Italian attitude would be determined as follows: If no conflicts result from the Danzig problem, there would be no occasion for Italy to take action. If, however, it came to a conflict, Italy would come forward with a plan of action.

What this plan of action will consist of is only hinted at quite vaguely by my informant and seems to revolve round the word Croatia. It does not seem improbable to me that the Italians have something in mind in this direction, also because Ciano let slip the word Greater Albania in his speech in Tirana, which was after all surprising in view of current Italian-Yugoslav relations, and therefore was probably suppressed on publication (according to information from Pannwitz at Tirana).¹²

You will perhaps find this account somewhat long. In spite of this, however, it seemed to me important to give it to you because in my opinion it gives a really instructive picture of what has taken place here in recent days.

I shall be calling on Ciano this evening at his own request and will then perhaps supplement this letter with a telegram.¹³

There is no need for me to draw particular attention to the necessity for keeping secret the source of my information.

With best wishes and Heil Hitler,

Yours etc.,

MACKENSEN¹⁴

¹² Not found.

¹³ See document No. 212.

¹⁴ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Submitted to the Führer."

No. 227

472/228626

*Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsäcker*ROME, August 23, 1939.¹

DEAR FRIEND: When he lunched with me today Count Schwerin-Krosigk gave me an account of his conversation with Count Ciano who received him at the Palazzo Chigi this morning. I asked him to take advantage of the air courier, who is leaving tomorrow, to forward Ciano's important statements to the Reich Foreign Minister and to have a copy sent to you direct in order to ensure that full use is made of them quickly. Count Schwerin-Krosigk acceded to this request and has just had the two enclosed letters² sent to me for onward transmission.

With best wishes and Heil Hitler,

Yours etc.,

MACKENSEN

¹ This letter was initialled and marked "Under State Secretary, Political Department" by Weizsäcker on Aug. 25.

² The copy for Weizsäcker is the one here printed as enclosure; Ribbentrop's copy has not been found.

439/221102-03

[Enclosure]

ROME, August 23, 1939.

DEAR HERR VON RIBBENTROP: First of all my cordial and sincere congratulations on the great success attained with the Russian Pact.

This morning at 10 o'clock I had a conversation with Count Ciano and, as agreed, am herewith informing you of its tenor.

After the usual words of welcome Count Ciano immediately spoke about foreign policy and stressed the importance of your visit to Russia. Nevertheless, in the event of Germany's intervention in Poland, England and France would, in his opinion, immediately join in the war. The Ambassadors of both Powers had just confirmed this to him expressly and very seriously. This created a very serious situation. For actually the Axis was not yet sufficiently prepared, above all, economically. Only in three to four years—Count Ciano corrected himself and said with strong emphasis "in three years"—would it be ready for war. We should certainly have initial military successes; but the enemy would survive these and would wage a war of attrition of long duration, primarily along economic lines. To my objection that the Führer was of a different opinion and did not believe in a war with England and France, Count Ciano replied that he was aware of that, but that he was afraid that the Führer would not be proved right this time. When I replied that it was completely intolerable for a great nation to look on passively any longer at the

systematic [? ill-] treatment of Germans by Poles, that therefore a solution of the Polish problem was absolutely necessary and that the whole German people was of one mind on that score. Count Ciano retorted that a great deal would depend upon the attitude of the Axis peoples. For it would be necessary to fight with the utmost tenacity, since, in the event of defeat, we would have to count on a peace which would practically mean the end of the Axis Powers. Count Ciano concluded the conversation by stating that, despite the great diplomatic success of the Russian Pact, he considered the situation to be very serious.

My audience with the Duce will take place tomorrow at 7 p.m. On Friday morning³ I shall return to Berlin.

Heil Hitler,

Yours, etc.,

COUNT SCHWERIN-KROSIGK

[In handwriting:]

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: In view of the absence of Herr von Ribbentrop, I am sending you direct a copy of my letter addressed to him.

L. KROSIGK

³ i.e., Aug. 25.

No. 228

F11/0048-50

Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desirous of strengthening the cause of peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R., and proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the Treaty of Neutrality, which was concluded between Germany and the U.S.S.R. in April 1926, have reached the following agreement:

Article I

The two Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any act of violence, any aggressive action and any attack on each other either severally or jointly with other Powers.

Article II

Should one of the Contracting Parties become the object of belligerent action by a third Power, the other Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support to this third Power.

Article III

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties will in future maintain continual contact with one another for the purpose of con-

sultation in order to exchange information on problems affecting their common interests.

Article IV

Neither of the two Contracting Parties will join any grouping of Powers whatsoever which is aimed directly or indirectly at the other Party.

Article V

Should disputes or conflicts arise between the Contracting Parties over questions of one kind or another, both Parties will settle these disputes or conflicts exclusively by means of a friendly exchange of views or if necessary by the appointment of arbitration commissions.

Article VI

The present Treaty shall be concluded for a period of ten years with the proviso that, in so far as one of the Contracting Parties does not denounce it one year before the expiry of this period, the validity of this Treaty shall be deemed to be automatically prolonged for another five years.

Article VII

The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible time.¹ The instruments of ratification will be exchanged in Berlin. The treaty shall enter into force immediately upon signature.

Done in duplicate in the German and Russian languages.

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

For the Government
of the German Reich:
V. RIBBENTROP

With full power of the
Government of the U.S.S.R.:
V. MOLOTOV

¹ Instruments of ratification were exchanged on Sept. 24; see *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1939, Part II, p. 968.

No. 229

F19/182-83

Secret Additional Protocol

On the occasion of the signature of the Non-Aggression Treaty between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of the two Parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of the delimitation of their respective spheres of interest in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to the following result:

1. In the event of a territorial and political transformation in the territories belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern frontier of Lithuania shall represent the frontier of the spheres of interest both of Germany and the U.S.S.R.

In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna territory is recognized by both Parties.

2. In the event of a territorial and political transformation of the territories belonging to the Polish State, the spheres of interest of both Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narev, Vistula, and San.

The question whether the interests of both Parties make the maintenance of an independent Polish State appear desirable and how the frontiers of this State should be drawn can be definitely determined only in the course of further political developments.

In any case both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly understanding.

3. With regard to South-Eastern Europe, the Soviet side emphasizes its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares complete political *désintéressement* in these territories.

4. This Protocol will be treated by both parties as strictly secret.

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

For the Government of
the German Reich:
V. RIBBENTROP

With full power of the
Government of the U.S.S.R.:
V. MOLOTOV

No. 230

7895/E573198

The Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 349 of August 23

BUCHAREST, August 24, 1939—8 a.m.

Received August 24—1:10 p.m.

W 1428 g.

During a discussion with the Foreign Minister today I mentioned that the outstanding petroleum to the value of $1\frac{1}{2}$ million [Reichsmark] had not yet been released, although we had fulfilled conditions (cf. my telegram No. 344 of August 19).¹ In addition to this I was authorized to inform him that the 195 Zbrojovka machine-guns, for the delivery of which Minister President was pressing a week ago, had been released.² The Reich Government take it as a foregone conclusion that the delivery of petroleum would now proceed according to schedule. I added that postponement of delivery might easily give the impression that Rumania was holding back even before any conflict had broken out. Gafencu repeatedly assured me that nothing of this kind was intended and that the delay on the part of

¹ Document No. 127.

² See document No. 121.

Minister for Economic Affairs³ was due to his being overburdened with work. I requested an assurance that Rumania would do everything to maintain deliveries, even in the event of a conflict; [he] promised to appeal to the Minister President at once for the release.

Gafencu has just rung up to say that the release of the petroleum has been effected by the Minister President. I now urgently request immediate release of the machine-guns, and instructions by telegram regarding the 3.7 cm. guns, as in my yesterday's telegram.⁴

STELZER⁵

³ Ion Bujoiu.

⁴ Telegram No. 348 (not printed, 7895/E573196).

⁵ Marginal note: "This telegram [from Bucharest] was already drafted yesterday afternoon. Klugkist reported the release by telephone yesterday evening; I told him that the machine and anti-aircraft guns would be released. Ju[nker] 24/8."

No. 231

7249/E532092-93

Minute by the President of the Danzig Senate

DANZIG, August 24, 1939.

The High Commissioner, whom I had asked to pay me a visit, called on me at 11:30 a.m. today.

I told him I had again asked him to call on me in person in order to inform him that the Senate had yesterday passed a resolution requesting the Gauleiter to accept the office of Head of the State of the Free City of Danzig.¹ I had today communicated to the Gauleiter personally, as well as by letter, the resolution and the decree issued thereon, which amended the constitution in this sense. The Gauleiter had informed me orally that he accepted this office with immediate effect and had sent me written confirmation of his acceptance.

At his request, I handed the High Commissioner copies of the resolutions and correspondence.

The High Commissioner asked me whether he should report on them in a telegram to the Chairman of the Committee of Three. I replied that I must leave that to his discretion and that any reaction by that Committee to these resolutions being carried out could no longer have any effect.

Professor Burckhardt then turned to the international situation and told me about the mission with which he had been entrusted by the Führer at the Obersalzberg,² and which, at the request of the Führer, was to have been kept absolutely secret. Only the Führer, Gauleiter Forster and he (Burckhardt) were to have had any knowledge of it. Unfortunately, this fact had been passed on by Zarske³

¹ See also document No. 224.

² This visit took place on Aug. 11; see document No. 67.

³ See document No. 104.

to a German journalist. He then went on to say that the international situation was becoming more acute and that Britain's attitude had stiffened and become more attuned to war, especially since Henderson's visit to the Führer at the Obersalzberg.⁴

We then spoke about the naval visit and the prospective programme.⁵ Herr Burckhardt said that he thought of arranging a reception for the officers and Danzig guests, but he personally felt that the reception would not now take place.

He told me he had sent his children away but his wife had insisted on remaining here. He spoke about the prospects of his decision to ask the Chairman of the Committee of Three to release him from his office, now that internal political developments had run their course and those of foreign policy lay close ahead.

We parted on cordial terms and with the promise to meet again some day in private life in Switzerland or Germany.⁶

GREISER

⁴ On Aug. 23; see document No. 200.

⁵ See document No. 197.

⁶ On the same day Bergmann circulated a minute (116/66547), marked as submitted to the Foreign Minister, which reads as follows: "This morning Greiser, the President of the Danzig Senate, officially informed Professor Burckhardt, the League of Nations Commissioner for Danzig, that the Gauleiter of Danzig has become the Head of the State in the Free City of Danzig. On this occasion M. Burckhardt told Herr Greiser that it was his impression that Britain's determination to go to war had been further strengthened as a result of Ambassador Henderson's visit to the Führer. Senate President Greiser—apparently at the Gauleiter's instigation—advised M. Burckhardt privately to leave Danzig soon."

No. 232

97/108551

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

BERLIN, August 24, 1939.

[Pol. V 8512].¹

Vice Consul von Grolman, of the German Consulate General Danzig, reported at midday today that the Danzig-Polish negotiations on the question of Customs Inspectors had been broken off by the Poles today. Herr von Grolman could not give any details yet.

Copies submitted herewith for information to:

State Secretary
Under State Secretary, Political Department
Deputy Director, Political Department
Senior Counsellor Schliep
Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Political Division I, Military Affairs
Minister Braun von Stumm
Minister Dr. Altenburg

BERGMANN

¹ Taken from another copy (7693/E548507).

No. 233

259/169780

The Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 318 of August 24

LONDON, August 24, 1939—1:15 p.m.

Received August 24—2:35 p.m.

For the Reich Ministry of Air—Attaché Group.

Final measures for the readiness for action of the British Air Force are being carried out.

There are no signs yet of preparations to transfer British units to France.

Mobile anti-aircraft defences, including balloon barrages, have been removed from sites hitherto occupied.

An aircraft reporting service has been set up.

WENNINGER¹
KORDT

¹ Lt. Gen. Wenninger, the Air Attaché.

No. 234

34/23279

Unsigned Memorandum

STATEMENT BY RIBBENTROP ON THE GERMAN-RUSSIAN NON-
AGGRESSION AND CONSULTATION PACT¹

Before his departure by air from Moscow² the Reich Foreign Minister said: "Formerly Germany and Russia always fared badly when they were enemies, but well when they were friends. Yesterday was a fateful day for both nations. The Führer and Stalin have decided on friendship. The Non-Aggression Pact and Consultation Pact which M. Molotov and I signed yesterday evening is a firm and unshakeable foundation on which both States will build and come into close cooperation. This is perhaps one of the most significant turning-points in the history of two peoples. An attempt was made to encircle Germany and Russia and from that very encirclement the German-Russian understanding has now emerged."

Asked what, in his view, would be the impression this Pact would make in Japan, Herr von Ribbentrop said: "I am convinced that this Pact will have good effects upon Russo-Japanese relations as well as upon German-Japanese friendship."³

¹ This statement was given by Ribbentrop to the DNB representative in Moscow; see document No. 252.

² According to Moscow telegram No. 207 of Aug. 24 (695/260296), Ribbentrop took off by air at 1:20 p.m. For a conversation he had with Rosso prior to his departure, see *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 264; no German record has been found.

³ The information in this paragraph was sent to Tokyo in telegram No. 263 of Aug. 24 (174/136068).

No. 235

2842/549705

*The Director of the Political Department to the Foreign Minister's
Special Representative in Danzig*

Teleprint

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, August 24, 1939—3 p.m.
Pol. V 8265.

For Veesenmayer.

With reference to your teleprint of August 23 for State Secretary von Weizsäcker.¹

The High Command of the Wehrmacht does not consider the arming of *Volksdeutsche* advisable, since they could not do anything against armed troops and would therefore be sacrificed in vain. Please notify the Gauleiter accordingly.

WOERMANN

¹ Document No. 202.

No. 236

388/211543

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 241 of August 24

BUDAPEST, August 24, 1939—3:20 p.m.
Received August 24—8:10 p.m.
Pol. V 8283.

The Foreign Minister read out to me the telegrams from Hungarian diplomatic representatives on the attitude taken yesterday by other Powers to the German-Russian Pact before its signature.

The French Foreign Minister stated that he had known about the German-Russian negotiations for three months and that their outcome was without doubt an incredibly great success for Germany. The European situation was very critical, he was expecting a general conflict . . . (group missing)¹ a week. Vansittart² told the Hungarian Minister,³ referring to the statement about the Cabinet meeting,⁴ that Britain would not yield in any event. Even if violence were not offered to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Poland, Britain would immediately mobilize and go into action.

The French and British had then thought that the Russians would still make considerable difficulties before signing. Their policy was

¹ The Budapest draft (8376/E591186-88) here reads "within".² Sir Robert Vansittart, Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Foreign Secretary.³ György de Barcza.⁴ Reference is to a statement issued in London after a meeting of the British Cabinet on Aug. 22, 1939.

to try to play off the Western Powers and Germany against each other.

The Rumanian Foreign Minister showed that he had been taken completely by surprise by the developments and he stated that it was a decisive factor for Rumania whether real cooperation between Germany and Russia would ensue. Poland was more than ever determined to resist, especially since British and French commitments would be honoured despite the German-Russian Pact. These [*sic*]⁵ perhaps offered the advantage that Soviet Russia might be included in any possible international conference.

Csáky then informed me that the Hungarian Government had decided, apart from doubling the frontier defence force, to mobilize the two army corps of Deb . . . (group mutilated) en⁶ and Szeged, but to keep them in their barracks for the time being. The reason for this step was the fact that Rumanian troops amounting to 80,000 men were being moved up to the Hungarian frontier. The Hungarian Minister in Bucharest⁷ would emphasize the defensive nature of the Hungarian measures to the Rumanian Foreign Minister and establish the responsibility of the Rumanian Government should the attempt to create a normal relationship between Hungary and Rumania fail owing to the present Rumanian move.

ERDMANNSDORFF

⁵ The Budapest draft here reads: "this".

⁶ The Budapest draft here reads: "Debrecen".

⁷ László de Bárdossy.

No. 237

50/202097

The Minister in Slovakia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

BRATISLAVA, August 24, 1939—3:55 p.m.

MOST URGENT

Received August 24—6:45 p.m.

No. 167 of August 24

Pol. I 1025 g. Rs.

With reference to your telegram No. 134 of August 23.¹

At 10 o'clock today, I transmitted the requests of the German Government and the confidential political communications to Minister President Tiso, Defence Minister Čatloš and Minister Polyák, representing the absent Foreign Minister.² General Barckhausen, who was also present, explained the military demands, which were accepted without protests or reservations. The Slovak Minister was obviously extremely satisfied with the proposed guarantee of the Hungarian frontier. The Slovak Government request the Government of the Reich to support also the reincorporation of the

¹ Document No. 214.

² Ferdinand Dúrčanský.

Slovak territories ceded to Poland in 1920,³ even if war should not occur between Poland and Germany. The Slovak Government will transmit this request in writing as well; they also . . . [group missing]⁴ written confirmation of the verbally proposed frontier guarantee. I request instructions by telegram on this point.

BERNARD

³ By the Decision of the Conference of Ambassadors of the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan (the Principal Allied Powers) at Paris relative to Teschen, Orava and Spisz on July 28, 1920, and under the Treaty signed at Sèvres on Aug. 10, 1920. For the texts see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 113, pp. 860-866 and 866-872 respectively.

⁴ Marginal note: "The word 'request' is apparently missing here."

No. 238

7985/E575307-09

The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, August 24, 1939.¹

No. 462 of August 24

Received August 24—4:10 p.m.

P. 10521.

The keynote of the Paris morning press is "Keep calm and stand firm", while at the same time the fact is not concealed that the situation has been aggravated by the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact and has deteriorated for France. Practically all the newspapers are endeavouring to counteract the demoralizing effect of the collapse of the much-vaunted "peace front" by giving great prominence to descriptions of the recently reported military security measures throughout the country, and particularly in the frontier districts, and are encouraging the public with references to the British Government's alleged composure and firmness.

A number of newspapers which yesterday expressed hopes of delaying tactics by Russia, or surmised far-reaching reservations for the denunciation of the Pact in the event of a Polish conflict, are today in a state of acute disappointment and resignation at the prompt conclusion of the Pact. In *L'Époque*, de Kérillis utters a fresh cry of alarm and says that France is now faced with the choice between capitulation or resistance under conditions which have now become more unfavourable and dangerous. The latter course will have to be chosen in order not to lose 100 Polish-Rumanian divisions in addition to the 40 Czech divisions lost a year ago. In *Le Populaire*, Léon Blum demands that parliament be summoned in view of the gravity of the situation. *Le Jour Echo de Paris* [*sic*] considers the idea of negotiations but drops it immediately with the remark that in her present triumphant mood Germany would not be prepared to nego-

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

tiate and, furthermore, negotiations would only end with the complete capitulation of Poland and the Allies. *L'Oeuvre* is not pessimistic, but rather thinks that the German-Russian *rapprochement* could become a constructive factor in the economic reconstruction of Europe, provided no attempt is made to solve territorial questions by force and divide up Central and Eastern Europe into a condominium under the authoritarian States.

The midday paper *Paris Midi* reflects two facets of the mood prevailing here. A perusal of the text of the German-Russian Pact, which has meanwhile been received, causes the paper to make on the one hand gloomy prophecies:

Article I is a blank cheque for Germany against Poland, and things are made more difficult by the fact that there is no escape clause as is the customary Russian practice.

Article II is Russia's pledge of neutrality in the event of a Polish conflict, and is diabolically framed to meet the possibility of English-French intervention. The whole thing is a Non-Aggression Pact expressly designed for an attack on Poland, and gives Hitler a free hand in Eastern Europe and probably also the certain prospect of deliveries of Russian raw materials in the event of a conflict. This now also explains why the Führer sent Henderson, the British Ambassador, away so abruptly from Berchtesgaden yesterday. Everything now suggests that the Führer will act immediately. Or can one still hope for intervention before the week-end? It is still possible that Mussolini will come forward with efforts for peace.

On the other side the leading article in *Paris Midi* warns against exaggerated pessimism. German policy is both brutal and pliant. It is a good sign that despite military measures the German Government are allowing diplomatic relations to continue. As long as Germany still has motives for biding her time all hope of peace is not lost. The gamblers are heavily involved but the game has not yet been played.

BRÄUER

No. 239

2721/532718-19

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 275 of August 23

WASHINGTON, August 24, 1939—5 p.m.

Received August 25—2:15 a.m.

Pol. V 8291.

The clear-cut text of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact has destroyed the last hopes here that, in certain circumstances, Russia would still hesitate to go over completely to the camp of the

Axis Powers. Public opinion continues to be so surprised and perplexed that it is still unable to take up a definite attitude to this epoch-making event. It is generally felt that America's position too has fundamentally changed. The efforts of the isolationists at this juncture to keep America out of a European conflict are increasingly finding expression, although, as in 1917, they are subjected to extreme pressure by those circles which just as energetically advocate the view that America is now more than ever resolved that she must stand by the two democracies, Britain and France. It is considered that since the defection of Russia there exists a positive danger that Britain and France may suffer a defeat which would so alter the balance of power that the independence and existence of the United States would also be in acute danger. President Roosevelt, who represents this view with the undisputed authority at his command, is, as has often been reported, determined to support the democracies with the entire moral might and material power of this continent. The question of raising the arms embargo, provided for in the supplementary [*sic*] act, plays materially but a secondary part. For the delivery of all raw materials of military importance is completely unobstructed since the expiry of the cash and carry clause.¹

In order to engage the moral might of America forthwith, Roosevelt, directly after his return to Washington, addressed a peace appeal to the King of Italy,² by which he naturally also hopes to drive a wedge between the Axis Powers.

The summoning of a special session of Congress is probable in the present critical situation; this has also been demanded by Senator Vandenberg, the leader of the opposition, in order to preserve for Congress control over the autocratic decisions of the President.

The press, which with its predominantly anti-isolationist attitude does not always completely reflect public opinion, is doing everything in its power to establish Germany's war guilt unmistakably beforehand, and thereby to propagate the idea of intervention still more strongly among the people. Significantly the *New York Times* mentions that it was confirmed at the last inter-departmental conference that an inventory of German assets in America has already been taken.

THOMSEN

¹ The so-called "cash and carry" clause (Section 2 of the Neutrality Act of 1937) had expired on May 1, 1939; see *Peace and War*, No. 83.

² For the text of this appeal, made on Aug. 23, see *ibid.*, No. 136. The King of Italy replied on Aug. 30; see *British Blue Book*, Cmd. 6106, No. 123.

No. 240

230/152012

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, August 24, 1939.

W 1422 g.

According to a telephone message from Ministerialrat Müller (Reich Air Ministry), the Field Marshal has instructed Consul General Neuhausen to advise the Yugoslavs that the contracts for the delivery of armaments can now be signed; furthermore that five more aircraft will be delivered by September 1.¹ In particular 124 anti-aircraft guns from Skoda are also included among the war material to be delivered to Yugoslavia (beyond the compass of the armaments credit).² Consul General Neuhausen has already notified the Yugoslavs accordingly.

Ministerialrat Müller stated furthermore that he had got into an awkward position as a result of the promise to the Yugoslavs regarding the anti-aircraft guns, because the Italians had meanwhile availed themselves of the offer once made to them by the Führer of delivery of anti-aircraft guns.³ The Italian Military Attaché⁴ had yesterday made urgent representations at the Air Ministry about the conclusion of the relevant contracts.

Ministerialrat Müller informed me in conclusion that a decision as to who is now to receive the anti-aircraft guns could probably not be reached until tomorrow.

Respectfully submitted herewith to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl.

KALISCH

¹ See document No. 102.² See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 620.³ See *ibid.*, document No. 703.⁴ Brig. Gen. Marras.

No. 241

8340/E590096

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Yugoslavia

Telegram

No. 208

BERLIN, August 24, 1939—6:10 p.m.

zu W III 6949.¹

1) The Reich Air Ministry states that Consul General Neuhausen has been authorized by the Field Marshal to inform the Yugoslav Government that the contracts for the delivery of arms would now be signed.²

¹ Not printed: the telegram referred to in footnote 4 below.² See document No. 240.

You should report by telegraph whether the statement has been made and includes not only air force material but all contracts envisaged under the credit agreement.

2) State Secretary Keppler requests Consul General Neuhausen now to put through the oil contracts³ also, including duty-free import.

3) With reference to your No. 234 of August 23.⁴ You should suggest to the Yugoslav Government in a suitable manner, and with reference to the anticipated generous German deliveries of arms, that they might make use of the situation at the Trepča Mines in order to obtain control of the mines. This could probably be achieved by the breakdown of arbitration negotiations and the immediate reopening of the concern under a commissioner appointed by the Government. We would be prepared to take the total output and to enter into negotiations regarding this immediately. Report by telegram.⁵

WIEHL

³ See vol. vi of this Series, document No. 615.

⁴ Not printed (8340/E590095); in this telegram Feine reported that the strike at the Trepča Mines was the subject of negotiations. In an earlier despatch of Aug. 16 (8340/E590093), he had reported that all work had ceased at the British-owned Trepča Mines.

⁵ After despatch this telegram was submitted to Clodius, who minuted on Aug. 24: "Belgrade Legation have been telephoned to take no action on this telegram till they receive instructions by telegram". A further telegram, No. 212, was sent on Aug. 25 at 11:50 p.m. (8340/E590097) which made the following changes of wording in paragraph 3: (a) The sentence beginning "You should suggest to the Yugoslav Government . . ." was altered to read: "You should sound the Yugoslav Government in a suitable manner as to whether the situation in the Trepča Mines could not be used to bring the mines under Yugoslav control". (b) In the penultimate sentence the words "to provide any requisite personnel," were inserted after "We would be prepared . . ."

No. 242

183/85940

The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 98 of August 24

BERNE, August 24, 1939—6:30 p.m.

Received August 24—8:55 p.m.

Federal Councillor Motta, who is completely restored to health, today expressed to me his pleasure and gratitude at the categorical declaration made by the Führer and Chancellor to Professor Burckhardt that Germany would respect Swiss neutrality in all circumstances.¹ He had made a report to this effect to the whole of the Federal Council. He further told me that Britain and France would agree, in fact they would certainly be pleased, if Poland were to declare that she was prepared to negotiate; but if on our side anything should be done against Poland's will, Britain and France would, in his opinion, not be able to avoid honouring their obligation to render assistance.

KÖCHER

¹ During the latter's visit to the Obersalzberg on Aug. 11, as emerges from a telegram, No. 114 of Aug. 25, sent to Berne by Weizsäcker (183/85941-43). See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. vi, No. 659.

No. 243

7895/E573204

The Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, August 24, 1939—7:40 p.m.

No. 352 of August 24

Received August 25—1 a.m.

W 1437 g.

With reference to your telegram No. 321.¹

The release ordered yesterday of petroleum to the value of 1½ million Reichsmark will take place and be charged to the 20% payment on account² on the occasion of the conclusion now impending of the Junkers and Heinkel contracts. The amount is already exhausted. The Junkers' representative authorized to sign the contract has still not arrived, although, as instructed, I promised that he would arrive on August 18.³ Please send him quickly and the Heinkel representative, also authorized to sign, so that I can apply for the release of further amounts of petroleum. I am working for the export of a normal quota of 3 million, which in our opinion is fixed too low for the third quarter. In the event of success I recommend the provision of adequate cargo space by sending instructions to Bayerischer Lloyd.

Please investigate whether increased purchases of grain are possible in order to raise the 25% quota for the fourth quarter and facilitate anticipating the quota.⁴

STELZER

¹ Document No. 162.

² See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 621.

³ See document No. 94.

⁴ In telegrams Nos. 333 and 339 of Aug. 25 and 26 respectively (7895/E573205-06), the Foreign Ministry sent further details on the position respecting aircraft contracts and grain supplies.

No. 244

97/108552

The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry

Teleprint

DANZIG, August 24, 1939—8:10 p.m.

For State Secretary Weizsäcker.

Submit immediately.

With reference to the teleprint from Gauleiter Forster to the Berghof at 12:30 p.m. today, of which I notified you at the same time,¹ I hereby inform you that a reply has been received in the meantime, according to which Points 1, 2, 3 and 5² are approved.

VEESENMAYER

¹ Not found.

² See document No. 176.

No. 245

169/82685

The Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, August 24, 1939—10 p.m.

No. 353 of August 24

Received August 25—3:20 a.m.

Gafencu informs me that he made the Hungarian Minister the offer of a non-aggression pact today. This was occasioned by the Minister's complaint about troop movements towards the Hungarian frontier which the Hungarians were obliged to counter with corresponding measures. He had repudiated the Hungarian assertions in writing. The Minister handed me a copy of the letter, which I am sending by tomorrow's courier.¹

STELZER

¹ This letter handed over by Gafencu (8378/E591199-200) was forwarded under cover of report No. 4430 of Aug. 25 (8378/E591197-98); the contents are summarized in document No. 361.

No. 246

174/136089

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 358 of August 23

Tokyo, August 24, 1939—11 p.m.

Received August 24—5:10 p.m.

Feeling in Japan is calmer. The attitude of the press is factual, it does not attack Germany or mention *rapprochement* with the opposing group. Individual newspapers intensify the demand for an immediate military alliance with the Axis Powers and describe Britain as the real common enemy. The majority of the newspapers, however, recommend continuation of the independent policy as regards China without attachment to one of the groups of Powers.

The Cabinet is said to be awaiting more precise details of the Pact. Army circles and the Foreign Ministry, while recognizing the necessity for and the effectiveness of the German step, nevertheless express grave concern over the possibility of increased Russian pressure in the Far East and hope that Germany has taken this danger into account.

All circles, especially the Army, are annoyed that Japan, a partner in the Anti-Comintern Pact, has been presented with a *fait accompli*. I am combating this touchiness by pointing out that the success of the German move could only be achieved by absolute secrecy, about which one could not be sure in view of the continued leakages by

Japanese departments in recent months. I am particularly emphasizing that the Non-Aggression Pact considerably weakens Britain's position, thus assisting Japan in her China policy which she herself has described as her chief task.

OTT

No. 247

96/107951-52

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TARABYA, August 24, 1939—11:30 p.m.

No. 243 of August 24

Received August 25—11:40 a.m.

I have just called on the Turkish Foreign Minister¹ in order to explain to him the situation which has arisen following the signature of the Russian Pact.

Reverting to my earlier warnings, I expressed my profound regret that Turkey was on the wrong side. The most significant implication of the Russian Pact was the fact that in future a blockade of the Axis Powers by Britain was impossible and that the balance of power in the European situation was tilted in favour of the Axis Powers. In view of this state of affairs Turkey should consider whether she does not, even now, wish to return to her proven policy of strict neutrality.

The Foreign Minister, apparently taken aback by the latest developments, let my observations pass unanswered.

I then asked about his Government's decision on our proposal of August 21² regarding the settlement of economic questions. The Foreign Minister replied:

Turkey might be a hundred times weaker than Germany, but she would have to reject outright a proposal of this kind. The Government could not simply cancel contracts with private individuals. If Turkey no longer had the opportunity of buying in Germany, then she naturally could not supply either. She had therefore decided to arrange for the export of her harvest to other countries by paying premiums. As I have the impression that in view of the new situation Turkey would like to remain neutral in the event of war, but at the same time maintain her economic relations, I attempted to smooth over the present difficulties, so as to avoid a complete severance of the ties with Germany.

After long arguments the following proposal was made:

The Turkish Government take cognizance of the non-delivery of war-materials and will not meanwhile raise the question of indemnity guarantees if we agree to a month's extension of the Trade and

¹ Sükrü Saracoğlu. See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 260.

² See document No. 141, footnote 5.

Payments Agreement, in the hope that at the end of this period the world situation will permit a fresh examination of the position in a calmer atmosphere than today.

I suggest that this compromise be agreed to, because by this means the Turkish Government's present disturbing interference with German banks here will be avoided, and, above all, an improvement in Turkey's political relations will remain open.

The Foreign Minister requests a decision most urgently.³

PAPEN

³ On Aug. 26 Wiehl replied by telegram (2950/576548): "Agreed."

No. 248

141/127247

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legations in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden

Telegram

- | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1) To Copenhagen No. 130 | BERLIN, August 24, 1939. |
| 2) To Helsinki No. 146 | e.o. W V 2065. |
| 3) To Oslo No. 114 | |
| 4) To Stockholm No. 150 | |

Drafting Officer: Counsellor van Scherpenberg.

To 1): With reference to your telegram No. 70 of August 21.¹

To 2)-4): With reference to my . . .²

You should ascertain, as far as possible *sub rosa*, to what extent details of economic cooperation between the Scandinavian States in the event of war were decided upon at the Brussels talks,³ and also whether decisions were taken regarding the framing of a policy of economic neutrality.⁴ Report by telegram.⁵

WIEHL

¹ Document No. 161.

² The reference has not been completed on the draft. It presumably applied to the telegram of Aug. 22 (26/16155), repeating Copenhagen telegram No. 70 (see footnote 1 above) to the addressees of the present circular.

³ See document No. 208.

⁴ On Aug. 26 a similar enquiry was addressed by telegram to the Missions at Brussels and The Hague (8470/E596094).

⁵ For the replies from Helsinki and Brussels see documents Nos. 270 and 374. The Missions at Oslo, Copenhagen and The Hague replied in the negative, as emerges from copies of their telegrams found in a file of the Brussels Embassy to which they were circulated (1602/385293). A reply from Stockholm has not been found.

No. 249

1570/380069

*The Director of the Political Department to the Embassies in
Great Britain and France*

Telegram

SECRET

BERLIN, August 24, 1939.

1) To Paris No. 388

e.o. Pol. II 1914 g.

2) To London No. 331

Regarding the question whether in view of the present critical situation Reich Germans should be advised to leave, your mode of procedure should be to advise persons who seem to be in any particular danger, especially this or that press representative, to leave unobtrusively. However, you should not give this advice generally and should act in such a way as to avoid causing alarm.¹

WOERMANN

¹ On the same day Woermann sent to the Glasgow Consulate telegram No. 8 (2840/549452) as follows: "You should arrange as unobtrusively as possible for Germans attending the Congress on Research into Heredity at Edinburgh to leave immediately."

No. 250

610/248242

The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Slovakia

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, August 24, 1939.¹

No. 135

zu Pol. I 1005 g. Rs.²

At the same time as you carry out the instructions in Pol. IV 968 g. Rs.³ relating to the security measures on Slovakia's northern frontier, you should request the Slovak Government to issue an immediate decree making the whole of Slovak territory a prohibited flying area in which all air traffic is banned. The decree must come into force on promulgation, is to be published through the usual channels there, and publicly announced simultaneously by press and radio with an explanation that any aircraft contravening the order within the prohibited flying area will run the risk of being fired upon and destroyed.

You should report by telegram when you have carried out these instructions.

WOERMANN

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

² Not found.

³ Document No. 165, enclosure 1.

No. 251

1619/387715-19

The Consulate General at Calcutta to the Foreign Ministry

No. 1756

CALCUTTA, August 24, 1939.

Received August 28.

Pol. VII 1527.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: India and a War.

The subject of "India and War" has engrossed the public here particularly deeply for some weeks. Newspapers of all shades of opinion and in all languages are writing about it almost daily and publishing numerous "Letters to the Editor" from all sections of the population; the political parties have taken up the subject and expressed their attitude to it in resolutions; the whole economic life of the country is dominated and restricted by a permanent war scare psychosis. Britain's nervousness, her feverish rearmament and her boasting about being prepared, has also spread to India, even though the practical results, the actual preparatory and defence measures, are rather scanty and inadequate. Many of the steps taken by the British Indian Government (the registration of foreigners, the transfer of British Indian troops to Egypt and Singapore, the ban on goods ordered by State-owned factories and those important for war in Germany, the laying down of an exclusively authoritarian system of government by the Governors in the provinces in time of emergency, the timid attempts to introduce A.R.P. measures, and so on) are clearly destined for the event of war between the democracies and the Axis Powers, of the early outbreak of which every Government official is convinced.

The press, which is systematically guided by Britain, and other media for forming public opinion, have taken good care to ensure that this conviction has become firmly rooted in the minds of the native population of India, together with the further conviction that it is a question of defending the good and sacred cause of democracy and the freedom of peoples against the dangerous and damnable desires of the authoritarian States to attack and subjugate peace-loving nations.

But now politically conscious India—above all Congress—is saying that Great Britain has herself betrayed the cause of democracy. She did not intervene successfully for the preservation of Abyssinia, Red Spain, Czechoslovakia and Albania; above all she has still not given India that democratic freedom which is due to her by human right; she continues to be imperialistic, and so too would be a war waged by Britain. India must not and will not in any event take

part in an imperialistic war; Indian troops must not be employed in one.¹

The Congress Working Committee accordingly passed the following resolution recently:

"The Working Committee have given their earnest consideration to the critical international situation and to the danger of war that overhangs the world in this world of crisis. The sympathies of the Working Committee are entirely with the peoples who stand for democracy and freedom and the Congress had repeatedly condemned Fascist aggression in Europe, Africa and the Far East of Asia, as well as the betrayal of democracy by British Imperialism in Czechoslovakia and Spain.

The Congress has further clearly enunciated its policy in the event of war and declared its determination to oppose all attempts to impose a war on India. The Committee is bound by this policy of the Congress and will give effect to it so as to prevent the exploitation of Indian resources for Imperialist ends. The past policy of the British Government as well as recent developments demonstrate abundantly that this Government does not stand for freedom and democracy and may, at any time, betray these ideals. India cannot associate herself for democratic freedom which is denied to her and which is likely to be betrayed."²

Since the despatch of Indian troops to Egypt and Singapore by the British-Indian Government, for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Indian territory right at its portals in the event of war, runs counter to the anti-war views of Congress, it was decided to boycott the meeting of the Central Legislature due to begin shortly and not to send Congress Deputies to it. This measure is at the same time intended as a protest against the fact that the British Government in India, against the will of Congress and in the usual fashion of course, without consulting the people and their representatives at all, has prolonged the mandate of the present Central Legislature for another year for reasons in which can likewise be seen the fear of war and a time of crisis. There is no need to mention that this protest has left the British-Indian Government quite cold at this time of increased internal political dissension and impotence among the Indian peoples, during which they are in a position to force through, against the wishes of Congress and other parties, everything which seems important to them, ranging from the Anglo-Indian Trade Pact,³ measures and laws for the defence and government of the Empire in the event of war, to the all-Indian federation which is shortly to become a reality. The split in Congress caused by the

¹ Marginal note by Rintelen: "India will stand behind Britain."

² The paragraphs in quotation marks are in English in the original.

³ The Trade Agreement signed in London, March 20, 1939. For the text see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 143, pp. 283-299.

break away of the "Forward Bloc" led by the Congress President Bose, who resigned, has been considerably widened as a result of the Congress Executive recently taking disciplinary action against Bose and declaring him ineligible to hold office for three years. Together with his still numerous supporters and partly with those newly joining him, especially in his native Bengal, he is now inevitably in much more pronounced conflict with the circles around Gandhi.

It is now by no means the case that the view reflected in the statement made by the Congress Working Committee on India's attitude in the event of war is that of all Indians, nor perhaps even of the majority of them, although it is shared by many members of other parties and many people who are not members of any party. There are many Indians—particularly in the territories inhabited by the warlike races—who advocate full support for Britain in the event of war, since she will after all be fighting against dangerous Fascism, and to join in would only mean a fight against the threatening Fascist yoke. As a matter of course, if it comes to the point, the Indian Princes will also solidly support Britain. There are, however, Indians—and their number is larger than is generally supposed—who say that India's place in a war is on the side of Britain's enemies; for only thus can freedom be gained. Indeed many recognize that authoritarian methods and friendship with authoritarian States are the right thing, and the means of salvation. Such views are only seldom heard in public, they cannot appear in the press of India, which is nominally free but is strictly supervised by the Government in this respect. For the British know too, that Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, who is otherwise not a particularly outstanding personality, recently spoke a very true word when he said that democracy was not suited to India. An authoritarian freedom movement would indeed be a great danger to British rule over India. Yet those Indians who regard this course as the right one are in general, with few exceptions, politically just as befogged by theories and are as unrealistic and just as unsystematic and unwarlike as their brothers who dream of democratic ideals.

The devoted belief in democracy of the Western-liberal type which Britain has been systematically inculcating into the Indian peoples for years, with the Congress Freedom Movement built upon it, the inevitable hopelessness of which is not recognized by those concerned, is still the best way for Britain to rule India. It will be possible for her to do so in this manner during a war as well, and a slogan reeking with humanitarianism, if sufficiently attractive, will again ensure the moral support of Indian democrats. Britain will in any case employ her Indian troops all the time and everywhere, when and where she finds it necessary. These men, who belong to quite different races from the political opponents of war, whom they despise as weak and

racially inferior, are not affected by such talk. They are soldiers by profession and not because of any political ideals.

A copy of this report is enclosed for the Embassy in London.

By order:
DR. PAUSCH

No. 252

52/35153-54

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 24, 1939.

I gave the Italian Ambassador, who called on me today, copies of Chamberlain's letter to the Führer and the Führer's reply.¹

Signor Attolico informed me of the contents of a telegram from the Italian Military Attaché in Tokyo dated August 22.² The Military Attaché was told at the Japanese War Ministry that the conclusion of the German-Soviet Treaty had aroused extreme feeling against Germany. The Treaty was a violation of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Particular exception was taken to the fact that no one in Japan had been notified beforehand.

The following appeared to be the probable consequences:

1. The fall of the Japanese Government and its replacement by a pro-British Cabinet.
2. A change in foreign policy.
3. The recall of the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin and perhaps the Ambassador in Rome.
4. The landing of fresh troops in Shantung in order to counter the Soviet threat on the Manchurian frontier.

The War Ministry's view was, furthermore, that if the Axis Powers wished to counteract this marked development they would have to act very quickly. At the time this telegram was despatched (August 22), the Japanese military authorities were not yet in possession of any reports from the Japanese Ambassadors in Berlin and Rome.

I pointed out to Signor Attolico that Ambassador Oshima had immediately received statements, first from the State Secretary, Freiherr von Weizsäcker, and then from the Foreign Minister, and in addition I repeated to him the contents of the statement which the Foreign Minister had made on this subject to the DNB representative in Moscow this morning.³

WOERMANN

¹ Documents Nos. 200 and 201.

² See document No. 212.

³ See documents Nos. 183, 186 and 234.

No. 253

73/51984-86

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IV

BERLIN, August 24, 1939.

The Hungarian Minister¹ called on me today in order to state that the Hungarian Government had, through their Minister in Bucharest,² conveyed certain explanations to the Rumanian Government, the substance of which is recorded in the attached Memorandum left by the Minister. The Minister drew special attention to, and asked that note be taken of, the fact that the Hungarian Government had stated they were now compelled to take appropriate defence measures. These defence measures consisted in a number of field units having been built up to mobilization strength and placed in a state of readiness. These units had not been moved to the frontier. The Minister could not furnish any detailed information as to the extent of these measures.

The Minister requested that the Reich Foreign Minister be informed of this.

HEINBURG

[Enclosure]

B508/1939

ROYAL HUNGARIAN LEGATION,
BERLIN, August 24, 1939.

Almost uninterrupted mobilization has been taking place in Rumania since March of this year, despite the fact that the Hungarian Government had already notified the Rumanian Government on March 25 that the military measures taken on their side had been stopped or else countermanded. The Rumanian Government stated on March 26 that they would take similar action, but regardless of this statement they are continuing their military measures. To their enquiries from time to time the Hungarian Government merely received evasive replies from Rumania.

It should be stressed that the Hungarian Government have repeatedly, and through the good offices of friendly Powers, conveyed to the Rumanian Government how much they would welcome a normalization of relations between the two countries. The Hungarian Government, however, emphasized at the same time that this was not possible as long as the Rumanian Government kept Hungarian public opinion in a state of tension by their unwarranted mobilization.

In order to prove their good will, the Hungarian Government have so far made no military dispositions and the Rumanian Government have had the opportunity of satisfying themselves of this.

According to reliable information received on August 23, mobilized

¹ Döme Sztójay.

² László de Bárdossy.

Rumanian forces are being continually concentrated along the Hungarian frontier. In view of these strong, completely unwarranted and incomprehensible military measures, the Hungarian Government are now forced to take appropriate defence measures. The Hungarian Government emphasize at the same time that they must place on the Rumanian Government the responsibility for the failure of the action already started weeks ago by the Hungarian Government for the improvement of mutual relations.³

³ Woermann sent the substance of this document to the Legations at Budapest and Bucharest in telegrams Nos. 225 and 325 respectively of August 24 (169/82687).

No. 254

116/60548

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

BERLIN, August 24, 1939.

[Pol. V 8511.]¹

Herr von Janson, the Consul General at Danzig, has just reported as follows:

1) The British Consul General at Danzig² left today without taking leave of the Danzig Senate.

2) The French Consul at Danzig³ told Herr von Janson this afternoon that he was remaining in Danzig and requested friendly treatment.

3) At the Danzig-Polish negotiations regarding Customs Inspectors, Danzig demanded the withdrawal of *all* frontier officials and a reduction in the number of the actual Customs Inspectors to between ten and fifteen (that is, by about 90 per cent). At first Poland replied that Danzig's demand would be considered. Then later the Chief Polish Customs Inspector supplied the information that the Polish Delegation had left for Warsaw.⁴

Copies herewith for information to:

State Secretary⁵

Under Secretary of State, Political Department

Deputy Director, Political Department

Senior Counsellor Schliep

Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Political Division I, Military Affairs

Minister Braun von Stumm

Minister Dr. Altenburg

BERGMANN

¹ Taken from another copy (7693/E548506).

² F. M. Shepherd, who had been in charge of the Consulate General at Danzig since July 10, 1939.

³ Guy de la Tournelle.

⁴ See also document No. 232.

⁵ This document is initialed by Weizsäcker and marked as having been submitted to the Foreign Minister.

No. 255

173/83918

Note by an Official of Political Division I

BERLIN, August 24, 1939.

Pol. I M 3799.

The OKW—Foreign Department [*Abt. Ausland*](Lieutenant Colonel Geisse) reports as follows:

The Military Attaché in Holland¹ who is staying here temporarily reports orally that:

1) Holland will maintain the strictest neutrality in the event of a conflict.

2) Provision is being made for a restriction on the export of certain raw materials.

3) Preparations are being made for laying mines in the Scheldt-Meuse area on the 24th of this month—that is today.

HEYDEN-RYNSCH

¹ Lt. Col. Rabe von Pappenheim.

No. 256

43/29605

Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop

BERLIN, August 24, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

The assertion that the British Secret Service was in a position to intercept the conversation which Count Ciano is alleged to have had with Mussolini during his last visit to Germany,¹ emanates from the British journalist, Williams, who, however, had already left Germany on Tuesday evening.

This British journalist told a neutral foreign correspondent that London was not yet convinced that Italy would afford Germany military assistance in the event of war. One could detect too many uncertain factors in Rome's policy to be convinced as yet that Italy would be certain to honour her obligations under the alliance. This view, so the British journalist said, had been strengthened in British Government quarters by the fact that the British Secret Service had succeeded in tapping Ciano's conversation with Mussolini. This conversation made the weak and vacillating nature of Mussolini's policy sufficiently plain.

On being asked whether this tapping took place on German or Italian territory, the British journalist refused to give any information. The neutral foreign correspondent gained the impression that the tapping had doubtless taken place on Italian and not on German territory.

L[IKUS]

¹ His visit to Salzburg on Aug. 11-13.

No. 257

43/29599-600

Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop

BERLIN, August 24, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

Vicomte Davignon, the Belgian Ambassador, told a Belgian press representative at noon on Thursday that the prospect was perfectly hopeless as far as peace was concerned. During the morning the Belgian Ambassador had a conversation with a British diplomat about the course of the British Ambassador's visit to the Führer.¹ The British say that Sir Nevile told the Führer plainly that, in the event of a German-Polish war, Great Britain would honour her obligations to Poland under the alliance immediately and in full. The manner in which the Führer had taken note of this was such that the British Ambassador did not believe that the Reich Government would allow themselves to be restrained from the action they intended against Poland. Sir Nevile, too, scarcely believed any longer in the possibility of peace being preserved.

The Belgian Ambassador appeared extremely depressed. The Belgian journalist saw him at a moment of deepest human emotion with tears in his eyes. The Belgian Ambassador is convinced that this war cannot be won by either side.

It was absolutely certain that Belgium intended in all circumstances to remain aloof from the war and defend her neutrality. He, the Ambassador, had asked Herr von Ribbentrop some time ago, whether he believed in the Belgian King's intention to remain neutral. He assumed that the German Foreign Minister was confident of this.

In any case the personality of the King of the Belgians was an absolute guarantee that Belgium would not become involved in the war they feared was coming.

The Ambassador stated that partial mobilization of the army would begin in Belgium today. In order not to cast doubt on the sincerity of Belgium's policy of neutrality, the army would immediately take up positions on both frontiers of the country. Therefore the Belgian Army would be just as ready to defend her neutrality on her frontier with France as on that with Germany. The Ambassador was convinced that the Belgian people would defend their policy of neutrality with unparalleled fanaticism and oppose any attack on their country from whatever side it might come.

In the event of war, Brussels' chief concern would be lest certain Powers should attempt to force the Belgian people to abandon their neutrality by starving them out. He knew that there was the same

¹ See document No. 200.

anxiety in Holland. He was, however, firmly convinced that Belgium would rather starve than allow herself to be forced into abandoning her policy of neutrality under pressure of a blockade. The Belgian correspondent was also extremely impressed by the Belgian diplomat's firm resolution and powers of conviction, and particularly as regards the fact that Brussels is obviously firmly resolved not to allow Belgium to be drawn into a possible war.

L[IKUS]

No. 258

2273/479640-42

*Unsigned Memorandum*CONVERSATION WITH PIERRE ETIENNE FLANDIN ON
AUGUST 24, 1939¹

Flandin regards the developments in foreign affairs during the last few days with deep pessimism. Nevertheless, he does not consider an eleventh hour settlement to be out of the question, if only Germany were prepared to submit acceptable proposals to Poland. The former Minister President was thus amplifying the remark, which he had already made yesterday on the telephone, that agreement between Berlin and Warsaw was within the bounds of possibility, if Berlin's action did not take the form of an ultimatum. The present tension was primarily due to the fact that Berlin had left the whole world (including the Poles) in complete ignorance of its real aims. "I believe," said M. Flandin, "that the Poles might bring themselves more easily to accept German wishes, if these were made the subject of discussion and did not have to be regarded by world opinion as the downright subjection of Poland. It is not even impossible that Warsaw, subject to certain concessions and effective guarantees, would be prepared to cede the Corridor."

In comparing the present crisis with that of September last year, it must never be forgotten that then extensive international discussion of Henlein's points² had prepared the way beforehand for the Munich Agreement.³ In the "*malaise*" of today, however, the fact that Hitler shrouded himself in mystery played a very important part from the negative point of view. Germany completely misunderstood the mentality of the French, who thought in a logical way and who were only made hostile to Germany by uncertainty. In the last few days Flandin had been in close touch with the country people, who were united in their belief that any yielding on the Polish question would not only shatter the prestige of France, but would place her very existence in jeopardy. Whereas those who had been mobilized

¹ This document was found in the files of the Paris Embassy.

² See vol. II of this Series, document No. 135.

³ See *ibid.*, document No. 675.

in September 1938 had had the feeling that there would be no fighting and that they would shortly return home to their villages, this time the majority had set out with the impression that they were leaving home for a long time, perhaps never to return. Flandin had not met one single person who had grumbled or who had even criticized in the slightest degree the measures taken by the Government. The former Minister President considered this psychological observation to be of extreme importance since he [*sic* ? it] largely determined the attitude of the Government.

Flandin considers it to be out of the question, as matters stand, for London to give way or to decide to exert pressure on Poland. The British man in the street resents as a grave and intolerable insult the fact that Germany should dispute the right of the British Empire to concern itself with the problems of Eastern Europe. It is therefore perfectly understandable for him to demand that the Government should stake their all on prestige. Berlin is making a double psychological mistake: as regards France, in that it does not pay due attention to the logical bent of the French mind, and, as regards Great Britain, because it apparently does not take her sensitiveness sufficiently into account.

It remains to be seen whether the Pact with the Soviets, apart from its diplomatic success which Flandin by no means wishes to dispute, will also stand the strain should war break out in Europe. Germany should never forget that in the Russians she has to deal with born traitors, "*qui pourraient rouler un jour l'Allemagne, elle aussi*".⁴

It might be possible to retain some hope of a peaceful settlement of the present difficulties if one could be certain that, in conjunction with his demands to the Poles, the German Chancellor would announce his views on a constructive peace in Europe and on fruitful cooperation between the nations. In this way Hitler, if his intentions were good, could prove that he was not aiming at German hegemony but that his goal was idealistic and far transcending all national interests! After all, what was at stake was not the principle involved in the problems of Danzig and the Corridor, but rather the German method of dealing with them. If the Chancellor should succeed in really convincing the nations concerned that there was no threat to their vital rights and interests, then peace might be preserved even at the eleventh hour.

⁴ i.e., "who might trick Germany too one day."

[EDITORS' NOTE: On August 24 both Houses of the British Parliament passed through all its stages the Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill, conferring upon the Executive exceptional powers to take all further measures necessary to secure public safety and the defence of the country in the event of war.]

No. 259

7693/E548508-10

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

BERLIN, August 25, 1939.

Pol. V 8513.

The Polish Diplomatic Representative in the Free City of Danzig yesterday handed two Notes to the Danzig Senate. One contains a protest against the resolution of the Danzig Senate, making the Gauleiter of Danzig Head of the State of the Free City;¹ the second is a protest against the alleged violation of Polish rights in Danzig recently. Translations of the Notes are enclosed.

Copies herewith for information to:

State Secretary
Under State Secretary, Political Department
Under State Secretary, Legal Department
Deputy Director, Political Department
Senior Counsellor Schliep
Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Minister Braun von Stumm
Minister Dr. Altenburg

BERGMANN

[Enclosure 1]²*Translation*

DANZIG, August 24, 1939.

To the Senate of the Free City of Danzig.

Herr Staatsrat Böttcher today informed the Counsellor of the Diplomatic Representation, Battaglia, of the resolution of the Senate of the Free City conferring on Gauleiter Forster the position of Head of the State of the Free City, this being confirmed in today's Danzig press. In this connection I address myself to the Senate of the Free City as the body which, in accordance with the legally binding constitution of the Free City, exercises supreme authority in that territory, in order to make on behalf of my Government the following declaration:

My Government see no legal foundation for the adoption by the Senate of the Free City of a resolution instituting a new post in the State, for which there is no provision whatever in the constitution of the Free City, and to which, as would appear, all the authorities hitherto functioning in the Free City are to be subordinated. The Polish Government reserve the right to adopt a further attitude in this respect.

¹ See document No. 224.

² See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, Nos. 245, 265 and 267.

On this occasion the Polish Government consider it necessary to remind the authorities of the Free City that they have already more than once warned the Senate of the Free City in the most decisive fashion against a policy of *faits accomplis*, the consequences of which might be most serious, and the responsibility for which would fall exclusively on the authorities of the Free City.

The Commissioner General of the Polish Republic,
CHODACKI

[Enclosure 2]

Translation

DANZIG, August 24, 1939.

MR. PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE: I have the honour to draw your attention to the fact that there has occurred recently a whole series of cases of violation by your subordinates of fundamental rights to which the Polish Republic is entitled in the Free City of Danzig and which derive from definite and formal legal principles. This happened, *inter alia*, in the course of today, when officials of various Danzig authorities arrested several senior officials of the Polish State Railways and in this way interrupted the normal administration and working of the Polish State Railways. At the same time further incidents took place when, by the use of force, the normal working of Polish Customs posts in the Free City was rendered impossible.

Without at the moment enumerating and describing in detail all the instances of violation of Polish rights which have taken place also in other spheres, and which run counter to the treaty rights and the interests of the Polish Republic in the territory of the Free City of Danzig, I am compelled to protest vigorously against the violation of Polish rights and to warn you, Mr. President of the Senate, of the consequences arising from this state of affairs which violate the vital interests and the treaty rights of the Polish Republic in the Free City of Danzig.

I avail etc.,

CHODACKI

To His Excellency

Herr Arthur Greiser,

President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig.

No. 260

B21/B004930-32

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1939—7:45 a.m.

No. 276 of August 25

Received August 26—6:00 a.m.

For Attaché Group, Army and Air.

The large-scale American army exercises, at which I have been present during the last two weeks and which have given me a comprehensive insight, confirm my previous reports that, besides lack of trained personnel, the deficiency of stocks of up-to-date war equipment is a decided weakness of the American army, and that after the outbreak of war it cannot be expected that units will be ready for use outside America under a year. Similarly the air force will not be in a position to despatch substantial units to an overseas theatre of war for twelve months. The manoeuvres, which ended on Thursday,¹ brought me into contact with all classes in the north-east of the United States of America and gave me the further impression that, in the two months which have elapsed since the retirement of the outstanding General Craig, political and Jewish forces have sought to gain decisive influence over the armed forces, especially over the Army Command which is still today the stronghold of all that is best in American life and which thinks independently. The result is the already clearly discernible uncertainty of the High Command in the face of political influence. Regard for the press overshadows military needs. In view of the scanty preparations for war the President will immediately attempt to create the necessary conditions for supporting Britain and France by delivery of arms together with delivery of raw materials, motor fuels and finished equipment. Roosevelt's messages,² which he describes as "Appeals for the maintenance of world peace," may have the military-political purpose of concealing his own weakness and, in face of public feeling, which is by no means unanimously anti-German, placing Germany in the wrong in the event of a conflict, and dissipating the view still persisting in many quarters today that Germany is only seeking her due rights. In this way also the necessary conditions are to be provided for Congress to approve the raising of the arms embargo laid down in the Neutrality Act,³ which is desired by Britain and France. The press already . . .⁴ Britain and France are obviously disappointed by the tardy delivery

¹ i.e., Aug. 24.

² For the messages addressed by President Roosevelt to the King of Italy on Aug. 23, to the President of the Republic of Poland on Aug. 24, and to Hitler on Aug. 24 and 25, see *Peace and War*, Nos. 136, 137, 138 and 139.

³ For the position under the U.S. neutrality legislation, see *ibid.*, Nos. 68 and 88.

⁴ Typewritten marginal note: "Groups obviously missing here."

of aircraft, long on order, and the output of the American aircraft industry which is severely limited as a result of American rearmament. The summoning of Congress appears to be envisaged chiefly for the purpose of amending the Neutrality Act, at latest in the case of hostilities in Europe. Furthermore I gathered from the statements which I heard during the manoeuvres, that relations between Germany and Japan are believed to have deteriorated. It appears that Roosevelt wishes to make it clear to Japan that the United States of America will make her influence felt in any coming conflict and that he intends thereby to influence the Japanese contradiction [*Gegensatz* sic ? Generals] in the interests of the United States of America. The same is being attempted with regard to the Central and South American States whose military men were greatly struck during the manoeuvres by the United States Army's lack of preparedness for war.

BÖTTICHER⁵

THOMSEN

⁵ Lt. Gen. Bötticher, Military and Air Attaché.

No. 261

52/35215-16

The Consul General at Ottawa to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 27 of August 25

OTTAWA, August 25, 1939—8:37 a.m.

Received August 26—7:50 a.m.

Prime Minister King asked that the following message be conveyed (the German text prepared here is a literal translation of the English text):

"To Herr Hitler, Reichsführer, from W. L. M. King, Prime Minister of Canada. The people of Canada are of one mind that there is no international problem which cannot be settled by conference and negotiation. They equally believe that force is not a substitute for reason, and that an appeal to force as a means of adjusting international differences defeats rather than furthers the ends of justice. They are prepared to join their authority and power to that of their fellow nations in the British Commonwealth in seeking a just and equitable settlement of the great problems with which the nations are faced.

"On behalf of the Canadian people, but equally in the interests of the whole of humanity, I join with those from other countries and Powers who have appealed to you in the firm hope that your great power and . . . (group mutilated) [authority] will be used to prevent the impending catastrophe by having recourse to every possible peaceful means to effect the solution of the momentous issues of this

period of transition and change in world affairs. Signed W. L. Mackenzie King."

When I asked whether he was addressing this appeal to Berlin only, the Prime Minister replied that he had sent a similar appeal to Rome, but realized from my question that an appeal addressed to the Axis Powers only might be wrongly interpreted as an expression of a one-sided attitude.

He would therefore address an identical message to the Polish Consul General¹ for transmission to the Head of the Government in Warsaw, and asked me to inform Berlin of this.

If possible he did not want to make the message public until its receipt had been acknowledged, and I therefore request an immediate acknowledgement by telegram.²

He answered my question about Canada's attitude in the event of war by saying that the whole Cabinet, in agreement with public opinion, was unanimously resolved to enter immediately into a war in which France and Britain were involved.

WINDELS

¹ J. Pawlica.

² An acknowledgement was telegraphed by Weizsäcker on Aug. 27 (52/35217). The messages to Hitler, Mussolini and the President of Poland appeared in the press under the date-line of Aug. 27.

No. 262

174/136054

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

TOKYO, August 25, 1939—8:40 a.m.

SECRET

Received August 25—9:30 p.m.

No. 363 of August 25

For the State Secretary.

With reference to your telegram No. 260 of August 22.¹

Today I called on the Foreign Minister in view of the great uneasiness shown by the Japanese press and public opinion over the text of the Non-Aggression Pact. I explained Germany's desire to continue to maintain friendly relations with Japan and the reasons for and advantages of Germany's action, in accordance with the instructions on language to be held in telegram No. 260. The Foreign Minister followed with particular attention my detailed statements on possible German influence with a view to easing Japanese-Russian relations, but reserved a further expression of opinion for a future conversation.

He handed me copies of the following instructions, despatched to Oshima today:

¹ Not printed; see document No. 186, footnote 5.

1) The German Government to be informed that, as interpreted by the Japanese Government, the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact had completely brought to an end the previous negotiations between Japan and Germany on a tripartite alliance with Italy;

2) the Japanese Government state that Germany's action in concluding the Non-Aggression Pact with Russia represents a serious violation of the Secret Agreement² appended to the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany. They therefore solemnly protest to the German Government.

The Foreign Minister added that Japan was forced to make the enclosed statements but she desired to continue friendship with Germany and was seeking suitable means.³

OTT

² Printed in vol. I of this Series, document No. 463, footnote 2a.

³ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 284.

No. 263

8395/E591849

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 391 of August 25

BERLIN, August 25, 1939—10:25 a.m.

Received August 25—11:45 a.m.

At midnight yesterday it was the Foreign Minister's intention, which he may well have carried out meanwhile, to inform Count Ciano by means of a direct telephone call of the extreme gravity of the situation now existing, and thus prevent the Italians from being able to speak of unexpected developments.¹

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Marginal note in Mackensen's handwriting: "The Foreign Minister got through to Ciano at 1 a.m." See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 225, and Appendix I, Part II, entry of Aug. 25, and the *Ciano Diaries*, entry of Aug. 25, 1939.

No. 264

52/35188

The Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry

Teleprint

DANZIG, August 25, 1939—11 a.m.

For immediate transmission to the Führer.

Gauleiter Forster enquires:

1) Whether on the key date [*Stichtag*] the High Commissioner may be informed that his mission is at an end and, following this, that his house can be requisitioned.

2) Whether the same steps can be taken in the case of the President of the Polish Harbour Board.

3) Whether and in what way Gauleiter Forster is to ensure the immediate departure of the two above-mentioned gentlemen.

End of message.

Please transmit simultaneously to the Foreign Minister at once.¹

VEESENMAYER

¹ No reply has been found; the High Commissioner left Danzig on Sept. 1. See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 275.

No. 265

2178/471635-37

Unsigned Memorandum

STATEMENT BY THE FÜHRER TO HENDERSON ON AUGUST 25, 1939¹

By way of introduction the Führer declared that the British Ambassador had given expression at the close of the last conversation² to the hope that, after all, an understanding between Germany and England might yet be possible. He, the Führer, had therefore turned things over in his mind once more and desired today to make a move towards England which should be as decisive as the move towards Russia which had led to the recent agreement.³

Yesterday's sitting in the House of Commons and the speeches of Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax⁴ had also moved the Führer to talk once more to the British Ambassador. The assertion that Germany affected to conquer the world was ridiculous. The British Empire embraced 40 million square kilometres, Russia 19 million square kilometres, America 9½ million square kilometres, whereas Germany embraced less than 600,000 square kilometres. It is therefore quite clear who it is who desires to conquer the world.

The Führer makes the following communication to the British Ambassador:

1. The Polish acts of provocation have become intolerable. It makes no difference who is responsible. If the Polish Government deny responsibility, that only goes to show that they no longer themselves possess any influence over their subordinate military authorities. In the preceding night there had been a further twenty-one

¹ The heading has been added in an unidentified handwriting. According to Sir Neville Henderson's Final Report, British White Paper, Cmd. 6115 (1939), he was summoned to an interview with Hitler at which Ribbentrop and Dr. Schmidt were also present. The text of the statement was delivered to the British Embassy by Dr. Schmidt in the course of the afternoon; see *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 284. See also *ibid.*, Nos. 283, 288 and 310.

² See document No. 200.

³ See document No. 228.

⁴ For the texts of these statements, see the *British Blue Book*, Cmd. 6106, Nos. 64 and 65.

new frontier incidents; on the German side the greatest discipline had been maintained. All the incidents had been provoked by the Polish side. Furthermore, commercial aircraft had been shot at.⁵ If the Polish Government stated that they were not responsible, this showed that they were no longer capable of controlling their own people.

2. Germany was in all circumstances determined to abolish these Macedonian conditions on her eastern frontier, and that not only in the interests of quiet and order but also in the interests of European peace.

3. The problem of Danzig and the Corridor must be solved. The British Prime Minister had made a speech which was not in the least calculated to induce any change in the German attitude. At the most, the result of this speech could be a bloody and incalculable war between Germany and England. Such a war would be bloodier than that of 1914 to 1918. In contrast to the last war, Germany would no longer have to fight on two fronts. The agreement with Russia was unconditional and signified a change in the foreign policy of the Reich which would last a very long time. Russia and Germany would never in any circumstances again take up arms against each other. Apart from this, the agreements reached with Russia would also render Germany secure economically for the longest possible period of war.

The Führer had always wanted German-British understanding. War between England and Germany could at the best bring some profit to Germany but none at all to England.

The Führer declared that the German-Polish problem must be solved and would be solved. He is, however, prepared and determined, after the solution of this problem, to approach England once more with a large comprehensive offer. He is a man of great decisions, and in this case also he will be capable of a great action. He accepts the British Empire and is ready to pledge himself personally for its continued existence and to commit the power of the German Reich for this, if:

(1) His colonial demands, which are limited and can be negotiated by peaceful methods, are fulfilled and in this case he is prepared to fix the longest time limit;

(2) His obligations towards Italy are not touched—in other words, he does not demand that England give up her obligations towards France and similarly for his own part he cannot withdraw from his obligations towards Italy.

(3) He also desires to stress the irrevocable determination of Germany never again to enter into conflict with Russia. The Führer is ready to conclude agreements with England which, as has already

⁵ See also document No. 355.

been emphasized, would not only guarantee the existence of the British Empire in all circumstances as far as Germany is concerned, but would also if necessary assure the British Empire of German assistance regardless of where such assistance should be necessary. The Führer would then also be ready to accept a reasonable limitation of armaments which would correspond to the new political situation and be economically tolerable. Finally, the Führer renewed his assurances that he is not interested in Western problems and that a frontier modification in the West does not enter into consideration. The Western fortifications [*Westwall*], which have been constructed at a cost of thousands of millions, were the final Reich frontier on the West.

If the British Government would consider these ideas, a blessing for Germany and also for the British Empire might result. If they reject these ideas, there will be war. In no case would Great Britain emerge stronger from this war; the last war had already proved this.

The Führer repeats that he is a man of great decisions by which he himself is bound, and that this is his last offer. Immediately after the solution of the German-Polish question he would approach the British Government with an offer.⁶

⁶ On Aug. 27 Weizsäcker communicated the substance of the document here printed by telegram to the Embassies in Rome, London and Paris (52/35236-37).

No. 266

FI/0242-44

The Führer and Chancellor to the Head of the Italian Government

Handed to the Duce at 3:20 p.m. on August 25, 1939.¹

DUCE: For some time Germany and Russia have been engaged in an exchange of views concerning a reshaping of their mutual political relations.

The necessity of achieving results in this direction was increased by:

1. The general situation of world politics in so far as this is decisive for the Axis Powers.

2. The constant procrastination of the Japanese Cabinet over taking a definite attitude. Japan had agreed to an alliance against Russia, which in the prevailing circumstances would have only a *secondary* interest for Germany, and, in my opinion, for Italy also. She had not, however, agreed to an equally definite obligation against England, and this, from the standpoint not only of Germany but also of Italy, would have been one of the decisive factors. Months ago the

¹ Another copy bears the following typewritten marginal note in Italian: "Transmitted by telephone by His Excellency the Reich Foreign Minister to His Excellency the German Ambassador in Rome with instructions to hand it personally and with the utmost speed to His Excellency the Duce." (100/64856-59) See also document No. 280.

military party had asserted that it would be able to induce the Japanese Government in a short time to take up a definite attitude towards England too, but this had not been realized in practice.

3. Germany's relations with Poland, through no fault of the Reich, but largely as a result of England's interference, have been unsatisfactory since the spring, and in recent weeks simply intolerable. The reports about the persecution of the Germans in this area are not invented press reports but represent only a fraction of the terrible truth. Poland's throttling of Danzig by a Customs policy which for weeks past has led to a complete paralysis of all trade, will destroy the City if continued even for a short time.

These reasons led me to hasten the conclusion of the German-Russian conversations. I have not yet informed you in detail, Duce, since I had no idea of the possible extent of these conversations, or any assurance of the possibility of their success.

The readiness on the part of the Kremlin to reshape its relations with Germany, which became apparent after the departure of Litvinov, has become ever stronger in the last few weeks and has now made it possible for me, after a preliminary clarification, to send my Foreign Minister to Moscow for the conclusion of a treaty which is the most extensive non-aggression pact in existence and the text of which has been made public. The pact is unconditional and includes also the obligation for consultation on all questions affecting Russia and Germany. Over and above that, however, I must tell you, Duce, that, through the agreements, the most benevolent attitude by Russia in case of any conflict is assured, and, above all, *that the possibility of intervention by Rumania in such a conflict no longer exists!*

Even Turkey in these circumstances can only proceed to revise her previous position. But I repeat once more, *that Rumania is no longer in a position to take part in any conflict against the Axis!* I believe I may say to you, Duce, that through the negotiations with Soviet Russia a completely new situation in world politics has been produced which must be regarded as the greatest possible gain for the Axis.

As to the situation on the German-Polish frontier, I can only inform Your Excellency that for weeks we have been standing by for action [*Alarmzustand*]; that, keeping pace with Polish mobilization, German preparations have naturally also gone forward; and that in case of intolerable events in Poland I will act immediately. The assertion of the Polish Government that they are not responsible for the inhuman activities, for the numerous frontier incidents (last night alone there were twenty-one Polish frontier violations), and for firing on German civil aircraft—which had already received orders to fly to East Prussia over the sea in order to avoid incidents—merely shows that the Polish Government are no longer in control of the soldiery

which they have themselves stirred up. Since yesterday Danzig has been blockaded by Polish troops, a situation unendurable in itself. In these circumstances no one can say what the next hour may bring. I can only assure you that there is a definite limit beyond which I can in no circumstances retreat.

In conclusion I can assure you, Duce, that in a similar situation I should have complete understanding for Italy and that in any such case you could be sure of my attitude from the outset.²

ADOLF HITLER

² See *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 245.

No. 267

52/35183

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 25, 1939.

As instructed, at 4:15 this afternoon by telephone I drew the British Ambassador's attention to the report published in the evening edition of today's *Berliner Börsenzeitung*, and in other evening papers, on the blood bath near Bielitz which resulted in eight persons being killed and many wounded.

WOERMANN

No. 268

22/13673

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 77 of August 25

OSLO, August 25, 1939—4:36 p.m.

Received August 25—6:00 p.m.

I have heard in confidence that Marxist circles feel the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and Russia to be a reverse blow [*sic*] for world . . . (group mutilated), since membership of the Comintern is correspondingly decimated. Agitation has already been started here by the Social Democrats. In the streets of the working-class quarter the hammer and sickle on the red flag appear sporadically with the swastika on the walls of houses. The Non-Aggression Pact will not prevent communists in other neutral States from committing acts of sabotage during the manufacture and transport of goods for Germany, since the Social Democratic trade unions have at once renewed such activities with increased vigour as a result of the defection of Communists to their [the Social Democrats'] camp.

With reference to my report of August 16, R. 7 No. 7.¹ I learn that

¹ The only relevant report of Aug. 16 which has been found is numbered R 7 No. 2 (not printed, 8568/E600182-84).

goods destined for Germany are already being produced with deliberate defects by the Norwegian trade unions, and especially the transport workers' organizations at Norsk Hydro; while general directions and an appeal for the formation of an Austrian and a Czech Legion for the French Army have been issued among Austrian and Czech immigrants into Norway in agreement with the foreign organization of the *émigrés* in Paris.

SAHM

[EDITORS' NOTE: On August 25, at 5:30 p.m., the French Ambassador, Coulondre, had an interview with Hitler, who asked him to transmit a message to Daladier. For Coulondre's account of this interview see the *French Yellow Book*, No. 242. No record of this interview has been found in the German Foreign Ministry archives.]

No. 269

141/127251

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, August 25, 1939—5:30 p.m.

No. 130 of August 25

Received August 25—6:30 p.m.

The Foreign Minister¹ received me immediately on his return from Brussels and informed me that the King of the Belgians had been empowered by the members of the Conference² to take steps towards mediation. The Foreign Minister thought that the King would probably bring pressure to bear on Rome.

BLÜCHER

¹ Elias Erkko.² The Conference of the Oslo Powers at Brussels. See document No. 208.

No. 270

26/16169

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

HELSINKI, August 25, 1939—5:31 p.m.

No. 131 of August 25

Received August 25—6:30 p.m.

Pol. VI 1975.

According to the Foreign Minister, the Brussels Conference decided upon active economic cooperation between the Powers represented there, joint action in questions affecting neutrality in the event of war and the establishment of a standing liaison committee in Brussels. The Scandinavian countries had already made such detailed eco-

conomic preparations for the event of war that they only needed to be published. The Foreign Minister was not, however, willing to give any details.¹

BLÜCHER

¹ This telegram is in reply to document No. 248; it was repeated, on Aug. 28, to the other Missions accredited to Governments participating in the Brussels Conference (26/16170).

No. 271

F1/0240-41

*The Head of the Italian Government to the Führer and Chancellor*¹

Handed over by Attolico at about 6 p.m. on August 25, 1939.

FÜHRER: I am replying to your letter² which has just been delivered to me by Ambassador von Mackensen.

1. Concerning the agreement with Russia, I approve of it completely. His Excellency Göring will tell you that in the discussions which I had with him last April, I affirmed that a *rapprochement* between Germany and Russia was necessary to prevent encirclement by the democracies.³

2. I consider it useful to try to avoid a break or a cooling off in relations with Japan, since that would result in a *rapprochement* between Japan and the democratic States. I have telegraphed⁴ to Tokyo to this effect and it appears that, the first surprise having been overcome, a better spirit prevails in public opinion there.

3. The Moscow treaty blockades Rumania and may alter the position of Turkey, who has accepted the English loans but has not yet signed the treaty of alliance. A new attitude on the part of Turkey would upset all the strategic plans of the French and English in the Eastern Mediterranean.

4. Concerning Poland, I have complete understanding for the German position and for the fact that such a tense situation cannot continue indefinitely.

5. As for the *practical* attitude of Italy, in case of a military action, my point of view is as follows:

If Germany attacks Poland and the conflict remains localized, Italy will afford Germany every form of political and economic assistance which is requested of her.

If Poland attacks⁵ and her allies open a counter attack against

¹ Translated from the German translation in the Foreign Ministry archives, where no Italian original has been found. The Italian text is printed in *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. xiii, No. 250.

² Document No. 266.

³ See vol. vi of this Series, document No. 211.

⁴ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. xiii, No. 180.

⁵ The word "Germany" has been crossed out here and the word "Poland" typed above it. In another copy of the German translation (147/78820-21) this alteration has not been made. In the Italian original (*loc. cit.*) these words read: "*Se la Germania attacca la Polonia e gli Alleati di questa contrattaccano la Germania . . .*"

Germany, I inform you in advance⁶ that it will be opportune for me not to take the *initiative* in military operations in view of the *present* state of Italian war preparations, of which we have repeatedly and in good time informed you, Führer, and Herr von Ribbentrop.

Our intervention can, nevertheless, take place at once if Germany delivers to us immediately the military supplies and the raw materials to resist the attack which the French and English would predominantly direct against us.

At our meetings, the war was envisaged for after 1942, and by that time I would have been ready on land, on sea, and in the air, according to the plans which had been concerted.

I am furthermore of the opinion that the purely military measures which have already been taken, and other measures to be taken later, will immobilize, in Europe and Africa, considerable French and British forces.

I consider it my bounden duty as a loyal friend to tell you the whole truth and inform you beforehand about the real situation. Not to do so might have unpleasant consequences for us all. This is my view, and since within a short time I must summon the highest governmental bodies, I beg you to let me know yours.

MUSSOLINI

⁶ The Italian text here reads: "*Vi prospetto l'opportunità . . .* [I put it to you that it may be advisable . . .]"

No. 272

1601/385180-81

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Belgium

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 138 of August 25

BERLIN, August 25, 1939—6:00 p.m.

Received August 25—8:20 p.m.

In view of the grave deterioration in the political situation as a whole, caused by the behaviour of Poland, it appears necessary that you should at once make the following statement to the Belgian Government, if possible to the King of the Belgians in person, setting out the attitude we shall observe towards Belgium and what attitude we for our part shall expect from Belgium, should it finally become impossible to avoid hostilities:

We are determined to abide unconditionally by our promise made in the German-Belgian exchange of Notes of October 13, 1937,¹ in consequence of which we shall under no circumstances infringe the inviolability and integrity of Belgium and shall respect Belgian territory at all times. The condition attached to this promise in the

¹ See vol. v of this Series, document No. 475.

exchange of Notes naturally holds good in full, for we for our part expect Belgium to observe strict neutrality towards us in any conflict. This also implies above all that Belgium will not tolerate any infringement of her neutrality by a third party, but if such occurs will resist it with all the means at her disposal. Should, contrary to our expectations, Belgium's attitude in the case of such a violation of her neutrality by a third party be different, we should naturally be compelled to safeguard our interests as required by the situation then arising.

You are requested to couch this statement in clear yet definitely friendly terms, in keeping with the good relations which exist between us and Belgium and which we wish to continue to foster. Similar statements will be made in The Hague and in Luxembourg.²

Report by telegram on action taken on these instructions.³

RIBBENTROP

² Such instructions were sent on Aug. 25 to The Hague and to Luxembourg in telegrams No. 109 (173/83923-25) and No. 44 (328/195365-66) respectively. On the same day similar instructions were sent in telegram No. 114 to Berne (183/85941-43). The Minister at The Hague was also instructed to inform the Netherlands Government that, in the event of relations between Germany and Poland being broken off, Germany proposed to request the Netherlands to take over her interests in Poland.

³ See document No. 315.

No. 273

141/127250

The Embassy in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 88 of August 25

BRUSSELS, August 25, 1939—6:20 p.m.

Received August 25—8:25 p.m.

For the High Command of the Army, Attaché Group.

At midday on August 25 the Cabinet issued a communiqué stating that certain military security measures would be taken from today. According to information just obtained from the General Staff, the measures consist in the mobilization of the peace-time units of the Army Air Defence and Aircraft Reporting Service, and also preparations for demolition work. This is therefore substantially Stage I of preliminary mobilization. The General Staff asserts that the measures apply equally to both fronts. Please inform Intelligence Department [*Abw.*] I.¹

PAPPENHEIM²

BÜLOW

¹ Typewritten marginal note: "Copy supplied to the High Command of the Army, Aug. 26, 4 a.m."

² Lt. Col. Rabe von Pappenheim, the Military Attaché.

No. 274

8340/E590098

The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 235 of August 25

BELGRADE, August 25, 1939—7:05 p.m.

Received August 25—12 midnight.

W III 7046.

With reference to your telegram No. 208 of August 24.¹

Consul General Neuhausen answers the question in paragraph 1 in the affirmative and is taking action on the lines of paragraph 2.

Regarding paragraph 3, in accordance with the instructions by telephone from Minister Clodius, I have taken no steps up to now, but I hear from Consul General Neuhausen that he has already sounded the Foreign Minister on these lines.

According to press reports, the management of the Triebca [*sic* ? Trepča] works have stated that production will be resumed in the next few days. The prospects for this, however, seem slight as the former workers are not being reinstated.²

At Bor, mining, smelting and electrolysis are continuing to the normal extent, whilst all prospecting work has ceased.

FEINE

¹ Document No. 241.

² See also document No. 318 and footnote 3 thereto.

No. 275

173/83922

The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 59 of August 25

THE HAGUE, August 25, 1939—7:34 p.m.

Received August 25—8:25 p.m.

Pursuant to a Royal Decree of 1931, which is still in force at present, foreign warships with aircraft on board may enter certain Netherlands waters (navigable channels) on certain conditions without obtaining permission from the Netherlands Government. The Foreign Minister¹ informed me that a new decree will be promulgated in the next few days prohibiting an entry of this kind in future. The Foreign Minister said that the decree was being issued to prevent any British aircraft carrier from entering the waters concerned (navigable channels) and going into action against Germany as a floating airfield. The Netherlands Government attach importance to giving expression to their absolute desire for neutrality in this manner also.

ZECH

¹ Eelco Nicolaas van Kleffens.

No. 276

388/211553

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

HELSINKI, August 25, 1939—7:35 p.m.

No. 133 of August 25

Received August 25—8:25 p.m.

Pol. V 8379.

The Foreign Minister, with whom I had my first conversation on the German-Russian Pact today, informed me that on the day before the [Reich] Foreign Minister's arrival in Moscow the Russian Government asked the Finnish Minister whether Finland would observe neutrality towards Germany also and, this being so, how she would apply this neutrality. The answer was that Finland would observe neutrality towards Germany also, and would defend her neutrality if necessary. The Foreign Minister admits that the risk of war in the Baltic area has been lessened for the moment, but is afraid that Germany is going to allow Russia a free hand in the so-called Russian sphere of interest in the Baltic Sea, or that even without this, Russia, safeguarded by the Non-Aggression Pact, would later turn against the neighbouring Baltic States.

BLÜCHER

No. 277

F1/0239

*The Führer and Chancellor to the Head of the Italian Government*BERLIN, August 25, 1939.¹

DUCE: You have informed me that you can enter a major European conflict only if Germany supplies you at once with implements of war and raw materials in order to resist the attack which the French and British would launch predominantly against you.² I would ask you to inform me what implements of war and raw materials you require and within what time, so that I may be in a position to judge whether and to what extent I can fulfil your demands for implements of war and raw materials.

Furthermore, I thank you heartily for Italy's military measures, of which I have been acquainted in the meantime and which I already regard as a great relief.

ADOLF HITLER

¹ Another copy (1133/323675) bears the following typewritten marginal note: "Transmitted by telephone to Ambassador von Mackensen at 7:40 p.m. (August 25). Brücklmeier." The Rome Embassy copy bears the following note in Italian: "Transmitted by His Excellency the Reich Foreign Minister to His Excellency the German Ambassador with instructions to deliver it personally to His Excellency the Duce with the utmost speed." (100/64848). According to document No. 282 the letter was handed to the Duce at 9:30 p.m. See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 262.

² See document No. 271.

No. 278

129/120878

The Chargé d'Affaires in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 152 of August 25

LISBON, August 25, 1939—7:46 p.m.

Received August 25—9:30 p.m.

I learn from a most reliable source that the Spanish Ambassador¹ enquired of Minister President Salazar yesterday whether Portugal would remain neutral in a general conflict. Salazar gave him to understand that he would do everything to ensure that Portugal remains neutral, but did not give any binding declaration. Thereupon Franco's Ambassador gave him to understand that Spain would be compelled to revise her policy towards Portugal, if Portugal did not maintain her neutrality.

DIETMAR

¹ Nicolás Franco y Bahamonde.

No. 279

141/127252-58

The Chargé d'Affaires in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 86 of August 25

BRUSSELS, August 25, 1939—7:50 p.m.

Received August 25—10:30 p.m.

Minister President Pierlot received me a short time ago for a political discussion. The conversation turned in the main on the present general situation and on Belgium's attitude in the event of war. M. Pierlot assured me that the Belgian Government's determination to continue a policy of independence and to stay out of any conflict had not altered. He was continuing the policy of his predecessor, Spaak,¹ and could only repeat to me the assurances which the latter had given me during the September crisis last year.² As was known, the policy of independence was the policy of the King, who adhered unwaveringly to it and exercised a strong influence on questions of foreign policy. Military measures which had so far been taken, and which would still be taken, were only for the country's security and were directed equally towards the eastern and the south-western frontiers. Belgium relied on the guarantees of her neighbours, but, as always, was determined to repel with her whole armed might any attack, from whatever direction it might come.

¹ Paul-Henri Spaak, Minister President, May 1938-February 1939.

² See vol. II of this Series, document No. 454.

In this connection I mentioned to the Minister President the problem of French troops marching through Belgium. My reason for doing so was yesterday's information from the Italian Ambassador³ that, according to a statement by a well-known and thoroughly reliable editor of a reputable newspaper here, the French intended to march through Belgian Luxembourg⁴ immediately after the outbreak of war in order to attack Germany from Belgium. The Belgian Government would allow them through. After a short token resistance Belgian troops would retreat and the Belgian Government would say that, in view of the superior strength of the French Army and the refusal of Walloon regiments to fire on the French, resistance was useless. This statement, which is to be treated with all reserve and for . . . (group mutilated)⁵ no confirmation of any kind has so far been obtainable here, I repeated to the Minister President as a rumour circulating in the town. He described it as being without foundation, and said that he knew conditions in Belgian Luxembourg particularly well as his home was there. The population certainly had a great deal of sympathy for France, but the troops were good and reliable and would regard as their enemy any French soldier who crossed the frontier. In reply to these rumours too, he could only assure me that the Belgian Government were still determined as previously to use the whole of their fighting forces against any aggressor. He was convinced that no Belgian in a responsible position would tell me anything else.

The Prime Minister was completely calm and fully confident regarding the fate of his own country in the event of war.

Military preparations are considerably less than at the corresponding stage of the September crisis. There is a feeling of anxiety in the country, but less excitement than last year.

BARGEN

³ Vincenzo Lojacono; see also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 221.

⁴ i.e., the most south-easterly province of the Kingdom of Belgium.

The Brussels draft (1601/385184-87) here reads "which".

No. 280

52/35189-91

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

ROME, August 25, 1939—10:25 p.m.

No. 370 of August 25

Received August 26—4:00 a.m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telephoned instructions of today.¹

I personally handed to the Duce at 3:20 p.m., in the Palazzo

¹ See document No. 266 and footnote 1 thereto.

Venezia in the presence of Ciano,² the text of the Führer's letter of today's date, which was transmitted here by telephone. The Duce, whose manner was one of perfect composure, first read the whole of the letter and then went through it again with me sentence by sentence, at the same time translating the sentences into Italian for Ciano, who does not know German. I was able to convince myself that his translation was a perfectly correct and faithful one.

I single out the following from his observations on the individual points.³

He was in complete agreement with the Moscow Non-Aggression Pact. In fact he himself had made a similar suggestion to Field-Marshal Göring as long ago as the spring, at the same time, however, pointing out the necessity of maintaining a moderate tempo, as for ten years our two peoples, for ideological reasons, had been trained for the struggle against Moscow and would have to have time to get used to the change! In spite of this suggestion he himself of course was, and would remain, an unswerving anti-Communist. (Here I interpolated that the German front against Communism was of course also completely unchanged, and Moscow too had never been left in any doubt about this fact.)

He described as pertinent the remark in the letter on the attitude of the Japanese Cabinet. The fault lay with the Japanese Ministry of Marine, which would not commit itself to a definite attitude against Britain. He seemed to take a particularly keen interest in the repercussions, which he too expected, of the Moscow Pact on Rumania. Consideration for Bessarabia would cripple Rumania's freedom of movement on behalf of Poland in the event of war. Rumania was thus at the mercy of the Hungarians.

He dismissed with a nod of agreement the fact that Turkey must now revise her attitude.

He described the deterioration in German-Polish relations as being so acute that an armed conflict could no longer be avoided. The moment for considering possible ways of avoiding the conflict was now past, for the Polish mind, relying on the attitude of Britain, was no longer open to reasonable persuasion, from whatever side it might come. Otherwise he might have thought, for example, that the Poles, rightly appreciating the danger threatening their existence, would have sought direct understanding with the Reich, and as unquestionable evidence of their willingness to reach an understanding would first of all have presented the Führer with Danzig, unreservedly and without any discussions or negotiations. Then one might have . . . (group mutilated)⁴ settling the further disputed points—he men-

² See also the *Ciano Diaries*, entry of Aug. 25, 1939.

³ See also document No. 271.

⁴ The Rome draft (100/64850-55) here reads: "considered [*daran denken*]".

tioned the Corridor and Silesia—by means of direct German-British talks; he considers this would have been within the bounds of possibility. Finally a general conference might then have followed in order to find a solution for the other major questions in dispute—Franco-Italian difference[s], German colonies, the distribution of raw materials, the armaments question—a solution which would have assured Europe of peace for fifteen to twenty years, which was after all what everyone wanted. Such considerations, however, had been superseded by the headlong course of events. He personally was now reconciled to the thought that the outbreak of a general⁵ conflagration was not only inevitable but imminent. He was extremely anxious about the question of the exact date and he wanted to know if I could give him any more precise information on this. I answered his question by referring to the relevant passages in the letter. He seemed to realize that neither side could say anything more than that at the moment, but he emphasized the importance he attached for obvious reasons to being informed as early as possible; in view of the speed at which things were developing, however, he was aware of the difficulties of giving such information. In conclusion he explained once more that he would have preferred the open conflict in about two or three years' time and gave his reasons, saying that these reasons also applied particularly⁶ when he thought of our fleet. Developments, however, were now forcing us in a different direction. At all events—and this he emphasized expressly—he stood beside [*neben*]⁷ us unconditionally and with all his resources.

At the end of the conversation he launched forth into observations on the prospects of an armed conflict between Germany and Poland, which would be decided in our favour by our army in the shortest possible time. Ciano, who accompanied me out after I had taken leave of the Duce, summed up his impressions of the situation by saying that any discussion on the possibilities of preserving peace had been superseded by events. The watchword for his actions would no longer be the word "peace" but the word "victory".

MACKENSEN

⁵ Underlined in the State Secretary's customary brown crayon; marginal note in his handwriting: "Italy?"

⁶ The Rome draft here reads: "also applied to us particularly . . ."

⁷ Underlined in brown crayon with two exclamation marks.

No. 281

1625/389206

The State Secretary to the Embassy in France

Telegram

No. 393

BERLIN, August 25, 1939—11:30 p.m.
e.o. Pol. II 3029.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counsellor von Rintelen.

As the majority of the French press correspondents here have already left Germany and the French Embassy has obviously induced them to depart, you should induce German press correspondents in France to leave immediately, as far as possible via Belgium.¹

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Handwritten marginal note: "Press Department has been informed."

No. 282

F1/0262

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, August 25, 1939—11:30 p.m.

No. 371 of August 25

Received August 26—4:00 a.m.

For the Foreign Minister.

I handed the Duce the Führer's second letter¹ at 9:30 p.m. He outlined his requirements tentatively as follows: Urgent need for anti-aircraft batteries to protect the industries concentrated in Northern Italy, a further number for the army, and raw materials, especially copper, tin, lead, nickel, iron, coal and petroleum.

The Duce will forward us an exact statement of requirements tomorrow, one list calculated for a war lasting six months and one for a war of twelve months.²

MACKENSEN

¹ Document No. 277.

² See also documents Nos. 301 and 308.

No. 283

2767/535959

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 216 of August 25

Moscow, August 25, 1939—11:36 p.m.

Received August 26—4:00 a.m.

Pol. II 3020.

With reference to my telegram No. 209 of August 24.¹

The Military Missions did not leave yesterday, the reason given being that some letter from Voroshilov which they were expecting did not arrive in time. The leaders of the Military Missions took leave of Molotov and Voroshilov today. The Military Missions are to leave today via Leningrad and Helsinki.

It further transpires from a British source that from the outset the Military Missions had instructions to spin out their work in Moscow and, if possible, protract it until October.

SCHULENBURG

¹ This telegram (7891/E571554/3) read: "I hear that the British and French Military Missions are leaving this evening via Leningrad."

No. 284

34/24045

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, August 25, 1939—11:37 p.m.

SECRET

Received August 26—6:45 a.m.

No. 217 of August 25

Molotov sent for me this evening and said that, because of the great haste with which the Secret Additional Protocol had been drawn up, an obscurity had crept into the text.¹ At the end of the first paragraph of point 2 ("two") it should read "bounded by the line of the rivers Pissa, Narev, Vistula and San", in accordance with the . . . (group missing)² held here.

The inadequacy of the maps³ used during the conversations gave rise to the mistaken impression among all those taking part that the upper reaches of the Narev extended to the frontier of East Prussia, which is . . . (two groups missing)⁴ the case. Although there is no doubt as to the meaning of the agreement reached, he asked as a

¹ See document No. 229.

² The Moscow draft (695/260289-90) reads: "conversations".

³ The Moscow draft reads: "map".

⁴ The Moscow draft reads: "not in fact . . .".

matter of form [*sic*],⁵ the sentence in question by the insertion of the names of the rivers Pissa, San [*sic*],⁶ which could be done by an exchange of letters between him and me.

I request authorization to agree with Molotov on the desired addition . . . (two groups missing)⁷ accuracy.

SCHULENBURG⁸

⁵ The sentence in the Moscow draft reads: ". . . he asked as a matter of form that the sentence in question be supplemented by the insertion of the name of the river Pissa, which could . . .".

⁶ The name "San" is a deciphering error; it does not appear in the Moscow draft, see footnote 5 above.

⁷ The Moscow draft reads: "in the interests of . . .".

⁸ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "To be kept in special safe [*Sekretieren Kasette*]".

No. 285

103/111540

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 207

BERLIN, August 25, 1939.¹

As a result of the agreement reached orally,² the Foreign Minister requests you to get in touch with Molotov at once and to ask that the proposed new Ambassador, and particularly the chosen military representative from Moscow, should take up their posts in Berlin without delay.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

² No record has been found.

No. 286

800/274258

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy and Consulates in Poland

Telegram

BERLIN, August 25, 1939.¹

You should immediately send all Reich Germans to Germany or to neutral foreign countries.²

Supplement to 1) [Warsaw]: Identical text to all career consuls.³

WOERMANN

¹ The copy printed here does not show when this telegram was despatched; the register, however, confirms that it was sent.

² On the same day Woermann telegraphed (800/274257) to the Embassies and career consuls in Great Britain and France, requesting that Reich Germans be advised to leave by the quickest route.

³ i.e., at Katowice, Cracow. Lwów, Lodz, Poznań, Teschen and Toruń.

No. 287

1625/389219-20

The Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry

Airgram

No. 328 of August 25

LONDON, August 25, 1939.

Received August 26—8:45 a.m.

1. Yesterday's Government statements, the debate in the House of Commons, today's entire press, as well as observations in the provinces, all go to show that the British people stand solidly behind the Government. The calling off of the railway strike is typical. The fulfilment of the guarantee to Poland has become a point of honour which is no longer even questioned. The whole picture presented is one of calm preparedness and confidence in face of a war which is not desired but which is nevertheless considered to be practically inevitable.

2. Special attention should be paid to the following points in Chamberlain's speech of yesterday:¹

(a) Unconditional confirmation of the guarantee to Poland. His observations on this reveal, however, a certain resignation over the fact that there is no other way open to Great Britain once the alliance has been invoked.

(b) Chamberlain avoided everything which might exacerbate the situation. He described the measures already taken by Great Britain as purely precautionary. He refused to give details concerning the Notes exchanged between the German and the British Governments, pleading the delicate nature of the present situation.

(c) Chamberlain's declaration that it was premature to form a definite opinion on the meaning and scope of the German-Russian Pact before consultation with the French Government. The British obligations to Poland had been accepted before negotiations started with Russia and were not dependent on the conclusion of an Anglo-Russian agreement. The British guarantee of support to Poland and other countries was not affected by the German-Russian Pact.

(d) Observations on the treatment of minorities reveal—due regard being paid to the fact that Great Britain is Poland's ally—implicit recognition that Germany has cause for complaint.

(e) In his closing sentences and with reference to the Chatham House speech by Lord Halifax,² Chamberlain affirms once again the twin aims of British policy: Resistance to aggression and the bringing about of a general pacification.

3. The debate in the House of Commons on Chamberlain's speech resulted likewise in unanimous approval of all the main features.

¹ The text of this speech is printed in the *British Blue Book*, Cmd. 6106, No. 64.

² On June 29, 1939. See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 593.

Only the pacifist members, Lansbury³ and Maxton,⁴ who possess no following, demanded peace at any price. Greenwood⁵ on behalf of the Labour Party and Sinclair⁶ for the Liberals gave full approval to a firm adherence to the Polish guarantee. Their criticisms of Government policy related only to past events. Like the Prime Minister, both refrained from making remarks likely to exacerbate the situation, and urged the Government to leave no stone unturned which, while safeguarding British honour, might contribute towards the preservation of peace.

4. This morning's newspapers do not present any fresh points of view. Those of the Right as well as those of the Left are alike unanimous in their attitude to the question of the Polish guarantee. Like the Opposition speakers, left-wing newspapers also leave criticism of previous policy in the background and demand a united nation.

By order:

VON SELZAM

³ The Rt. Hon. George Lansbury, Labour M.P. for Bow and Bromley.

⁴ James Maxton, Independent Labour M.P. for the Bridgeton division of Glasgow.

⁵ The Rt. Hon. Arthur Greenwood, Labour M.P. for Wakefield, former Minister of Health.

⁶ Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bart., Liberal M.P. for Caithness and Sutherland, Chairman of the Parliamentary Liberal Party.

No. 288

183/85947

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 25, 1939.

When the Swiss Minister enquired about the situation during his visit today, I described it as being grave owing to fresh Polish acts of provocation. Herr Frölicher mentioned that the Military Attaché¹ had learned from German military authorities that the Tannenberg celebrations would take place² and that there were no objections to the Attaché leaving for Berne. Herr Frölicher concluded from this that there was no immediate danger, and I left it at that.

The Minister enquired about the result of his previous *démarche* regarding transport for Swiss subjects liable for military service, in the event of complications.³ I told him that the matter was still being studied and promised him a reply soon.

I further indicated to Herr Frölicher that tomorrow, August 26, he would receive the reply to the Swiss enquiry regarding supplies by sea in the event of war.⁴

WOERMANN

¹ Col. von Werdt.

² The Tannenberg celebrations were due to be held on Aug. 27. Their cancellation was announced on Aug. 26.

³ According to a memorandum by Woermann of Aug. 16 (8369/E590661-64), this *démarche* had taken place that day. Subsequently, in a Note of Aug. 27 (8369/E590658), the Foreign Ministry informed the Swiss Legation in Berlin that transport facilities would be available.

⁴ See document No. 383.

No. 289

78/51989

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 25, 1939.

I requested the Hungarian Minister¹ to call on me today in order to draw his attention to the gravity of the situation which had arisen as a result of recent Polish acts of provocation, which I illustrated by referring to the latest instances.

The Hungarian Minister showed a very firm attitude towards all eventualities and assured me again that there was not the slightest doubt about Hungary being on the side of the Axis Powers.

When the German-Soviet Treaty was discussed, the Minister was particularly pleased with the deterrent effect which the Treaty would be bound to have on Rumania.

WOERMANN

¹ Döme Sztójay.

No. 290

173/83919

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 25, 1939.

On his enquiring today I told the Netherlands Minister¹ that there was no improvement in the situation, and that, on the contrary, we had numerous reports of fresh and serious Polish acts of provocation and bloodshed. I drew his attention in particular to the Bielitz incident.²

Furthermore, I told the Minister, privately for the present, that there was a possibility that in the event of hostilities we might request the Netherlands Government to take over German interests. If so the official request would, however, be made through our Legation at The Hague. Such a request would apply particularly in the case of Poland.³

The Minister asked whether he might transmit this preliminary notification to his Government.

I said that I thought it would be as well.

WOERMANN

¹ Jonkheer Dr. H. M. van Haersma de With.

² See document No. 267.

³ See also document No. 272, footnote 2.

No. 291

173/83920

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 25, 1939.

The Netherlands Minister handed me the enclosed translation of an official statement¹ by the Netherlands Government, issued today, to the effect that in the event of war they would maintain towards everyone absolute neutrality in every sphere, particularly in the air. The Minister thought that this announcement would also be in keeping with our views, which I emphatically affirmed.

M. van Haersma de With informed me that the Netherlands Military Attaché² had already handed the communiqué to General von Toppelskirch.³ He requested, however, that we should ourselves make it available to all the Wehrmacht departments concerned.

WOERMANN

¹ Not printed (173/83921). This statement was published in the press on Aug. 26.

² Capt. Hasselman.

³ Oberquartiermeister IV at the OKH.

No. 292

2898/565757

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VIII

BERLIN, August 25, 1939.

Pol. VIII 1394.

BRIEF IN THE EVENT THAT THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR SHOULD RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE GERMAN-RUSSIAN TRADE AGREEMENT.¹

1. In return for a credit of 200 million Reichsmark, the Soviet Union will deliver essential goods to the value of 180 million RM, to begin immediately, primarily timber, grain for fodder, raw cotton, petroleum, especially lubricating oil, phosphates, platinum, asbestos, manganese ore, raw hides, caracul skins, etc. There is no type of goods among the 180 million RM worth that we do not urgently need. Germany's purely economic interest in the agreement was therefore very great.

2. We were able to allocate our output of machine tools to export

¹ According to a memorandum by Knoll dated Aug. 24 (174/186070-72), the Japanese Counsellor had called on Aug. 23 to draw attention to the fact that the terms accorded to the Soviet Union in the German-Soviet Credit Agreement (document No. 131) were considerably more favourable than those accorded to Japan in the German-Japanese economic agreement, which had been initialled (see vol. VI of this Series, Editors' Note, p. 1012), and to request an explanation of this differential treatment, in order to be able to reply to questions on this subject put by his Government.

to a much greater extent when the Soviet Union ceased to be a probable opponent. Our promised deliveries amount to 125 million RM over two years. These, however, include pressing and forging hammers, and other mechanical equipment, not included in the promised deliveries to Japan amounting to 100 million yen over two years.

3. Certain improvements in the conditions, such as the periods of credit and rates of interest, were conceded at the last minute in view of the political importance of the agreement, so that certain data given by the German side during the German-Japanese negotiations, which were correct at the time, are now out of date. Such concessions would no doubt also have been made to Japan, if Japan had concluded the military pact.

Submitted herewith to the State Secretary through Ministerialdirektor Wiehl.

KNOLL

No. 293

472/228634-36

Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsäcker

ROME, August 25, 1939.

DEAR FRIEND: Although I scarcely think that my information can still have any practical importance in view of the rapid course of events, I should not like to miss the opportunity of submitting the enclosed copy of a report which Captain Löwisch, the Naval Attaché, made of a conversation he had yesterday with the British Naval Attaché,¹ who has just returned from England.

Heil Hitler!

Yours etc.,

MACKENSEN

¹ Capt. Sir Philip Bowyer-Smyth, Bart., R.N.

[Enclosure]

ROME, August 24, 1939.

To be submitted to the Ambassador.

The Naval Attaché had a conversation today with the British Naval Attaché who has just returned from England.

The subject-matter seems to be of some importance in view of the present situation:

1. The conviction is widely held by the Attaché's friends and acquaintances in England that the Führer intends to destroy Poland.

2. In the spring of 1939 it became necessary for Britain to oppose Germany's efforts towards expansion at some point or other. The choice of the Danzig affair for this had indeed been unfortunate. Germany today was in far the better position with regard to this question. Once the agreement had been concluded with Poland, however, there was no doubt in the mind of the British that the

promise they had made would have to be kept. There is a point of honour for the British which transcends all other questions. Public opinion has to be considered in a democratic State. It would not tolerate a second Munich, where Chamberlain did not keep the promise made to Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain was the man with the peace policy. No statesman succeeding him would be able to pursue so peaceful a policy.

3. In any case a war would be prejudicial to Britain. Military success was questionable also, since Italy, Japan, Russia, Spain and Hungary were now on Germany's side. Britain would, however, keep the promise made to Poland.

4. The British Naval Attaché mentioned three points again and again:

- 1) Does the Führer know the real mood of the British people?
- 2) Where are Germany's efforts towards expansion to end?
- 3) What possibility is there of avoiding an Anglo-German war?

The general impression made by the conversation was that the British are worried about a war in which Britain would be involved without any advantage to herself, but which would be unavoidable for her if faced with the necessity of redeeming the promise she had made to Poland.

LÖWISCH

[EDITORS' NOTE: On August 25, 1939, Keitel issued a Directive (F19/542-65) with reference to the Mobilization Book for the Civil Administration (see Nuremberg document 1639-A-PS, exhibit USA-777), which was headed:

"Reich Defence Committee
High Command of the Wehrmacht
WFA. No. 2065/39 g. Kdos. L IVa
Subject: X-Day for the Wehrmacht
Application to the civil administration."

BERLIN, August 25, 1939.
Pol. I 1022 g. Rs.

The first three paragraphs of this Directive read as follows:

"1. The Führer and Reich Chancellor has ordered the mobilization without public proclamation (X-Day) of the bulk of the Wehrmacht. Those units of the SS-Verfügungstruppe [general service troops] will be mobilized which, by order of the Führer, are incorporated in the Army.

X-Day is August 26, 1939

With effect from the same date, the Führer has conferred upon the Commander-in-Chief of the Army authority to exercise executive power in the 'East' and 'West' operational areas of the Army (see Enclosure). On the crossing of the Reich frontier 'East', the operational area will be extended forward in accordance with the ground gained by the troops.

Special regulations apply to Slovakia (see Enclosure).

2. *X-Day* will *not* apply to the civil administration as a whole. There should be applied only those measures, as far as they have not already been taken as preparatory measures, necessary to secure the mobilization of the Wehrmacht and to maintain the administration's efficiency.

When transmitting orders to subordinate offices, please refrain from using code numbers of the Mobilization Book (C[ivil]) and issue the orders en clair. (Note exception in paragraph 17a [relating to intelligence communications].)

3. All actions and demands are to be based on peace-time legislation. A state of defence or a state of war in accordance with the Reich Defence Law of September 4, 1938, is *not* declared. [For the text of this Law see Nuremberg document 2194-PS, exhibit USA-86. On Hitler's instructions it was not published.] . . ."

The subsequent paragraphs provide in detail for restrictions and security measures, covering the various branches of civil administration.

According to the enclosure referred to at the end of paragraph 1, the fact that Slovakia is a friendly State is to be reflected in the conduct of German troops.

For the cancellation, on August 25, of the German orders to march, see entries of that date in Appendix I to the present volume.]

[EDITORS' NOTE: On August 25, 1939, there was signed in London the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Polish Government regarding Mutual Assistance. This Agreement, concluded for a period of five years, came into force on signature. The text of the Agreement as published at the time and transmitted by Kordt to Berlin in telegram No. 330 of August 25 (1625/389201-03) is printed in the British White Paper *Treaty Series No. 58* (1939), Cmd. 6144. For the text with the annexed Protocol see *Poland No. 1* (1945), Cmd. 6616.]

No. 294

8345/B590227-28

The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 483 of August 25

PARIS, August 26, 1939.

Received August 26—2:40 a.m.

Pol. II 3021.

I have heard from members of the Flandin group in the Chamber of Deputies that the conclusion of the German-Russian Pact came as a bombshell to the Government and to political circles. At one blow,

the balance of power in Europe has been tilted in favour of Germany, and it is beginning to be realized that France's position in Eastern Europe must be reviewed. In the acute problem of a settlement of German-Polish relations, influential persons in the group believe that allowance must henceforth be made for the improvement in Germany's position. It is realized that, in these circumstances, Poland must make sacrifices, and it is thought that the French and probably also the British Government are counting on such sacrifices. A solution satisfactory to Germany is thought to be attainable now without conflict, but only if, as is emphasized, Germany commits no act of force, for this would compel both France and also Britain to carry out their treaty obligations for good or ill. The following conditions would have to be fulfilled: Germany would have to make it clear that, in spite of her territorial demands, she would allow Poland to continue as an independent State and also to have an outlet to the sea. The impression must be avoided that Germany intended the same fate for Poland as for Czechoslovakia. In order to pacify public opinion in France and Great Britain, it would be necessary for Germany to disclose her final demands and give assurances that she had no aggressive designs against France or Great Britain. Finally, a lot would depend on the kind of methods which Germany used. Flandin is reported to have said that the Polish problem, and with it the preservation of peace, is today no longer a question of principle but has become mainly a question of methods.

BRÄUER

No. 295

419/216279

*Circular of the Director of the Information Department*¹

Telegram

BERLIN, August 25, 1939.
e.o. Kult. Spez. 1026.

At the present juncture it is particularly important for propaganda reasons to receive material which indicates weaknesses of the British and French Governments in foreign policy, economically, or in other ways, in order that this may be appropriately exploited in the press, on the radio, or by other means. The Foreign Minister feels that the cooperation of Missions in this respect has so far not been at all adequate. It is therefore urgently necessary that Missions should devote more attention than hitherto to these questions. According to the topical value of the report, Missions are requested to send it either by despatch or telegram. At the same time suggestions are desired as to the most suitable way of using it.

ALTENBURG

¹ The list of Missions to which this telegram was sent has not been found.

No. 296

2178/471638 39

*The British Ambassador in Germany to the Reich Foreign Minister*¹*Copy*BRITISH EMBASSY, BERLIN.
August 26, 1939—7:30 a.m.

DEAR REICHSMINISTER: I am leaving immediately² and shall return as soon as I can as I realize full well how strained the situation is.

At the same time please realize also that the Reichschancellor has made a big proposition to His Majesty's Government and it will have to be carefully considered.

As I said to Herr Hitler yesterday I would be failing completely in my duty if I did not make it clear that my Government could not honourably discuss such a project and at the same time be "*wort-brüchig*".³ There could be no possible better foundation-stone for a real Anglo-German understanding than a peaceful solution of the problems which admittedly have got to be settled between Germany and Poland. Nothing could be calculated more effectually to prevent such an understanding than a German-Polish war.

For four months Herr Hitler has shown great strength in his patience. However strained the position is today and whatever plans he may have made, is it too much to ask that he should wait that little while more which may make all the difference [?].

I write in great haste and quite personally, but please tell the Chancellor that I am [*sic* ? not]⁴ seeking to gain time unworthily if I do not return today or tomorrow. What I seek above all things in this world is to prevent that greatest of all catastrophes, another war between Germany and England, and I beg him to believe in my good faith and in the sincerity of my effort.

Yours very sincerely,

NEVILLE HENDERSON

¹ The original of this letter has not been found; the copy here printed is in English in the original.

² Sir N. Henderson flew to London early on the morning of Aug. 26, returning to Berlin on the afternoon of Aug. 28.

³ i.e., "breaking their word".

⁴ The word "not" is also missing in the copy of this letter transmitted to his Government by Sir N. Henderson; see *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. vii, No. 355. In another copy of the English text in the Foreign Ministry archives (52/35227) it has been inserted in pencil and the correction is included in a German translation made in the Foreign Ministry (52/35228-30); in another version of the translation (2780/537079), possibly made in the British Embassy, the sentence has been rendered: "I write in great haste and quite personally, but please tell the Chancellor that I am trying to gain time, no matter whether I return today or tomorrow."

No. 297

SC91/E591812

*Circular of the Director of the Political Department*¹

Telegram

BERLIN, August 25, 1939.
e.o. Pol. II 3026.

On the question, which has come up repeatedly in the press of various countries, as to whether the Franco-Russian Pact of Assistance of May 2, 1935,² can still be regarded as valid after the entry into force of the German-Soviet Russian Non-Aggression Pact,³ it can be stated that, in view of the absolutely unequivocal provisions of Articles 1, 2 and 4 of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact, there can be no question of the Franco-Soviet Russian Pact of Assistance remaining in being.

Where the press still continues in many ways to represent the German-Russian agreement as having been reached at the expense of the Baltic States and Finland, this is quite untrue. On the contrary, it is to be expected that, as a result of the conclusion of the German-Russian Pact, the whole area of the Baltic States, which felt itself to be seriously endangered in consequence of Anglo-Russian negotiations, will in future experience peaceful conditions, and the individual Baltic States will now more easily be able to reach a satisfactory settlement in their relations with Soviet Russia, such as is known to have already been reached in Germany's relations with the Baltic States.

WOERMANN

¹ The list of Missions to which this telegram was sent has not been found.

² The text is published in *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 139, pp. 474-477.

³ See document No. 228.

No. 298

100/64863

Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Italy

ROME, August 26, 1939.

Herr Brücklmeier of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat telephoned at about 10:30 a.m. today, and said that our telegram No. 370¹ was in absolute contradiction to a letter from the Duce, which Attolico had presented in Berlin.² The question was naturally of fundamental importance and Berlin wanted to know if our telegram was to stand.

I told Herr Brücklmeier that the Ambassador was at the funeral

¹ Document No. 280.

² Document No. 271.

service for Prince Colonna.³ We left it that I was to be notified if I had to send for the Ambassador from the funeral service. Otherwise it would be sufficient for the Ambassador to telephone in the course of the morning.

I have sent Herr Witte⁴ to the church where the funeral service is being held with instructions to inform the Ambassador, if he could still catch him outside the church, and if not to see that the Ambassador returned to the Embassy immediately after the service.

Submitted herewith to the Ambassador.

PLESSEN

³ Governor of Rome.

⁴ Attaché at the German Embassy in Rome.

No. 299

100/64861

Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Italy

ROME, August 26, 1939.

At approximately 11:15 a.m. Minister Schmidt of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat telephoned to say that the Foreign Minister very urgently required the promised list of Italian requirements.¹ The situation was becoming increasingly acute and growing more and more serious.

Then Herr Kordt came to the telephone and asked when our telegram No. 370² had been dictated and what had been the interval between yesterday's two conversations with the Duce. I told Herr Kordt that the first conversation had taken place about 3 p.m., and the second that evening at 9:30 p.m. Then Herr Kordt enquired whether we were aware that, at 6 p.m., another document had been handed over in Berlin. I said that I knew nothing of this. (This must be the Duce's letter that Herr Brücklmeier mentioned today.)³

Herr Kordt then asked me where the Ambassador was, and when I told him, asked me to fetch the Ambassador from the funeral service⁴ and to request him to telephone Berlin at once. I sent Herr Berger⁵ to the church.

Submitted herewith to the Ambassador.

PLESSEN

¹ See document No. 282 and *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, Nos. 290 and 292.

² Document No. 280.

³ Document No. 271.

⁴ See document No. 298.

⁵ Secretary of Legation at the German Embassy in Rome.

No. 300

2798/548122-23

*The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry*Telegram [en clair by teleprinter]¹

No. 484 of August 26

PARIS, August 26, 1939.

Received August 26—11:45 a.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 391 of August 25.²

In the *Action Française* Charles Maurras³ describes Chamberlain's speech as a danger to peace and writes, *inter alia*: "As far as an immediate call to an offensive war is concerned, there are valid reasons for warning Daladier against some of his colleagues. Whether because of their race, or because of the business interests with which their lives are bound up, Mandel,⁴ Campinchi,⁵ Jean Zay⁶ and Paul Reynaud belong to the European clique that would like to disturb the peace of the world. Jews or friends of Jews, these gentlemen are in closest contact with the powerful Jewish clique [in London].¹ In London, where Chamberlain has just admitted frankly and clearly that he is preparing for a war of prestige, which would also be a war of ideas, the Jewish emigrants are well known to be most impatient. Can they be certain of finding a French Government tomorrow which will be equally compliant in its attitude towards anonymous and homeless capital? Will they tomorrow have at their disposal in Paris, alongside the Jacobin Daladier, the four-leafed clover: Mandel-Jean Zay-Campinchi-Paul Reynaud? Today they hold the trump card; it must be played at once. French public opinion is already stirring. The Moscow coup has shattered what remained of hot-headed and corrupt men such as Kérillis and Buré.⁷ Many Frenchmen are already listening again to thoughtful patriots. If, today, contrary to all conditions of time and place, our French people allow themselves to be slaughtered unsuspectingly and vainly at the will of forces that are English-speaking Jews, or at the will of their French slaves, then, come what may, a French voice must be raised to proclaim the truth." Charles Maurras recalls the opinion of a military expert in order to demonstrate the futility of a mass French attack on the Siegfried Line. He says: "It would be just as though one man were to run his head against a stone wall, to help another who was being murdered on the other side. It would be useless to Poland, and France would be disastrously weakened." This military chief witness

¹ Taken from the Paris draft (9887/E693548).

² Document No. 295, as telegraphed to Paris (7991/E575474).

³ Editor of this Royalist paper.

⁴ Minister for the Colonies.

⁵ Minister of Marine.

⁶ Minister of Education.

⁷ Editor of *L'Ordre*.

for the prosecution also testifies against the possibility of advancing over the Alps into the valley of the Po, as follows: 1) a fortified mountain range is also a wall; 2) if the case arose, the French Army would encounter a German Army coming from the Brenner and would be exposed to a flank attack by the Italian Army.

BRÄUER

No. 301

100/64828-30

*The Head of the Italian Government to the Führer and Chancellor*¹

Letter from the Duce to the Führer communicated by telephone at 12:10 p.m. on August 26, 1939—XVII, by His Excellency Count Ciano to the Royal [Italian] Ambassador in Berlin for immediate delivery to the Führer.

FÜHRER: I called a meeting this morning of the Chiefs of the General Staff of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, at which Minister Ciano and the Minister of Communications were also present, and this is the minimum required by the Italian Armed Forces to sustain a war lasting *twelve months* apart from what we have already.

Coal for gas and metallurgy	6 million tons
Steel	2 million tons
Petroleum	7 million tons
Timber	1 million tons
Copper	150,000 tons
Sodium Nitrate	220,000 tons
Potassium Salts	70,000 tons
Colophony	25,000 tons
Rubber	22,000 tons
Methylbenzol	18,000 tons
Turpentine	6,000 tons
Lead	10,000 tons
Tin	7,000 tons
Nickel	5,000 tons
Molybdenum	600 tons
Tungsten	600 tons
Zirconium	20 tons
Titanium	400 tons

Food and textile requirements will be assured by having recourse to rationing.

Apart from all the raw materials which are mentioned above, you are aware that all our war industries are situated in the Turin-Genoa-

¹ Translated from the Italian. Marginal note at head of document: "Given me today by Count Ciano. M[ackensen] 26/8." See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 293.

Milan-Savona quadrilateral and along the shores of the Tyrrhenian Sea, that is half an hour's flight from Corsica. The immediate despatch of 150 90 mm. batteries and the appropriate ammunition is necessary for the protection of these industrial plants, the destruction of which could literally paralyse our war effort.

General Keitel is in possession of the list of machinery which is indispensable for speeding up our war production.

Führer, I would not have sent you this list, or else it would have contained a smaller number of items and much lower figures, if I had had the time agreed upon beforehand to accumulate stocks and to speed up the tempo of autarky.

It is my duty to tell you that unless I am certain of receiving these supplies, the sacrifices I should call on the Italian people to make—certain though I am of being obeyed—could well be in vain and could compromise your cause along with my own.

If you think that there is still any possibility whatsoever of a solution in the political field, I am ready—as on other occasions—to give you my full support and to take such initiative as you may consider useful for the aim in view.²

MUSSOLINI

² A German translation in the Foreign Ministry archives (1133/323676-77) appears to be a copy of Ribbentrop's copy of this letter, as it has typed on it the following marginal notes which are each marked "Signed v.R.": At the head: "*War lasting 12 months. Material must be in Italy before outbreak of war*"; at the foot: "*All materials according to Keitel list also before outbreak of war*"; against the items listed in the document: "*Because sea communications are cut*" and "*Russia could not supply, as only by sea*".

No. 302

100/84814

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy

ROME, August 26, 1939.

When I was summoned back here, I at once telephoned Geheimrat Kordt and asked him to explain his statements to Counsellor of Embassy Baron Plessen.¹ He said that it was merely a question of obtaining with all possible speed the Duce's promised list of requirements. He asked me to get in touch with the Italians about this at once and then to inform Berlin. I was to say that the Foreign Minister was definitely counting on receiving the lists today. I told him that I would get in touch with Ciano at once, but that, in view of the present difficulty of establishing quick telephonic communication with Berlin, he must be prepared for my answer to take some time.

When I further asked to what the statement to Baron Plessen referred, about there being inexplicable discrepancies between my telegram on yesterday's midday conversation with the Duce and the

¹ See documents Nos. 298 and 299.

Duce's letter presented that afternoon by Attolico in Berlin, Herr Kordt replied that all this was now superseded and all right.

I then telephoned Count Ciano direct and was informed by him that the two lists had already been telephoned to Attolico,² and that, by his reckoning, they would be in the Führer's hands in about a quarter of an hour.³

[MACKENSEN]

² See document No. 301; see also document No. 282.

³ Marginal note: "I telephoned Count Ciano's statement to Herr Kordt at 12:30 p.m. M[ackensen] 26/8."

No. 303

91/100055

The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 47 of August 26

DUBLIN, August 26, 1939—12:15 p.m.

Received August 26—4:15 p.m.¹

Secretary General Walshe of the Irish Foreign Ministry lunched with me today and brought the conversation round to the Irish attitude in case of war. He stated definitely that Ireland would remain neutral except in the case of a definite attack, for example dropping bombs on Irish towns. He could not think that such a thing would happen through us as it would not appear to be in the German interest, while, on the other hand, Irish sympathy—especially in view of the strong, perhaps decisive, influence of the American-Irish against an American-British alliance—could not be a matter of indifference to us. Also the disturbance of normal trade with Britain, of vital importance to Ireland for obtaining supplies of essential consumer goods, and which Ireland would have to confine to the export of agricultural produce . . . (eight groups mutilated). He also expects that Britain, in view of the American-Irish, will do everything to avoid violating Irish neutrality . . . (two groups mutilated) representation with the usual proviso as to long term-maintenance of neutrality.

He repeated the suggestion that in the case of German acts of war against Britain involving Ireland, any suffering incurred should be kept to a minimum, and at the same time a formal declaration should be made that Germany has no aggressive aims in Ireland, but on the contrary has sympathy for Ireland and Irish national aims—mentioning, if necessary, Northern Ireland—that she regrets Irish suffering and will attempt to keep this to the unavoidable minimum. Avoid internment of Irish nationals in case of war.

HEMPEL

¹ Marginal note: "Delayed".

No. 304

183/85948

The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 101 of August 26

BERNE, August 26, 1939—1:45 p.m.

Received August 26—6:40 p.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 114 of August 25.¹

I conveyed the substance of the above telegram to Federal Counsellor Motta, who thanked me heartily and said that, in the event of war, Switzerland too would do everything to maintain the strictest neutrality.

KÖCHER

¹ Not printed; see document No. 272, footnote 2.

No. 305

328/195367

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.

In reply to his enquiry of this morning,¹ and in accordance with the State Secretary's decision, I informed Minister von Radowitz by telephone at 2:30 p.m. as follows:

1) We had no objection to the Luxembourg Government informing the French Government of the content of the statement.

2) We did not exactly want to forbid the Luxembourg Government making the matter public, but did not consider this altogether expedient at the moment. It must also be remembered that we had made *démarches* similar to that made to Luxembourg to other Governments as well, so that a unilateral publication in the press of our Luxembourg *démarche* did not seem to us expedient.

Herr von Radowitz then asked if there would be any objection to publication in the press if the other countries in question made a similar announcement. I said that in this case there would be no objection. I subsequently had the Minister informed that in this case the communiqué should be agreed upon with him and not published until the text had been approved here.

WOERMANN

¹ Not printed (328/195368). This memorandum of a telephone conversation also reported that Radowitz had made the statement as instructed (see document No. 272, and footnote 2 thereto).

No. 306

2422/511788

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 280 of August 26 WASHINGTON, August 26, 1939—2:57 p.m.
Received August 27—12:15 a.m.

Whereas yesterday, Friday, the American press and radio were still announcing the imminent outbreak of war, today they give prominence to reports on the Führer's overtures to Britain, which again give rise to the hope of a peaceful solution, at least of the Danzig question. Kennedy's¹ reports from London have strengthened this hope in official circles also.

Among other things, Kennedy described Britain's financial position as severely affected. Roosevelt's peace appeals,² following closely on each other, were inspired less by the desire to prevent the outbreak of war than by efforts to isolate Germany and . . . (group mutilated) to place the responsibility for war on the German leaders, both in the eyes of the world and of the American people, as well as to throw in now already the weight of America's moral support on the side of the democracies as far as possible. In the opinion of well-informed confidants, this fresh intervention by the President in European affairs has been made easier for him by the belief, current here, that Japan feels compelled to adopt a new course in her foreign policy, which it is hoped will relieve America's Pacific flank.

Anti-German press propaganda in general has seized with satisfaction upon the idea of identifying National Socialism with Communism.

THOMSEN

¹ United States Ambassador in Great Britain.

² To the King of Italy, Hitler and President Mościcki on Aug. 23, 24 and 25; see *Peace and War*, Nos. 136-139.

No. 307

F1/0222-25

*The Führer and Chancellor to the Head of the Italian Government*August 26, 1939.¹

DUCE: Ambassador Attolico has just handed to my Foreign Minister the additional requirements which Italy would claim from

¹ The copy of this letter retained by Mackensen (100/64831-33) has the following typewritten note: "Letter from the Führer to the Duce transmitted by telephone at 3:8 p.m. on August 26, 1939, by His Excellency the Reich Foreign Minister to His Excellency the German Ambassador in Rome, for immediate transmission to the Duce." According to document No. 320, this letter was delivered shortly after 5 p.m. See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, Appendix I, Part II, entry of Aug. 26, where the time is given as 4 p.m.

Germany for the duration of a war.² These requirements could be met in full as regards coal and steel, i.e., 6 million tons of coal and 2 million tons of steel. It would be impossible for Germany to deliver 7 million tons of petroleum. At the moment I cannot state exactly what amount we could contribute. Germany would be in a position to deliver a million tons of timber. The delivery of 150,000 tons of copper would be impossible; in anticipation of the shortage of copper, Germany herself has already changed over to the use of light metals and other substitute materials in most fields. The delivery of nickel in the quantity asked for could not nearly be met, for German industry itself has almost completely gone over to steels containing little or no nickel. Our own requirements in this field are therefore completely vanishing. If Italian workers were brought in, Germany would, however, be able in principle so to increase German munitions production, which has already changed over to available materials, that a great part of Italy's munitions requirements could be met. As regards anti-aircraft guns, the Reich would be able to contribute thirty 4-gun batteries at once; after the end of operations in Poland a further 30 batteries, and within a year another 30, all with German gun crews and predictors. Potassium salts could be sent at once. As for explosives, I must first obtain exact data. I consider it important, however, Duce, to send you this information at once. Acting on verbal instructions, Ambassador Attolico stated that all material must be in Italy before the beginning of hostilities.³ This, Duce, is impossible for reasons of organization and transport. The 30 heavy anti-aircraft batteries could be sent at once; all the rest must be fitted into the general transport system. Since Ambassador Attolico described this request for immediate delivery of all the material before the outbreak of war as decisive, I regret that I regard it as impossible to fulfil your requests, as I have already stated, purely for reasons of organization and for technical reasons. In these circumstances, Duce, I understand your position, and would only ask you to try to achieve the pinning down of Anglo-French forces by active propaganda and suitable military demonstrations such as you have already proposed to me. As neither France nor Britain can achieve any decisive successes in the West, and as Germany, as a result of the Agreement with Russia, will have all her forces free in the East after the defeat of Poland, and as air supremacy is undoubtedly on our side, I do not shrink from solving the Eastern question even at the risk of complications in the West.⁴

ADOLF HITLER

² See document No. 301.

³ See also the *Ciano Diaries*, entry of Aug. 26, 1939.

⁴ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 298.

No. 308

100/84810-13

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy

ROME, August 26, 1939.

At 2:30 p.m. Senior Counsellor Hewel telephoned on behalf of the Foreign Minister and asked me to go to Count Ciano at once and to "verify" from the lists in my possession the figures of Italian war requirements handed over by Attolico in Berlin today.¹ I told him that I had no such list, but that when I telephoned Ciano this morning he had pointed out that he had just telephoned the lists to Berlin and they should be in the Führer's hands in a very short time.² No duplicate lists had been sent to me. However, as Ciano would certainly have the lists himself, I would get him to give me the exact figures again which I would then transmit to Berlin. When I asked whether I had understood the instructions correctly, namely that it was merely a question of verifying the quantities, not calibres or any other such points, Herr Hewel said that this was so.

I called on Count Ciano at once and was received by him at 3:15 p.m. He took my request to mean that Berlin was obviously surprised at the high figures. He said that a mistake in transmission was absolutely impossible, as he personally had dictated them by telephone to Ambassador Attolico, who had repeated them without mistake. I then asked him to give me the list, whereupon he handed me a copy of the Duce's letter on the subject, saying that he had in any case meant to send it to me, even had I not called on him now. He then expatiated at some length on the fact that Italy's urgent needs in the fields of armaments and raw materials must be sufficiently well known in Berlin. Both General Pariani in his conversation with Colonel General Keitel,³ and he himself during the conversations in August at Fuschl and at the Obersalzberg,⁴ had stated their views on this in detail and, in the case of certain raw materials, had even given the number of days for which Italy had sufficient stocks of one or other raw material in the event of war.

I then pointed out to Count Ciano that I had gained the impression from my telephone conversation this morning with Berlin that they thought there they had detected discrepancies between my account of my conversation with the Duce yesterday, reported in telegram No. 370,⁵ at which he [Ciano] had been present, and a letter from the Duce,⁶ which I understood had been handed to the Führer by Attolico

¹ See document No. 301.

² See document No. 302.

³ See vol. VI of this Series, Appendix I, document No. III.

⁴ See Editors' Note, p. 35, and documents Nos. 43 and 47.

⁵ Document No. 280.

⁶ See document No. 271.

in the afternoon. This was not quite clear to me, for I had adhered strictly to the Duce's statements, which I would now repeat to him, in so far as they concerned the question of further political intervention or new suggestions. Ciano confirmed that this account was perfectly correct in all particulars and added that, immediately after our conversation, the Duce, in a talk with him, had again closely studied the letter I had brought,⁷ and had the impression that, by referring to his complete understanding for Italy at the end of his letter, the Führer had given him the opportunity to express himself with complete frankness on this question. He had therefore resolved, not indeed to put forward new suggestions, but to tell the Führer once again in his letter that he placed himself and the whole weight of his personality at the disposal of the Führer for any further attempt the latter might make to reach a peaceful solution. He had also expressed the same sentiments in the last paragraph of his letter of today to the Führer,⁸ of which I have just received a copy.

At 3:40 p.m., in connection with the conversation in progress between the Foreign Minister's Secretariat and Consul Reisinger⁹ (telephone transmission of the text of the Führer's third letter),¹⁰ I informed Herr Sonnleithner of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat of my conversation with Count Ciano, and asked him to inform Herr Hewel of this at once. Herr Sonnleithner promised to do so.

He added that he had also been instructed by the Foreign Minister to tell me that, when I handed over the Führer's third letter to the Duce, I was to hand over as an enclosure to it the list of raw materials and quantities asked for by him. I told Herr Sonnleithner that I could not understand this order, as it comprised an instruction to give the Duce figures which had originated with him, for they were part of the letter sent by him to the Führer. Herr Sonnleithner said these were his instructions, but then said he was prepared to make further enquiries. He rang up again a few minutes later and said that the Foreign Minister requested me to use the figures in question as a basis for the anticipated conversation.

I told Herr Sonnleithner that I would telephone the Foreign Minister's Secretariat again immediately after carrying out my mission with the Duce.¹¹

MACKENSEN

⁷ See document No. 266.

⁸ See document No. 301.

⁹ An official in the German Embassy in Rome.

¹⁰ Document No. 307.

¹¹ See document No. 320.

No. 309

F11/0017

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

IMMEDIATE

No. 213

BERLIN, August 25, 1939.

Sent August 26—3:50 p.m.

I must again point out that the secret additional protocol signed in Moscow on August 23,¹ together with any possible drafts, is to be kept most strictly secret. All your officials and staff who up to the present have received knowledge of it must be specially pledged to secrecy, and must confirm this pledge with their personal signature.² No other persons are to be informed in any way of the existence or contents of the document.

RAM³¹ Document No. 229.² Such a pledge was signed by all those concerned on Aug. 27 (644/254850).³ Not signed by Ribbentrop, but approved by him according to a marginal note by a member of his staff.

No. 310

7985/E575334-36

*The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry*Telegram [en clair by teleprinter]¹

MOST URGENT

No. 490 of August 26

PARIS, August 26, 1939.

Received August 26—4 p.m.

P 10733.

This morning's press appears calm and composed. Minister President Daladier's radio speech yesterday² is reproduced and commented on, and the French point of view on war or peace is discussed in detail. In general the resolute attitude of the French Government is emphasized, as is also Daladier's advocacy of the method of negotiation. Several papers give prominence to Daladier's bitter words about Russia. De Kérillis in *L'Epoque* weighs up the pros and cons resulting from the conclusion of the German-Soviet Pact, and concludes that the Pact, or rather Alliance, will have severe and serious consequences, as it welds together two colossal forces, thus "brutally upsetting" the balance of power in the East. The effects of the Pact will also be bad because the Führer's master stroke has given the German people new courage and determination to hold out, while at the same time the unity of France has been torn asunder.

The morning press devotes its main attention to possible ways out

¹ Taken from the Paris draft (9887/E693549-51).² On Aug. 25, Daladier had given a broadcast to the nation, reviewing the Government's policy and expressing their determination to resist further aggression and stand by France's undertaking to Poland.

of the present impasse, and the possibilities of a peaceful solution of the threatened conflict. Various papers again seize upon the idea that Italy does not want war and will therefore defect from the Axis front, or that Italy will try to slow down German action or render it harmless by a peace move. Reports from Warsaw, or from "Polish diplomatic circles in Paris", that Poland has never closed the door on negotiations with the Reich, are circulated with sighs of relief and hope.

Nearly all newspapers attribute great significance to the visit to London of the British Ambassador, Henderson, to convey the Führer's message to the British Government, and pin their hopes for peace on it. The *Petit Parisien* detects in it the Führer's Godesberg tactics and gives an urgent warning against being taken in by Germany's proposals.

The newspapers are reserved in their comment on the British Government's currency measures and the Anglo-French exchange of ideas on currency control,³ but the stability of the French franc in the crisis is noted with satisfaction.

In domestic politics the leading articles of nearly all newspapers are launching a violent campaign against the French Communists. The ban on the publication of *L'Humanité* and *Le Soir* is generally welcomed; some papers also demand a ban on the Communist Party.

Paris Midi publishes the following report from its London correspondent: The tension has become most acute with incidents on the frontier between Poland and Germany. In diplomatic circles in Berlin the impression predominates that in "certain eventualities" Italy might remain neutral in a European conflict. In yesterday's conversation with the Führer, Ambassador Henderson suggested that Germany should return to her minimum demand "Danzig and an Autobahn through the Corridor". The Führer rejected this but at the same time declared his willingness to abandon the maximum solution of "partition and erasure of Poland from the map", and was considering a middle course. This was said, according to *The Times*, to consist of the return of Danzig, the whole of the Corridor and Poznań.

Paris Midi also reports that Polish general mobilization, which had already been ordered for 3 o'clock this morning, has been deferred on the advice of the British Government. London advised this to avoid anything happening which might irritate the Führer at the present juncture. Mobilization is to be postponed until Ambassador Henderson's report has been studied in London.

BRÄUER

³ In order to conserve gold stocks in Britain, the Exchange Equalization Fund withdrew its support from sterling and the rate depreciated sharply in terms of dollars. The decision was stated to have been taken with the full cognizance of the French and U.S. authorities.

No. 311

100/64820

Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Italy

ROME, August 26, 1939.

Minister Schmidt telephoned about 5:10 p.m. and first asked whether the Ambassador had gone to the Duce with the letter.¹ I answered that he had. Then Herr Schmidt said that he had been trying to get me for some time to tell me the following:

The Foreign Minister had only learnt of the letter after it had been telephoned through. He had therefore not been able to convey to the Führer in time a communication,² which had reached him via Attolico and the State Secretary, to the effect that Italy was not now demanding delivery of all the materials asked for *before* the outbreak of hostilities, but delivery of only part of them.

Herr Schmidt asked me to tell the Ambassador this and to ask him when he returned from the Duce to telephone Ciano and explain matters to him.

Submitted herewith to the Ambassador.

PLESSEN

¹ See document No. 307.

² Not found. See, however, *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, Nos. 299 and 303.

No. 312

1625/389204

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.

The Lufthansa has informed us by telephone that they have received a report from Amsterdam to the effect that their regular aircraft from London would arrive at Tempelhof at 5:30 p.m. today with Dahlerus,¹ a gentleman from the "Foreign Office",² on board.

MEYER-HEYDENHAGEN

¹ For M. Dahlerus' activities, see Editors' Note in vol. VI of this Series, p. 1088.

² In English in the original.

No. 313

173/83926

The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 62 of August 26

THE HAGUE, August 26, 1939—5:40 p.m.

Received August 26—6:40 p.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 109 of August 25.¹

1. I made the declaration to the Queen personally, who thanked

¹ Not printed; see document No. 272 and footnote 2 thereto.

me, asked me to inform Berlin that she had noted it with satisfaction, and said that it was hardly necessary for her to add that the Netherlands were resolved to observe strict neutrality towards all parties in the event of war and to see that their neutrality was respected.

2. If need be the Netherlands Government are prepared to take over the protection of our interests in Poland, and have instructed their Minister in Warsaw to take the necessary steps if a request to that effect is made by our Embassy in Warsaw.

3. The Foreign Minister,² who originally did not want to inform the press of my audience with the Queen, has just read me the Brussels communiqué on Bülow's audience,³ adding that, in these circumstances, the Netherlands Government assumed that we would agree to a similar communiqué being issued in The Hague.⁴

ZECH

² Eelco Nicolaas van Kleffens.

³ See document No. 315 and footnote 2 thereto.

⁴ Such a communiqué was issued in The Hague on Aug. 26.

No. 314

1625/389221

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 130 of August 26

SOFIA, August 26, 1939—5:50 p.m.

Received August 26—7:30 p.m.

Pol. IV 4843.

The Minister President told me last night that the conclusion of our Pact with Russia had convinced even those who had so far opposed cooperation between Bulgaria and Germany of the rightness of the Bulgarian Government's policy. The whole country had welcomed this Pact with joy and also with great relief. Its conclusion had been a master stroke on the Führer's part. He hoped that Turkey too would now revise her former policy; the next few days must show whether she would once more reduce the number of her troops in Thrace. The British Minister,¹ whose leave had been interrupted and who is now on his way back, would probably arrive with threatening letters, which would be received calmly here. At the same time he read to me part of a report which had just arrived, according to which Ambassador Henderson had told Mme Draganov² that if Bulgaria repeated the mistake she made in the World War, she would be annihilated (*sera anéantie*).

In conclusion the Minister President expressed his satisfaction and thanks for our deliveries of arms, which were now arriving.

¹ George W. Rendel.

² Wife of the Bulgarian Minister in Berlin.

In the meantime the Military Attaché³ has learnt from the Bulgarian General Staff this morning that difficulties have arisen over transit through Yugoslavia, which it is hoped will soon be removed with help from Berlin (cf. telegram 129⁴).

RICHTHOFEN

³ Lt. Col. Bruckmann.

⁴ Not printed (5558/E396031). This telegram of Aug. 26 reported that, according to the Bulgarian General Staff, the Yugoslav Government had detained two ammunition trains destined for Bulgaria. Clodius replied to Sofia in telegram No. 190 of Aug. 29 (5558/E396032) that, according to a telegram from Belgrade, the Yugoslav Ministry of War had authorized transit.

No. 315

141/127254

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BRUSSELS, August 26, 1939—5:50 p.m.

No. 91 of August 26

Received August 26—8:30 p.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 138 of August 25.¹

I have carried out the instructions. The King received with thanks the declaration which I made in solemn yet friendly tones, emphasizing the good relations between Germany and Belgium, and expressed his deep satisfaction at Germany's step. It is fully realized that the German declaration is only valid as long as Belgium maintains strict neutrality towards all sides. The King asked whether the Belgian air space was also included in the assurance of neutrality. I replied in the affirmative. In conclusion, the King stated that he was firmly resolved to carry out the policy of independence towards everyone and in all circumstances.

The Minister President and Foreign Minister Pierlot, whom I visited immediately afterwards, also received the declaration with great satisfaction and said that Belgium's salvation lay exclusively in carrying out her policy of independence, and therefore she wanted to be on friendly terms with all her neighbours. If, however, anyone violated Belgian integrity, no matter whether it was by occupying a province or a few square metres the size of his room, Belgium would resist with all the means at her disposal. The necessary measures were being put into effect. The Minister President gave the confident and serene impression of a resolute man who has set his house in order.

The Belgian Government are issuing the press communiqué² agreed on with me concerning my visit to the King and the making of the declaration. A translation will be transmitted through DNB.

BÜLOW

¹ Document No. 272.

² Such a communiqué was issued in Brussels on Aug. 26. See also Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *Belgium: The Official Account of what happened* (London, 1940), Appendix 6.

No. 316

100/64816-17

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy

Rome, August 26, 1939.

At 6:20 p.m. Minister Schmidt telephoned me again and asked if I had received his message,¹ given to Baron von Plessen, about the mistake over dates for delivery in the Führer's third letter.² I replied that I had, and told him how my conversation with the Duce had gone on this point.³ I was able to reply there and then to his question as to what proportion of the materials was to be delivered at once, by saying that this only concerned the anti-aircraft batteries which had been asked for.

Minister Schmidt then asked me on behalf of the Foreign Minister to call at once on Count Ciano and urge him, now that it had been ascertained that the rest of the deliveries were to be spread over a longer period, to send us as quickly as possible a plan giving exact details of the dates on which the requisite materials should be delivered, and in what quantity each time. I told Minister Schmidt that this question might, perhaps, invite a counter question from the Italians as to what purpose such a list would serve when we had already stated that there were certain raw materials which we could not supply at all. Herr Schmidt nevertheless stood by his request, as he was evidently reckoning on the possibility of obtaining, perhaps in some indirect way, what we could not supply from Germany direct. I promised to pass on his request without delay.

When, immediately afterwards, I tried to reach Ciano by telephone, I was told that this was not possible at the moment, but Anfuso, his *Chef de Cabinet*, offered to speak to me. I asked him to have the list with the details, as requested, transmitted to the Reich Foreign Minister through Attolico in the quickest possible way, preferably by telephone. He promised to submit the matter to Count Ciano without delay.⁴

MACKENSEN

¹ See document No. 311.

² See document No. 307.

³ See document No. 320.

⁴ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 305.

No. 317

100/64843-44

*The Head of the Italian Government to the Führer and Chancellor*¹

Message from the Duce to the Führer telephoned by His Excellency Count Ciano to the Royal [Italian] Ambassador in Berlin at 6:42 p.m. on August 26, 1939—XVII, for immediate delivery to the Führer.²

FÜHRER: I believe that the misunderstanding into which Attolico involuntarily fell³ was cleared up immediately, in accordance with my instructions. That which I asked of you, except for the anti-aircraft batteries, was to be delivered in the course of 12 months. But even though the misunderstanding has been cleared up, it is evident that it is impossible for you to assist me materially in filling the large gaps which the wars in Ethiopia and Spain have made in Italian armaments.

I will therefore adopt the attitude which you advise, at least during the initial phase of the conflict, thereby immobilizing the maximum Franco-British forces, as is already happening, while I shall speed up military preparations to the utmost possible extent.

I leave you to imagine my state of mind in finding myself compelled by forces beyond my control not to afford you real solidarity at the moment of action.

And it is also for this reason that I venture to insist anew, and not at all from considerations of a pacifist character foreign to my nature, but by reason of the interests of our two peoples and our two régimes, on the opportunity for a political solution, which I regard as still possible and such a one as will give full moral and material satisfaction to Germany.⁴

MUSSOLINI

¹ Translated from the Italian. See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 304.

² See also *ibid.*, No. 307.

³ i.e., in asking for full delivery before the commencement of hostilities; see documents Nos. 307, 311 and 320; also the *Ciano Diaries*, entry for Aug. 26.

⁴ Marginal note: "Handed to me on the evening of August 26 by Anfuso who stated at the same time that, in the prevailing circumstances, the Italians would refrain from handing over the list which had been requested from them by me in the afternoon. [Mackensen] 26/8." See document No. 316.

No. 318

8340/ES90099

The Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 238 of August 26

BELGRADE, August 26, 1939—8 p.m.

Received August 27—6:15 a.m.

W III 7051.

With reference to your telegram No. 212 of August 25.¹

Your instructions have been carried out with the Foreign Minister;

¹ See document No. 241, footnote 5.

he showed interest in the suggestion and will discuss the matter today with the Minister President.² Cincar-Marković expressed his satisfaction about the announcement about signing the armaments supply contracts and referred to the oil contracts just concluded as an indication of Yugoslav good will.³

FEINE

² Dragiša Cvetković.

³ In telegram No. 247 of Aug. 29 (8340/E590103) Heeren reported: "Trepča has resumed work. If this is not a mere feint, as must be ascertained, the Yugoslav Government see no possibility of stepping in."

No. 319

328/1953 60

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.

Minister von Radowitz telephoned from Luxembourg at 8:15 this evening and said that Radio Luxembourg had broadcast an official Belgian report on Ambassador von Bülow-Schwante's audience with the King of the Belgians, and an official Dutch report on the German Minister, Count Zech's, audience with the Queen of the Netherlands.¹ In these circumstances he considered it fitting that we should sanction the issue of a similar communiqué by the Luxembourg Government.² I agreed with this.

As arranged, Minister Braun von Stumm will deal with the matter further.

WOERMANN

¹ See documents Nos. 313 and 315.

² See also document No. 321.

No. 320

F1/0259-61

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, August 26, 1939—11:10 p.m.

No. 379 of August 26

Received August 27—3:30 a.m.

With reference to my report by telephone¹ for the Reich Foreign Minister.

Shortly after 5 p.m. I handed the Führer's third letter,² of today's date, to the Duce in the presence of Count Ciano. He noted the German statement on supply possibilities, and merely observed, on the subject of the anti-aircraft batteries, that 30 batteries would just be sufficient to defend the Ligurian industrial area, but not the other

¹ See document No. 316.

² Document No. 307.

vital parts of the Upper Italian industrial quadrilateral, Turin-Genoa-Milan-Savona. Attolico's request that the full total of the requirements described as essential should be delivered here *before* the outbreak of war, the Duce described as completely incomprehensible, as even the Almighty Himself could not transport such quantities here in a few days. It had never occurred to him to make such an absurd request. Here Ciano interrupted, and reassured the Duce by saying that in the meantime the mistake had long since been cleared up, and that the correct interpretation would certainly have come to the Führer's knowledge, namely that the request for immediate delivery had applied only to the anti-aircraft guns.

Concerning the request for further active propaganda and suitable military demonstrations, he observed: "We have done this and will continue to do so." It was a very painful matter for him, the Duce continued—going on to statements which he was obviously anxious to make to me—that in the present situation he could adopt no other attitude. He had, however, a country behind him which had just waged war for five years and had been bled white by the Spanish Civil War; that operation had cost over fourteen thousand millions for which there would be little return, and had made enormous inroads on reserves of foreign exchange, which greatly increased the problem of obtaining raw materials. Italy's position, especially as regards supplies of raw materials, was, however, familiar to us and the seriousness of the situation had recently again been clearly explained by Count Ciano in Salzburg.³ He would make no further suggestions, the more so as the final passage in his letter of today to the Führer,⁴ in which he had once again offered his services, had remained without response. He could not, however, help feeling convinced that even today there were still possibilities of finding a solution without war and without giving way in the question at issue. Only today he had again received information from the British Ambassador⁵ which seemed to him to prove that the British were prepared to exercise the strongest pressure on Poland, if by so doing an armed conflict could be avoided. He did not deny that, so far, there were no signs of such pressure, but nevertheless thought that this possibility still existed. He could not take the initiative, but, as he was anxious to emphasize to me too, he was completely at the Führer's service. Furthermore, a few days ago, he had personally sent Beck a very stiff warning. That a war, once it had broken out, could be localized, he considered impossible. If he were asked, he would . . . (group mutilated)⁶ advise that the greatest attention be paid to the way the war was conducted, in other words that

³ See documents Nos. 43 and 47.

⁴ Document No. 301.

⁵ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 294.

⁶ In Mackensen's draft (100/64839-42) this reads: "in this connection".

Poland alone be attacked. By contrast a purely defensive attitude should be adopted in the West, in order to demonstrate to the French and British peoples (perhaps stressing this by a suitable appeal to both nations) that whilst we were ready to prevent their intervention by force of arms, for us it was merely a question of asserting our good German rights against a nation having nothing in common with the British and French and living thousands of kilometres away from them. Then, after Poland's overthrow, it would be easier to find the right moment to make an end. Ciano underlined these statements by the Duce and mentioned that, at their last meeting, the Reich Foreign Minister had already told him that we were thinking of acting like this in the West and, even in the event of enemy air attack, of confining ourselves to the defensive, without ourselves replying in kind. The Duce said that was excellent.

The Duce then again reverted to the position of Italy, who today was only able to wage war for some three to four months, and would then come to the end of her resources for lack of supplies. He also mentioned that, through the medium of the German-Italian exchange of information, he had just read a report from our Navy, to the effect that it could definitely be expected that, in view of the impossibility of an assault on our West Wall, the French and British would attack Italy in full force by land, sea, and in the air, immediately war broke out.

In conclusion, the Duce said that he intended to answer the Führer today and in the speediest possible way.

MACKENSEN⁷

⁷ Marginal note: "Submitted to the Foreign Minister. Sonn[eithner] 27/8."

No. 321

328/195370-71

The Minister in Luxembourg to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 21 of August 26 LUXEMBOURG, August 26, 1939—11:55 p.m.
Received August 27—7:45 a.m.

As already reported by telephone¹ I made the statement prescribed in your telegram to Foreign Minister Bech this morning in friendly terms. This afternoon Foreign Minister Bech, who expressed to me personally his particular satisfaction at our communication, gave me the following statement: "The Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg have taken note with great satisfaction of the statement made by the German Government to the Government of Luxembourg that, in recognition of the repeatedly declared intention of the

¹ See document No. 305, footnote 1.

Luxembourg Government to remain neutral, they will observe an attitude which will in no circumstances prejudice the integrity of Luxembourg territory. The Luxembourg Government for their part confirm their resolute intention to maintain the neutrality of the Grand Duchy in all circumstances, and naturally to observe unimpeachable neutrality towards Germany too in any European conflict. If, in a few years, and contrary to expectation, conflicts . . . (group mutilated) violation of neutrality by a third party, the Luxembourg Government, taking their stand on the sovereignty and the neutrality of their country, reserve the right to take and to propose such measures as the situation may require.[¹] In reply to a question from me, B[ech] interpreted the last sentence as meaning that, in the case of Germany feeling herself automatically released by a third party from her obligation to respect the neutrality of Luxembourg as the result of an occupation of Luxembourg by France, Luxembourg, as a sovereign and neutral State, must also make a reservation against this. However, he thought this was only of theoretical significance.

B[ech] has instructed his Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow [*sic* ? Paris²] to bring our statement to the notice of the French Government.

After consultation with Under State Secretary Woermann,³ my *démarche* will be made public this evening in the same way as reported from Brussels and The Hague.

RADOWITZ

² The Luxembourg Chargé d'Affaires in Paris was Antoine Funck.

³ See document No. 319.

No. 322

7985/E575322-24

The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram [en clair by teleprinter]¹

No. 498 of August 26

PARIS, August 26, 1939.

Received August 27, 1939—4:5 a.m.

P 10652.

A special source makes this semi-official statement on the situation: The outstanding factor today is the military measures adopted by the Ministry of War² and designed to complete those decided on earlier. These measures have no provocative character; they are the result of a decision reached a few days ago in view of the gravity of the international situation; they follow one another in the automatic sequence which is in the nature of military affairs.

¹ Taken from the Paris copy (9887/E693555-57).

² It had been publicly announced that *inter alia* the Franco-Italian frontier was closed, and orders had been issued prohibiting the flying of aircraft over territory east of a line drawn from Calais through Paris to Marseilles. See also document No. 352.

As far as France's attitude in the international field is concerned, this has not changed. It was stated clearly and forcefully yesterday by the Head of the Government.³ Yesterday's diplomatic activity in Berlin brought no change in the situation. Today, as yesterday, the statements made by the French Minister President retain their full value and topicality.

French diplomatic circles preserve complete silence both about the character of the conversations which Reich Chancellor Hitler had yesterday with the Ambassadors of Great Britain⁴ and France,⁵ and about the nature of the declaration given to the Führer of the Third Reich in the course of these conversations. It is merely pointed out that the Chancellor's statements, which were couched in extremely general terms, give no indication of the actual intentions of the Reich Government, and, in the main, throw no light on Germany's attitude to the principles expounded last night by the French Minister President, on which France bases her attitude. The question therefore remains open whether the Third Reich is prepared to enter into negotiations, to be conducted freely and without pressure, in order to settle the differences peacefully, or whether the Reich is determined to wring from Poland by force concessions which would be irreconcilable with Poland's honour and national sovereignty.

M. Daladier emphasized yesterday that France is prepared to cooperate in the solution of every difference by means of negotiation, but that she is resolved at the same time to oppose any solution by force which would result in the enslavement of a free and proud nation.

This afternoon the French Government issued their instructions to the French Ambassador in Berlin, Coulondre. They were agreed upon this morning at a conference in the *Présidence du Conseil*, in which Daladier, Bonnet and Léger⁶ took part. Coulondre was received in audience this afternoon by Chancellor Hitler. It can be assumed that the French Ambassador represented to the Head of the German Government France's views as set forth by the French Minister President.

BRÄUER

³ By Daladier in a broadcast to the nation on Aug. 25.

⁴ See document No. 265.

⁵ See Editors' Note, p. 284.

⁶ Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry.

No. 323

26/16172-73

*The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry*A 912¹ II

BRUSSELS, August 26, 1939.

Received August 27.

Pol. VI 1980.

Subject: Conference of the Oslo Powers.

With reference to my report of August 22¹ and to my telegram No. 82 of August 23, 1939.²

According to information given by Minister President Pierlot to Counsellor of Embassy von Bargaen, the Conference of the Oslo Powers was summoned on Belgian initiative for the dual purpose of consulting together as to the position of the seven participating States, in view of the serious crisis, and of contributing towards the preservation of peace by a solemn appeal to all the countries of the world. The appeal, cast in the form of a speech by the King, was prepared, according to M. Pierlot, through diplomatic channels in advance of the Conference meeting, and the Conference merely produced the final version. In addition, there was a general discussion on the European situation without any definite agenda. The Minister President observed that he, who was for the first time conducting the negotiations with the other Oslo Group States, had been most deeply impressed to see how closely these States were bound together by common principles of morality and common interests. The exchange of views was to be continued. He himself intended to arrange a meeting, perhaps at the end of next week, with the representatives in Brussels of the Oslo Powers, in order to agree upon a date for a fresh Conference.

Apart from the final communiqué, of which you know through DNB, no resolutions of any kind were taken by the Conference.

The King's appeal, transmitted by the State broadcasting system of Belgium, by stations in North America, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and over the entire French State broadcasting system, has evoked great response in the Belgian press. According to the Foreign Ministry, many telegrams expressing approval have since been received from Heads of other States.

Some newspaper cuttings dealing with the Conference are enclosed.³

VON BÜLOW-SCHWANTE

¹ Document No. 185.² Document No. 208.³ Not reprinted (26/16176-79).

No. 324

3059/611754-56

*The French Minister President to the Führer and Chancellor¹**Copy*

PARIS, August 26, 1939.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: The French Embassy in Berlin has informed me of your personal message.²

Finding ourselves faced, as you remind me, with the gravest responsibility that can ever be assumed by two Heads of Government, that of allowing the blood to be shed of two great peoples who desire nothing but peace and work, I owe it to you and I owe it to our two peoples, to say that the fate of peace still rests in your hands alone.

You cannot doubt my sentiments towards Germany, nor France's peaceful sentiments towards your nation. No Frenchman has ever done more than I have to strengthen between our two peoples not merely peace, but a sincere cooperation in their own interest as well as in that of Europe and the world.

Unless you attribute to the French people a conception of national honour less high than that which I myself recognize in the German people, you cannot doubt, either, that France will be true to her solemn promises to other nations, such as Poland, which, I am certain, also want to live in peace with Germany.

These two certainties are completely reconcilable.

There is nothing today which need prevent any longer the pacific solution of the international crisis with honour and dignity for all peoples, if the will for peace exists equally on all sides.

I can vouch not only for the good will of France, but also for that of all her allies. I can personally guarantee the readiness, which Poland has always shown, to have mutual recourse to methods of free conciliation, such as may be envisaged between the Governments of two sovereign nations. In all sincerity I can assure you that there is not one of the grievances invoked by Germany against Poland in connection with the Danzig questions which might not be submitted to decision by such methods with a view to a friendly and equitable settlement.

I can also pledge my honour that there is nothing in the clear and sincere solidarity of France with Poland and her allies which could modify in any manner whatsoever the peaceful inclinations of my

¹ Translated from the French. For the text sent from Paris, which shows certain minor verbal differences, see the *French Yellow Book*, No. 253, where it is stated that it was transmitted from Paris at 2:50 p.m. on Aug. 26. According to Coulondre's report dated Aug. 27 (see *loc. cit.*, No. 261) he had an interview with Hitler on Aug. 26, when he presented this letter. No record of this conversation has been found in the German Foreign Ministry archives.

² See Editors' Note, p. 284.

country. This solidarity has never prevented us, and does not prevent us today, from helping to maintain Poland in her pacific inclinations

In so serious an hour I sincerely believe that no man endowed with human feelings could understand that a war of destruction should be allowed to break out without a last attempt at a pacific adjustment between Germany and Poland. Your will for peace may be exercised in all confidence in this direction without the slightest derogation from your sense of German honour. As for myself, the Head of the French Government, concerned only for harmony between the French people and the German people and, on the other hand, united to Poland by bonds of friendship and by their pledged word, I am ready to make all the efforts that an honest man can make in order to ensure the success of this attempt.

Like myself, you were a soldier in the last war. You realize, as I do, how a people's memory retains for ever a horror and condemnation of the disasters of war, whatever may be the result. The conception which I have been able to form of your eminent role as leader of the German people, to guide them along the paths of peace towards the full accomplishment of their mission in the common work of civilization, prompts me to ask you for a reply to this proposal. If the blood of France and that of Germany flows again, as it did twenty-five years ago, in a longer and even more murderous war, each of the two peoples will fight with confidence in its own victory, but the most certain victors will be the forces of destruction and barbarism.³

EDOUARD DALADIER

³ According to the report of Aug. 27 by Coulondre (*French Yellow Book*, No. 262), he had arranged with Hitler that no publicity should be given to this letter from Daladier, and to the coming reply by Hitler, till further notice.

No. 325

2856/551422

Note from the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the German Embassy in Brussels¹

BRUSSELS, August 26, 1939.

In his Note of today's date² the German Ambassador has been good enough, on instructions from the Head of the State, to define, on the occasion of the present international crisis, the attitude which the Government of the Reich will adopt towards Belgium in the event of a conflict in Europe becoming inevitable.

The Royal Government thank the Government of the Reich for this communication, by which the latter confirm their firm deci-

¹ Translated from the French original filed in the Brussels Embassy. No evidence has been found of the transmission of the Note to the Foreign Ministry.

² See document No. 815.

sion to adhere to the Declaration contained in the German Note of October 13, 1937.³

For their part, the Royal Government, faithful to the policy of which Germany took cognizance in the above-mentioned Note of October 13, intend to remain outside a possible conflict; they will in consequence not tolerate any violation of this neutrality and will oppose with all their available forces such violation should it occur.

³ See vol. v of this Series, document No. 475.

No. 326

2134/467404-05

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 645

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.

The British Chargé d'Affaires¹ has just handed me the attached *aide-mémoire* according to which the British Government are carefully studying the Führer's message sent through Sir Nevile Henderson.² The British Government's reply is at present being drafted and will be considered at a full meeting of the Cabinet. Sir Nevile Henderson will fly back to Berlin tomorrow afternoon, Sunday, August 27, with the final text of the British reply.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

Copy

BRITISH EMBASSY, BERLIN.³

Aide-mémoire

His Majesty's Government are studying with care Herr Hitler's message in consultation with Sir Nevile Henderson this afternoon. His Majesty's Government's reply is being prepared and will be considered at a full meeting of the Cabinet. Sir Nevile Henderson will fly back to Germany with the final text of the reply on Sunday afternoon, August 27th.

Signature

¹ Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes. See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 331.

² See document No. 265.

³ This *aide-mémoire* is in English in the original.

No. 327

34/24047-48

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 646

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.

The Chinese Ambassador¹ called on me today, on instructions from his Government, to express their satisfaction at the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact. His Government were anxious to know whether this event would provide an opportunity to improve German-Chinese relations. Until two years ago, these relations had left nothing to be desired. Since then they had not been as friendly as before.² China, however, had patiently awaited the opportunity for an improvement and saw in the present situation the hope of getting back on better terms with us, not only in the economic but also in the political field.

I went into some detail to make clear to the Ambassador the circumstances which had finally led to the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact and depicted to him the full significance of the conclusion of the Treaty. However, I did not conceal from him either that we did not intend to see our relations with Japan change as a result of this Pact. What Germany most desired in respect of the conditions prevailing in East Asia was peace. It was well known that nothing would please us more than the restoration of peace between Japan and China, while we were not concerned with the disturbed frontier relations between the Japanese and the Russians. I then went on to say that German-Chinese relations had indeed suffered somewhat in the last few years from the fact that the German-Russian hostility and Chinese-Russian friendship did not go well together. After the revolutionary event in Moscow this week, a stumbling block between China and Germany had been removed. Thus, therefore, indirectly, relations between Germany and China would undoubtedly benefit. But whether immediate and concrete progress would result in our economic and political relations, as the Ambassador and his Government thought, was a question I did not feel able to answer for the moment. But I believed that his Government's basic idea would undoubtedly meet with understanding and sympathy here. I would naturally not fail to inform the Foreign Minister of his visit and request.

The Ambassador did not press me further, but said that we must certainly have other matters to discuss at the present moment which would be fully engaging our attention.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Chen Chieh.² For documents on German-Chinese relations see vols. I and IV of this Series, chapters IV and VIII respectively.

No. 328

7971/E575083

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 647

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.
Pol. IX 1794.

As instructed, I received the American Chargé d'Affaires this evening in order to speak to him as follows: The Führer had received President Roosevelt's two telegrams.¹ He had placed the telegrams in the hands of the Foreign Minister for consideration by the Government. I had not been instructed to enter into the details of the President's telegrams and was requesting that this communication of mine should be transmitted provisionally, as I had made it, to the Government of the United States for the President. Mr. Kirk evinced pleasure at this act of courtesy and will cable home accordingly.

When the Chargé d'Affaires then wished to say something more about the situation and the possible consequences of a war, I told him that even if the position was not entirely without hope for peace, it was nevertheless, in my opinion, extremely strained. For the rest, it would be better to issue warnings elsewhere, for instance in Warsaw, as to the possible consequences of a war.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ On Aug. 24, President Roosevelt had addressed telegrams to Hitler and President Mościcki of Poland making an appeal for peace, and on receipt of a reply from the President of Poland, a further telegram to Hitler on Aug. 25 (for the texts, see *Peace and War*, Nos. 137, 138 and 139).

² This memorandum was repeated to Washington as telegram No. 221 of Aug. 26 (7971/E575084).

No. 329

174/138079-81

Memorandum by the State Secretary

SECRET

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.

St.S. No. 648

I received the Japanese Ambassador this evening, at his own request. As we had already been informed by Ambassador Ott,¹ he had two matters to discuss, and brought them up in the following order:

1. He handed me a Note in which the Japanese Government addressed a "serious protest" to the German Government concerning the alleged incompatibility of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact with the German-Japanese Agreement of which we were aware.

¹ See document No. 262.

2. He read me a statement according to which the Japanese Government take the view that, as a result of the conclusion of the German-Russian Pact, the German-Italian-Japanese negotiations on an alliance so far conducted have come to an end.

As instructed, I told the Ambassador that this time I wanted to speak to him not officially, but as a friend and comrade. As regards the Note, we knew that it had been agreed between the Reich Foreign Minister and Oshima that legal experts should meet to discuss the alleged incompatibility of the two Treaties.² I was quite unable to agree that they were incompatible. Furthermore, at serious moments in the lives of nations it was not the legal niceties which were decisive, but realities which were self-evident to men and soldiers. If, at the present moment, the Japanese Government considered it expedient to come to us with such disputations and, further, to present them in writing as a "serious protest", I could only assure Oshima that his Government would receive a very sharp answer, and not one likely to promote the friendly relations between Japan and Germany which we certainly all wished to promote.

On the question of not accepting responsibility for the alleged termination of the talks we had so far conducted on an alliance, I told Oshima that if we were to talk of responsibility, this in our view lay solely with Foreign Minister Arita, who had most unwarrantably kept us waiting for six months in spite of the most extensive German concessions. In such methods lay the responsibility for the present developments. I could assure Oshima that this second part of his mission too would just as clearly be rejected by the Reich Foreign Minister, if it came to his knowledge.

Then, speaking as a friend, I recommended Oshima to treat our conversation as though it had not taken place and as if he had not met me in the Foreign Ministry at all. I told him to put his Note in his pocket again and to reflect for twenty-four hours how best he could get round acting on these instructions from his Government, which might perhaps suit Japanese requirements in domestic policy, but which were not in the well-understood interests of our two countries.

Oshima took his papers back again and left me, intending to reflect on what he should now do, but expressing great anxiety as to what could be done, as he had received unequivocal instructions from Tokyo.³

WEIZSÄCKER

² No record of such a conversation has been found, but see document No. 183.

³ The substance of this conversation was sent to the Ambassador in Tokyo for his personal and strictly confidential information in telegram No. 271 on Aug. 27 (174/136082-83).

No. 330

8393/E591832; 825-26; 830-31

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.

Pol. V 8488.

The Polish Ambassador today brought forward a number of complaints about German frontier violations, which he described as serious. He read out in German the two appended "unofficial" translations of two *notes verbales*¹ giving the details of the incidents and the requests made by the Polish Government.

I promised to look into the incidents,² adding that we had a large number of very serious complaints of the same kind, which would be preferred by our Embassy in Warsaw.

WOERMANN

[Enclosure 1]

Note Verbale

No. N/388/48/39

BERLIN, August 25, 1939.

Unofficial translation

Pol. V 8487.

The Polish Embassy has the honour to draw the Foreign Ministry's attention to the following incident:

At 4:30 p.m. on August 25, 1939, a German military patrol, composed of a corporal and ten men, crossed the Polish frontier near the town of Myszyniec, Voyvodship Bialystok, and proceeded 900 metres into Polish territory.

Two Polish frontier guards blocked the passage of the patrol, who opened fire; the Polish guards returned the fire. As a result of this clash, on the German side, Corporal Kapenhagen of the First Cavalry Regiment, Third Squadron, Insterburg, was killed.

Thereupon the German patrol withdrew across the frontier, leaving behind a light machine gun.

The body of the corporal was taken to Myszyniec and, on completion of all formalities, will be handed over to the German authorities at the frontier on August 26.

The Embassy strongly protests against the above case of the crossing of the Polish frontier by a German military unit, and has the honour to request the Foreign Ministry to have this incident investigated, as well as to call to account those persons responsible.

¹ The Polish texts of the *notes verbales* (8393/E591823-24 and 8393/E591828-29) are not printed.

² On Aug. 27, the Foreign Ministry sent copies of both the Polish *notes verbales* in translation to the OKW (8393/E591827, 838), with a request for their views. The OKW replied on Aug. 31 (8393/E591834), referring to the report by the Main Customs Office in Beuthen on the death of the Polish soldier Piatkowski, and stated that investigations had been ordered into the alleged frontier violation.

[Enclosure 2]

Note Verbale

No. N/388/49/39

BERLIN, August 25, 1939.

Unofficial translation

Pol. V 8488.

The Polish Embassy has the honour to draw the Foreign Ministry's attention to the following incidents:

At 1:25 a.m. on August 24, 1939, a soldier of the Polish frontier guard, Edmund Piatkowski, of the Commissariat at Tarnowskie Góry, was shot dead while on patrol. The shots came from German territory, from the park of Herr Donnersmarck, which is situated on the frontier. The shots were fired by a group of six persons.

At midnight on August 24, 1939, a group of persons crossed the Polish frontier from Germany, near Szczygłowic in the Voyvodship of Silesia, by frontier stone No. 252, and fired approximately 300 shots towards the frontier guard house. Furthermore, these persons also threw four hand grenades and penetrated as far as 400 metres into Polish territory.

At 5 a.m. on the same day, another group of persons attacked the frontier post near Chwalecic in the district of Rybnik. These persons threw three hand grenades and fired several shots.

At the same time, an attack was made on the Polish frontier guard house at Zwanowice in the district of Rybnik. The group, consisting of approximately forty persons, was equipped with six light machine guns. These persons threw three hand grenades and fired approximately 300 shots.

This place, Zwanowice in the district of Rybnik, has been fired on by two bands since 11:55 (today, August 25). These bands, consisting of approximately a hundred and fifty men, took up positions along the frontier, but did not cross the frontier itself. Two heavy machine guns manned by soldiers were observed on the German side. The shooting continues.

In bringing the above to the notice of the Foreign Ministry, the Polish Embassy protests most strongly against incidents of this kind. The Embassy requests, in the first place, that an investigation be conducted into the case of the Polish frontier guard Piatkowski being shot dead, that the firing at Zwanowice be stopped, and also that the other instances of frontier violation be investigated.

The Embassy has the honour to request, at the same time, that those responsible be punished, and that such measures be taken as will serve to exclude the possibility of a repetition of such incidents.

No. 331

52/35195

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.

On his visit today, the Polish Ambassador stated that he was completely cut off by telephone both from Poland and from the Polish Consulates in Germany. He knew that other foreign Missions had also been in the same position last night. Their difficulties, however, had soon been removed, whereas for the Polish Embassy the difficulties still persisted. He asked for the immediate removal of these difficulties, referring to the prerogatives internationally accorded to diplomats.

I told the Ambassador that I knew nothing of this, but that I would have the matter looked into at once.¹

WOERMANN²

¹ In a further memorandum on Aug. 26 (52/35194), Woermann recorded that at 2:15 p.m. he had telephoned the Polish Ambassador as follows: "(1) I assumed that telephone communication between the Polish Embassy and the Consulates had meantime been restored. The Ambassador had, however, not recently tried to telephone.

"(2) The Embassy's line to the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw was now clear. Any remaining difficulties would be removed at latest within an hour. On the other hand, we had not succeeded in getting through to our Embassy in Warsaw. We therefore requested him, when next he telephoned the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw, to see to it that reciprocal facilities be assured." Schliep noted, in a subsequent memorandum (800/274241), that he had succeeded in getting through to the German Embassy in Warsaw at about 5 p.m. See also documents Nos. 334 and 335.

² The distribution of this memorandum was to the Foreign Minister, the State Secretary, the Directors of the Legal and Political Departments, Political Division I, Military Affairs, with the request for further action, and Political Division V.

No. 332

34/24046

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.

The Finnish Minister¹ called on me today and asked outright whether anything concerning Finland had been agreed between Germany and the Soviet Union in Moscow. I replied in the negative² and the Minister was relieved to hear it. I then explained in detail to the Minister the advantages which the Baltic States would derive from the conclusion of the German-Soviet Treaty.

WOERMANN

¹ Aarne Wuorimaa.

² On the same day Woermann, replying to a similar enquiry from Blücher contained in telegram No. 129 of Aug. 25 from Helsinki (1793/408514), stated, in telegram No. 155 to Helsinki (388/211547): "You are authorized to state, if asked, that during the German-Russian pact negotiations, no agreements were made about Finland."

No. 333

183/85944-46

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Department

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.

zu R. 1388.¹

With reference to the question of the transport of Swiss goods by sea in neutral ships in the event of war, I today handed the Swiss Minister the enclosed memorandum. When he asked how neutral ships would, in general, be treated by German naval forces, I replied that the general principles of the law of naval warfare must apply, which give the Navy the right to stop neutral ships on the high seas, examine the ship's papers and, if necessary, conduct a search. In reply to my question to which European ports Switzerland proposed sending the ships carrying cargoes for her, the Minister replied that they had in mind neutral and French ports. I pointed out to him that naturally ships entering enemy ports would be exposed to war risks. The Minister replied that the British had agreed that ships carrying cargoes for Switzerland might enter German ports. When I asked whether the British had also given an assurance that, in this case, the ships would not be exposed to general war risks such as minefields, etc., he had of course to reply in the negative. With reference to Point 2, we discussed the practice applied by the British during the war, of supplying bunker coal to neutral ships only if these ships carried cargoes for Britain also. The Minister regarded it as obvious that the German assurance did not cover such cases.

In conclusion the Minister expressed his Government's thanks for the memorandum, the substance of which he thought would be found entirely satisfactory.

ALBRECHT

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.

R. 1388 g.

The Foreign Ministry has the honour to give the following reply to the Swiss Legation's Note of July 20 last, IV 7/19,² handed over personally by the Swiss Minister, regarding the transport by sea of Swiss goods in neutral ships in the event of war.

1. In the event of war, neutral ships exclusively engaged in carrying cargoes for Switzerland would in principle receive the same treatment by Germany on the high seas as other neutral ships. German

¹ See enclosure.

² Not printed (183/85931). This Note of even date asked for a German assurance that ships carrying goods exclusively destined for Switzerland, and ships chartered by the Swiss Government from neutral shipping companies, would not be molested in case of war. See also vol. v of this Series, document No. 528 and footnotes 2 and 3 thereto.

naval forces, however, would afford every consideration compatible with the war situation to neutral ships exclusively engaged in supplying Switzerland with goods necessary to her.

2. The German Government have no intention of requisitioning ships which Switzerland has reserved in the event of war by concluding option agreements with shipping agents in neutral countries for the transport of goods for Switzerland, and which in each individual case are being used exclusively for that purpose.

No. 334

800/274237

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.

Pol. I M. 3858 g.

Admiral Canaris informs me that, according to a statement by the Führer, the present ban on communications did not seem to him to be very practical. In consequence Colonel General Keitel will once again raise the question of whether the ban on communications still in force with Poland, Lithuania and Slovakia can be lifted. The Foreign Ministry will be informed immediately a decision is taken.¹

Captain (Navy) Bürkner,² who has just been in communication with Bratislava, transmitted the following information from Consul Hofmann:

The Polish, Italian and Hungarian representatives in Bratislava had told the Slovak Government that if the present ban on communications were not lifted in a very short time they would consider themselves compelled to leave.

V.D. HEYDEN-RYNSCH

¹ See also document No. 335.

² Of the OKW.

No. 335

800/274238

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.

Pol. I M. 3865 g.

Message from the OKW.

The Führer has decided that communications with Poland and Lithuania are to remain interrupted.¹ With regard to Slovakia, only

¹ In a memorandum of the same day, Pol. I M. 3873 g. (800/274240), Nostitz recorded that, on instructions from Woermann, he had asked the Intelligence Department (Abwehr III) of the OKW to permit the transmission of telegrams, both en clair and in cipher, between the Polish Embassy in Berlin and their Government in Warsaw. See also documents Nos. 331 and 334.

the communications with Poland will remain interrupted, whereas those with Hungary, the Protectorate and Germany will be opened with immediate effect.²

HEYDEN-RYNSCH

² Typewritten marginal notes: (i) "To be submitted to the State Secretary through the Under State Secretary." (ii) "Copy to Political Division IV with the request that Bratislava be informed."

No. 336

800/274239

Note by an Official of Political Division I

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.

e.o. Pol. I M. 3874 g.

In reply to an enquiry, the Foreign Ministry this morning requested the High Command of the Wehrmacht not to arrest certain members of Polish Consulates in the Reich, named by the OKW, against whom there is evidence that they have engaged in espionage against the Reich. The OKW now proposes to prevent these persons leaving the country, and asked for the Foreign Ministry's views about it. On instructions from the Under State Secretary, the OKW was informed that there were no objections to this measure, provided it was carried out in a disguised way. The OKW, Intelligence Department [*Abwehr*] (Major Wagner), promised that this would be done.

v. NOSTITZ

No. 337

F11/0240-41

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.

zu Pol. I 1038 g. Rs.¹

At today's meeting of the Reich Defence experts [*Reichsverteidigungsreferenten*],² Colonel Wagner, in his capacity as Chief of the General Staff of the Quartermaster General, announced that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, to whom executive power had been transferred, had appointed him to take the appropriate measures for the civilian sectors and/or to consult with them.

Two documents were presented (No. 1615 and No. 1655 g. Kdos. of August 24 and 26)³ containing further details of the continuance of

¹ Not printed (F11/0239); the cover note under which eleven numbered copies of this memorandum were distributed.

² *Reichsverteidigungsreferenten* were members of the Reich Defence Committee, to be set up in accordance with Section 11 of the Reich Defence Law of Sept. 4, 1938 (see Editors' Note, p. 302), and assigned to the Führer's Deputy, the Reich Chancellery, each Reich Ministry, the Reichsführer-SS, and to other high-level Reich agencies, as well as to the Prussian State Ministry.

³ Not found in the Foreign Ministry archives, but see Editors' Note, p. 302.

the state of mobilization. It was expressly pointed out that, by the Führer's directive of August 25, executive power had passed to the Supreme Commander of the Army for the operational areas East and West (for further details see Appendix I to document No. 1615 g. Kdos.).

With regard to Point 2 of document No. 1655 g. Kdos. of August 24, referring to the ban on entry into Slovakia, I maintained that, in view of the changed situation and in consideration of the fact that no ban had been decreed for Poland, it would be politically inexpedient to include Slovakia in this measure at present. This was admitted on the military side. Should measures of this kind become necessary, the Foreign Ministry will be consulted beforehand.

The question of how the present special expenditure is to be entered in the accounts remained unsettled. The representative of the Ministry of Finance was asked to procure a letter from his Ministry stating clearly how the present special expenditure was to be entered. At this point the representative of the Ministry of Finance remarked that the strictest economy measures were now to be observed and any unnecessary expenditure would be rigorously vetoed by the Ministry of Finance.

It was also announced that the Ministry of Justice is to set up nine special courts to supplement, if necessary, courts martial with the troops.

A permit office in charge of Captain Engelbrecht has been set up at Room 233, Bendlerstrasse 14, for passes for the occupied zone. A representative of the staff of Brigadeführer Best will be sent there.

Captain Getgens is ready to deal with all technical questions concerning executive authority.

From 8 p.m. tomorrow the railways will be fully mobilized and consequently have already cancelled their public transport obligations.

VON DER HEYDEN-RYNSCH

No. 338

F11/0237-33

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.

e.o. Pol. I 1042 g. Rs.

1. According to information from the High Command of the Navy, yesterday's and today's air reconnaissance has shown that there is no truth in the report broadcast by the Polish radio that the British Fleet was stationed north-east of the Skagerrak ready for a blockade. The presence of British naval forces in the North Sea area has not been confirmed. According to reports to hand, the British Fleet is still stationed in northern British waters—Scapa Flow and similar har-

bours. Nor are the minefields, which have been announced for merchant shipping (announcement on the British radio),¹ particularly surprising measures. These are the same minefields as those laid last September; mostly harbour minefields, such as have also been used by the French and Italians. Minefields of this kind are not generally used by Germany, as the situation of the harbours does not require them.

2. German naval forces are so stationed, particularly in the Baltic Sea, that they can keep the closest watch on all important points, so that no foreign naval forces can enter that area of the Baltic of interest to Germany without being observed. The naval forces ordered to Danzig have taken up their stations at a distance from the Polish mainland, which precludes the risk of incidents.

3. The High Command of the Navy has ordered the Commander of the *Schleswig-Holstein* to remain in Danzig² until further notice, even after August 28. It has been left to our discretion to inform the Consulate General in Danzig. A telegram to this effect, countersigned by Political Division V,³ has been despatched.

HEYDEN-RYNSCH

¹ A navigational warning to merchant shipping was broadcast by the B.B.C. on Aug. 24.

² See document No. 225.

³ Not printed; telegram to Danzig No. 48 of Aug. 26 (8287/E588337).

No. 339

1793/408517-20

Minister Blücher to Senior Counsellor Grundherr

HELSINKI, August 26, 1939.

Received August 28.

DEAR HERR VON GRUNDHERR: I have just heard that a courier is leaving this afternoon. I would like to take advantage of the opportunity to send you some brief news in haste.

The reaction to the German-Russian Pact varied here from person to person and from hour to hour. This is shown by my telegrams,¹ the contents of which are somewhat divergent.

I should like, first, to tell you about my conversation with Erkko, which only took place yesterday because of his visit to Brussels.² Erkko admits that at present the Pact has the advantage for Finland that the Baltic Sea area will be excluded from hostilities and thus the danger diminished of Finland being involved in the war. But he has doubts about the future.

The first thing that strikes him is that the German-Russian Non-

¹ See documents Nos. 208 and 276.

² i.e., for the Conference of the Oslo Powers.

Aggression Pact differs from the text which we at one time proposed to Finland,³ and also differs from the Non-Aggression Pacts which Russia has concluded with other Powers. He suspects that there is something special behind this, which he cannot yet understand. He even hinted at the possibility that in reality there was a German-Russian alliance.

The question, which I have reported, put by the Russian Government to the Finnish Minister, as to whether Finland was also neutral towards Germany and how she would apply her neutrality in the event of a crisis, has naturally also strongly contributed to arousing M. Erkko's mistrust. He is still not clear what this question signifies, but at least assumes that, at the time of the conclusion of the Pact with Germany, the Russians were also occupying themselves closely with the question of Finland.

M. Erkko is wondering if any secret agreements have been concluded between Germany and Russia, or if the Non-Aggression Pact will now be amplified by further discussions. M. Erkko says he knows that several of those who accompanied the Foreign Minister have remained in Moscow.⁴

He is concerned about the question of what Germany gave Russia in return. The assurance against attack by Germany does not seem to him sufficient compensation. I cannot but feel that British and French circles have hinted to him that Britain and France had not been able to conclude a pact because they did not want to abandon the Baltic countries and that Germany had had no scruples about sacrificing these countries out of hand. They will certainly have suggested to him that Germany and Russia had agreed on their pre-World War frontiers.

You see how important it is that I should soon receive the instructions, requested by telegram, to tell the Foreign Minister that no agreements about Finland were reached between Germany and Russia.⁵

Then the Foreign Minister is wondering what would happen if, later, Russia were to attack Finland and Germany were forced under the Pact to stand aside.

Apart from this, he is afraid that the result will be a strengthening of Russia. Any strengthening of Russia, however, would be contrary to Finland's interests.

M. Erkko has therefore received the Pact with mixed feelings. In my conversation I laid the main emphasis on the fact that the Pact was a necessary measure to counteract British and French action, that it was nothing but a non-aggression pact, which fitted in well

³ See vol. vi of this Series, document No. 330.

⁴ Marginal note in Grundherr's handwriting: "No."

⁵ Marginal note in Grundherr's handwriting: "Blücher has in the meantime made this statement." See also document No. 332, footnote 2.

with the other Baltic Non-Aggression Pacts, and that it removed the threat of war from the Baltic area.

In connection with this, I will give you a few more fragments from other conversations.

Hackzell⁶ thought that Russia in her present state represented no danger to Finland, but that the situation might change completely, if, in a few years' time, Russia were to be built up with Germany's help. He thought another danger was that Russia would stand aside in a war now and, when the nations of Europe were bled white, would enter the scene. Finland would then be the first to feel the consequences of this situation.

There is concern in economic circles about markets for timber and cellulose in time of war. Fears are expressed there that Finland might become economically entirely dependent on Germany.

The question is raised in certain circles as to whether, in view of the latest developments, Erkkö's strongly anti-Russian policy was really the best.⁷

I must now close this hasty letter.

Heil Hitler !

Yours etc.,

BLÜCHER

⁶ Marginal note in Grundherr's handwriting: "Former Finnish Foreign Minister, big industrialist."

⁷ Marginal note in Grundherr's handwriting: "Russia has at least been pursuing the same anti-Finnish policy (Aalands!)"

No. 340

8379/E591232-34

Confidential Protocol between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

In connection with the Credit Agreement signed on August 19, 1939,¹ between the German Government and the Government of the [Union of] Soviet Socialist Republics, the undersigned representatives have made the following agreement with each other:

Should, by the day when payment falls due on one of the bills of exchange drawn for Soviet orders on List A, the gold content of the Reichsmark be reduced by law or Government decree in comparison with the gold content recognized on the day when the bill was drawn, the difference to be calculated on the amount of the bill shall be paid simultaneously with the amount stated in the bill.

In the event of a reduction in the gold content of the Reichsmark, there will, on the other hand, be a corresponding proportionate increase in all the amounts held in the special accounts of the Trade Delegation and the Staatsbank, provided for in Article III, para. 2, of

¹ Document No. 131.

the Agreement of December 19, 1938,² on trade and payments between the German Reich and the U.S.S.R.

The same increase applies to all prices agreed in Reichsmark in contracts for the sale and delivery of Soviet goods concluded with firms in Germany up to the time of the reduction in the parity of the Reichsmark, in so far as payment for goods under such contracts have not been made by then. In the case above referred to, of a reduction in the gold content of the Reichsmark, the amount of the deliveries of German goods on orders not yet placed, the unavailed credit balance and the amount of the deliveries of Soviet goods, shall be computed to correspond to the alteration in the gold content of the Reichsmark.

Should the purchasing power of the Reichsmark take a course not corresponding to the alteration in its gold content, both sides will enter into negotiations to adjust to this change in purchasing power the increase in the amounts of the bills of exchange, the prices of the so far unfulfilled contracts for the delivery of Soviet goods, and the increase in the amounts in the above-mentioned special accounts. This adjustment will also apply to the amounts for German and Soviet deliveries mentioned in the previous paragraph, and to the still unavailed balance of the credit.

Done, in duplicate, in both the German and Russian languages, each text being equally authentic.

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.

For the German Government: For the Government of the U.S.S.R.:
DR. K. SCHNURRE E. BABARIN

² i.e., the exchange of letters on Dec. 19, 1938, extending the Agreement of March 1, 1938. See Appendix III, section (G), document (i) and footnote 1 thereto.

No. 341

FI/0233-36

*An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy
in Italy*

Telegram

No. 403 of August 26

August 27, 1939—12:10 a.m.¹

For Ambassador von Mackensen personally.

The Foreign Minister requests you to hand the following reply from the Führer to the Duce immediately.

DUCE: I have received your communication² on your final attitude. I respect the reasons and motives which led you to take this decision. In certain circumstances it can nevertheless work out well. In my

¹ On the Rome Embassy copy (100/64836-38) the time of receipt is recorded as 3:40 a.m. According to document No. 346 the letter was delivered at 9 a.m.

² See document No. 317.

opinion, however, the prerequisite is that, at least until the outbreak of the struggle [*Kampf*], the world should have no idea of the attitude Italy intends to adopt. I therefore cordially request you to support my struggle psychologically with your press or by other means. I would also ask you, Duce, if you possibly can, by demonstrative military measures, at least to compel Britain and France to tie down certain of their forces, or at all events to leave them in uncertainty. But, Duce, the most important thing is this: If, as I have said, it should come to a major war, the issue in the East will be decided before the two Western Powers can score a success. Then, this winter, at latest in the spring, I shall attack in the West with forces which will be at least equal to those of France and Britain. The blockade will have little effect, particularly because of the new circumstances now prevailing in the East, and also thanks to my preparations for autarky. Its danger will not increase but diminish with the duration of the war. I must now ask a great favour of you, Duce. In this difficult struggle you and your people can best help me by sending me Italian workers, both for industrial and agricultural purposes. Should you later be compelled to intervene by the course of events, or find yourself after all in a position to do so, then the reinforced autarky of the Reich would be of the greatest importance to you too. In specially commending this request of mine to your generosity, I thank you for all the efforts you have made for our common cause.³

ADOLF HITLER

End of letter.

SCHMIDT

See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 329.

No. 342

1625/389210-11

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 247 of August 26

TARABYA, August 27, 1939—12:15 a.m.

Received August 27—3:30 a.m.

Pol. II 3035.

I have just called on the President to represent to him our views of the situation which has now changed entirely to Turkey's disadvantage, since a change in Turkish policy is probable.

The President, who was very greatly impressed by the Russian Pact, said that Turkey would only act in accordance with what she considered to be her own vital interests. If the Balkans and the Mediterranean were unaffected, he hoped to be able to remain neutral, but he

saw no possibility of preventing the conflict from spreading to the Mediterranean, as in the impending war by Britain and France against Germany, Italy could not possibly remain neutral. In that case Turkey could not withdraw from her obligations.

My repeated efforts to convince the President that neutrality would best serve Turkey's true interests were met with the argument that, although there was nothing he desired more ardently than neutrality, Turkey had nevertheless irrevocable commitments in the Mediterranean. As to the Balkans, he is only reckoning with the obligations arising out of the Balkan Pact.

I also hear from the Hungarian Legation that the Foreign Minister has told the British and French Ambassadors¹ that Turkey will stand by her word.

The President also said that he most warmly supported Germany's desire to have a final settlement of all problems, and that he knew Britain was ready to meet this desire in large measure by negotiation.

PAPEN

¹ Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen and René Massigli. See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, Nos. 188, 339 and 386.

No. 343

910/294381; 383-84

Circular of the State Secretary¹

Telegram

BERLIN, August 26, 1939.

Sent August 27—12:45 a.m.

e.o. Pol. V 1941 g.

The situation must still be regarded as very serious and is to be so described in conversations.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Addressees were all diplomatic Missions, the Consulates General at Danzig, Sydney, Ottawa, Calcutta, Batavia and Singapore, and the Consulate at Geneva.

No. 344

100/64818

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy

ROME, August 27, 1939.

At 8:25 a.m. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop telephoned in person to point out that, judging from information reaching him, he thought that Ambassador Attolico's misunderstanding yesterday had been followed by a second one. He therefore asked me to emphasize most strongly, in the conversation with the Duce which, as I now told

him, would take place at 9 o'clock, that the Führer's request for the strictest secrecy naturally applied not only to the paper¹ which had reached me during the night, but to the whole exchange of letters.²

MACKENSEN

¹ Document No. 341.

² See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, Nos. 307 and 331.

No. 345

100/64819

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy

ROME, August 27, 1939.

At 8:50 a.m. the Foreign Minister in person telephoned me again¹ to ask me, although these were not instructions, to lay special stress on the request concerning propaganda made in the letter.² There had, however, been no orders from the Führer.

MACKENSEN

¹ See also document No. 344.

² Document No. 341.

No. 346

F1/0255

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, August 27, 1939.

Ambassador von Mackensen telephoned from Rome at 10:10 a.m. to say that he had carried out his latest instructions¹ with the Duce at 9 o'clock. A conversation lasting until 10 o'clock had ensued. The Duce would reply in writing at once. He had promised the Ambassador that the requests would be fulfilled and that complete solidarity would be maintained. In addition, the Duce had made two suggestions which the Ambassador will, however, reserve for his next telegram.²

SONNLEITHNER³

¹ See documents Nos. 341, 344 and 345.

² See document No. 349.

³ Marginal note: "For the Reich Foreign Minister. Telephoned through to Dahlem (v. Saef [?]). State Secretary has a copy. Sonn[leithner] 27/8."

No. 347

34/24053

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, August 27, 1939—11:26 a.m.

No. 222 of August 27

Received August 27—11:00 a.m.

Molotov has just sent me word¹ that the ratification of the Non-Aggression Pact will be submitted to the Supreme Soviet which meets tomorrow. I request an early reply to my telegram No. 217 of August 25.² Molotov therefore expects³ ratification by us equally quickly.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Through Pavlov (Molotov's interpreter), according to a note by Schulenburg dated Aug. 26, 11 p.m., on the Moscow draft (127/69464) of this telegram.

² Document No. 284.

³ In the Moscow draft this reads: "Molotov will expect . . ."

No. 348

7985/E575325-26

*The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry*Telegram [en clair by teleprinter]¹

No. 500 of August 27

PARIS, August 27, 1939.

Received [August 27]—3:15 p.m.

P. 10657.

In the last few days the French political parties have sharply divided themselves from the Communist Party. The French Government have associated themselves with this attitude by taking various measures. The Communist organs *Humanité* and *Ce Soir* have been declared "dangerous to public order and to the defence of the country", and banned until further notice. The *Petit Parisien* states, semi-officially, that the Government will not tolerate any demonstrations by the Communist Party and proposes to take measures to suppress them should they occur. The paper reports that a Communist Party delegation called at the Ministry of War that afternoon and demanded an interview with Minister President Daladier. Daladier refused to see them. Later that afternoon² Senator Marcel Cachin went to the Ministry of the Interior to protest against the ban on *Humanité* and *Ce Soir*. Sarraut,³ too, refused to see the delegation.

On the same lines is the tone of extreme irritation adopted towards

¹ Taken from the Paris draft (9887/E693559-60).

² In the Paris draft the words "another delegation under the leadership of the Communist Senator . . ." are included at this point.

³ Minister of the Interior.

Russia and Bolshevism, resulting primarily, of course, from the conclusion of the German-Russian Pact and from the somewhat ignominious departure of the British and French Military Missions. The way in which the struggle against Communism is being waged, and in which dissociation from Soviet Russia is expressed, makes it apparent, however, that definite political objectives are also being pursued. On the one hand, these objectives are concerned with domestic policy. The intention is to form a national fighting front of all parties and to provide a slogan, with an emotional and propaganda appeal, namely, the struggle against Communism. In foreign policy the intention is, apparently, to convey to⁴ those States close to the Axis Powers that France is a more honest opponent of Communism than Germany, with which is associated the very transparent attempt to win such States away from Germany and lure them to the side of the democracies.

BRÄUER

⁴ The Paris draft here reads: "convince".

No. 349

F1/0256-58

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, August 27, 1939—3:55 p.m.

TOP SECRET

Received August 27—6:45 p.m.

No. 381 of August 27

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 403 of August 26.¹

As already reported by telephone,² I handed the Führer's answer to the Duce in the presence of Ciano, at 9:10 today. The Duce will reply at once and confirm that he will carry out the Führer's requests one hundred per cent and that he stands solidly beside him. As to the request to pin down Anglo-French forces, Italian military measures already taken are such as to pin down at a conservative estimate at least 300,000 of the enemy on the line of the Alps-Corsica-Tunis. On the Western frontier of the fatherland he had already stationed—and he confirmed this by telephone with Pariani³ in my presence—thirteen divisions, which would be brought up to seventeen within the next few days. In addition there were twenty-five battalions of Alpini, frontier defence formations and frontier militia. There was thus a total strength which, as he emphasized,

¹ Document No. 341.

² See document No. 346.

³ Under Secretary of State in the Italian War Ministry and Chief of Staff of the Italian Army.

taken in conjunction with the frontier defences inspected by General Halder,⁴ would make it absolutely impossible for the enemy to set foot on Italian soil. The fact that he was also transferring the Alpini Division from the Trentino to the West would still further increase the deterrent effect of these measures. He had placed two trusted leaders, Marshals Graziani and Tua, in charge of the two commands which he had established. Even in Libya, where, as reinforcements, a division was being sent on Monday morning, and another immediately afterwards, he felt sufficiently strong to conduct a successful defensive action, especially as he already had a reserve of 15,000 men among the settlers introduced there.

Such a state of armed waiting could not, of course, be maintained indefinitely and he must expect that sooner or later—the exact moment would probably be determined chiefly by the course of the conflict with Poland—he would be called upon by the other side to define his attitude clearly. The war would have two phases: the first, the defeat of Poland; the second, the conflict with the Western Powers. He did not for one moment doubt that the Poles would be defeated, although at first Poland would certainly offer stiff resistance; but because of her lack of staying power and inferior organization the war would be over, not perhaps in three days, but certainly in a few weeks. It was impossible to foretell the second phase.

Furthermore he would consider it useful, and would also say so in his letter, if we could prevail upon the Lithuanians to take military action against Poland, and if we could perhaps also induce the Russians to go a step further.

He would exert influence on Spain's attitude by means of a letter to Franco.

As to Japan, reports at present in his hands⁵ that Tokyo regarded the discussions for a tripartite pact as broken off were perhaps not altogether unfavourable for the prospects of a Russo-Japanese non-aggression pact. The Japanese, of course, always needed a certain amount of time to get used to new ideas.

The Duce then repeated, in forcible terms, the view he had already advanced yesterday,⁶ namely that he still believed it possible to attain all our objectives without resort to war. He had therefore decided to bring this up too in the letter he intended sending to the Führer. It was probably true that for him, as well as for us, a postponement for three or four years of the armed conflict with the Western Powers, which indeed he too believed inevitable, would

⁴ According to a despatch to Rome of June 20 (8392/E591816), the Führer had approved Halder's attendance at the Italian manoeuvres in August. No other documents on his visit have been found.

⁵ See documents Nos. 212 and 252, and *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, Nos. 156, 175 and 284.

⁶ See document No. 320.

change our prospects completely. Field Marshal Göring had once mentioned four years for us.⁷ And, in the Pariani-Keitel talks,⁸ the latter had said that we required a period of several years in order to reach maximum military strength. Even postponement by a few months, however, would be a gain. I shall refrain from repeating in detail the Duce's familiar arguments, which he again expounded to me today. In enumerating them today, he emphasized the unsatisfactory condition of both fleets, and the possibility of Spain's actively participating on our side—a possibility which would not arise for a few years. He entertained no doubts that in Britain, too, considerable forces were at work for the purpose of yet reaching a solution without war. In so saying the Duce was obviously thinking of the indefatigable efforts of the British Ambassador here to induce him to make an accommodating gesture, efforts of which Ciano had already told me at yesterday's conversation in [*sic*] the Palazzo Chigi.⁹ In the course of the last twenty-four hours the Ambassador, who was at present confined to bed, had addressed about a dozen letters to him. The Duce closed the conversation, which had lasted about three quarters of an hour, by saying that in his reply he would express what he had to say about the Führer's letter with the frankness demanded by the gravity of the hour; but confirmed again that he was endeavouring¹⁰ to fulfil the Führer's wishes "cento per cento".

I should like to add that when I asked Ciano, he assured me that the views of the Duce, as communicated to the Führer, on the question of Italy's future attitude, had only been confided to a very narrowly restricted group of persons, which, as far as Ciano knew,¹¹ did not even include the Chiefs of Staff of the Italian Services.

MACKENSEN

⁷ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 211.

⁸ See *ibid.*, Appendix I.

⁹ The Rome draft (100/64786-89) here reads: "... had already told me on the way to the Palazzo Chigi".

¹⁰ The Rome draft here reads: "that he was resolved to fulfil . . ."

¹¹ The Rome draft here reads: "which, Ciano assumed, did not . . ."

No. 350

100/64790-91

*The Head of the Italian Government to the Führer and Chancellor*¹

Transmitted in cipher by telephone to the Royal [Italian] Embassy in Berlin at 4:30 p.m. on August 27, 1939, XVII.

FÜHRER: I reply to your letter² delivered to me by the Ambassador. The world does not and will not know before the outbreak of hostili-

¹ Translated from the Italian original. See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 341.

² Document No. 341. See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 348.

ties what the attitude of Italy is, and will learn instead that Italy has concentrated her forces towards the frontiers of the great democracies. On the French frontiers I have actually concentrated seventeen divisions, plus twenty-seven Alpini battalions, plus the frontier guards. Two new divisions are proceeding to Libya—a weak point in our strategic dispositions—and these will bring up the number of metropolitan divisions to *six*, plus four of Libyan Arabs. These measures are more than a demonstration; they will leave the French and British in a state of uncertainty, and will confront them with a disposition of forces at least equal to theirs.

I see you are convinced that an immediate intervention by me in the first phase of the conflict, especially if—as you say, and as is right—you will not be taking the initiative on the Western Front, thereby bringing upon Italy the mass of Franco-British troops and exhausting the limited Italian resources, might have serious repercussions on the development of the war for you as well.

All that can be done from the psychological point of view to underline Italian-German solidarity will be intensified by press, radio, cinema and thorough propaganda.

I am prepared to send you the greatest possible number of workers for your industries and agriculture compatible with my present and prospective mobilization measures.

It is my desire to keep in closest contact with you, Führer, in order to coordinate the action of our two countries and make it conform—in every field—to the requirements which will result from the course of events.³

MUSSOLINI

³ Marginal note on Mackensen's copy here printed: "Given me this morning by Count Ciano. M[ackensen] 30/8."

No. 351

1132/323653-54

The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 501 of August 27

PARIS, August 27, 1939.¹

Received August 27—4:50 p.m.

The Italian Ambassador, Guariglia, who visited M. Bonnet yesterday, informed me with great concern [*ganz bestürzt*] of the following: Not having seen M. Bonnet for some four weeks, he was invited to call on him yesterday for no special reason. At the interview,² M. Bonnet at once began by stating that, as a result of the conversation between the Führer and the British Ambassador,³ he again saw

¹ The Paris draft showing whether this telegram went by teleprinter has not been found.

² See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 312.

³ See document No. 265.

a faint gleam of hope that an armed conflict in Europe might be avoided. It was clear from the Führer's gesture that he did not reject the principle of "conversations". Perhaps thereby ways and means might be found of settling the German-Polish conflict on a friendly basis. Guariglia believes that he detected, in this conversation with Bonnet, a change in the Minister's resoluteness as compared with their last interview, and this he ascribes to the effects of the conclusion of the German-Russian Pact. It is true that Bonnet stressed the Franco-British obligations to Poland, but he had clung more to the hope of the possibility of a peaceful solution. He, Guariglia, had made it clear to Bonnet that in Italy's view it would be suicide for France, on behalf of Poland, to enter a war against Germany in which Italy's attitude had been made quite clear. In a war of this kind, Poland would be the first victim and, whatever the war's outcome, would disappear from the map. The justice of the German demands was incontestable, and it was the duty of France to prevail upon Poland to make the sacrifices necessary to preserve peace. Bonnet replied that the French Government were exerting the strongest influence on Poland to refrain from any provocative action against Germany. At the same time, the Foreign Minister let it appear that he did not entirely exclude the possibility of a settlement if the Poles could yield in such a manner that their honour and independence remained inviolate. He emphasized, however, that if Germany employed force against Poland, then Britain and France would be compelled to fulfil their treaty obligations, however earnestly they sought to avoid a conflict.

The Ambassador went on to inform me that the Italian Military Attaché⁴ had learnt from the General Staff that they, too, were exerting strong pressure on Polish military circles to give no cause for a conflict to break out.

BRÄUER

⁴ General Visconti Prasca. See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 313.

No. 352

625/359222

The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

PARIS, August 27, 1939.¹

No. . . . [?503]

Received [August 27]—4:50 p.m.

Also for Attaché Group, Air.

The French Government have transmitted a *note verbale* which reads as follows:²

¹ The Paris draft showing whether this telegram went by teleprinter has not been found.

² From this point the original is in French.

With reference to Article 3 of the Franco-German Convention of May 22, 1926,³ the Foreign Ministry has the honour to inform the German Embassy that the French Government have, on the 26th of this month, issued the following decree: Article 1: That part of metropolitan France east of a line stretching from Calais—Saint-Inglevert, Paris—Le Bourget, Lyons—Bron, Marseilles—Marignane, has been declared a prohibited zone for flying over; landing on and taking off from these aerodromes being permitted.

Article 2: The present decree comes into force on August 27, 1939, at 9 a.m.

BRÄUER

³ For the text of this Convention on Air Navigation see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 126, pp. 656-661.

No. 353

695/260281

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

TOP SECRET
No. 217

BERLIN, August 27, 1939—5:17 p.m.
Received August 27—9:45 p.m.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 217 and 222.¹

1. The proposed exchange of letters is approved.
2. Ratification can take place immediately after the German instrument of ratification has been drawn up, which is being done as quickly as possible.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Documents Nos. 284 and 347.

² Schulenburg replied in telegram No. 229 of Aug. 28 (34/24055), as follows: "1. Supplementary agreement in form of an interpretation of the Additional Protocol signed today. Documents follow by next safe hand. 2. Ratification of non-aggression pact forms item 3 on the agenda of the extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet which opened today. Molotov informs me that this item will be dealt with on about Aug. 31."

No. 354

147/78829-39

The Führer and Chancellor to the French Minister President¹

BERLIN, August 27, 1939.

DEAR MINISTER PRESIDENT: I understand the misgivings which you express.² I, too, have never overlooked the high obligations laid on those who are in charge of the fate of peoples. As an old front-line soldier, I know, as you do, the horrors of war. This conviction and this knowledge have led me, too, to strive honourably to

¹ The copy here printed is unsigned.

² See document No. 324.

remove all subjects of dispute between our two peoples. I assured the French nation quite openly of one thing, that the condition for this was the return of the Saar Territory. When this had been returned, I at once solemnly affirmed my renunciation of any further claims whatsoever which might affect France.³ The German people has approved this attitude of mine. As you were able to convince yourself on your last visit here, conscious of their own attitude, they did not and do not feel any ill-will, much less hatred, for their erstwhile gallant foe. On the contrary. The establishment of peace on our Western frontier led to a growing sympathy, at least as far as the German people were concerned. A sympathy which has been shown in truly demonstrative fashion on many occasions. The construction of the great fortifications in the West, which swallowed and continues to swallow many thousands of millions, represents for Germany both a deed of acceptance and a delimitation of the final Reich frontier. The German nation has thus renounced two provinces, which once were part of the old German Reich, which were conquered later at much cost in bloodshed and which, finally, were defended at still greater cost in bloodshed. You, Your Excellency, will certainly grant me that this renunciation is indeed no tactical manoeuvre for foreign consumption, but a resolution which has been consistently reinforced by all the measures which we have taken. You will not be able, Mr. Minister President, to adduce a single instance in which, in a single line or one speech, this final fixing of the frontier of the German Reich in the West has been repudiated. I had thought that by this renunciation and by this attitude I had eliminated every conceivable subject of dispute between our two peoples which might have led to a repetition of the tragedy of 1914-1918. This voluntary limitation of German vital claims in the West cannot, however, be taken as signifying acceptance of the Versailles Dictate for all other territories as well. Year after year I have truly striven for the revision, by way of negotiation, of at least the most impossible and the most intolerable clauses in this Dictate. But it was impossible. That revision must come was clearly realized by many intelligent people in all countries. Whatever can be adduced against my methods, whatever criticism it may be thought must be brought against them, it cannot be overlooked or gainsaid that this method made it possible in many instances to find a solution without fresh bloodshed, which was not only satisfactory to Germany but, by the way it was done, relieved the statesmen of other nations of the obligation, often an impossible one for them, of accepting responsibility for this revision towards their own peoples. For Your Excellency must always grant me this:

³ In a broadcast on Jan. 15, 1935, following the announcement of the results of the Saar plebiscite, Hitler declared that Germany would make no more territorial demands on France (see Baynes: *Hitler's Speeches*, vol. II, p. 1195).

Revision had to come. The Versailles Dictate was intolerable. No Frenchman of honour, certainly not you yourself, Monsieur Daladier, would, in a like situation, have acted other than I did. I have also tried, in this spirit, to remove the most unreasonable provision of all in the Versailles Dictate. I made an offer to the Polish Government, which startled the German people. No one but myself could have dared to come before the public with such an offer. Therefore it could only be made once for all. I am most deeply convinced that if England, in particular, instead of unleashing a savage press campaign against Germany and launching rumours of German mobilization, had at that time somehow persuaded Poland to be reasonable, Europe today and for twenty-five years to come could have enjoyed a state of the most profound peace. But, as it was, Polish public opinion was excited by lies about German aggression, the clear decisions required from the Polish Government were made harder to take, and, above all, their insight into what was actually possible was obscured by the promise of the guarantee which followed. The Polish Government rejected the proposals. Polish public opinion, firmly convinced that Britain and France would fight for Poland, began making demands which might, perhaps, be dismissed as ridiculous lunacy if they were not so infinitely dangerous. Then an intolerable reign of terror set in, a physical and economic oppression of the Germans, who, after all, number over a million and a half in the territories ceded by the Reich. I will not here go into the atrocities which took place. Danzig, too, through the continual encroachments of the Polish authorities, was made increasingly aware that she was apparently abandoned, without hope of deliverance, to the caprice of a power alien to the national character of the City and of its population. May I now ask, Monsieur Daladier, how you, as a Frenchman, would act if, as a result of the unfortunate outcome of a gallant struggle, one of your provinces were cut off by a corridor occupied by a foreign Power, a great city—let us say Marseilles—were prevented from professing allegiance to France, and the Frenchmen living in precisely this region were persecuted, beaten, ill-treated, even bestially murdered? You are a Frenchman, Monsieur Daladier, so I know how you would act. I am a German, Monsieur Daladier. Do not doubt my sense of honour or my consciousness of my duty to act in just the same way. If you were suffering the same misfortune as we are, would you, Monsieur Daladier, understand it if, for no cause, Germany wished to intervene so that the corridor through France should remain, so that the stolen territories might not be restored, and so that the return of Marseilles to France should be forbidden? I cannot in any circumstances imagine, Monsieur Daladier, that Germany would fight against you on these grounds. For I and everyone have renounced Alsace-Lorraine in order to avoid further bloodshed. Still less would we shed

blood to maintain an injustice which would be as intolerable for you as it would be meaningless for us. I feel just as you do, Monsieur Daladier, about everything you write in your letter. Perhaps, just because we are old front-line soldiers, we can understand each other more easily on a number of subjects; but I only ask you to understand that it is impossible for a nation of honour to renounce nearly two million people and see them being ill-treated on its own frontiers. I have therefore put forward a clear demand: Danzig and the Corridor must come back to Germany. The Macedonian conditions on our Eastern frontier must be removed. I can see no way of inducing Poland to adopt a peaceful solution as, under the protection of her guarantees, she now feels unassailable. I would, however, despair of an honourable future for my people if, in such circumstances, we were not determined to solve the problem one way or another. If, in consequence, destiny again compels our two peoples to fight, then there would still be a difference between the motives of either side. I, Monsieur Daladier, would then be fighting with my people to right an injustice done to us, and the others would be fighting to perpetuate this injustice. This is the more tragic, because many of the most important men, even of your own nation, have realized alike the senselessness of the 1919 solution as well as the impossibility of maintaining it permanently. I am clear as to the grave consequences which such a conflict would entail. But I believe that Poland would have to bear the heaviest consequences, for whatever the outcome of a war fought over this question, the Polish State of today would disappear in one way or another.

That, for this reason, our two peoples should now embark on fresh bloodshed in a new war of annihilation is very painful not only to you, Monsieur Daladier, but also to me. But, as I have already said, I see no possibility of our being able, on our side, to influence Poland in the direction of reason, so as to rectify a situation which is intolerable for the German people and the German Reich.⁴

⁴ See also the *French Yellow Book*, No. 266, for Coulondre's account of Ribbentrop handing him a copy of this letter at 4 p.m. on Aug. 27. See also this volume, document No. 356.

No. 355

7989/E575445

An Official of Political Division V to the Embassy in Poland

Telegram

No. 260

BERLIN, August 27, 1939—5:30 p.m.
e.o. Pol. I Lu. 2637.

On August 24, at 1:15 p.m., a civil air liner, D-ABHF of the Lufthansa, flying some 15 to 20 kilometres distant from the Hela

coast, at a height of 1500 metres, was fired on by Polish anti-aircraft batteries and by a Polish ship lying 40 kilometres off the shore; bursts of eight rounds were observed from the plane.

On August 25, at 12:47 p.m., a civil air liner, D-AHHH of the Lufthansa, was fired on by Polish anti-aircraft batteries when 20 kilometres from Heisternest. The shots passed so close that the bursts were clearly heard in the plane. Amongst the passengers was State Secretary Stuckart.¹

On August 25, at 2:18 p.m. and 3:25 p.m., a naval seaplane from Pillau was fired on above Brösen, a good distance away from the coast, the second time with six rounds. The shots were fired either from Hela or from Polish ships.

You are requested to protest most strongly to the Polish Government about the totally unwarranted firing in all these instances. Report by telegram.

BERGMANN

¹ Of the Ministry of the Interior.

No. 356

1570/380074

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 649

BERLIN, August 27, 1939.

The French Ambassador informed me at 5:30 p.m. today that the French Government, as agreed, would of course not publish the exchange of letters between the Führer and Daladier.¹ Nevertheless, they wanted to inform us that the fact that letters had been exchanged between the Führer and Daladier could not be concealed from the public, as a special German aircraft was leaving for Paris for this purpose.

I reserved my reply and received the Führer's instructions in the Reich Chancellery that the French Ambassador should be told that we desired to avoid all publication, and had therefore not allowed the aircraft to leave. The text of the letter in reply to M. Daladier was just being communicated to our Ambassador in Paris, so that M. Daladier would be informed of the text this same evening. The original, which had been retained here, I would send on to the French Ambassador here at the earliest moment,² so that he could transmit it to his Government in Paris through the normal channels of communication with Paris.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Documents Nos. 324 and 354.

² According to Coulondre's report in the *French Yellow Book*, No. 267, he received the original from Weizsäcker that same day.

No. 357

100/64793

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy

ROME, August 27, 1939.

The Foreign Minister telephoned me from the Reich Chancellery at 10 p.m. and informed me as follows:

According to reliable information, a rumour was being circulated in Rome, which came through the Italian Embassy in Berlin, that there was a *détente* in the situation and that conversations were taking place. He wished on the contrary to make it clear that the exact opposite was the case and that the situation was deteriorating hourly. "The armies are on the march." It would be advisable for me to ensure that this rumour did not obtain credence with the Duce and Ciano.

MACKENSEN

No. 358

52/35232

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, August 27, 1939.

Counsellor of Embassy Bräuer telephoned at 10 p.m. to report the following:

Minister President Daladier's *Chef de Cabinet* had telephoned him to say that after the visit of the German Chargé d'Affaires at 8 p.m.¹ the Minister President's office had been besieged with questions from the press about the meaning of the visit. In view of this, Minister President Daladier felt obliged to make a short communication to the press, giving the general sense (*sens général*) of the Führer's communication. M. Daladier wished to have the German Chargé d'Affaires informed of this beforehand.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

ERICH KORDT

¹ In telegram No. 508 of Aug. 27 (52/35247), Bräuer reported that he had handed Hitler's letter (document No. 354) to Daladier at 8 p.m. See also document No. 356.

No. 359

7989/E575439

The Chargé d'Affaires in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 189 of August 27

WARSAW, August 27, 1939—11:58 p.m.

Received August 28—2:40 a.m.

Pol. I Lu. 2648.

With reference to your telegram No. 260 of August 27.¹

As instructed, I have lodged a protest about the German aircraft being fired on. The *Chef de Cabinet* in the Foreign Ministry said he was instructed to inform me that there had recently been many instances of frontier violations by German aircraft;² today alone some thirty-two cases had been reported. As far as air traffic in the zone of the Hela peninsula was concerned, he must point out that the question of observing the regulations in force there had already repeatedly been raised in conversations with the Reich Foreign Ministry, as well as with the Reich Air Ministry. Count Lubinski promised a thorough investigation of the three incidents cited in the German protest.

WÜHLISCH

¹ Document No. 355.

² A Polish *note verbale*, dated Aug. 21, had drawn the attention of the Foreign Ministry to a number of cases of frontier violation by German aircraft during July 27 to 31, (9882/E693477-80); earlier exchanges on the subject of frontier violation by aircraft of either side, during the summer of 1939, have been filmed on Serial 9882.

No. 360

461/225143

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

SECRET

BERLIN, August 27, 1939.¹

No. 218 of August 27

Received August 28—2:10 a.m.

For the Ambassador personally.

For your guidance: Tension is steadily mounting in the German-Polish conflict. You are requested, in connection with the exchange of Notes on the points mentioned in telegram No. 217 of August 25,² to try to ascertain in a cautious way:

1. Whether it is the case that Soviet Russia has withdrawn her troops from the Polish frontier;

2. If this is correct, whether it could not be cancelled, as any appearance of Poland being threatened from the Russian side too

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

² Document No. 284.

would naturally contribute to easing the situation in the West and might even, in the end, bring about a remarkable reduction in the readiness to help Poland.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 361

1632/389829-33

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

No. 4494—I A 4

BUCHAREST, August 27, 1939.

Received September 4.

Pol. IV 4954.

Subject: Conversation with Foreign Minister Gafencu.

I called on Foreign Minister Gafencu immediately on my return. During the conversation he again emphasized that Rumania was determined to remain neutral in any conflict between Germany and Poland, even if France and Britain were to come in. The only thing that could make Rumania abandon her neutrality would be an attack by Bulgaria or Hungary. M. Gafencu did not deny that Rumania had made her military preparations on both frontiers. He referred to the letter which he had given to M. Bárdossy, the Hungarian Minister, and of which we possessed a copy.¹ It was evident from this, he said, that Rumania had not actually drawn up any troops on the Hungarian frontier, and that by offering to conclude a non-aggression pact with Hungary, she had again clearly proved her peaceful intentions and her desire for neutrality. But Hungary had declined this latest offer as inopportune.

I then drew M. Gafencu's attention to the fact that, on my journey here, between Ciucea and Klausenburg (Cluj), I had seen with my own eyes four military convoys which were moving in the direction of the Hungarian frontier; distinguishing badges and numbers had been removed from the uniforms. This did not point to simple manoeuvres. Gafencu replied that the War Minister had given him assurances that no further military measures were being directed towards the Hungarian frontier; he would make enquiries.

Furthermore M. Gafencu emphasized repeatedly that it was his intention, and that of the Rumanian Government, to maintain strict neutrality. He had informed the German Chargé d'Affaires, Counsellor of Legation Stelzer, officially of this² and had recorded this statement in a minute. The Rumanian Government did not yet wish to make a declaration of neutrality publicly to parliament or press, since the conflict had not yet led to hostilities. We should, however, be able to recognize from the fact that Rumania had de-

¹ See document No. 245.

² No record of this has been found.

livered all the petroleum we had asked for that she was adhering strictly to the Economic Agreement,³ and that she would also continue to supply us even during a conflict.

M. Gafencu told me that the King was convinced it would not come to war, but that Britain and France would find a peaceful solution even at the last moment. I did not conceal from him the gravity of the situation. I said the Führer wanted peace, but it was not possible to reach a peaceful solution with Poland because Britain had intervened. Poland had now let herself become a factor in Britain's policy of encirclement and could not very easily get out again. M. Gafencu tried to argue that Poland was not to blame for the policy of encirclement; she had only looked round for assistance in order to defend her territory. I retorted that Poland was admittedly not the encircler but that through her obdurate attitude she had started the Western democracies' policy of encirclement. Now that this policy had been shattered by the German-Russian Pact, it was primarily Poland who had to take the full consequences.

We then discussed this Pact, and M. Gafencu told me that the Rumanian Government welcomed it. For what they had always been afraid of here, was that German-Soviet Russian differences would one day be settled on Rumanian territory. It had always been Rumania's desire not to break off relations with her great Eastern neighbour. Since Titulescu's day,⁴ however, she had done nothing further to improve her relations with Soviet Russia, having regarded an improvement in her relations with Germany as the most important question in her future policy. Now that Germany had established good relations with the Soviet Union, there could certainly be no objection to Rumania also settling her relations with the Soviet Union. He wished, however, to go hand in hand with us in this matter and asked us to let him know what were our views.

The Foreign Minister went on to say that, above all, it would be very valuable if I could give him an indication of what the Reich Foreign Minister had discussed in Moscow as concerning Rumania and the Soviet Union's other neighbour States. Naturally he was very interested in the Bessarabian problem. He had already been told by our enemies that there were agreements between Germany and the Soviet Union on this score.

I told M. Gafencu that I had not learned any details about the Reich Foreign Minister's political conversations in Moscow. Since, however, our relations with Rumania were dictated by the great Economic Agreement, the basis of which was a compact [*abgeschlossen*] economic region, we could hardly be interested in any modi-

³ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 78.

⁴ Rumanian statesman and diplomat; served as Foreign Minister in 1927 and 1932-1936.

fications of Rumania's frontiers which perhaps her Eastern neighbour might desire. He was also aware, from our previous discussions, of our interest in the Danube delta; nor should he overlook the fact that there were many *Volksdeutsche* living in Bessarabia and we should not care to see them subjected to the Bolshevik régime. So I could hardly suppose that Herr von Ribbentrop had discussed the problem of Bessarabia with MM. Stalin and Molotov. As for the Baltic border States, to which Gafencu had alluded, I could say that we were adhering to our Treaties with them,⁵ and there were sound reasons for believing that Soviet Russia also recognized the independence and inviolability of these States. Hereupon M. Gafencu observed that, though Rumania was not directly interested in the existence of these States, she could nevertheless conclude that no imperialist policy had been agreed with Soviet Russia, as was maintained by our opponents.

We then discussed Turkey and the King's visit on his trip through the Sea of Marmora.⁶ M. Gafencu admitted that the Turks were very disappointed at the attitude of the British, who, in spite of the credit, were not delivering goods. This had shown the King that Britain could not be depended upon. Accordingly, Rumania's only interest in common with Turkey was under the Balkan Pact, i.e., the alliance became operative the moment there was a Bulgarian attack. The King's voyage had been purely a holiday trip; he had only made a brief stay in Istanbul and had subsequently spent four days in Rhodes where he had maintained friendly relations with the Governor.

FABRICIUS

⁵ See vol. VI of this Series, Editors' Note, p. 664.

⁶ King Carol had visited Istanbul on July 27 and again on Aug. 11.

No. 362

610/248252-53

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 27, 1939.

1. Minister Bernard, Bratislava, telephoned today at 6 p.m. and told me that General Barckhausen had been ordered by AOK 14 to convey certain military demands to the Slovak Government. He asked whether the instructions contained in the despatch sent to him, but suspended,¹ should now also be carried out. AOK 14 had stated through General Barckhausen that they attached no importance to this. Minister Bernard asked, however, whether action should now be taken on the suspended telegrams Nos. 135² and 138³ and the despatch Protokoll No. 70 g. Rs. of August 23.⁴

¹ Document No. 165, enclosures 1 and 2.

² Document No. 250.

³ Not found.

⁴ Not found.

2. An enquiry made by Political Division I (Military Affairs) to the OKW (Captain (Navy) Bürkner) elicited that the OKW through the OKH will endeavour to have the orders given to General Barckhausen postponed. Should the orders have already been carried out, Minister Bernard is to present the proposed Note.

3. I telephoned at 6:25 p.m. to the Attaché, Prince Solms, in Bratislava, that he should at once take the following action:

a) General Barckhausen should wait before carrying out his orders until he had received further instructions from AOK 14.

b) Should the orders have already been carried out, Minister Bernard should immediately act on the political instructions in the despatch.¹

c) The telegrams Nos. 135 and 138 and the despatch Protokoll No. 70 g. Rs. continue to be suspended.

4. Minister Bernard telephoned at 7:15 p.m. from Bratislava and told me that General Barckhausen had already carried out his orders; he would therefore now present the Note. Tiso did not appear to be available, so he would give it to Ďurčanský.

WOERMANN

No. 363

43/29618-19

Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, August 27, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT¹

The Secretary at the British Embassy, H., gave a few indications of the feelings of the British Embassy here to the Berlin chief correspondent of the American News Agency, I.N.S. [International News Service], and probably to him alone of the foreign journalists in Berlin. The British diplomat and the American journalist know each other well, so that the Englishman told the American in confidence, but not for publication, the following about the situation:

It was not known in the Embassy whether Sir Neville Henderson would return from London with good results. There was no doubt that Sir Neville would most strongly recommend to the London Cabinet a solution without compromise [*sic—kompromisslose*] whereby war might be avoided. In this Sir Neville was counting on the full support of influential members of the London Cabinet. But the Ambassador had not been without misgivings when he flew to London, as he was not sure whether the Cabinet would adopt such an

¹ Note at the head of the document in Likus' handwriting: "From the British Embassy."

attitude as would allow the problems at issue between Germany and Poland to be solved by way of agreement.

The British diplomat explained to the American journalist that there could only be peace if a compromise were attained between Berlin and Warsaw. Sir Nevile saw a compromise, which would save the peace, based on Poland renouncing her political rights in respect of Danzig, and the Free City not being prevented from union with the Reich. Furthermore, an agreement would have to be reached providing for a German corridor through the Polish corridor: a compromise roughly based on the Reich Government's original proposal to Foreign Minister Beck.

That was the situation. What success Sir Nevile would have in London could not be foretold. The British diplomat said that he could say nothing about the prospects. The main difficulty for a result in favour of peace he saw in the fact that Polish consent would finally have to be obtained. He did not know how the Poles could be got out of the Corridor, if they gave Britain a refusal. If it actually came to a German-Polish war, the British diplomat feared that it would not be possible to localize it.

L[IKUS]

No. 364

100/64792

State Secretary Weizsäcker to Ambassador Mackensen

SECRET

BERLIN, August 27, 1939.

DEAR FRIEND: I do not want to let slip the opportunity of an aircraft going to Rome without sending you a few lines. The reason for sending you two assistant cipher officers is the likelihood of requiring within the next few days to provide for a very fast exchange of telegrams in cipher, so that views can be exchanged, even when involving lengthy communications, several times a day.

It is also perhaps as well to assure you that the number of people here who know about the events of the last two days is very small. The most scrupulous efforts are being made to avoid any show of animosity over what has been going on in Italian-German relations. The solidarity of the Axis is an asset in impressing third parties, which we naturally do not want to renounce in any way at this precise moment.

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.,

WEIZSÄCKER

[EDITORS' NOTE: On August 27, Hitler addressed a private meeting of Reichstag Deputies and Gauleiters on the political situation. See Appendix I, entry of August 28, and *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 346.]

No. 365

7895/E573228

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 365 of August 27

BUCHAREST, August 28, 1939—1:40 a.m.

Received August 28—2:40 a.m.

W 1481 g.

With reference to your telegram No. 333 of August 26.¹

1. Machine guns are still impounded in Brno.² As assurances had been given, according to instructions, that they were already released³ when the additional exports of petroleum were granted to [*sic* ? by] the Minister President and the Armaments Minister Slavescu, the despatch of this transport and . . . (group mutilated) is a prerequisite for further releases [of petroleum]. I also intend, with the help of the Armaments Minister, to apply for petroleum in exchange for 250 Ford truck chassis, to the value of half a million Reichsmark.

2. Please instruct me by telegram whether the Norwegian steamer *Sticklestad* with a cargo of petroleum for Germany should sail, not to the Mediterranean, but to Galatz in order that the oil may be transported by the Danube. On account of her heavy draught, 5,000 tons out of a total of 15,000 tons would have to be transferred to the steamer *Belinda*, also chartered by us.

FABRICIUS

¹ Not printed; see document No. 243, footnote 4.

² See document No. 97.

³ See document No. 230.

No. 366

1132/323649

The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, August 28, 1939 [2:30 a.m.]¹

No. 510 of August 27

Received August 28—3:15 a.m.

With reference to my telegram No. 508² and to the instructions by telephone from State Secretary von Weizsäcker.³

As the Minister President was no longer available, I called on his *Chef de Cabinet*, Clapier, at 11:30 p.m., and expressed extreme surprise at finding reference made in the Government communiqué⁴ to the Führer's letter of today's date⁵ to Daladier, as this was contrary

¹ Taken from the Paris draft (9887/E693567-70).

² Not printed; see document No. 358, footnote 1.

³ No record of these instructions has been found.

⁴ Issued in Paris on the evening of Aug. 27.

⁵ Document No. 354.

to what had been agreed. Among other things, I pointed out that the . . . (group mutilated)⁶ mention of the letter at the end of the French communiqué was bound to create a completely false impression and mislead the public as to the contents of the letter and its purpose.

In order to obviate this impression, the only thing to do now was to publish the letter. I said I had been instructed by my Government to request that the full text of the letter be published immediately. It would also be published in Germany tomorrow morning.⁷

Clapier tried to explain the reference made to the letter in the communiqué by saying that the French press had learnt through people connected with the airways (through the plan to send a special aircraft) that a message had been sent from the Führer to Daladier, and that the press had exerted very strong pressure on the Minister President's office for information. It had been decided to issue the communiqué in order to avoid false reports and speculation. In making this decision, our request that no part of the letter should be published had been taken into account. I replied by stating our view, as set out above. Clapier thereupon promised to convey our wishes to the Minister President as soon as he could reach him.

I am continuing my efforts to have the complete text of the letter published.

BRÄUER

⁶ The Paris draft here reads: "laconic".

⁷ Daladier's letter and Hitler's reply were published through DNB on Aug. 28.

No. 367

7972/E575097

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

TOKYO, August 28, 1939—5:00 a.m.

No. 371 of August 28

Received August 28—4:45 p.m.

Pol. VIII 1411.

The Hiranuma Cabinet resigned today. A telegram reporting on the new Cabinet will follow¹ when the final list of Ministers has been drawn up. The resignation does not in any way indicate an admission of fundamental changes in the direction of foreign policy, but rather it expresses, in accordance with Japanese tradition, the assumption of responsibility towards the Emperor. There is still nothing to show that pro-British elements are gaining ground. The Army statement of August 26 (cf. DNB telegrams Nos. 132 and 133)² was

¹ See document No. 455.

² Not found. In this statement, as published in the press, the Army expressed the disappointment of the Japanese people at Germany's *rapprochement* with Russia, and at the same time stressed Japan's determination to maintain her opposition to the Comintern, and resolutely to carry out her policy in China, regardless of changes in the European situation.

obviously intended to prevent this happening. So far the results of the Army's firm attitude have been that the Anti-Comintern Pact has not been denounced, that only a formal protest has been made, and that the formation of a pro-British Cabinet, which appeared likely, has been prevented. The confidence in Germany felt by a large part of the population has certainly been profoundly shaken. In the interests of morale here, and to strengthen the position of the Army and of Ambassador Oshima, I should be glad if some gesture could be made to show our appreciation of the way the Army has tenaciously held to the German line.³

OTT

³ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 363.

No. 368

8137/E582136

The Chargé d'Affaires in China to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 159 of August 28

SHANGHAI, August 28, 1939—8:48 a.m.

Received August 28—5:20 p.m.

Pol. VIII 1417.

With reference to my telegram No. 151 of August 15,¹ and my report of August 22.²

Wang Ching-wei is back in Shanghai, and is continuing his efforts to form a new Chinese Central Government, bringing in the Peking and other recognized Governments, and is planning to summon immediately a "Kuomintang Congress for the salvation of the nation".

Wang Ching-wei's objective is to have the new Government as independent of Japan as possible. Discussions with the Japanese are in progress concerning the degree of independence, but remain so far without result. With the setting up of the new Government, pacification can hardly be expected in the near future. Wang Ching-wei's local newspaper³ states that, in spite of the German-Soviet Pact, Japan is on Germany's side. Repeated to Tokyo.

ALTENBURG

¹ Not printed (8137/E582135). In this telegram, Altenburg reported on reactions to Wang Ching-wei's broadcast of Aug. 9. The *Shanghai Times* published the text of this broadcast on Aug. 10; in it Wang Ching-wei sharply attacked Chiang Kai-shek, and urged negotiations with Japan whose peace proposals he considered to be compatible with China's independence.

² Not printed (8137/E582142-52). In this report Altenburg reviewed the political situation in China and discussed Wang Ching-wei's aims and prospects. See also vol. IV of this Series, chapter VIII.

³ The *Chung Hua Jih Pao* published in Shanghai.

No. 369

52/35259

Memorandum by an Official of the State Secretary's Secretariat

BERLIN, August 28, 1939.

The Chargé d'Affaires in Paris, Counsellor Bräuer, telephoned from Paris at 9:40 a.m. as follows:

"Last night I made the *démarche* as instructed¹ concerning publication of the Führer's letter to Daladier.² Thereupon, Havas carried the text of the letter as given by Berlin. To this extent, the matter has reached the public. Through instructions meantime given by the press censorship, further circulation in the French press may be somewhat delayed. I am continuing my efforts to obtain publication in full throughout the press."

Submitted to the State Secretary.

SIEGFRIED

¹ No record of these instructions has been found, but see document No. 366.

² Document No. 354.

No. 370

1132/323647-48

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 28, 1939.

Counsellor of Embassy Bräuer telephoned the following information from Paris at 11 a.m.:

1. Daladier's letter to the Führer¹ and the Führer's reply² have been published by the Havas agency but have so far only appeared in the late editions of *Le Journal*.

2. An influential person, not a member of the Government, whose name Bräuer will send through other channels,³ described the effect of the Führer's letter as being very good, especially the example of Marseilles. On the other hand, this person advanced the following arguments, with which Bräuer does not in any way associate himself:

a) The claims on Poland were considered to be heavier than had previously been assumed in France. Bräuer replied: It was known that the Führer's offer had been made once and for all.

b) The reference to one and a half million Germans in Poland could be variously interpreted. Bräuer replied: This number had been given in connection with the oppression of Germans.

c) There was no statement to the effect that Poland should remain an independent State, and that she should be afforded access to the sea.

¹ Document No. 324.

² Document No. 354.

³ In telegram No. 512 of Aug. 28 (1132/323646), Bräuer stated that this reference was to the former Minister President, Flandin.

The person to whom Bräuer was speaking also said that for any direct negotiations there were a number of suitable mediators, such as Franco, the King of the Belgians and Motta.

In conclusion Herr Bräuer again emphasized that he in no way associated himself with the statements of the person to whom he had been speaking, and, as appears from the foregoing, that he had already given him fitting replies.

WOERMANN

No. 371

173/83927

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 28, 1939.

Counsellor of Legation von Puttlitz telephoned the following information from The Hague at 12:30 p.m.:

The Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry¹ has just informed Minister Count Zech that the Netherlands Government have decided to mobilize. Mobilization is taking place, in spite of the hope of preserving peace, in order to be ready for all eventualities.

WOERMANN

¹ Jonkheer A. M. Snouck Hurgronje.

No. 372

2915/566607-08

The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 77 of August 28

COPENHAGEN, August 28, 1939.¹

Received August 28—12:40 p.m.

The Danish Foreign Minister² has made a statement to the press, from which I quote the following verbatim:

"We are firmly resolved to maintain our neutrality in any war and we are convinced that we can do so. We must hope that we will be able to maintain our trade both with Britain and Germany in the normal way. Of course, if war breaks out, special negotiations will have to be conducted, for we take the view that the present trade agreements can be observed. This plan worked excellently during the last war because Germany put no obstacles in the way of Denmark's trade with Britain, and I see no reason why this system cannot be applied again. Only on this basis can Denmark continue her imports, on which her exports depend as a matter of course. It is our normal practice to ban the export of arms to both parties."

RENTHE-FINK

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

² Peter Munch.

No. 373

7895/E573221

*The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Legation in Rumania*

Telegram

No. 347 of August 28

BERLIN, August 28, 1939—4:45 p.m.
e.o. W 1466 g.

With reference to yesterday's telephone conversation with Klugkist.¹
[Z]brojovka was already informed on Thursday² by telephone
about the release of the machine guns.

For your information only:

All certificates of release became invalid on mobilization. Release
of the machine guns was therefore renewed on Saturday, as from
August 25.

CLODIUS

¹ Secretary at the German Legation in Bucharest. No record of this conversation
has been found, but see document No. 365.

² i.e., Aug. 24.

No. 374

141/127257

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 99 of August 28

BRUSSELS, August 28, 1939—5:5 p.m.
Received August 28—5:55 p.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 142 of August 25 [*sic*].¹

According to reliable information the conference of the Oslo Powers
did not deal with any economic questions. The Foreign Ministry
here is at present studying the formulation of a policy of economic
neutrality. It is intended to hold consultations between the Oslo
Powers on this subject.

BÜLOW

¹ Not printed; see document No. 248, footnote 4.

No. 375

406/214413

The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 96 of August 28

TALLINN, August 28, 1939—5:38 p.m.
Received August 28—6:50 p.m.

The Foreign Minister¹ offered me his congratulations on the German-
Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. By this, and by the earlier German-

Karl Selter.

Estonian Non-Aggression Pact,² Germany had prepared the ground for Estonia's security, for which Estonia must be profoundly grateful. The Minister also described as completely without foundation propaganda in the Western European press concerning the alleged dangers of the pact for the Baltic States. In the Estonian press, moreover, there are only isolated references to this subject and it is merely stated that a certain caution would be advisable in the event of *further* German-Russian *rapprochement*. In public speeches at the opening of the Agricultural Exhibition both the Minister for Agriculture³ and the Propaganda Minister⁴ spoke in very favourable terms of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.

FROHWEIN

² Of June 7, 1939. See vol. VI of this Series, Editors' Note, p. 664.

³ Artur Tupits.

⁴ Ants Oidermaa.

No. 376

621/250803-05

*The Embassy in France to the Foreign Ministry*Telegram [en clair by teleprinter]¹

No. 518 of August 28

PARIS, August 28, 1939.

Received August 28—7:10 p.m.

Pol. II 3055.

The following is published, from a special quarter, as semi-official views on the exchange of letters between the Führer and Minister President Daladier:²

"The publication, occasioned by German propaganda, of the two messages exchanged between Edouard Daladier and Hitler is regarded as a political gesture, which is to justify the German press [*sic*]³ in the eyes of the public in general.

"As for French public opinion, which, during the last few months, has been valuable [*sic*]⁴ regarding the development of German policy in Europe, it has corrected of its own accord the arguments advanced by the Chancellor. There is no doubt that in Paris we should have been pleased to note the renewed assurances that the French frontier would be respected, but the French character of the provinces which were recovered in consequence of the world war has never been in doubt, and the fact that they were annexed for fifty years never established any legal German claim for Germany to renounce or not as she pleased. As to the reference to Hitler's writings or speeches, it should be noted that *Mein Kampf*, the French publication of which the author himself tried to forbid, has never been a reassuring document for France. As to Poland, it has not been forgotten that a ten-

¹ Taken from the Paris draft (9887/E693571-72).

² Documents Nos. 324 and 354.

³ The Paris draft here reads: "which is to justify the German thesis . . ."

⁴ The Paris draft here reads: "has been enlightened . . ."

year treaty of good neighbourly relations was concluded between Berlin and Warsaw,⁵ and that the result of this treaty was to reassure Poland as long as Germany was amending the map of Europe to her own advantage in other regions, and that when this readjustment was completed, Germany denounced⁶ the treaty. During the period of good German-Polish relations Hitler repeatedly made statements in which he recognized the right of the Polish nation to exist and emphasized the incompatibility of the annexation of part of Polish territory with National Socialist doctrine, and Germany's desire to live at peace with Poland.⁷

"The argument of the existence of a considerable German minority in Poland is counterbalanced by the fact that, in Germany too, there is a not inconsiderable Polish minority. Furthermore, the number of Germans who have become Polish citizens is no more than 700,000 and does not amount to about two millions, as stated by Hitler. In addition, this racial argument was completely disregarded when German troops marched into Prague, and the Czechs, who were ethnically and legally independent, were absorbed by the German Reich. Hitler's speech demanding the return to the Reich of seven million Germans has not been forgotten. The return of this number was achieved in consequence of the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland. Those Germans now claimed by the Führer were thus not included in the total which, at the time, was regarded as final. The Chancellor speaks of the ill-treatment which the Germans in Poland have had to suffer, but on the one hand the statements of the Nazi press on this subject must be treated with caution, and on the other, this argument, which was never advanced as long as the Polish⁸ treaty was in force, bears too singular a resemblance to that used last year to 'justify', first the German claims to the Sudeten territory, and then to the whole of Czecho-Slovakia.

"The Führer clearly demands Danzig 'and the Corridor'. He thus makes it clear that his demands of April 28⁹ are already outdated. If his present claims were fulfilled, they would cut off the diminished Polish territory from the sea, and expose Poland to any and every pressure from her neighbours. In actual fact German policy since the annexation of Austria and the seizure of Czecho-Slovakia has proved to be one of expansion. Neither this annexation nor this seizure can be explained by alleging that they are a revision of the wrongs done to Germany by the Treaty of Versailles."

No signature¹⁰

⁵ The German-Polish Declaration of Jan. 26, 1934; for the text see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 137, pp. 495-496.

⁶ The Paris draft here reads: "unilaterally denounced . . ."

⁷ This sentence as received is incomplete. The Paris draft reads: "and acknowledged Poland's need for an outlet to the sea".

⁸ The Paris draft here reads: "German-Polish . . ."

⁹ In his speech to the Reichstag; for extracts see *British Blue Book*, Cmd. 6106, No. 21.

¹⁰ The Paris draft had the signature: "Bräuer".

No. 377

8504/E597269

The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 521 of August 28

PARIS, August 28, 1939 [7:20 p.m.].¹

Received August 28—7:30 p.m.

Pol. II 3070.

I draw your attention to the semi-official statement circulated by Havas-Special, just transmitted in telegram No. 518,² concerning the German attitude as expressed in the Führer's letter to Daladier. The publication of the correspondence is described as German propaganda; Germany's renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine as irrelevant and superfluous; the unacceptable nature of the German demands, which, moreover, are said to conflict with Germany's policy towards Poland between 1934 and 1939, is set forth; the ill-treatment of the German minorities in Poland is called in question and there are polemics against the alleged claims for the return of millions³ of Germans in Poland (of whom there are said to be actually only 700,000). Both the tone and the wording of the statement are malicious and provocative.

BRÄUER

¹ Taken from the Paris draft (9887/E693573).² Document No. 376.³ The Paris draft here reads: "two millions".

No. 378

7971/E575085-86

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 282 of August 28

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1939—8:47 p.m.

Received August 28 [*sic* ? 29]—7:10 a.m.

Pol. IX 1802.

With reference to your telegram No. 222 of August 27.¹

I agree with the Military Attaché's observations on military policy, which are based on first-hand information from high military authorities and reflect their views. In military circles, with which the Military Attaché continues to be on the best of terms, feelings towards Germany are substantially less influenced by the press campaign than is the case with the general public. By the latter Germany is considered in general to be a disturber of the peace and an aggressor who refuses to settle political problems otherwise than by

¹ Not printed (2422/511789). In this telegram Woermann asked Thomsen to telegraph his views on the political observations made by the Military Attaché in document No. 260.

force. However, hostility towards Germany has not yet been transformed into preparedness to intervene, in the sense of taking an active part in a war, as far as the broad masses of the American people are concerned as memories of the world war are still too deep rooted. On the other hand, the pro-interventionist press, supported by the Government, is energetically endeavouring to spread the propagandistically dangerous idea that isolation, and especially an embargo on the export of arms, entails support of the totalitarian Powers, whilst support of Britain and France is tantamount to averting a danger directly threatening America herself through a possible collapse of the democracies.

I judge the situation as follows:

1. Roosevelt considers . . . (group mutilated) neutrality to be despicable. He will do all he can to prevent the defeat of Britain and France, and to bring about the downfall of the totalitarian systems of government, especially that of Germany. He and the American Government do not consider it likely that Germany will immediately succeed in defeating Britain and France. They expect rather, that, after the first shock, there will commence a long war of attrition, the outcome of which they regard as uncertain. The possibility that Germany may evade a blockade by importing from Russia is not rated very highly here. The speedy collapse of Italy—if she comes in at all—is taken for granted in political circles; the General Staff, however, in no way share this view. Official quarters consider that Germany's position as regards supplies and food can be compared with her strained position in 1917. The weakness of Britain, France, and especially of Poland, is realized here.

2. America will resort to armed intervention,

- a) if Britain and France are in danger of being defeated;

- b) presumably, also, if there is an assured prospect of a final Anglo-French victory.

3. The despatch of considerable American armed forces to the European theatre of war in less than a year from the outbreak of war is technically impossible.

4. At the proper time, the nation will be brought ruthlessly, by every possible means, to the required state of mind for intervention.

5. On the outbreak of war the Neutrality Act,² which already provides conditions for measures favourable to Britain and France, will at first enter into force *pro forma*, but will later be abrogated, modified (raising of arms embargo), or circumvented.

6. Raw materials of military importance, as well as machines and equipment, will immediately be made available to Britain and France in unlimited quantities. As this would help to overcome unemployment, no opposition to such supply is to be expected.

² Of 1937; see *Peace and War*, No. 83.

7. The denunciation of the Japanese-American Commercial Treaty³ turns out to be a political blunder which the American Government are endeavouring to rectify. Even if a *rapprochement* with Japan should come about, the re-establishment of the position of 1917 in the Pacific area is hardly to be expected in view of America's attitude towards the conflict in China. The main fighting strength of the American fleet will therefore be tied down in the Pacific until further notice.

8. The President may proclaim the severance of relations with Germany without consulting Congress. This measure would undoubtedly be popular here and would strongly influence decisions by Congress.

THOMSEN

³ By the U.S. Government on July 26, 1939; see *ibid.*, No. 135.

No. 379

141/127258

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 100 of September [*sic*] 28 BRUSSELS, August 28, 1939—9:22 p.m.
Received August 28—11:25 p.m.

As you will already know through DNB, the British and French Ambassadors¹ last night and this morning made declarations to the King similar to that made by me on Saturday.² Minister President Pierlot has just informed the Embassy of this, before publication, sending an Attaché from his office for this purpose.

The German declaration, which was the first to be made, and which prompted the British and French declarations, had a very favourable reception in the Belgian press, and made an excellent impression on public opinion generally. Even if doubts as to the reliability of the German declarations are expressed here and there, the solemn repetition of our assurances has nevertheless helped to calm the population and has lessened the distrust of our political intentions, which unfortunately exists as a result of one-sided reports in the Belgian press.

This renewed assurance of respect for Belgium's neutrality occasioned by our declaration may well provide a further compelling reason for the British and French to honour this obligation, and may thus be in our interests.

BÜLOW

¹ Sir Robert Clive and Paul Bargeton. For their statements see *Belgium: The Official Account of what happened*, Appendix 7; see also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, Nos. 377 and 393, and the *French Yellow Book*, No. 270.

² See document No. 315.

No. 380

73/51991

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 251 of August 28

BUDAPEST, August 28, 1939—9:26 p.m.

Received August 29—12:5 a.m.

In reply to my question, the Deputy Foreign Minister¹ told me that at its meeting today, under the chairmanship of the Regent, the Council for National Defence had decided to take no further military measures for the present.

After the rejection of Rumania's offer to conclude a non-aggression pact,² the Hungarian Minister in Bucharest³ had proposed the conclusion of a minorities agreement as a means of improving the atmosphere. The Rumanian Foreign Minister had . . . (word missing) he did not consider this course practicable but would report to his Government. Circles close to Gafencu were trying to find out more about the substance of the Hungarian proposal from the Hungarian Minister. The Hungarian Government will now draw up a detailed proposal and send it to Bucharest.

ERDMANNSDORFF

¹ János Vörmlé.² See documents Nos. 245 and 361.³ László de Bárdossy; see also document No. 385.

No. 381

103/111550/

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, August 28, 1939.¹

No. 221

With reference to your telegram No. 218.²

In view of the extremely tense situation the absence of a new Russian Ambassador, and in particular of a new military representative from Moscow, is increasingly felt here. Please use your influence

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

² In this telegram of Aug. 25 (103/111543), Schulenburg reported: "I have emphatically represented to Molotov the Foreign Minister's wish that a special military representative should be sent. Molotov said that he appreciated our reasons and that the Soviet Government would be at pains to meet the Foreign Minister's wishes as soon as possible. Molotov said that the appointment of a new Ambassador would not be long delayed either. The delay is clearly connected with the lack of suitable persons here. Molotov also told me that the Soviet Government were considering the following appointments to the Soviet Embassy in Berlin: (1) Counsellor Alexander Shkvarzev, Russian, aged 39 (in place of Nikolaiev), (2) Secretary Kobulov, Armenian, aged 33. I told Molotov that we would presumably have no objections to these persons (with whom I am otherwise unacquainted)."

again for their immediate posting and report by telegram the results of action taken by you, also the names and date of arrival of the two persons.³

WEIZSÄCKER

³ See document No. 425.

No. 382

461/225053

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 223 of August 28

BERLIN, August 28, 1939—10:00 p.m.

Received August 29—4:00 a.m.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to our telegram No. 218.¹

In the highest quarters here a keen interest is being shown in the outcome of your enquiries and the results of your efforts in accordance with our telegram under reference. Please report by telegram by return.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 360.

No. 383

103/111552

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, August 28, 1939—10:6 p.m.

SECRET

Received August 28—10:45 p.m.

No. 230 of August 28

With reference to your telegram No. 218¹ of August 29 [*sic* ? 27].

I asked Molotov today whether newspaper reports that the Soviet Government had withdrawn their troops from the Polish frontier were true; the reports seemed to me incredible; in cases like the present it was customary to reinforce, not to decrease, one's frontier troops.

Molotov laughed heartily and said that of course the newspaper reports were untrue; so much nonsense was published in the press nowadays that one could not concern oneself with all of it.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 360.

No. 384

F17/402-04

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*BERLIN, August 29,¹ 1939.RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE
BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FOREIGN
MINISTER ON AUGUST 28, 1939, AT 10:30 P.M.

The British Ambassador handed over the British Government's Memorandum, which is enclosed. When the Führer had read the German translation attached,² Henderson again explained the individual points orally without adding anything essentially new to the contents. He emphasized once again that it was completely wrong to imagine that the British Government's aim was to destroy Germany. Britain was perfectly willing to concede to Germany her vital rights, but she had given her word to Poland and could not break her word. The British people, and Mr. Chamberlain in particular, wanted understanding with Germany, but in order to achieve this they needed the cooperation of Germany, who must try to reach an understanding with the Poles by peaceful means.

The Führer replied that he had been quite ready to settle the questions at issue with the Polish Government on a very reasonable basis. This attempt had failed owing to the behaviour of the Poles, particularly because they felt secure under the protection of the British guarantee, and now, with their Slav mentality, they were becoming provocative and insolent. Things had now reached such a pitch that every day there were fresh incidents and acts of violence against the *Volksdeutsche*. The Führer then quoted individual examples of shooting and ill-treatment of Germans in Poland. When he remarked in this connection that all this was a matter of indifference to Britain, Henderson, who had wrongly taken the remark as applying to himself, replied very heatedly that such things should not be said to him, who, ever since he had occupied his post in Berlin, and particularly just recently, had done everything in his power to prevent war and bloodshed. The choice between war and peace now lay with the Führer.

The Führer replied that this was not a correct picture of the situation and declared that the alternatives before him were either to

¹ This document is printed here for the convenience of the reader. It would appear also to relate to the conversation between Hitler and Henderson the following day, of which no separate German record has been found, when Henderson was given the German reply (document No. 421); see also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, Nos. 450, 455 and 501 for the interview of Aug. 28, and Nos. 490, 493, 502 and 508 for that of Aug. 29.

² This translation was prepared in the British Embassy in Berlin; see *British Documents. loc. cit.*, Nos. 421, 426, 447 and 501.

defend the rights of the German people or to abandon them at the cost of an agreement with England. For him there was no choice: his duty was to defend the rights of the German people. Furthermore a Great Power like Germany must decline to be put on the same level as a country like Poland. The former alternative in the case of Czechia had been equally insulting to Germany, when England had also placed herself before the alternative of having either Germany or Czechia as a friend. Germany could not tolerate anything of that kind.

On parting, the Führer, after expatiating on the course of his efforts to reach understanding with England, again expressed most forcibly his desire to cooperate with England. He had always cherished this desire and had endeavoured to realize it. England had repulsed him again and again and had thus forced him against his will into alliances with others, which had not been in keeping with his original intentions. Even now he still wanted friendship with England and he expressed the sincere hope that England would not let this last chance slip.

SCHMIDT
Minister

3001/587693-97

[Enclosure]³

August 28, 1939.

1. His Majesty's Government have received the message⁴ conveyed to them from the German Chancellor by His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin, and have considered it with the care which it demands.

They note the Chancellor's expression of his desire to make friendship the basis of the relations between Germany and the British Empire and they fully share this desire. They believe with him that if a complete and lasting understanding between the two countries could be established it would bring untold blessings to both peoples.

2. The Chancellor's message deals with two groups of questions: those which are the matters now in dispute between Germany and Poland, and those affecting the ultimate relations of Germany and Great Britain. In connection with these last, His Majesty's Government observe that the German Chancellor has indicated certain proposals which, subject to one condition, he would be prepared to make to the British Government for a general understanding. These proposals are of course stated in very general form and would require closer definition, but His Majesty's Government are fully prepared to take them, with some additions, as subjects for discussion and they would be ready, if the differences between Germany and Poland are peacefully composed, to proceed so soon as practicable to such discussion with a sincere desire to reach agreement.

³ The enclosure is in English in the original.

⁴ See document No. 265.

3. The condition which the German Chancellor lays down is that there must first be a settlement of the differences between Germany and Poland. As to that, His Majesty's Government entirely agree. Everything, however, turns upon the nature of the settlement and the method by which it is to be reached. On these points, the importance of which cannot be absent from the Chancellor's mind, his message is silent, and His Majesty's Government feel compelled to point out that an understanding upon both of these is essential to achieving further progress. The German Government will be aware that His Majesty's Government have obligations to Poland by which they are bound and which they intend to honour. They could not, for any advantage offered to Great Britain, acquiesce in a settlement which put in jeopardy the independence of a State to whom they have given their guarantee.

4. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government a reasonable solution of the differences between Germany and Poland could and should be effected by agreement between the two countries on lines which would include the safeguarding of Poland's essential interest[s], and they recall that in his speech of the 28th April last⁵ the German Chancellor recognized the importance of these interests to Poland.

But, as was stated by the Prime Minister in his letter to the German Chancellor of the 22nd August,⁶ His Majesty's Government consider it essential for the success of the discussions which would precede the agreement that it should be understood beforehand that any settlement arrived at would be guaranteed by other Powers. His Majesty's Government would be ready if desired to make their contribution to the effective operation of such a guarantee.

In the view of His Majesty's Government it follows that the next step should be the initiation of direct discussions between the German and Polish Governments on a basis which would include the principles stated above, namely the safeguarding of Poland's essential interests and the securing of the settlement by an international guarantee.

They have already received a definite assurance from the Polish Government that they are prepared to enter into discussions on this basis, and His Majesty's Government hope the German Government would for their part also be willing to agree to this course.

If, as His Majesty's Government hope, such discussion led to agreement the way would be open to the negotiation of that wider and more complete understanding between Great Britain and Germany which both countries desire.

5. His Majesty's Government agree with the German Chancellor that one of the principal dangers in the German-Polish situation arises

⁵ To the Reichstag; for an English translation of the relevant extracts see *British Blue Book*, Cmd. 6106, No. 13.

⁶ Document No. 200, enclosure.

from the report[s] concerning the treatment of minorities. The present state of tension, with its concomitant frontier incidents, reports of maltreatment and inflammatory propaganda, is a constant danger to peace. It is manifestly a matter of the utmost urgency that all incidents of the kind should be promptly and rigidly suppressed and that unverified reports should not be allowed to circulate, in order that time may be afforded, without provocation on either side, for a full examination of the possibilities of settlement. His Majesty's Government are confident that both the Governments concerned are fully alive to these considerations.

6. His Majesty's Government have said enough to make their own attitude plain in the particular matters at issue between Germany and Poland. They trust that the German Chancellor will not think that, because His Majesty's Government are scrupulous concerning their obligations to Poland, they are not anxious to use all their influence to assist the achievement of a solution which may commend itself both to Germany and to Poland.

That such a settlement should be achieved seems to His Majesty's Government essential, not only for reasons directly arising in regard to the settlement itself, but also because of the wider considerations of which the German Chancellor has spoken with such conviction.

7. It is unnecessary in the present reply to stress the advantage of a peaceful settlement over a decision to settle the questions at issue by force of arms. The results of a decision to use force have been clearly set out in the Prime Minister's letter to the Chancellor of the 22nd August, and His Majesty's Government do not doubt that they are as fully recognized by the Chancellor as by themselves.

On the other hand, His Majesty's Government, noting with interest the German Chancellor's reference in the message now under consideration to a limitation of armaments, believe that, if a peaceful settlement can be obtained, the assistance of the world could confidently be anticipated for practical measures to enable the transition from preparation for war to the normal activities of peaceful trade to be safely and smoothly effected.

8. A just settlement of these questions between Germany and Poland may open the way to world peace. Failure to reach it would ruin the hopes of better understanding between Germany and Great Britain, would bring the two countries into conflict, and might well plunge the whole world into war. Such an outcome would be a calamity without parallel in history.

No. 385

169/82891

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 374 of August 28 BUCHAREST, August 28, 1939—10:35 p.m.
 Received August 28—11:25 p.m.

The Hungarian Minister¹ confirmed Gafencu's statement² that Hungary had rejected the non-aggression pact proposed by Rumania; Hungary had proposed instead a minorities treaty. Gafencu had referred to the Rumanian Government's well-known reluctance so far to settle minority questions by agreement with foreign States, but had promised to submit the matter to the Council of Ministers.

FABRICIUS

¹ László de Bárdossy; see also document No. 380.

² See document No. 361.

No. 386

169/82692

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT BUCHAREST, August 28, 1939—10:45 p.m.
 No. 373 of August 28 Received August 29—7:10 a.m.

Air Attaché Gerstenberg reports as follows on his two-hour conversation with King Carol: He was very cordially received. The King expressed his pleasure at the delivery of arms and asked for further support; he said that he for his part would see that deliveries of petroleum were fulfilled.

The King then mentioned the call-up of reservists which had been ordered and which he could not cancel because mobilization had now begun in Hungary and Bulgaria. Hungary's attitude filled him with anxiety, especially as the non-aggression pact had been rejected.¹ He had been obliged to get into touch with Turkey because of the possibility of an attack by Bulgaria, but, on the other hand, he had formed no alliance with Britain. He would give Germany tangible proof of his neutrality.

The King described the German-Soviet Pact as a tremendous strengthening, both politically and economically, of Germany's military power, and stressed the adaptability of German policy. With regard to Poland he considers that the conflict should be localized, if possible without war. At the same time he mentioned Britain's dilatory fulfilment of her arms deliveries to Turkey as a sign of Britain's weakness.

¹ See document No. 385.

It is worth noting that at the end of the conversation the King told me of his own accord that the British and French had recently submitted to Rumania a plan for sabotaging the oil fields in the event of war. He had rejected the plan, pointing out that Rumania would be strictly neutral, and indicated that measures against acts of sabotage would be announced.

FABRICIUS

No. 387

461/225118-19

Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union¹

August 28, 1939.

At 11 p.m. the Reich Foreign Minister in person telephoned me. He was interested in two questions:

1. The alleged withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Polish frontier.

I told him that the report was untrue; a telegram was already on the way.² Herr v. R[ibbentrop] then asked me to take steps to have this false report denied as emphatically as possible. "It is understood, of course, that the Soviet troops on our Western frontier have not been decreased but augmented."³

2. Posting of the two officers:⁴ Military Attaché and special confidential officer for Herr v. R[ibbentrop]. Herr v. R[ibbentrop] asked that the posting of the two officers be expedited as much as possible.

3. Herr v. R[ibbentrop] said that he would keep the Berlin representative of the Soviet Union constantly "informed". I replied that that would be a *very* good thing, as a hint to that effect had already been dropped here.

SCHULENBURG

¹ This memorandum is in Schulenburg's handwriting.

² See document No. 383.

³ This sentence has been inserted by Schulenburg in blue crayon.

⁴ See document No. 381.

No. 388

461/225052

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 225 of August 28

BERLIN, August 28, 1939—10:50 p.m.

Received August 29—4:00 a.m.

With reference to the Foreign Minister's telephone conversation today.¹

¹ See document No. 387, which indicates that Ribbentrop's telephone conversation took place at 11 p.m. Moscow time.

One form of demonstration might be some kind of official announcement in the Soviet press concerning troop concentrations on the Polish frontier.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 389

141/127259

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 101 of August 28

BRUSSELS, August 28, 1939.¹

Received August 28—11:25 p.m.

1. At midday today, the second of the, presumably, five stages of Belgian mobilization was ordered.² As six peace-time divisions were brought up to war strength through Stage 1, this probably means that part of six second-line divisions is being mobilized.

2. At 3 p.m. today defensive measures began on the French frontier which indicate the Belgian Government's intention to remain neutral. The Military Attaché³ will give further details.⁴

BÜLOW

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

² After a meeting of Ministers on Aug. 25, an official communiqué was issued in Brussels announcing that new military measures had been taken. For details of the stages of Belgian mobilization, see *Belgium: The Official Account of what happened*, p. 12.

³ Lt. Col. Rabe von Papenheim.

⁴ Given in telegram No. 103 of Aug. 28 (not printed, 141/127260).

No. 390

173/83930

The Legation in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram telephoned from The Hague

No. 71 of August 28

August 28, 12 midnight.

The Foreign Minister¹ summoned me a short time ago and informed me that if the Powers concerned thought it expedient, the Queen [of the Netherlands] and the King of the Belgians were prepared to offer their good offices jointly, but without thereby taking any step which might render the already complicated situation more difficult. The same statement has been made to the Ministers of France, Britain, Italy and Poland.² The Foreign Minister added that a similar communication would be made to our Ambassador in Brussels by the Foreign Ministry there.³

GERMAN LEGATION

¹ E. N. van Kleffens.

² See the *French Yellow Book*, No. 284, *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 451, *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 397, and the *Polish White Book*, No. 100.

³ See document No. 408.

No. 391

141/127255

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy
Department*

BERLIN, August 28, 1939.

A report has reached the Ministry of Economics from business circles that Belgium intends to stop all transit traffic to Germany as from 12 o'clock tonight.

I telephoned Herr von Bülow-Schwante and asked him to enquire into this rumour, saying at the same time that we could not imagine that the report was true, for such a step would be an open breach of neutrality.

Herr von Bülow-Schwante thereupon telephoned at 12 o'clock tonight and told me that the Belgian Minister President, whom he had seen at 11 o'clock this evening in connection with another matter,¹ had informed him that the rumour was completely without foundation, such as often arises in times of crisis.

CLODIUS

¹ See document No. 408.

No. 392

136/73836-37

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 854 of August 28

SAN SEBASTIAN, August 28, 1939.¹

Received August 29—2 a.m.

At my first visit today to the new Spanish Foreign Minister² I asked him about French press reports which alleged that a promise of Spain's neutrality in the event of war had been given by the Spanish Government to Marshal Pétain,³ or by the Spanish Ambassador in Paris⁴ to the French Foreign Minister.

The Minister at once stated categorically that all these reports were pure invention. The best proof of this was afforded by the fortifications which Spain was building in the Pyrenees and particularly in Spanish Morocco, and also the strong reinforcements of troops there; these precautionary measures would be continued in spite of Pétain's protests and *démarches*. In addition, a new Gibraltar command of one division had been set up in the last few days. France felt insecure

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

² Col. Beigbeder, who had been appointed Foreign Minister in the new Cabinet formed by General Franco on Aug. 10, 1939.

³ French Ambassador in Spain.

⁴ José Felix de Lequerica.

as a result of these precautions and had already taken counter measures, for example in the Pyrenees. France would not be able to withdraw any men from Morocco as 87,000 men were already concentrated in the Spanish Zone, which was more than the peace-time strength of the French Zone.

Spain, the Minister concluded, wanted to be prepared for all eventualities and thought that by these measures she could be of service to us and to Italy.

STOHRER

No. 393

1594/384346-49

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

A 2382

TARABYA, August 28, 1939.

Received September 1.

Pol. VII 1556.

POLITICAL REPORT

With reference to my telegrams,¹ there follows a short report on the measures I have taken here:

Immediately after my return from the Obersalzberg,² I requested an interview with the Foreign Minister and the President. Referring to the situation which had arisen, I explained to the Foreign Minister how greatly the recently concluded Soviet Pact had changed the balance of power in Europe, and into what a regrettable position he had manoeuvred Turkey by participation in the policy of encirclement. The fact that a blockade of the Axis Powers was now impossible, and that the Dardanelles problem was no longer acute, was an indication to Turkey that she should revise her policy as soon as possible.

The Minister seemed very resigned and made no comment at all on my detailed statements. He merely broached the question of the continuation of our trade relations and the non-delivery of war material. I promised him that, in the event of a change in Turkey's policy, the question of military deliveries could again be examined favourably. I am grateful that in the meantime approval has been given to my proposal to extend the trade agreement and the payments agreement for a month,³ so that all the questions regarding the non-delivery of war material will not be discussed until then. This arrangement gives me the chance to exert further influence for a possible change of policy, and is regarded here at present as a concession on the part of Germany.

The purpose of my detailed discussion with the President was also

¹ See documents Nos. 247 and 342.

² When Papen would appear to have seen Hitler on Aug. 21; see document No. 219, footnote 1.

³ See document No. 247, Footnote 3.

to convince him that a revision of Turkey's political course had become urgently necessary in her own interests. I also wanted to ascertain to what extent Turkey was prepared to abide by her hitherto existing obligations. The President received me with marked cordiality; he seemed very much impressed by the change in the European situation and the gravity of the impending conflict. The gist of his remarks was that he most earnestly desired to keep Turkey out of any war. In reply to my assurances that neither we nor Italy were contemplating aggression against Britain and France, and still less against the Balkan Powers or Turkey, but that in the circumstances it would be Britain and France who would open the attack, be it on us or on Italy, he said that he was fully convinced of the correctness of my statements. He knew that Britain and France would attack Germany as soon as war broke out in Poland, and he did not see how, in that case, Italy could remain neutral. However, if Italy were forced to enter the war, she would not be fighting for Germany's war aims but only for her own. That would result in Turkey's vital interests in the Mediterranean being affected. Consequently he had little hope that Turkey would be able to avoid fulfilling her obligations in this respect. In conclusion I begged him most earnestly at least to serve the interests of general peace and those of Turkey at the eleventh hour by using his influence for the final settlement of all problems resulting from Versailles. The Führer and the Reich would not tolerate a further postponement of the long delayed settlement. I also indicated to him that, in a general settlement, Turkey's position might be very greatly improved. It would be possible for us to relieve her of any anxiety regarding an attack by Italy. The President assured me that he would make every effort towards influencing London.

I had another appeal made today to the leading figures of the Turkish press to bring the weight of Turkish public opinion into play in favour of a final and comprehensive settlement of all outstanding problems.

As regards the Turkish press, I have already telegraphed⁴ that its attitude reflects the uncertainty of the Turkish Government. So far no semi-official organ has stated that Turkey will actively support the Western Powers. They are looking for a way out and hope to find one.

To give visible expression to the confident mood of the Germans, I assembled the whole German colony here yesterday for a social gathering. Over 800 of them had accepted the invitation. As the Turkish press had already stated beforehand that no one would accept this invitation in view of the crisis, it made an excellent impression that, in contrast to the departure, almost flight, of all other foreigners,

⁴ In telegram No. 248 of Aug. 28 (not printed, 96/107957).

the German Reich nationals are obviously inspired with a strong and unshakable confidence in the future.

The new Turkish Ambassador to Berlin⁵ called on me yesterday. On the lines of the above remarks I asked him to take as active a part as possible in the present developments; he then saw the President and told me today that his statements in this respect had been satisfactory. I asked him today to use his influence in Government circles as well, with a view to obtaining the greatest measure of support for the Führer's proposals for a solution.

For the rest, all measures have been taken here too in case of war. I assume that we will have sufficient time to evacuate at least the women and children and some of the Reich nationals by steamer via Bulgaria, if this proves necessary.

PAPEN

⁵ R. Husrev Gerede.

No. 394

583/242161-62

Memorandum by the State Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL
St.S. No. 650

BERLIN, August 28, 1939.

The Italian Ambassador handed to me yesterday evening the attached memorandum concerning regular supplies of coal to Italy. The Foreign Minister has instructed me to see that this Italian request is complied with despite the mobilization measures, and I request, therefore, that appropriate action with the competent home departments be taken at once and vigorously.

Herewith to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

ITALIAN EMBASSY,
BERLIN, August 27, 1939, XVII.

MEMORANDUM

The Office of the Italian Ministry of Transport in Essen telegraphs that as from today all railway waggons remain at the disposal of the German military authorities and that ship sailings have been cancelled.

As it is of the greatest urgency that the consignments of coal to Italy be despatched overland without delay, in the quantities provided for, it is requested that an adequate number of railway waggons be made available at once for this purpose.

No. 395

52/35251

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 651

BERLIN, August 28, 1939.

The Italian Ambassador called on me yesterday evening in connection with other matters¹ and then brought up the following:

He wished to tell me of his own accord that the Duce still had in mind a plan for solving the present crisis. But since, as was known, we had not accepted two of his suggestions (the plan for a conference, and the communiqué handed over by Ciano at Salzburg),² the Duce was reluctant to put forward a new concrete suggestion. If, however, the Führer agreed, he would doubtless be ready to put forward a new scheme.

Attolico described this scheme roughly as follows:

There must first be recognition of Germany's rights to Danzig, and then a conference could be called, at which there could be discussions on the questions still to be settled between Germany and Poland, the questions pending between Italy and France, as well as the colonial problem, and the problem of raw materials and the limitation of armaments. He suggested as an alternative that the purely political issues between Germany and Poland, and between Italy and France, should not be put on the agenda of the conference but settled outside the conference proceedings though simultaneously. Finally Attolico again mentioned the possibility of initiating direct German-Polish negotiations, which the Duce would also be prepared to support.

I informed the Reich Foreign Minister of these statements of Attolico's that same evening. For the present, however, no answer will be given to the Ambassador.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 394.

² See Editors' Note, p. 35, and documents Nos. 43 and 47.

No. 396

247/163899-900

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 652

BERLIN, August 28, 1939.

In accordance with instructions, I requested the Danish Minister to call on me this morning and spoke to him in the following terms:

It would not have escaped M. Zahle's notice that during the last few days we had carried out certain *démarches* in the Netherlands,¹

¹ See document No. 313.

Belgium,² Luxembourg³ and Switzerland⁴ with the object of strengthening and consolidating the neutral position of these countries in the event of war. These four countries had been chosen in view of possible intentions on the part of France to infringe their neutrality. Denmark did not come under this heading, but it was, however, conceivable that Great Britain, and in particular the British air force, might abuse Danish neutrality. In consequence the German Government considered it advisable to give the Danish Government renewed confirmation of our political attitude towards Denmark, as finally defined in the Non-Aggression Treaty of May last.⁵ Naturally we expected, at the very least, absolute neutrality on the part of Denmark. This also meant that Denmark must not tolerate any infractions of her neutrality at the hands of a third party but must oppose these, if they occurred, with all the resources available to her. If, contrary to expectations, the Danish attitude should be other than this, we should be compelled to protect our interests in such a manner as the situation then existing might dictate.

Knowing the views of his Government, M. Zahle confirmed of his own accord my summing-up of the situation and is in full agreement with it. The Minister will inform his Government as quickly as possible of the substance of our conversation. I left it entirely to his discretion whether to do this by telephone. The Minister's enquiry as to whether the other Scandinavian countries were to receive a similar communication I described as an open question and not of a pressing nature in view of the substantially different geographical situation of these countries.

I concluded by saying that our Minister in Copenhagen would of course be immediately informed of this conversation. We had permitted ourselves in the present instance to make use of the services of the Danish Minister in Berlin because only a few months ago M. Zahle had taken so active a part in consolidating our political relations.⁶

WEIZSÄCKER

² See document No. 315.

³ See document No. 321.

⁴ See document No. 304.

⁵ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 461.

⁶ Typewritten marginal note: "Under State Secretary: Please acquaint Minister von Renthe-Fink with the facts as soon as possible—preferably perhaps by telephone." In a memorandum of even date (247/163904) Woermann recorded that he had done so.

No. 397

247/163905

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI

BERLIN, August 28, 1939.

e.o. Pol. VI 1981.

Minister von Renthe-Fink, Copenhagen, telephoned this afternoon to say that on the occasion of a visit to the Foreign Minister, already

arranged a few days ago, he had had the opportunity to hold language in accordance with the State Secretary's statement to the Danish Minister today.¹ He would report by telegram on the conversation with M. Munch.² Minister Mohr³ had asked him if publication of the *démarche* in the press was intended. M. Mohr intended, if asked by journalists, to inform the Danish press in an unsensational way, if we agree.

As instructed, I briefly told Herr von Renthe-Fink by telephone that we agreed to this procedure, and that after publication in the Danish press a short report would also appear in the German press.

In accordance with a telephone call from Counsellor Siegfried, I then telephoned the Danish Minister Zahle. He asked the same question on behalf of Minister Mohr, and I gave the same reply, saying that I had also informed Herr von Renthe-Fink to that effect.

GRUNDHERR

¹ See document No. 396.

² See document No. 407.

³ Secretary General in the Danish Foreign Ministry.

No. 398

2134/467421

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 654

BERLIN, August 28, 1939.

The Italian Ambassador asked me today by telephone if I could give him the text of the Führer's communication to Chamberlain. I told Attolico that, as far as I knew, only a verbal discussion had taken place between the Führer and Henderson. I knew of no letter from the Führer to Chamberlain. Attolico said he was satisfied with this.¹

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, Nos. 371 and 375.

No. 399

96/107958

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 656

BERLIN, August 28, 1939.

The Italian Ambassador asked me today about the results of Herr von Papen's political conversations during the last few days. I told Attolico that our impression concerning Turkey's political attitude in the event of a conflict in the Mediterranean was not favourable. We were, however, not putting any economic pressure on Turkey at present, but were endeavouring to keep open her return to the path of virtue.¹

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 385.

No. 400

174/136084

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 657.

BERLIN, August 28, 1939.

In reply to a question by the Italian Ambassador today, I told him that we were not at the present moment considering a declaration of sympathy by the German Army to the Japanese Army.¹

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See also document No. 367 and *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 386.

No. 401

850/202087-88

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

SECRET

BERLIN, August 28, 1939.

Counsellor of Legation Hofmann telephoned from Bratislava at 11:45 p.m. on August 27 and told me that Minister Bernard, in the presence of General Barckhausen, had handed to the Slovak Government the Note as instructed in despatch Pol. I [*sic* IV] 968 Top Secret.¹ In accordance with this Note, Slovakia voluntarily makes her territory available for the deployment of German troops. The authority to exercise executive power remains formally in the hands of Slovakia; the Slovak authorities remain in office, but have instructions to comply with all requirements of the German military authorities. A number of further separate provisions are also being made. After deliberating for an hour and a half, the Slovak Cabinet had agreed to the German requests, making only a reservation with regard to b), which states that in certain special circumstances persons not of German nationality may also be summoned before German military courts for offences against the German Wehrmacht, etc.

The Slovak reservation is to the effect that the Slovak Government claim similar rights if Slovak troops are ever used in the same circumstances in Reich territory.

The Slovak Government intend to communicate this reservation, together with their acceptance of the other German demands, to the German Legation on the morning of August 28.

Minister Bernard asked for authority to acknowledge receipt of this Slovak Note, which would mean accepting the reservation. General Barckhausen signified his agreement on behalf of AOK 14.

I gave authority for the Legation to proceed accordingly. In actual fact the reservation has little or no significance; the Slovak

¹ Document No. 165, enclosure 2. See also document No. 362.

Government have, moreover, been given an assurance that Slovak troops will not be used outside Slovakia.²

WOERMANN

² See document No. 214.

No. 402

52/35273-75

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, August 28, 1939.

In order to safeguard our imports from neutral countries in the event of war, it appears necessary that certain neutral Governments should, from the start, be left in no doubt as to our expectations in this respect. Therefore; immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, it is proposed to send two plenipotentiary representatives to the respective capitals—Ambassador von Hassell¹ to Copenhagen, Stockholm, Oslo and Helsinki,² and Ambassador Ritter to The Hague, Brussels and Luxembourg—in order to state our views to the Heads of the Governments there. This intention is to be conveyed forthwith to the Governments there through our Legations, in order to counter in good time enemy, particularly British, influence.

Similar steps regarding other countries have been postponed for the moment, either because of existing agreements which already envisage negotiations in the event of war (Switzerland),³ or because the countries in question would, if war broke out, be almost entirely dependent on Germany in the matter of exports (Baltic States), or because they have so far shown no signs of any intentions inconsistent with neutrality (South Eastern States).

The instructions for the journey of the two Ambassadors are enclosed, drawn up according to the suggestions of Ambassador Ritter.

Submitted to the Reich Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request for approval.

WIEHL

[Enclosure]

A. General

1. The object of the visit is to give assurances on behalf of the Reich Government to the Government of X that the Government of the Reich earnestly desire, during the critical time to come, to maintain economic relations between the two countries on as full a scale as possible and to regulate them in a spirit of friendship.

¹ Ulrich von Hassell, Ambassador in Italy, 1932–Feb. 4, 1938.

² Typewritten marginal note: "The advisability of taking the same action with Finland as well is doubtful and is still under consideration."

³ By an exchange of Notes on June 28, 1939; see vol. v of this Series, document No. 528 and footnote 3 thereto.

2. The Government of the Reich consider that the only possible basis for this is that the imports of State X from, and its exports to, the States involved in the conflict should be maintained at the same proportionate level as for the recent period.

During the World War of 1914-18, this basic principle was not observed by all the countries who were at that time neutral. The Reich Government, therefore, deem it necessary to bring their views on this subject immediately to the knowledge of Government X. Should Government X, by their own measures, disturb this basic principle to Germany's disadvantage, or should they even submit to unilateral controls of their foreign trade which would injure Germany, that would then create a situation inconsistent with economic neutrality and one which would immediately evoke serious reactions on the part of Germany.

3. This declaration implies that Germany likewise will maintain on an equal basis deliveries of German goods which are important to State X.

4. The present conversations are confined to this general declaration of principle. Their purpose is not the conclusion of separate agreements at the present moment. Existing agreements remain in force. Should adjustments to the new situation become necessary, these may only be effected through the usual channels by means of bilateral agreements.

B. *Special Points*

1. In Copenhagen, reference should be made to the provisions of the Protocol of Signature to the German-Danish Non-Aggression Pact of May 31, 1939,⁴ in which it is laid down that a continuation of *normal* exchange and transit of goods between Denmark and a Power at war with Germany would accord with the generally accepted laws of neutrality. The same must of course apply to a continuation of such traffic with Germany.

2. In Stockholm reference should be made to the declaration which the Swedish Minister here made in the name of his Government to the Foreign Ministry on April 21, 1939, namely "that Sweden, who has repeatedly expressed her determination to preserve neutrality in the event of war, will also conduct her foreign trade policy during the period of hostilities in a manner appropriate to that end".⁵

3. It should be pointed out in Oslo, with reference to the measures announced by the Norwegian trade unions,⁶ that neutrality includes an obligation on the part of the Government to suppress such a non-neutral attitude on the part of the population.

⁴ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 461.

⁵ See *ibid.*, document No. 242.

⁶ See document No. 268.

4. In Helsinki, reference should be made to the statement by the Finnish Foreign Minister on April 19,⁷ which contradicts the above principles by saying that neutral countries might be forced to cease their exports and to retire into isolation.

5. In Luxembourg, the declaration by our Minister should be repeated, if still necessary, namely that we should consider the suspension of iron and steel production in the event of war, as announced by the Luxembourg Minister of State, as a measure directed unilaterally against German interests, and one difficult to reconcile with Luxembourg neutrality.⁸

⁷ No statement of this kind on this date has been traced.

⁸ Radowitz had transmitted this statement by Minister of State Dupong in report Pol. 2, No. 1 g. of Aug. 14 (8505/E597273). For the instructions to the German Minister to make the declaration, see document No. 542.

No. 403

174/136088

Note by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop

BERLIN, August 28, 1939.

For State Secretary Weizsäcker.

Ambassador Oshima told me the following about the personality of the new Japanese Minister President:

General Abe is 64 years old and has a brilliant military career behind him. He is an artillery officer and served with Oshima on the General Staff. Mr. Abe was formerly attached for a considerable time to a German artillery regiment in Toruń as a captain and was also Military Attaché in Berlin.

Oshima is a personal friend of General Abe and considers him a far better Minister President than Baron Hiranuma, the former Minister President. The Ambassador is to make enquiries about the other members of the Cabinet so far named, Isogai, the War Minister,¹ and Yoshida, the Minister of Marine, and will then send me information.

Oshima also told me that in his opinion the Japanese press was gradually returning to reason and he asked that press articles should not be taken too seriously. He was continuing to do all in his power to maintain and improve German-Japanese relations.

STAHMER

¹ The War Minister eventually appointed was General Hata.

No. 404

43/29620-23

Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop

BERLIN, August 28, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

On Monday afternoon the Belgian Embassy regarded the prospects of peace as hopeless. Both the Ambassador¹ and the Counsellor of Embassy² said in a conversation with a Belgian correspondent that the publication of the exchange of letters between the Führer and Daladier³ had made the situation sufficiently clear. The exchange of letters must indeed make a tremendous impression throughout the whole world, as it is almost without precedent for two statesmen, who are about to wage war on each other, to exchange ideas on so lofty a plane. The Belgian Ambassador regards both letters as classic avowals of the national outlook and is convinced that they will not be published in France.⁴ For he admits that Hitler's letter depicts in masterly fashion the mentality of the average Frenchman and that therefore the French Government will not see its way to publishing Hitler's letter for psychological reasons.

Coulondre, the French Ambassador, confidentially informed a few foreign diplomats in Berlin (including the Belgian Ambassador) about his last interview with the Führer.⁵ It had been an extremely grave discussion, conducted by both sides with the greatest frankness. During the conversation Coulondre could not but be convinced of Hitler's absolute determination to solve the German-Polish question now on the basis of his correspondence with Daladier. The Führer had admitted in this conversation that, in the event of intervention by the Western Powers, a frightful conflict would flare up in Europe. The Führer himself had painted a thoroughly pessimistic picture of the effects of a great European war, and had even hinted at the possibility that Trotsky might be the victor. The Führer had not mentioned Russia. Coulondre assured them that he had naturally conveyed his personal impression to Paris, as well as his impression of the conversation with the Führer. He showed no hope that this could still influence the attitude in Paris.

The diplomatic *démarche* by the Reich⁶ made an extremely favourable impression in Belgium and had been received by the whole Belgian nation with a feeling of great relief. This move on Germany's

¹ Vicomte Davignon.

² Vicomte Berryer.

³ See documents Nos. 366 and 369.

⁴ Marginal note: "But they have been!"

⁵ See Editors' Note, p. 284.

⁶ See document No. 315.

part had been very astute as it had completely consolidated the Belgian people's determination to maintain unconditional neutrality. There had already been one very welcome result of the step, namely that on Monday morning the British Ambassador in Brussels⁷ had found himself obliged to give similar assurances about respecting the integrity of Belgian territory. The French Ambassador in Brussels would take similar steps there either this morning or this afternoon. The result of Germany's welcome *démarche* had thus been the reaffirmation of the solemn guarantee of Belgian neutrality by all the Powers in question.

The Belgian Embassy, in conformity with the other members of the Diplomatic Corps, is today convinced that Italy will not at first participate in the war. In the opinion of the Belgian Ambassador this is a certainty. Nevertheless British and French Government circles are not sure that, should Germany make an impressive start in the event of war, Italy would not after all range herself sooner or later at the side of the German Reich. It is felt, however, that for the time being, Berlin would probably be able to count only on benevolent neutrality on the part of Italy.

In the view of leading members of the Belgian Embassy there are grave doubts in the Western European capitals about Russia's attitude. There is a conviction that Russia is lost to the Western Powers and to Poland as a matter of course. It is even feared that the German-Russian Agreement is already so far advanced that a military attack on Poland by Russian forces may be expected.

The Belgian Embassy as well as other diplomatic circles see a last hope of peace in London's delay in coming to a decision. There is an impression that the final decision is obviously an extremely difficult one for Chamberlain. People are therefore evidently still clinging to the hope that Sir Nevile Henderson will bring something with him which would afford the possibility of final negotiations. On the whole, however, the hopes for peace in foreign diplomatic and journalistic circles had on Monday sunk to zero, and the conviction, also shared by the Belgian Ambassador, was expressed that a long war must be expected. The members of the Diplomatic Corps in Berlin—at least those who do not belong to hostile Powers—have nearly all sent their families home in the last few days. Also, during the week-end, as a result of the increasing tension, numerous Missions have already removed important documents.

L[IKUS]

⁷ See document No. 379.

No. 405

823/279417

Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop

BERLIN, August 28, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

A correspondent [*Mitarbeiter*] reports from London:

Considering the obligations which they have undertaken, the British feel that they cannot avoid declaring war in the event of an attack on Poland, but they still manage to believe that it will be conducted on such a moderate scale that there would be no question of a life and death struggle between the Great Powers. It may be thought that this is merely wishful thinking which would soon vanish in the course of hostilities. At all events the "qualitatively limited war" is at present engaging the minds of quite a number of knowledgeable people and the idea seems to have a certain attraction for various Ministers. Even such a convinced "supporter of Munich" as Sir Samuel Hoare¹ is reported to have made the following statement immediately before the Cabinet meeting: "Although we cannot in the circumstances avoid declaring war, we can always fulfil the letter of a declaration of war without immediately going all out".

If it comes to war, the seat of the British Government will be transferred mainly to Oxford. The supply Ministries are to be transferred to Lancashire. I mention this because I recently heard in a neutral country the ridiculous report that the Government would go to Canada and leave the British Isles to the German bombers—right up to Scotland, if not further.

L[IKUS]

¹ Secretary of State for Home Affairs.

No. 406

8342/E590163-64

Ambassador Papen to the Turkish Foreign Minister

TARABYA, August 28, 1939.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE:¹ Following our conversation of August 24,² and in accordance with the suggestion I have submitted to my Government in agreement with Your Excellency, I have the honour to inform you of the following on instructions from my Government:

1. The Reich Government and the Government of the Turkish Republic agree to extend provisionally for one month—that is to September 30, 1939, inclusive—the Clearing, Trade and Payments

¹ Translated from the French.

² See document No. 247.

Agreements concluded between Germany and Turkey on July 25, 1938,³ and due to expire on the 31st of this month.

2. It is understood that the questions arising out of contracts previously concluded between the Government of the Turkish Republic and German industry concerning the delivery of war material will remain in suspense during that same period.

I should be obliged if Your Excellency would confirm to me that your Government agree to the terms of this letter.⁴

I avail, etc.,

P[APEN]

³ See document No. 80, with footnote 4 thereto, and vol. VI of this Series, document No. 454.

⁴ In telegram No. 288 of September 12 (not printed, 8342/E590159), Papen reported that Turkey had declined the extension on the grounds that she adhered to the principle of the integral fulfilment of contracts. See also vol. VIII of this Series, document No. 391.

No. 407

247/163908-09

The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 80 of August 28 COPENHAGEN, August 29, 1939—12:41 a.m.
Received August 29—2:25 a.m.

With reference to today's telephone conversation with Under State Secretary Woermann.¹

The Danish Foreign Minister, to whom I repeated the substance of today's statement by the State Secretary to the Danish Minister, thanked me for confirming our political attitude towards Denmark, recently expressed in the Non-Aggression Pact,² and asked me to inform the German Government that the Danish Government would adhere strictly to all obligations of neutrality and would maintain absolute neutrality. Munch added that he did not think that there would be any violation of Danish neutrality by Britain; in any case Denmark would of course not tolerate such violation and would do everything in her power to prevent it. The exercise of neutrality towards Germany would be benevolent and friendly.

In later conversation, Munch said that, in practice, it was difficult effectively to prevent aircraft from flying over Denmark at a great altitude, if the British actually tried to do so. He subsequently asked that this reflection should not be understood as a reservation, it had only been made conversationally. He mentioned that it was intended to leave the British Government in no doubt that flying over Danish territory could not be permitted. He also remarked that any British bomber squadrons arriving in Poland could also be flown there from

¹ See document No. 396 and footnote 6 thereto.

² See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 461.

Scotland over Sweden or direct over Germany. I replied that I thought this improbable.

I made a special point of drawing the Foreign Minister's attention to the fact that in these critical days the opinions and attitude displayed here, particularly by the press, would be of considerable importance for Danish-German relations.

RENTHE-FINK

No. 408

141/127261

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BRUSSELS, August 29, 1939—12:45 a.m.

No. 104 of August 28

Received August 29—3:05 a.m.

Minister President Pierlot invited me late this evening to call on him and spoke as follows: The King of the Belgians and the Queen of the Netherlands had charged him to offer to the Governments of Germany, Italy, Britain, France and Poland, their good offices in the present crisis, should it be desired to make use of them.¹

I received this communication without comment and promised to forward it immediately.

The Minister President went on to say that the Netherlands Minister President would make a similar communication to those Heads of Missions at The Hague who were concerned.²

BÜLOW

¹ For these communications to the Italian, British, French and Polish representatives in Brussels. See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 396, *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 441, the *French Yellow Book*, No. 284, and the *Polish White Book*, No. 101.

² See also document No. 390.

No. 409

7985/E575289

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 374 of August 29

TOKYO, August 29, 1939—1:50 a.m.

Received August 29—9:20 a.m.

P. 10761

In the last few days, the Berlin representative of Domei,¹ Ejiri, has sent a number of unfavourable reports on the morale and the situation in Germany. I recommend a sharp warning. I shall make representations myself at the Domei head office. I should advise against

¹ The Japanese news agency.

his expulsion, as this would lead to reprisals and would be exploited against us.²

OTT

² Marginal note: "Mr. Ejiri (Domei, Berlin) was sharply reprimanded by the head of the East Asian section as well as by Minister Braun v. Stumm for the tenor of the Domei reports from Berlin. It was emphasized that to offend Germany was in no way in the interests of Japanese foreign policy. Ejiri promised an improvement. U[rach] 30/8." A second copy of this telegram (7985/E575290) which was submitted to the Foreign Minister, bears marginal notes indicating that this action was taken on his instructions. The Embassy in Tokyo was informed of the action taken in telegram No. 293 of Sept. 1 (7985/E575291), which stated that the possibility of expulsion in the event of a further lapse had been mentioned.

No. 410

115/117603-05

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Lithuania

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, August 29, 1939—3:45 a.m.

No. 114

e.o. Pol. II . . . g. Rs.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counsellor Rintelen.

In view of the sharp deterioration in the whole political situation resulting from Poland's behaviour, it appears necessary that you should at once make to the Government to which you are accredited, the following statement which clarifies the attitude that we shall observe towards Lithuania, and that which we, on our side, expect from Lithuania, should it ultimately prove impossible to avoid hostilities.

We are determined to abide unconditionally by our assurance under the German-Lithuanian Treaty on Memel of March 22 last,¹ by which we shall in no circumstances resort to force against Lithuania. We naturally expect in return that in any conflict Lithuania will observe a completely unimpeachable neutrality towards us. This would, in particular, include Lithuania refusing to tolerate any possible infringement of her neutrality by a third party, but, should such occur, resisting it with all means at her disposal. Should, contrary to our expectations, Lithuania's attitude, in the event of such an infringement of her neutrality by a third Power, be other, or should Lithuania, in such an eventuality, find herself so placed as to be unable to maintain her neutrality, then we should naturally be obliged to safeguard our interests in such a way as the resulting situation required.

You should make this declaration in a clear but markedly friendly form. In so doing you should state that we were aware that, particularly in Lithuania, we would meet with the utmost understanding for the way we are placed in the German-Polish conflict. Just as we, by the imposed Peace Dictate of Versailles, have had the purely

¹ Printed in vol. v of this Series, document No. 405, footnote 2.

German city of Danzig and the Corridor torn from us, so too the Lithuanian people have been cheated out of the realization of their aspirations to Vilna, stolen by a Polish *coup*, through the attitude adopted towards Lithuania by Poland and the League of Nations in this question.² Now that, thanks to the recently concluded German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact, the way is open to a fundamental change in the general political situation in Eastern Europe, we attach importance to expressing the hope that, within the framework of this new situation, German-Lithuanian relations will be allowed to continue to develop along friendly lines.

As to what concerns certain difficulties in the present situation which Lithuania may experience in connection with German security measures on the German-Lithuanian frontier, we will endeavour, in applying these measures, to take Lithuanian requirements into account as fully as possible, particularly in respect of traffic through the port of Memel. Please report by telegram on action taken.³

RIBBENTROP

² Vilna was occupied by Poland in 1920 and incorporated in the Polish State in 1922.

³ See document No. 419.

No. 411

F17/398-401

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, August 29, 1939.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND ATTOLICO, THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, ON AUGUST 29, 1939¹

The Reich Foreign Minister informed the Italian Ambassador that during a conversation with the Führer, the British Ambassador had expressed the hope that even now a settlement of the Polish question by peaceful means might be possible, and that, following on this, the way might be opened for an improvement in German-British relations. The Führer had taken up this idea and had also expressed his own desire for better German-British relations. He laid down the following conditions for this:

1. The obligations to Italy, which Germany had undertaken, must remain as unaffected by the new German-British understanding as those between France and Britain. Henderson agreed with this.

2. In the same way, German-Russian relations must not be affected by the German-British understanding. Germany had taken the irrevocable decision never again to enter into a conflict with Russia.

3. Germany's colonial aspirations must be fulfilled, and

¹ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 408, according to which the conversation took place at 12:30 p.m.

4. The Führer had announced that the Polish problem would be settled in one way or another. The Führer had gone on to say that he did not know how this settlement could be achieved by peaceful means, nor did he believe a peaceful settlement possible. Such was, in essence, the message which the Führer gave Henderson verbally. No official written document was handed over. Henderson had only been given a minute written by Minister Schmidt² on the conversation with the Führer.

Henderson had returned yesterday bringing an *aide-mémoire*,³ in which the British declared that they too were aiming at a better understanding between Germany and Britain and hoped for a peaceful solution of the Polish problem. They offered their services as mediators in initiating direct conversations between Germany and Poland. This document, which Henderson handed over, was at the moment being examined and, with as short a delay as possible, a reply would be given to him today or tomorrow.

The Foreign Minister pointed out that the entire German Army had received marching orders and that, therefore, certain rumours in Rome as to a relaxation of tension in the situation were incorrect.⁴ He had already emphasized this on another occasion in order to ensure that the Duce and Count Ciano did not receive erroneous information and that they should remain completely aware of the seriousness of the situation. Strategic concentration was proceeding day and night both in the East and in the West of Germany. The tension was worse than it had ever been. He could say nothing further at the moment as to the prospects opened up by the document which Henderson had handed over. Everything depended on the results of its study now taking place.

The Foreign Minister then quoted a few passages from the minute given to Henderson on the conversation with the Führer. The Führer had declared that the provocative acts of the Poles were intolerable and that the Polish Government had no longer any control over their subordinate bodies. He had mentioned twenty-one frontier incidents and had emphasized his determination to put an end to the Macedonian state of affairs on Germany's Eastern frontier, not merely for the sake of quiet and order but also to serve the interests of peace in Europe. It was emphasized that the agreement with Russia was conclusive. A war on two fronts was thereby excluded and, moreover, in a protracted war, Germany need no longer be afraid of supply difficulties. The Führer had added that Germany had no intention of making war on Great Britain but was prepared for such a struggle if Great Britain should begin it.

² See document No. 265.

³ See document No. 384, enclosure.

⁴ See document No. 357.

Attolico observed that what he chiefly desired to know was the German reaction to the British reply.

The Foreign Minister answered that he would inform the Italian Ambassador directly the study of the document had been concluded.

When Attolico asked whether the spirit of the British document was friendly, the Foreign Minister replied that the British desire to discover some way out was discernible in the document. The British wished to establish direct contact between Germany and Poland and considered that the Poles should come to Berlin. He (the Foreign Minister) was only wondering whether a Polish Government existed which was really capable of negotiating.

Attolico said in reply that, in his opinion, the Poles had learnt a thing or two in the last few hours.

The Foreign Minister emphasized the conviction in Germany that Germany was not merely bluffing. Troop trains were moving towards the fronts and 5,000,000 men were under arms. He then referred once more to the British document and pointed out that British mediation for the purpose of bringing about direct German-Polish negotiations was the only concrete thing which the document contained in addition to its numerous general observations. The British wished to exert their influence on the Poles with this object and, in conjunction with it, were prepared for an understanding.

Attolico mentioned that Mussolini had had in mind one other particular proposal but had not yet ventured to put it forward, in view of the earlier suggestions which he had made to the German Government.⁵ It was not in itself a proposal for a conference. The conference would only come into being at the second stage and must be preceded by concrete concessions on Germany's rightful claims.

The Foreign Minister replied that matters had already gone too far for suggestions of this kind. The armies were moving up towards the fronts and Germany was now busily engaged with the British suggestion for direct contact. In this connection he must emphasize the Führer's determination to settle the question in one way or another in the shortest time.

Attolico further added that he thought he could assume from various signs, including a conversation with Orsenigo,⁶ that the Poles now had a better comprehension of the situation than a few days ago.

Submitted, according to instructions, to the Foreign Minister.⁷

DR. SCHMIDT
Minister

⁵ See also document No. 395.

⁶ Papal Nuncio in Berlin.

⁷ In telegram No. 418 (not printed, 100/64805-06), sent at 9:53 p.m. on Aug. 29, Weizsäcker sent Mackensen a summary of this conversation with the request that Ciano be informed at once.

No. 412

26/17024

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 98 of August 29

OSLO, August 29, 1939.

Received August 29—1:40 p.m.

Pol. VI 1993.

1. The conference of the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers arranged for today has been cancelled.¹

2. The sale of Norwegian ships and shipping shares abroad has been banned.

3. The rate of exchange of the Norwegian crown against the pound sterling is being maintained for the present.

4. The Norwegian armed forces have been mobilized at vulnerable points.

SAHM

¹ A communiqué issued in Oslo on Aug. 31 stated that the Foreign Ministers of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden had met on Aug. 30 and 31 in Oslo.

No. 413

103/111553

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, August 29, 1939—2:17 p.m.

SECRET

Received August 29—3 p.m.

No. 231 of August 29

With reference to my telegram No. 230 of August 28¹ and to my telephone conversation with the Foreign Minister.²

All Military Attachés accredited here are firmly convinced that large numbers of troops have long been concentrated on the Soviet Western frontier and are permanently kept up to full war strength. The state of mind prevailing here renders it quite improbable, as a matter of course, that the Soviet Government would reduce the number of troops on the Western frontier at present. Lieut. General Köstring shares this view. It was expressly confirmed to him today by members of the Red Army that special measures were not required on the Soviet Western frontier, as a state of complete readiness had always existed there.³ It will be very difficult to obtain further details of these matters because of the usual reserve and secretiveness here.

When I call on Molotov today, I shall do my best to see that your wishes are given consideration.⁴

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 383.

² See document No. 387.

³ See also document No. 414.

⁴ See document No. 424.

No. 414

103/111554

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 232 of August 29

Moscow, August 29, 1939—2:18 p.m.

Received August 29—3 p.m.

For the State Secretary.

For the High Command of the Army, Attaché Group.

With reference to the enquiry by Mellenthin,¹ the Red Army gave this information: No special measures had been taken by Russia on the Polish frontier, nor were any necessary, as a state of readiness had always existed there.

KÖSTRING
SCHULENBURG

¹ Lt. Col. von Mellenthin, of the General Staff of the Army, Head of the Attaché Group.

No. 415

52/35302

The Chargé d'Affaires in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 198 of August 29

WARSAW, August 29, 1939—2:46 p.m.

Received August 29—5:30 p.m.

The report of German military measures in Slovakia has so far not been given great prominence in the Polish press nor been utilized for creating greater agitation. Only short telegrams on the subject were published, without comment, with headings describing the appeal by Tiso, the Slovak Minister President, as "Betrayal of the Slovak people by their own Government".¹ Also the substance of the Führer-Daladier exchange of letters² is only now reported, briefly and likewise without comment. *Gazeta Polska* publishes a report with the caption "Hitler rejects France's proposals". One gets the impression that the press, as has already been the case for the last week, is being kept in restraint by the Government and that in particular, probably in deference to Britain, propaganda for Poland's own aggressive course of action is not allowed. At the same time, however, the press describes the general situation as extremely grave and today speaks of the "decisive hour upon which we are entering".

¹ On Aug. 29 an official communiqué was issued by the Polish Telegraph Agency (P.A.T.) protesting against an announcement on the Slovak radio, after the arrival of German troops in Slovakia "in accordance with the German-Slovak agreement on protection", that danger was threatening from Poland. For the text of this communiqué see the *Polish White Book*, No. 97.

² See documents Nos. 324 and 354.

The mood of the population is serious but there are no signs of a decline in the determination to resist. The overwhelming majority are firmly convinced that war will break out.

WÜHLISCH

No. 416

129/120871

The Chargé d'Affaires in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 162 of August 29

LISBON, August 29, 1939—2:56 p.m.

Received August 29—6:00 p.m.

Also for DNB.

Havas, Lisbon, announces the following today:

"Authoritative circles give an assurance of Portugal's loyalty to the alliance with Britain. It is said in authoritative circles that respect for the pledged word is preferable to complacent neutrality."

DIETMAR

No. 417

100/64797

The Head of the Italian Government to the Führer and Chancellor¹

Transmitted by telephone in cipher to the Royal [Italian] Ambassador in Berlin at 4:40 p.m. on August 29, 1939, for immediate transmission to the Führer.

FÜHRER: Ambassador Attolico informs me that he has learned from von Ribbentrop² that you will today be studying the British Note,³ with which I am acquainted, and will be making your decisions. As a true friend of yourself and the German people I wish to tell you that in my opinion the British proposals contain the prerequisites and factors for reaching a solution favourable to Germany in all the problems which concern her. With this solution the rhythm of your splendid achievements will not be disturbed and you will add a fresh indisputable success to those you have already obtained. You are aware that at this difficult moment the guiding principles of my actions have been defined in agreement with you. Please regard my appeal therefore as another proof of my constant solidarity.⁴

MUSSOLINI

¹ Translated from the Italian (for which see *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 414). According to *D.D.I.*, *loc. cit.*, No. 418, Attolico delivered this letter at a personal interview with Hitler before 9 p.m. No record of this conversation, or German translation of the letter, has been found in the Foreign Ministry archives.

² See document No. 411.

³ See document No. 384, enclosure.

⁴ Marginal note: "Handed to me by Count Ciano today. M[ackensen] 30/8."

No. 418

F1/0226

*Unsigned Memorandum*ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE DUCE TO THE FÜHRER OF AUGUST 29, 1939
—THROUGH ATTOLICO

...¹ that every action which, in the Führer's view, Mussolini could undertake in the political or diplomatic sphere, would be carried out with great willingness by the Duce.

Whereas Italian relations with Paris were, as we knew, such that Italy neither could nor would take any action in Paris, Italy's relations with Britain, both official and personal, were very cordial and good. If Germany wanted Italy to take any action or to make any statement in London, the Duce was entirely at the Führer's disposal.

¹ These omission marks appear on the original; the message may have been delivered with the Duce's letter printed as document No. 417.

No. 419

2767/535960-61

The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 73 of August 29

KOVNO, August 29, 1939—5:52 p.m.

Received August 29—8:50 p.m.

Pol. II 3085.

With reference to your telegram No. 114 of August 29.¹

As instructed, I today told the . . . (group mutilated) Minister President and Foreign Minister Bizauskas [*sic*],² in very friendly but unequivocal terms that, in accordance with the Treaty of March 22, Germany would in no circumstances resort to force against Lithuania. Germany, however, expects Lithuania to observe absolutely unimpeachable neutrality which also means that she would resist with all available means any violation of her neutrality by a third party. If, contrary to expectations, Lithuania adopted a different attitude or was unable to maintain her neutrality, Germany would also safeguard her interests as the situation demanded. At the same time I stated Germany's reasons for expecting special understanding from Lithuania for her attitude in the present conflict.

Bizauskas expressed his satisfaction and his sincere thanks for the statement; he could only repeat, as the Lithuanian Government had often declared, that Lithuania would pursue a policy of strictest neutrality and would resist with all means in her power any violation

¹ Document No. 410.

² Kazys Bizauskas, Deputy Minister President.

of her neutrality by a third party. Lithuania was adopting this attitude in her own particular interests, for she fully realized the consequences which any other attitude would incur for the country. I urgently request [*sic*]. According to what Bizauskas said, although Poland had previously made a statement regarding respect for Lithuania's neutrality, she had so far not done so in the present crisis.

Bizauskas also expressed his thanks for Germany's intention to take Lithuanian wishes into consideration in any difficulties arising in Memel or on the German-Lithuanian frontier. However, no complaints on this subject have so far become known to him or to the Legation.

Bizauskas said that the German-Russian Treaty has been welcomed here as a valuable contribution to the pacification of Eastern Europe.

ZECHLIN

No. 420

1625/389216

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 95 of August 29

OSLO, August 29, 1939—6:35 p.m.

Received August 29—8:30 p.m.

Pol. II 3106.

It is reported in the evening press that the British Military Delegation, coming from Moscow, arrived in Bergen today.

The delegation will be taken on board the British cruiser *Scotland* in Bergen. At the same time as the British cruiser arrived the American coastguard cruiser *Bell* [*sic* ? *Campbell*] called at Bergen with orders to take on board American citizens in Norway.

The permission for both warships to enter the harbour is contrary to the attitude of the Foreign Ministry here, which I reported on September 19, 1938, in telegram 41/19,¹ that in the present world political situation the Norwegian Government did not welcome the entry of warships of foreign Powers into Norwegian harbours. We were asked at the time to cancel the visit of the cruiser *Emden* to Larvik [*sic* ? *Narvik*].

SAHM

¹ Not found.

No. 421

147/78841-50

*The Führer and Chancellor to the British Government*¹

August 29, 1939.

His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin has submitted to His Majesty's Government suggestions² which I felt bound to make in order:

(1) To give expression once more to the will of the Reich Government for sincere German-British understanding, cooperation and friendship;

(2) To leave no room for doubt as to the fact that such an understanding could not be bought at the price of a renunciation of vital German interests, let alone the abandonment of demands which are based as much upon common human justice as upon the national dignity and honour of our people.

The German Government have noted with satisfaction from the reply of His Majesty's Government,³ and from the oral explanations given by His Majesty's Ambassador, that His Majesty's Government for their part are also prepared to improve the relationship between Germany and England and to develop and extend it in the sense of the German suggestions.

In this connection, His Majesty's Government are similarly convinced that the removal of the German-Polish tension, which has become unbearable, is the prerequisite for the realization of this hope.

Since the autumn of the past year, and on the last occasion in March, 1939, there were submitted to the Polish Government proposals, both oral and written, which, having regard to the friendship then existing between Germany and Poland, offered the possibility of a solution of the questions in dispute, acceptable to both parties. His Majesty's Government are aware that the Polish Government saw fit, in March last, finally to reject these proposals. At the same time, they used this rejection as a pretext or an occasion for taking military measures which have since been continuously intensified. Already in the middle of last month, Poland was in effect in a state of mobilization. This was accompanied by numerous encroachments in the Free City of Danzig due to the instigation of the Polish authorities; threatening demands in the nature of ultimata, varying only in degree, were addressed to that City. A closing of the frontiers, at

¹ This memorandum was handed to Henderson by Hitler on Aug. 29 in the presence of Ribbentrop, the time being, according to Henderson's account of his interview with Hitler, 7:15 p.m. (see *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. vii, Nos. 490 and 493). No separate German record of this interview has been found, but see document No. 384 and footnote 1 thereto. See also document No. 470.

² See document No. 265.

³ See document No. 384, enclosure.

first in the form of a measure of customs policy but extended later to military and traffic and communications matters, was imposed with the object of bringing about the political exhaustion and economic destruction of this German community.

To this were added barbaric acts of maltreatment which cry to Heaven, and other kinds of persecution of the large German national group in Poland, which extended even to the killing of many Germans living there or to their forcible removal under the most cruel conditions. This state of affairs is unbearable for a Great Power. It has now forced Germany, after remaining a passive onlooker for many months, in her turn to take the necessary steps for the safeguarding of just German interests. And indeed the German Government can but assure the British Government in the most solemn manner that a condition of affairs has now been reached which can no longer be accepted or observed with indifference.

The demands of the German Government are in conformity with the revision of the Versailles Treaty, which from the beginning has been recognized as being necessary in regard to this territory: viz. the return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, and the safeguarding of the existence of the German national group in the territories remaining to Poland.

The German Government note with satisfaction that His Majesty's Government also are in principle convinced that some solution must be found for the situation which has arisen. They further feel justified in assuming that His Majesty's Government too can have no doubt that it is a question now of conditions, for the elimination of which there no longer remain days, still less weeks, but perhaps only hours. For in the disorganized state of affairs obtaining in Poland, the possibility of incidents supervening, which it might be impossible for Germany to tolerate, must at any moment be reckoned with.

While His Majesty's Government may still believe that these grave differences can be resolved by way of direct negotiations, the German Government unfortunately can no longer share this view as a matter of course. For they have made the attempt to embark upon such peaceful negotiations, but, instead of receiving support from the Polish Government, they were rebuffed by the sudden introduction of measures of a military character in the form of the development alluded to above.

His Majesty's Government attach importance to two considerations:

- (1) that the existing danger of a threatening explosion should be eliminated as quickly as possible by direct negotiation, and
- (2) that the existence of the Polish State, in the form in which it would then continue to exist, should be adequately safeguarded in the economic and political spheres by means of international guarantees.

On this subject the German Government make the following declaration:

Though sceptical as to the prospects of a successful outcome, they are nevertheless prepared to accept the British proposal and to enter into direct discussions. They do so, as has already been emphasized, solely as the result of the impression made upon them by the written statement received from His Majesty's Government that they too desire a pact of friendship in accordance with the general lines indicated to Ambassador Henderson. The German Government desire in this way to give His Majesty's Government and the British people a proof of the sincerity of Germany's intentions to enter into a lasting friendship with Great Britain.

The Government of the Reich feel, however, bound to point out to His Majesty's Government that in the event of a territorial rearrangement in Poland they would no longer be able to bind themselves to give guarantees or to participate in guarantees without the U.S.S.R. being associated therewith.

For the rest, in making these proposals the German Government have never had any intention of attacking Poland's vital interests or questioning the existence of an independent Polish State. The German Government, accordingly, in these circumstances agree to accept His Majesty's Government's offer of their good offices in securing the despatch to Berlin of a Polish emissary with full powers. They count on the arrival of this emissary on Wednesday, August 30, 1939.

The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place these at the disposal of His Majesty's Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator.

No. 422

52/35276-77; 83-85

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

I. There is agreement on the procedure, that is to say:

- a) first, solution of the German-Polish problem,
- b) then discussion of the more general questions between the Great Powers.

II. Incidents and maltreatment must cease at once. For this it is advisable to establish immediately international control in Polish territory.

¹ Heading in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Drafts and notes [*Skizzen*] relating to the British Memorandum of 28/viii 39." [Enclosure to document No. 384]. Filed with the memorandum above are three documents of which the last is reprinted as an enclosure here. The first two are entitled respectively: "Scheme for a bi-lateral contractual regulation of the rights of the German national group in Poland and the Polish national group in Germany" (52/35278-79), and "Scheme for a statute for the protection of the German national group in Poland" (52/35280-82).

The German press will quieten down as soon as an end has been put to these abuses.

III. a) Agreeable to direct German-Polish negotiations.

b) This not to prejudice Poland's independence. The imperative interests of Poland in this connection will be respected.

c) Imperative German interests would have to be respected in the same way, otherwise there is no object in the negotiations.

d) On these conditions I am prepared to receive a Polish negotiator vested with plenary powers.

e) There are no objections to an international guarantee (for example, an Anglo-Russian one) of the result reached.

IV. Agreeable to more general negotiations with Britain after solution of the German-Polish problem. The agenda should be prepared through diplomatic channels. (Small circle, at first Great Powers only; drawing up agenda. What are the additions indicated by the British Government? The problem of armaments limitation is also regarded by Germany as an important item on the programme.)

[Enclosure]

Notes for a reply to Britain

(1) The German Government are prepared to receive in Berlin representatives of the Polish Government vested with plenary powers for negotiating on German-Polish matters in dispute.

(2) If, in view of the present situation, the negotiations are still to meet with success, they must begin on August 30 and be concluded within the shortest period.

(3) The Polish Government must at once take effective measures in order to put an end to all incidents and excesses on their territory. As soon as this has been done, the German press will quieten down of its own accord.

(4) The negotiations must be conducted on the basis that not only the essential interests of Poland shall be considered, but also the essential interests of Germany.

(5) The German Government regard the following settlement as the minimum for safeguarding the essential interests of Germany:

(a) The territory of the Free City of Danzig to be unreservedly reincorporated in the German Reich.

(b) Poland to be assured, in accordance with her economic needs, the use of communications and means of transport on Danzig territory, *inter alia* the provision of a free port.

(c) Communication between East Prussia and the rest of the Reich to be re-established by reincorporating into the German Reich the territory of the Corridor bounded on the South by a line running

about 20 kilometres south of the River Netze and the towns of Bromberg, Toruń and Strasburg, but the territory of the town of Gdynia to remain under Polish sovereignty.

(d) Poland to receive extra-territorial railway and motor road communications through the Corridor to Danzig and Gdynia.

(e) In order to remove the difficulties which arise from different national groups living side by side, the inhabitants of the Corridor belonging to the Polish national group shall, under international control, be exchanged for a corresponding number of *Volksdeutsche* living in Poland.

When handing over the above paper, the British Ambassador should also be told orally:

(1) that, in the view of the German Government, the question of a guarantee mentioned in the British Memorandum is settled by the treaties already concluded by Britain and France with Poland;

(2) that, with respect to the German-Polish settlement outlined above, the German Government proceed from the assumption that negotiations for re-shaping German-British relations, as proposed by the German Government and accepted in principle by the British Government, would follow immediately.

No. 423

583/242164-66

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 389 of August 29

ROME, August 29, 1939—9:00 p.m.

Received August 29—10:10 p.m.

For Air Attaché Group.

General Valle¹ communicated the following to me orally on August 29: Preparations for carrying out general mobilization of the Air Force were completed between August 16 and August 25.

The High Command of the Air Force is at Rome. The fighting strength of the Air Force includes five Air Commands, each with its own General Staff: 1) Upper Italy, 2) Rome, with Air Divisions Central Italy and Sardinia, 3) Sicily, 4) Bari, with Air Divisions Southern Italy and Albania, 5) Libya, including the Dodecanese.

The present strength of fully operational aircraft in Italy is 2000, in Abyssinia 300, a total of two thousand three hundred. Total strength against Tunis is 350 aircraft in Sicily, Sardinia and Libya, as compared with 300 French aircraft. On the Alpine front the position in the air is unfavourable. Valle has concentrated the best

¹ Under Secretary of State in the Italian Air Ministry and Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force.

equipped fighter formations in the area of No. 1 Air Command. Valle considers that the threat from the air to the coastal area between Leghorn and Naples is less because Corsica is as yet unsuited as an offensive air base against the coastal towns, and Southern France is too far distant as a jumping-off base. In an emergency he thinks that Corsica could be subjected to an aerial pincer movement from the air bases of Sardinia and Tuscany.

The air situation against Tunis is favourable, because the most important harbours and installations at Tunis, Algiers and Oran could be attacked from Sardinia, Sicily and Libya.

The aerial situation against Egypt is not unfavourable either, because of the possibility of destroying important military objectives and aerodromes in Egypt and on the Suez Canal.

Cyprus, Haifa and Egypt could also be attacked from the Dodecanese (average distance 800-900 kilometres).

There are doubts regarding the general defence of the Dodecanese because of their proximity to the coast of Asia Minor. The overall defence there is still too weak at present.

Valle answered in the negative a question regarding existing reserves of aircraft. All aircraft serviceable in war had been sent to the front. The potential output of the aircraft factories at the end of September would be 300 a month, and 400 aircraft . . . (group mutilated)² end of October. The reserves of engines and other equipment vital for war had been amply provided, but he gave no figures.

For putting the Air Force into action there is only two and a half months' supply of petrol at home, in Libya, Albania and in the Dodecanese, and three months' in Abyssinia; this quantity is completely inadequate. At present great efforts, strongly supported by the Duce, are being made for . . . (group mutilated)³ for 6-8 months of air warfare. Valle describes the shortage of petrol supplies as the most dangerous factor for the Air Force.

Valle is optimistic about the possibility of using the Air Force from Albania, because of absolute air superiority over Greece and the possibility of very strong air cover for naval actions along the western coast of Greece.

Valle showed special interest in Turkey's future attitude and asked about the object and result of the action taken by our Ambassador in Ankara.

Valle answered all questions frankly and readily and said he was always ready to give us information.

MACKENSEN⁴

² The Rome draft, of which only the second page has been found (8395/E591850), here reads: "by the".

³ The Rome draft reads: "stocking up".

⁴ The Rome draft was signed by both Gen. von Bülow, the Air Attaché, and Mackensen.

No. 424

103/111556

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, August 29, 1939—9:18 p.m.

SECRET

Received August 30—12:15 a.m.

No. 233 of August 29

With reference to your telegram No. 225 of August 28¹ and to my telegrams Nos. 232 of August 29² and 231 of August 29.³

I called on Molotov in the Kremlin at 5 p.m. today.

I explained to him in urgent terms the necessity of a specific *démenti* being issued by the Soviet side to counteract foreign reports circulated for propaganda purposes regarding the withdrawal of two hundred and fifty thousand (250,000) Soviet troops from the Polish frontier. Molotov stated emphatically that the Soviet Government took the Non-Aggression Pact concluded with Germany very seriously and this fact alone should suffice to discredit the present report. Molotov asked whether I myself or Berlin believed this report at all.

I replied that we, of course, knew very well that there was not a word of truth in this report, but it was important that the report, invented for propaganda purposes, should be combated by counter propaganda; that was the only reason why we were asking for a *démenti* in terms as emphatic and unequivocal as possible, and I made use of the suggestion in telegram No. 225.

Molotov made copious notes and said that he would discuss the matter at once with Voroshilov and several other colleagues (meaning Stalin).

I had the definite impression that the Soviet Government will comply with our wishes in one way or another.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 388.² Document No. 414.³ Document No. 413.

No. 425

103/111555

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

Moscow, August 29, 1939—9:18 p.m.

URGENT

Received August 29—10:00 p.m.

No. 234 of August 29

With reference to your telegram No. 221 of August 28.¹

I urgently reminded Molotov again today of the need for the speedy

¹ Document No. 381.

posting of an Ambassador, a Military Attaché and another senior officer.

Molotov replied that the military representatives for Berlin had been appointed and were ready to depart. Four officers were concerned whose names he did not have at the moment. I recommended to Molotov that they should be sent to Berlin by air via Stockholm, tomorrow morning if possible. I shall send the names of the officers by telegram as soon as their passports are sent to me for visas.

On the question of sending a new Ambassador, Molotov intimated that a suitable person had not yet been found. Molotov gave no answer to my request that at least in that case Ast . . . (group mutilated)² or [Astakhov] should be sent back at once, and said that Shkvarzev, the newly appointed Counsellor of Embassy (see telegram No. 218 of August 25)³ could also render useful services. He would see to his speedy . . . (group mutilated)²

SCHULENBURG

² The Moscow draft has not been found, so that mutilated terms cannot be corrected.

³ See document No. 381, footnote 2.

No. 426

169/82694-96

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 388 of August 29

BUCHAREST, August 29, 1939—9:40 p.m.

Received August 30—1:50 a.m.

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 381 and 382 of August 29.¹

In influencing public opinion in Rumania in the event of a conflict we must not proceed on the lines of mistakes committed between 1914 and 1916. Firstly: While our opponents worked, we waited. Secondly: We only started when our opponents were already working at full pressure. Thirdly: We went to great expense without effect, because people had already made up their minds. Fourthly; Success was slight, because our measures were taken without knowledge of the conditions and by people ignorant of the locality.

To be more successful, we should from the start have had more means at our disposal and have been more skilful.

I therefore agree with the view of the German DNB representative² appointed for information services, that propaganda should be conducted with adequate means or not at all. For the immediate commencement of this work on an unlimited scale a first instalment of 300,000 Reichsmark is required.

¹ Neither found.

² Dr. Schickert.

Schickert, who is in close collaboration with the Press Adviser³ and myself, without this being known outside, would be responsible for the ways and means of starting this work in Bucharest. He is drawing up a plan and is arranging for it to be put into effect. One of the first tasks is to influence the press.

Also the provinces. An unobtrusive system of agents is necessary.

In the first place efforts must be made to bring *Curentul*⁴ over more definitely to our side and to influence Gafencu's newspaper⁵ in our favour by a change of ownership and the removal of Jews from the editorial staff.

Our primary effort must of course be to deny scope to hostile propaganda which is working with ample means at its disposal. A staff of correspondents is required to prepare articles, as articles sent from Germany arrive late.

I again urgently request that the sum of 300,000 Reichsmark asked for be placed at our disposal at once. The moment is favourable for the start of intensive propaganda, so long as the psychological effect of the Soviet Treaty is stronger than British influence, the more vigorous reappearance of which we must expect.

(Unsigned.)

³ Werner Voss.

⁴ Rumanian daily newspaper.

⁵ *Timpul*.

No. 427

116/66556-58

Exchange of Teleprint Communications between the Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig and the Foreign Ministry

DANZIG, August 29, 1939—11 p.m.

Please telephone at once to the Foreign Minister's ante-room and say that Gauleiter Forster, after previously telephoning the Führer, will arrive in Berlin by air about 10 o'clock tomorrow and will stay for a few hours. Gauleiter Forster wishes me to accompany him and I ask to be informed by return if the Foreign Minister agrees to this.

VEESENMAYER

Please let me know at once how soon I can have this information.¹

The Foreign Minister's Secretariat has just stated: It is impossible to decide at once when you can have the information.

If Dr. Veessenmayer has not received word by 7 a.m. tomorrow he will take agreement for granted. Dr. Veessenmayer asks that this be communicated to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.²

¹ Marginal note: "Telephoned through to Attaché Halter in the ante-room of the Minister's Secretariat at 11:10 p.m. Persdorf."

² Marginal note: "Telephoned through 29.8.39, 11:25 p.m. P[ersdorf]."

BERLIN, August 29—11:45 p.m.

For Veesenmayer.

The Foreign Minister's Secretariat states:

It cannot be foreseen whether and when the Minister will decide the question. Silence from this end is not to be taken as agreement to his coming, rather the contrary, until he receives instruction. End.

I will give Dr. Veesenmayer the message by telephone, as he is not here at present.

BERLIN, August 29, 1939—11:50 p.m.

For Dr. Veesenmayer.

The Foreign Minister agrees that Dr. Veesenmayer should accompany Gauleiter Forster.

Foreign Minister's Secretariat.³

³ Marginal note: "Transmitted 29.8.39, 11:50 p.m. P[ersdorff]."

No. 428

91/100057-58

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Eire

Telegram

No. 72

BERLIN, August 29, 1939.
zu Pol. II 3053.¹

Drafting Officer: Senior Counsellor von Rintelen.

With reference to your telegram No. 47.²

In view of the deterioration in the political situation as a whole, resulting from the behaviour of Poland, it appears expedient that you should now make the declaration to the Irish Government which you suggested. I therefore request you to call on Mr. de Valera without delay and make the following statement to him, which is intended to clarify the attitude which we shall adopt towards Ireland, and also the attitude which we for our part expect from Ireland, if hostilities cannot after all be avoided.

In accordance with the friendly relations between ourselves and Ireland we are determined to refrain from any hostile action against Irish territory and to respect her integrity, provided that Ireland, for her part, maintains unimpeachable neutrality towards us in any conflict. Only if this condition should no longer obtain as a result of a decision of the Irish Government themselves, or by pressure exerted on Ireland from other quarters, should we be compelled as a matter of course, as far as Ireland was concerned too, to safeguard our interests

¹ Presumably the telegram referred to in footnote 2 below.

² Document No. 303.

in the sphere of warfare in such a way as the situation then arising might demand of us.

You are requested to deliver this statement in clear yet definitely friendly terms, and in doing so you can refer (without expressly mentioning Northern Ireland) to the wide sympathy felt in Germany for Ireland and the national aspirations of the Irish people. I also request you to add that we have taken steps whereby Irish nationals resident in Germany may remain there even in the event of war, and in this connection we naturally expect Ireland to reciprocate in a similar way. Furthermore the German Government would make every effort to restrict as far as possible to an absolute minimum any unavoidable repercussions which might arise for Ireland and Irish trade from Germany's conduct of the war. We are, of course, aware of the difficulties involved in the geographical position of Ireland. Report by telegram on action taken.³

RIBBENTROP

³ See document No. 484.

No. 429

321/193103

The State Secretary to the Legation in Lithuania

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, August 29, 1939.

No. 115

[Pol. II 1114 g. Rs.]¹

With reference to our telegram No. 114.²

The Foreign Minister asks you to sound the Lithuanian Government cautiously as to whether they would be prepared to stage some kind of demonstration on the Polish frontier, perhaps by means of troop concentrations.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Ascertained from document No. 481. The hour of despatch is not recorded.

² Document No. 410.

No. 430

2988/584686-88

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

No. 4508

BUCHAREST, August 29, 1939.

Received September 4.

Pol. IV 4953.

Subject: Movements of Rumanian diplomats.

The Counsellor of the Crown, Ambassador Tatarescu, has been recalled from his post in Paris. As long ago as the spring Tatarescu called on the Minister of the Court, Urdareanu, and told him that he was not happy in the Paris post, especially as Rumania's policy

towards France allowed no scope either in the purely political or in the economic field. The attempts of the Jewish industrial magnate Max Auschnitt¹ to promote British and French economic relations with Rumania, attempts which Tatarescu had been persuaded to support, were, as the Foreign Ministry knows, brought to naught by the Rumanian Government, who at that time were anxious to conclude the Trade Agreement with Germany. At the time, when with the Foreign Minister, I criticized Auschnitt's scheme as a Jewish manipulation of capital; the result was that Tatarescu was summoned here and advised to have nothing to do with Auschnitt's scheme. In addition to this M. Tatarescu realized that his position in Rumania's domestic policy was on the wane, while the King was strengthening his authoritarian Government and depriving the Party and parliamentary system of the last possibilities of action. M. Tatarescu, however, hoped to continue his work again in domestic politics with the help of his friends; he has put it about that the King is holding him in reserve for the next change of Government.

When he enquired about this at his last visit in the spring, it was pointed out to him that at present the King had nothing in view for him, and that he should simply return to his post in Paris, or, if he did not want to do that, resign his post as Ambassador. M. Tatarescu returned to his post reluctantly, as his wife quite openly said.

When I asked M. Gafencu about the reasons for Tatarescu's sudden recall, he told me that the latter had incurred disfavour as a result of making political proposals to the French which he had not been authorized to make. In the end he had simply been told to obtain the *agrément* of the Quai d'Orsay for Ambassador Franasovici, previously in Warsaw.

Minister of the Court Urdareanu thinks that after he returns, Tatarescu will try to work himself somehow into domestic politics; but he will soon realize that he will not succeed in this.

Certain rumours are already circulating again that a reshuffle of the Cabinet is planned. The King, however, has no intention of doing this.

Ambassador Franasovici's successor in Warsaw is expected to be Grigorcea, a former Secretary General and ex-*Chef-de-Protocol* in the Foreign Ministry. As a native of Bukovina he was formerly a member of the Austro-Hungarian Imperial and Royal [*k. u. k.*] service. I already knew him during the war when he was Second Secretary at the Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Constantinople. He must be about sixty, is soon to marry Princess Laetitia Ghiki (a fact which he is keeping secret so far) and was always very friendly towards us during his term of office. He is not an outstanding personality, but

¹ Max Ausnit, General Manager of the Reşita Works and one of the most prominent Rumanian industrialists.

as a result of his Austrian training has acquired a certain amount of experience in the Diplomatic Service.

FABRICIUS

No. 431

F17/396-97

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, August 29, 1939.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER
AND THE RUSSIAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES, IVANOV, ON AUGUST 29,
1939

The Foreign Minister informed the Russian Chargé d'Affaires that when the British Ambassador was received by the Führer, he expressed the hope that the Polish question might be settled peaceably and that thereupon an improvement in German-British relations might ensue.¹ The Führer declared in reply² that he, too, desired an improvement in German-British relations and that the Polish problem would shortly be solved in one way or another. The Führer, moreover, stipulated as an absolute prerequisite for a better understanding between Germany and Britain that the Agreement between Germany and Russia should not be affected. This Agreement was unconditional and signified a change in the foreign policy of the Reich that would last for a long time. Russia and Germany would never in any circumstances again take up arms against each other. In addition to respect for the new German-Russian relations, the Führer laid down as a second prerequisite for a German-British *rapprochement* that the mutual obligations of Germany and Italy should not be affected in any way whatsoever, just as Anglo-French relations would be respected by Germany.

Henderson had then left for England to inform his Government of the Führer's attitude and, on his return yesterday, had handed over the British Government's reply³ that Great Britain likewise desired to improve German-British relations. The British Government hoped that it would be possible to settle the acute Polish problem by means of direct German-Polish discussions. The British reply was at the moment being studied and the Russian Government would be kept further informed of the results of this examination.

The Foreign Minister added that, as he had already stated to Stalin and Molotov, the change in German foreign policy towards friendship with Russia was radical and final. Germany would not take part in any international conference at which Russia was not also represented.

¹ See document No. 200

² See document No. 265.

³ See document No. 884 and enclosure thereto.

Germany would likewise act in concert with Russia in all eastern questions.

In conclusion, the Foreign Minister referred again in the most emphatic terms to the German mobilization, which was now in full swing, and to the Führer's determination to settle the Polish question in one way or another at an early date.

Submitted, according to instructions, to the Foreign Minister.⁴

DR. SCHMIDT

Minister

⁴ In telegram No. 227 (461/225044-45) sent at 10 p.m. on Aug. 29, Weizsäcker sent to Schulenburg a summary of this conversation with the request that Molotov be informed at once.

No. 432

533/239112

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 660

BERLIN, August 29, 1939.

The Nuncio today mentioned to me a secret agreement made at the time of the conclusion of the Concordat between the Curia and the Reich.¹ Under this secret agreement, of which I personally was unaware, the Reich Government agreed to exempt certain categories of Roman Catholic clergy and students from call-up in the event of mobilization. The Nuncio added that so far no concrete instances had been brought to his notice of violation of this secret agreement during the present mobilization. He referred to the agreement, however, in order to make the suggestion that the Army authorities—without mentioning the secret agreement—should instruct their district commands to proceed as stipulated in the secret agreement.

I received the suggestion favourably and ask you to consider without delay how effect can be given to it if the need arises.

To the Under State Secretary, Political Department.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ For the agreement concluded on July 20, 1933, see Series C, volume I. The terms were as indicated in the document here printed.

No. 433

183/85950

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 29, 1939.

The Slovak, Lithuanian and Swiss Ministers¹ today asked me for information on the situation. I told them that I was not in a position

¹ Matúš Černák, Kazys Skirpa and Hans Frölicher.

to give any information about the exchange of views with Britain. It seemed likely, however, that a public statement on this would be made during the day. It was of course not out of the question that certain fresh possibilities might emerge; the situation was still very grave.

WOERMANN

No. 434

183/85949

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 29, 1939.

The Swiss Minister¹ told me today that the Federal Council had ordered the calling out of the frontier guard. Switzerland believed that this measure would suffice without general mobilization which in any case could be put into effect very quickly in Switzerland. Extraordinary plenary powers would also be conferred on the Federal Council. The Minister added privately that from tomorrow Switzerland would be an authoritarianly governed State. I told him that the Federal Council should take advantage of this to exercise strict control over the press.

WOERMANN

¹ Hans Frölicher.

No. 435

173/83928

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division II

BERLIN, August 29, 1939.

A telephone enquiry addressed to Minister Count Zech at The Hague has shown that up to now no Franco-British *démarche* on respecting Dutch neutrality, corresponding to the declaration made yesterday in Brussels by the British and French Ambassadors,¹ has taken place.

VON RINTELEN

¹ See document No. 379.

No. 436

34/24058-61

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, August 29, 1939.
W IV 3296.

The German-Soviet Trade Agreement concluded on August 19¹ contains the following:

1. Germany grants the Soviet Union a commercial credit of 200 million Reichsmark. The financing will be done by the German

¹ Document No. 131.

Gold Discount Bank. This method of financing includes a 100 per cent guarantee by the Reich. It is a credit based on bills of exchange. The bills of exchange are to be drawn for each individual transaction and have an average term of seven years. The interest is five per cent. Under a secret final protocol, one-half per cent of this is refunded to the Russian special accounts in Berlin, whereby the actual interest rate is reduced to four and a half per cent.

2. The credit will be used to finance Soviet orders in Germany. The Soviet Union will make use of it to order the industrial products scheduled in List A of the Agreement. They consist of machinery and industrial installations. Machine tools up to the very largest dimensions form a considerable part of the deliveries. Also armaments in the broader sense (such as optical instruments, armour plate and the like) will, subject to examination of every single case, be supplied in smaller proportion.

3. The credit will be repaid by Soviet raw materials, which will be chosen by agreement between the two Governments. The annual interest will likewise be paid from the proceeds of Soviet merchandise, that is, from the special accounts kept in Berlin.

4. In order that we might secure an immediate benefit from the Credit Treaty, it was made a condition from the beginning that the Soviet Union bind itself to the delivery, starting immediately, of certain raw materials as current trading. It was possible so to arrange these raw material commitments of the Russians that our wishes were largely met. The Russian commitments in raw materials are contained in List C. They amount to 180 million Reichsmark: half to be delivered in each of the first and second years following the conclusion of the agreement. It is a question, in particular, of lumber, cotton, feed grain, oil cake, phosphate, platinum, raw furs, petroleum, and other goods which, for us, have a more or less gold value.

5. Since these Soviet deliveries made as current trading are also to be compensated by German counter deliveries, certain German promises of delivery have to be made to the Russians. The German industrial products to be supplied in current business as counter deliveries for Russian raw materials are scheduled in List B. This List totals 120 million Reichsmark and comprises substantially the same categories of merchandise as List A.

6. From the welter of difficult questions of detail which arose during the negotiations, the following might also be mentioned: Guaranteeing of the rate of exchange of the Reichsmark. The complicated arrangement arrived at appears in the Confidential Protocol signed on August 26² of this year. In order not to jeopardize the conclusion of the Treaty on August 19 of this year, the question was laid aside

¹ Document No. 340.

and settled afterwards. The questions of the repayment of the old credits, the shipment clause, an emergency clause for the event of inability to deliver of either party, the arbitration procedure, the price clause, etc., were settled satisfactorily despite the pressure of time.

7. The Treaty, which has come into being after extraordinary difficulties, will undoubtedly give a decided impetus to German-Soviet trade. We must try to build anew on this foundation and, above all, try to settle a number of questions which could not heretofore be settled, because of the fall to zero in our trade relations. The framework now set up represents a minimum. Since the political conditions are favourable, it may well be expected that it will be exceeded considerably in both directions, both in imports and exports.

8. On the basis of the Treaty, the following movement of goods will result for the next few years:

<i>Exports to the U.S.S.R.</i>	<i>Imports from the U.S.S.R.</i>
200 million RM credit deliveries, List A.	180 million RM raw material deliveries, List C.
120 million RM deliveries as cur- rent business, List B.	200 million RM repayment of 1935 credit.
	Approx. 100 million RM capital- ized interest from present and last credit.
X million RM unspecified de- liveries as current trading.	X million RM unspecified de- liveries of Soviet goods under German-Soviet Trade Agree- ment of Dec. 19, 1938. ³

The movement of goods envisaged by the agreement might therefore reach a total of more than one thousand million RM for the next few years, not including repayment of the present 200 million credit by deliveries of Russian raw materials beginning in 1946.

9. Apart from the economic import of the Treaty, its significance lies in the fact that the negotiations also served to renew political contacts with Russia and that the Credit Agreement was considered by both sides as the first decisive step in the reshaping of political relations.

SCHNURRE

³ See Appendix III, Section (G).

No. 437

247/163910

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*BERLIN, August 29, 1939.
e.o. Pol. VI 1990.

As instructed, I have telephoned to thank Minister von Renthe-Fink, Copenhagen, for his suggestion.¹ I said that the attitude of the Royal Family in Denmark was well known to us; in the *démarches* made with the countries on our Western border,² on the one hand, and with Denmark, on the other hand, we had, however, intentionally made a distinction, necessitated by the fact that the geographical position of either country would affect the acuteness of a possible threat. Through our Non-Aggression Pact of the spring of this year³ our relations with Denmark were especially friendly; we reserved, however, the right, should the situation demand it, to approach His Majesty the King also.

Minister von Renthe-Fink was satisfied with this reply.

I have further told Minister Renthe-Fink, as instructed, that we would not publish a press communiqué on our *démarche* with the Danish Government.

GRUNDHERR

¹ According to a memorandum by an official of Political Division VI of August 29 (247/163911), Renthe-Fink had telephoned from Copenhagen at 9:55 a.m. that day and had suggested making the statement relating to Danish neutrality [see document No. 407] to the Head of the State in person, as had been done in the case of Belgium and the Netherlands.

² See documents Nos. 272, 313 and 315.

³ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 461.

No. 438

472/228638-39/1

Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsäcker

ROME, August 29, 1939.

DEAR FRIEND: The events of the last few weeks have compelled us to subject our relations with our Axis partner to a certain strain. I am worried about this. The visit to Salzburg,¹ Attolico's reports on his impressions here, and, lastly, my telegrams on the various conversations with the Duce, will have given Berlin a fairly exhaustive picture of the psychological effects observed on the Duce and Ciano. In view, however, of the urgent necessity of giving the most earnest consideration to the way in which these matters are developing, I feel I must also send you the enclosed situation report, which emanates from the pen of my well known confidant. I can say of him with a

¹ See Editors' Note, p. 35, and documents Nos. 43 and 47.

clear conscience that he does not exaggerate. In the interests of absolute secrecy I have not had the document translated here, but am sending it *tel quel*.

Best wishes and Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.,

MACKENSEN²

52/35142-46

[Enclosure]³

The state of mind of M[ussolini] and C[iano] is determined principally by the following circumstances:

The attitude of Germany towards Italy has not been such as Rome might have expected from a friendly and allied Power.

The Alliance⁴ presupposed that there would be no war for the first three years. There was complete oral agreement in this sense at the time of the Ciano-Ribbentrop understanding at Milan,⁵ and the Reich Foreign Minister had also added that the Danzig question would in time solve itself, by degrees, by a process of attrition. Therefore he thought he could leave war out of account as not necessary for such a solution.

The three years were necessary for Italy to complete her own preparations in every field, especially in that of the Navy. In 1939 Italy has only two capital ships. In 1940 she will have six. In 1942 eight. It should be borne in mind that in the event of war Italy would have to bear the whole brunt of a naval attack, because Germany is practically invulnerable, or only slightly vulnerable, thanks to her favourable geographical position.

An enormous deposit of iron ore was discovered in Albania, in the neighbourhood of Kruja. However, it will take some years before this can be fully exploited. It will be necessary to begin by constructing cableways. At present Italy is suffering from a very grave shortage of iron ore.

M[ussolini] therefore embarked on a programme of public works, feeling certain that he could exclude the possibility of an immediate war.

Instead of that, reports from the Italian Embassy at Berlin suddenly forecast an almost immediate conflict over Danzig, a conflict of which Berlin had not warned Rome direct. Besides this, if Italy had not been in possession of information of her own about this new and unexpected situation, she would have been confronted by her ally

² Marginal notes: (i) "Herr v. Kessel: Please arrange for translation of the enclosure by a reliable person. W[eizsäcker] 30/8"; (ii) "For Foreign Minister. W[eizsäcker] 1/9"; (iii) "Returned from the special train on September 17, 1939. Sonnleithner." This translation, which is headed "Free translation from the Italian", is not printed (472/228639/2-43).

³ Translated from the Italian original.

⁴ Concluded on May 22, 1939. See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 426.

⁵ For the Milan conversations, see vol. VI of this Series, document No. 341.

with a *fait accompli*, which would have been in complete contradiction to the obligations to hold consultations and to have a three years' respite.

It should also be noted that Italy had also asked Germany to supply her with anti-aircraft artillery to be paid for out of Italian credits with the Reich.⁶ These deliveries, however, were not conceded. Thus Germany, although she had no shortage but a surplus of armaments (reference is made in this connection to Czechoslovak armaments), had not troubled to arm her ally, but had brought her, insufficiently armed, face to face with an imminent conflict.

Reports from Italian diplomats lead one to believe that Germany's decision about Danzig was due to the determination of Ribbentrop, who was now certain of the agreement with Moscow and was relying on the probable non-intervention of the Western Powers. Ribbentrop, who was eager for great success, also in order to take second place in prestige and power in Germany in the place of Göring, had persuaded Hitler. Goebbels too was relying on the non-intervention of the Western Powers. This confidence, however, was not shared by Italian diplomats. Likewise, neither C[iano] nor the leading figures at the Palazzo Chigi shared the confident hope expressed by von Ribbentrop at Salzburg of a *revirement* by Turkey, who had now irrevocably become a vassal of Britain's.

At Salzburg there was the known clash between C[iano] and von Ribbentrop. The latter was somewhat obstinate and stated plainly that he refused to allow discussion of certain points. Thus C[iano] commenced his report to M[ussolini] on the evening of Friday, August 11, by stating that it had been impossible to have a discussion with or convince v[on] R[ibbentrop].

Instead, the Italian Government were afterwards surprised to read in the DNB communiqué⁷ a definite statement that there was one hundred per cent solidarity with Italy, which did not correspond with the truth, and was described as "a mean trick" and not a friendly way of doing things; besides it had been agreed not to issue communiqués.

C[iano] had also pointed out to v[on] R[ibbentrop] that Germany had not given Rome information about the negotiations for an agreement with Moscow, as she ought to have done in accordance with the obligation to hold consultations.

In the last few days there have been contacts between the Führer and London and Paris, but Italy had not been informed beforehand of these either. Summing up, it is pointed out that the Reich wished to act on its own initiative in questions of vital importance which it

⁶ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 660.

⁷ This statement was contained in a communiqué issued by DNB on the afternoon of Aug. 13; see also document No. 71.

was obliged, under the Pact of Alliance, to discuss in mutual agreement with Rome.

However, M[ussolini] did not want anything of this to leak out and has loyally maintained an appearance of solidarity. "As we are in the throes of a grave European crisis, we are keeping up appearances and others must not perceive anything."

Moreover, conviction and sentiment would move him to intervene at once on Germany's side if the conflict should break out. However, he is inwardly troubled because Italy is not prepared and many conditions are distinctly unfavourable.

The [Italian] Empire is in need of replenishments but supplies cannot arrive for some weeks. Libya has few divisions, four metropolitan and four native. The "Pavia" division is now being sent. The "Brescia" division will follow and other battalions of the militia equipped with artillery will be sent, making another four divisions in all. War material will also be despatched in order to double the strength of the two Libyan divisions. Thus Italy will have a total of fourteen divisions in Libya. It is known that the plans of the French General Staff provide for the occupation of Libya, a landing on the western part of Sicily and a naval bombardment of Liguria. After the occupation of Libya, the French coloured troops and the British troops in Egypt would be moved across for the big offensive against the Alps. France deludes herself that, with Italy put out of action, she could then move all her forces from the Alps to the Rhine in order to attempt a final offensive against Germany with the aid of the British and American armies. It is also known, however, that the French General Staff proposes to occupy Belgium from the outbreak of war in order to attempt to outflank the Siegfried Line from the north.

For all these reasons it will be in Italy's interests to gain a few months more while still maintaining the solidarity of the Axis. The transport of troops to Libya will require some time.

France is on a war footing on the Alpine frontier, but for the present her contingents there are only sufficient for defence, not for an offensive. This seems to bear out her plan not to attack the Alpine frontier at first, but to open the offensive in Libya and in Belgium, or in Belgium only.

The French Ambassador has informed us that France has been obliged to take counter measures of a defensive nature on the Alpine frontier in consequence of the measures taken by Italy. It is considered that at present she [France] has from thirty-five to forty battalions on the Alpine frontier.

It is therefore assumed that Italy will not intervene at first, and, on the other hand, it is thought that for the present Germany too does not expect immediate intervention.

No. 439

52/35325-26

Circular of the State Secretary¹

Telegram

BERLIN, August 29, 1939.

Sent August 30—[12:25 a.m.]²

e.o. Pol. II. . . .

Drafting Officer: Senior Counsellor Rintelen.

For the Head of the Mission personally.

For strictly confidential information.

Replying to the British Ambassador, who had expressed the hope that a peaceful solution of the Polish question and a German-British understanding were still possible, the Führer, when he received the Ambassador on August 25,³ stated that a solution of the Polish question was a prerequisite for any German-British understanding. After the solution of this question he would be prepared to consider German-British understanding on condition that it did not affect German-Italian and German-Russian relations and that Germany's colonial demands were fulfilled. If the British Government rejected these ideas, war seemed to him inevitable.

Thereupon the British Ambassador flew to London and returned with the British Government's reply,⁴ which in outline is as follows:

The British Government share the desire for a German-British understanding, and are ready for it as soon as the German-Polish question has been settled; they consider the best method to be direct German-Polish discussions. The British Government are prepared to bring all their influence to bear to contribute to such a solution.

The offer contained herein, to mediate in initiating German-Polish discussions, is at present being studied by the Reich Government.

The seriousness of the situation is still unchanged, as, in view of the increasing Polish and hence also German military measures, the tension cannot be said to have relaxed, and our determination to settle the problem one way or another in the shortest possible time remains unshaken.

Repeated to the most important Missions.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Addressees were the Embassies at London, Paris, Rome, Ankara, Tokyo, Washington, Brussels, Warsaw, Moscow and San Sebastian, and the Legations at The Hague, Berne, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade and Sofia (52/35327).

² The hour of despatch is taken from the Rome copy of this telegram (100/64798-99).

³ See document No. 265.

⁴ See document No. 384, enclosure.

No. 440

52/35319/1-19/2

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

URGENT

No. 229 of August 29

BERLIN, August 29, 1939.

Sent August 30—[1:40 a.m.]¹[Received August 30—7:40 a.m.]¹

The Führer received the British Ambassador this evening and handed him a written reply² to the British Memorandum of August 28.³

The reply again states most forcibly the extremely pressing nature of any German-Polish negotiations if a peaceful solution is still to be achieved. The reply states further that, in the event of a territorial rearrangement in Poland, the German Government would no longer be in a position to agree to guarantees without the participation of the Soviet Union. As a proof of their good will at the eleventh hour, the Reich Government agree to the despatch to Berlin of a Polish emissary with full powers, adding that they count on his arrival on Wednesday, August 30. In the meantime proposals for a solution acceptable to Germany would be drawn up.

Please inform M. Molotov of this tomorrow.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ The hour of despatch is taken from the Moscow copy (461/225043).

² See document No. 421.

³ Document No. 384, enclosure.

No. 441

52/35318

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Belgium and the Legation in the Netherlands

Telegram

BERLIN, August 29, 1939.

Sent August 30—[1:50 a.m.]¹zu Pol. II 3065.²3066.³

Drafting Officer: Senior Counsellor Rintelen.

1) To Brussels No. 163.

2) To The Hague No. 133.

1) With reference to your telegram No. 104 of August 29.⁴

2) With reference to your telegram No. 71 of August 28.⁵

You are requested to state to the Belgian (Netherlands) Govern-

¹ The hour of despatch is taken from the Brussels copy (1601/385192).

² The reference is uncertain; presumably the document referred to in footnote 5 below.

³ The reference is uncertain; presumably the document referred to in footnote 4 below.

⁴ Document No. 403.

⁵ Document No. 390.

ment, in answer to the communication concerning the offer of their good offices by the King of the Belgians and the Queen of the Netherlands, that the German Government, even though they do not consider that they can make use of the offer at the present juncture, have nevertheless gratefully taken note of it.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 442

52/35380

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 289 of August 30 WASHINGTON, August 30, 1939—4:19 a.m.
Received August 31—1:45 a.m.

Both the Embassy and the Consulate General in New York received on August 28 an unsigned telegram *en clair*, which obviously emanated from the Foreign Ministry,¹ asking that the Führer's exchange of letters with Daladier² should be given the widest possible circulation here. Therefore, in conjunction with the Consulate General in New York, I at once caused the [German] Library of Information to distribute 120,000 copies of the letters this week. I request that four thousand five hundred dollars be made available to the Embassy without delay to cover the cost involved.

In order to hamper American counter measures and to avoid compromising the [German] Library of Information and confidential agents, I request that in future instructions for propaganda of this kind be sent only by cipher telegram.

THOMSEN

¹ Not identified.

² Documents Nos. 324 and 354.

No. 443

52/35389-40

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division II

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, August 30, 1939.

The Embassy in Brussels (Counsellor of Embassy von Bargaen) reported by telephone as follows at 10:45 a.m.: The Belgian press announces today very prominently that Britain, France and Poland have accepted the offer of their good offices by the King of the Belgians and the Queen of the Netherlands.¹ The details given by the press were: The Polish reply² referred to the Polish President's reply to Roosevelt in which Poland had already stated her willingness

¹ See documents Nos. 390 and 408.

² See the *Polish White Book*, Nos. 102 and 103.

to accept such good offices, expressed approval of the initiative taken by Belgium and the Netherlands, and said in conclusion that Poland could not at present take any further steps simply because all previous appeals of this kind had met with no response from Germany. The British reply³ is said to amount to an acceptance of the offer, and France is said to have given a favourable reply to it.⁴

Herr von Bargaen added that in the circumstances the Embassy thought it would be necessary immediately after the Ambassador had made the *démarche* prescribed in telegram No. 163,⁵ to give a statement to the press on the following lines:

The German Ambassador has stated that the Reich Government have taken cognizance of the friendly offer by the two Sovereigns. He has expressed the profound gratitude of the Reich Government for this generous Royal gesture. Although the German Government believe that they should not at the present juncture accept the good offices of the two Sovereigns, they may avail themselves of the offer at a later date.

The Embassy in Brussels requests authority to make this statement to the press.⁶ As regards similar steps at The Hague, the Embassy in Brussels is keeping in touch with the Legation there.

VON RINTELEN

³ See *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 601.

⁴ See the *French Yellow Book*, Nos. 292 and 298.

⁵ Document No. 441.

⁶ A minute of August 30 (1601/385192) by Bülow-Schwante reads as follows: "Herr v. Rintelen telephoned at 2:30 p.m. that a press communiqué was to be drawn up somewhat as follows: 'The German Ambassador has stated that the Government of the Reich have taken note of the friendly offer by the two Sovereigns and that he has to acknowledge the offer (*geste*) with the particular thanks (*profonde gratitude*) of the Reich Government.' Translations [i.e., the French terms] supplied by Herr v. Rintelen."

No. 444

52/35348

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

MOST URGENT

No. 390 of August 30

ROME, August 30, 1939—12:25 p.m.

Received August 30—1 p.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 418 of August 29.¹

I carried out my instructions at 9:45 a.m. Ciano confirmed that my statements had already been conveyed to him by Attolico, and supplemented them by telling me what Attolico had in the meantime reported to him on the course of events,² in particular the Führer's reply to Britain. He added the remark that a peaceful settlement

¹ Not printed, see document No. 411, footnote 7.

² See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 418.

now seemed to him impossible in view of the deployment of troops carried out by both sides.

On this occasion Ciano handed to me, for my personal information, a copy of Mussolini's messages of the afternoons of [August] 27³ and 29,⁴ which had been transmitted through A[ttolico].

MACKENSEN

³ See document No. 350.

⁴ See document No. 417.

No. 445

52/35338

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 664

BERLIN, August 30, 1939.

The British Ambassador has just telephoned to me to confirm the communication which Mr. Holman of the British Embassy made at 4 o'clock this morning to Senior Counsellor Kordt.¹

Sir Nevile Henderson informed me that his Government were giving careful attention to the answer which the Führer had handed to him yesterday evening.² However, the German reply was couched in very categorical terms and was something in the nature of an ultimatum. The British Government must point out that they were not certain whether they would succeed in persuading the Polish Government to send a plenipotentiary to Berlin this very day.

I confined myself to describing the situation to the Ambassador as extremely tense and urgent.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, Nos. 504 and 520. According to Sir N. Henderson's account, he telephoned the State Secretary in the course of the morning.

² See document No. 421.

No. 446

103/111557-58

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 235 of August 30

Moscow, August 30, 1939.¹

Received August 30—3 p.m.

The entire Soviet press today gives prominence to the Tass statement, the text of which is as follows: "A number of foreign newspapers, particularly the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*,² announce that the

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

² In an article entitled "Surprise from Moscow" published on Aug. 25, the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* had described the main objective of the Anglo-French negotiations with the U.S.S.R. as being to obtain a guarantee for Poland that she would not be attacked in the rear by the U.S.S.R., and had expressed the opinion that the withdrawal of 250,000 Russian troops from the Polish frontier in the last few days indicated that Poland could, for the moment, rest assured on this head.

Soviet Army Command is supposed to have withdrawn between two and three hundred thousand men from the Soviet western frontier to the east in order to strengthen the eastern frontier. Tass is authorized to say that this announcement is not at all in accordance with the facts. On the contrary, authoritative circles affirm that in view of the increasing gravity of the situation in the eastern territories of Europe, and of the possibility of surprises, the Soviet Command has decided to increase the numerical strength of the garrisons on the western frontier of the U.S.S.R."

The above statement has also been broadcast several times by the Soviet radio since last night.

SCHULENBURG³

³ See also document No. 424.

No. 447

34/24064

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, August 30, 1939—3:04 p.m.

No. 238 of August 30

Received August 30—4:40 p.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 226 of August 29.¹

On the occasion of my visit to Molotov on August 28, he told me that the ratification of the Non-Aggression Pact was merely a formality. Soviet public opinion had shown great satisfaction with the conclusion of the Treaty, and this satisfaction would also be expressed in the Supreme Soviet's discussions on the matter. When I asked on what day he—Molotov—would address the Supreme Soviet on the subject of ratification, he replied that this depended on how quickly the first two points on the agenda (agrarian tax and military service) could be disposed of, and whether August 30 was to be observed as a general holiday or not. In addition, as a result of the hurried summoning of the Supreme Soviet, all members had not yet arrived and the necessary quorum had only just been obtained. Other members were arriving in Moscow from the provinces every day, so that in three or four days the Supreme Soviet would be almost complete.

As today was observed as a holiday, everything points to the ratification being discussed and carried at the evening session on September 1.

I will take suitable steps to see that ratification is pronounced

¹ Not printed (695/260264); in this telegram Ribbentrop enquired whether ratification would take place on Aug. 31, and for Schulenburg's views as to the reasons for the delay. See also document No. 353 and footnote 2 thereto.

immediately afterwards, and for this, under the constitution of the Soviet Union, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is the competent body.

SCHULENBURG

No. 448

96/107961

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 253 of August 30

ANKARA, August 30, 1939—3:50 p.m.

Received August 30—5:45 p.m.

After the Cabinet meeting yesterday, the Hungarian Minister¹ spoke to Saracoğlu about Turkey's attitude. In accordance with the line taken by the Party press that Turkey had not undertaken her obligations in the interests of Britain and France, the [Turkish Foreign] Minister said that, if Italy entered the war, Turkey would act according to her own interests. This subdued tone is the result of popular feeling which wants to avoid war at all costs and sees no reason for Turkey to take sides. As to Italy's attitude during the last few days leading to the supposition here that Italy wishes to remain neutral, the [Foreign] Minister said he thought it unlikely, as the Western Powers would make demands which would render such neutrality impossible. Furthermore, Germany needed Italy's help, as Britain . . . (group mutilated) was determined to attack with very strong forces on the Western front, in order to relieve Poland.

Over Russia's attitude, complete uncertainty prevails. The [Foreign] Minister assumes that we have agreed on the partition of Poland and about the Dardanelles.

Army Inspector Fahreddin says that the Army does not believe that Germany has given Russia a free hand with regard to Turkey, and as Turkey will only intervene if she . . . (group mutilated) the object of an attack, no preparations for mobilization have been made so far.

I continue my attempts to influence everybody towards the strictest neutrality.

PAPEN

¹ Zoltán de Máriássy.

No. 449

129/120872

The Chargé d'Affaires in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 165 of August 30

LISBON, August 30, 1939—4:02 p.m.

Received August 30—7:50 p.m.

I learn that when he was in Lisbon the day before yesterday, the Portuguese Ambassador in Spain¹ was instructed to inform the Spanish Government that Portugal would try to remain neutral as long as possible, but would probably not be able to withstand excessive British pressure in the long run, especially in view of her colonies.

DIETMAR

¹ Dr. Pedro Theotónio Pereira.

No. 450

147/78865/2

The British Ambassador in Germany to the Reich Foreign Minister¹

BRITISH EMBASSY, BERLIN.

August 30, 1939.²

MY DEAR REICHSMINISTER: I am directed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to convey to Your Excellency the following message from the Prime Minister for His Excellency, the Reich Chancellor:

"We are considering the German Note with all urgency and shall send an official reply later in the afternoon.

"We are representing at Warsaw how vital it is to reinforce all instructions for the avoidance of frontier incidents and I would beg you to confirm similar instructions on the German side.

"I welcome the evidence in the exchanges of views which are taking place of that desire for Anglo-German understanding of which I spoke in Parliament yesterday."³

I should be grateful if the above message could be delivered to His Excellency as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

NEVILLE HENDERSON

His Excellency Herrn Joachim von Ribbentrop

¹ A typewritten note at the head of this document reads: "Handed over by Holman, First Secretary of the British Embassy, at 5:30 p.m."² This note is in English in the original. See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 525.³ See *Parl. Deb., H. of C.*, vol. 351, cols. 111-116.

No. 451

1818/415670

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, August 30, 1939.

The German Embassy in Warsaw (Counsellor of Embassy v. Wühlich) has just (5:30 p.m.) informed us by telephone that placards ordering general mobilization in Poland were posted up an hour ago. The first day of mobilization is to be August 31; all in possession of a white call-up card have to report.

Submitted herewith to:

State Secretary
Under State Secretary, Political Department
Under State Secretary, Legal Department
Deputy Director, Political Department
Senior Counsellor Bergmann
Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Minister Braun von Stumm
Minister Dr. Altenburg
Senior Counsellor Rühle
Political Division I, Military Affairs
Personnel Department
Protocol Department

SCHLIEP

No. 452

52/35356

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 666

BERLIN, August 30, 1939.

The Italian Ambassador informed me this afternoon that he had heard from the British Ambassador that if a Polish negotiator did not arrive in Berlin, a fresh initiative, this time by the Pope, might perhaps be expected.¹ This might contain positive suggestions, based on the Führer's proposal in the spring of this year. Attolico told me this solely as an item of information.

I explained to Attolico that the proposal made by the Führer at that time was known to be superseded and was of course inadequate today.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 445, and *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, Nos. 520 and 522.

² See also document No. 473.

No. 453

108/111559

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, August 30, 1939—6:47 p.m.

SECRET

Received August 30—6:30 p.m.

No. 240 of August 30

With reference to my telegram No. 233 of August 29 and your telegram No. 229.¹

It appears that because of today's general holiday Molotov is at his country house, far outside the city, where in principle members of the Soviet Government never entertain. I have therefore at Molotov's request had the contents of both the above-mentioned telegrams brought to the notice of his special confidant who promised to inform Molotov at once. I asked the confidant to remind Molotov emphatically of the Reich Foreign Minister's urgent wish that the four officers should be posted without delay.² At the same time I also pointed out why we attach so much importance to the speedy ratification of the Non-Aggression Pact.³

I hope to hear further from Molotov tomorrow.

SCHULENBURG

¹ The Moscow draft (461/225041-42) reads: "With reference to your telegrams Nos. 227 [not printed, see document No. 431, footnote 4] and 229 [document No. 440] of Aug. 29."

² See also document No. 425.

³ See also document No. 447.

No. 454

5556/E395407-08

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUCHAREST, August 30, 1939—7:22 p.m.

No. 392 of August 30

Received August 31—1:45 a.m.

W 1519 g.

For the Reich Air Ministry.

At all my visits to Departmental Ministers and at my audience with the King,¹ I was asked about the further delivery of German air armaments and other war equipment in the event of a conflict. I was told that Rumania had even . . . (group mutilated) allowed the export of petroleum in advance of contracts for air equipment which had not even been concluded, and had helped in the removal of technical difficulties regarding export.² Nevertheless, German

¹ See document No. 386.

² See also documents Nos. 230 and 243.

supplies under armaments contracts already concluded had not yet been fulfilled to the promised extent. Thus sixteen Rheinmetall 37 mm. anti-aircraft guns, due for delivery, had been held back. Neither had delivery, repeatedly promised by the Legation, of twenty-one waggon loads of machine guns from the Brno armaments and munitions factory so far taken place. They were expecting the early delivery of the rest of the twenty Heinkel fighter aircraft, and were counting on the early conclusion of the other contracts provided for in the agreement on delivery of air armaments.³ Rumania had already given proof of her clear military... (group mutilated) attitude to Germany by allowing important deliveries to Germany even in excess of the amounts contracted for. Rumania would in all circumstances adhere to this attitude in future and would continue deliveries to Germany. Nevertheless it seems to me necessary for further supplies of petroleum that we should quickly fulfil the obligations we have undertaken and thus remedy the grievances brought forward. The Legation has submitted to the Minister of Economics new applications for the granting of additional exports of petroleum, giving various reasons. No decision has yet been reached on the applications. In my opinion favourable treatment depends on our releasing the supplies which we do in fact owe. I consider the continuation without friction of supplies of petroleum from Rumania to be more important than the military value of the armaments held back.⁴

GERSTENBERG⁵

I, too, strongly support the execution of our agreements, as the Rumanian Government for their part are making every effort to facilitate deliveries of petroleum (cf. tanker transports).⁶

FABRICIUS

³ See also vol. VI of this Series, document No. 632 and footnote 3 thereto.

⁴ Marginal note in Junker's handwriting: "We too!"

⁵ Col. Gerstenberg, the Air Attaché.

⁶ In telegram No. 367 of Aug. 28 (7895/E573238-39) Fabricius had reviewed the tanker and railway facilities and the quantities of petroleum which might be made available during the remainder of the year.

No. 455

7972/E575098-99

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 378 of August 30

TOKYO, August 30, 1939—8:30 p.m.

Received August 30—3:40 p.m.

Pol. VIII 1430.

With reference to my telegram No. 371 of August 28.¹

For details of the composition of the new Cabinet and the press

¹ Document No. 367.

reaction to it, I refer you to the extensive DNB reports. The overwhelming influence in the formation of the Cabinet was the Army, which secured the appointment of General Abe as Minister President in opposition to several other candidates, and at the same time secured his appointment as Foreign Minister. The nomination of Ambassador Shigemitsu² as Foreign Minister was abandoned for the time being. Abe, who has hitherto been neutral in politics, appeared to be acceptable as a compromise to the Court circles which also played an important part in forming the Cabinet, especially as he is the brother-in-law of the influential Marquis Kido, late Minister of the Interior and the closest confidant of Konoye.³ Moreover, General Abe's professional connection with the Army might well be the more important influence in administrative matters.

Among the other members of the Cabinet the following can be considered as well-disposed towards our policy: Vice Admiral Godo, Minister of Economics and Agriculture, Nagai, Minister of Transport and Railways and a member of the executive of the Minseito Party, who on several occasions in recent months has advocated an alliance with the Axis Powers.

The non-political Minister of War, Hata, who was previously Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Army, might if necessary be more suitable for a policy of Japanese-Russian settlement than Isogai and Tada, the Kwantung [Army] Generals, who were first nominated. Finally, Endo, the new Secretary to the Cabinet and a member of the Upper House, might be mentioned as an Army supporter.

An influential representative of the opposition group is Kawarada, the Minister of Education, an intimate friend of Kon[oye]. Yamamoto, the Navy Minister, a major opponent of our alliance policy, is to receive a command at the front.

The cabinet offers no evidence of a clear political trend. The well known opposing forces will strive to gain the upper hand and the prospects for the Army are favourable. In foreign policy . . . (group mutilated) will at first adopt an attitude of wait and see, particularly with regard to the European situation.

Repeated to Shanghai and Hsinking.

OTT

² Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japanese Ambassador in Great Britain 1938-1941. In a memorandum of Aug. 28 (174/136089) Knoll, reporting that Shigemitsu's name was being mentioned for the position of Foreign Minister, had commented that such an appointment would presumably mean even less support in the Japanese Foreign Ministry for German views than had obtained under the outgoing Minister, Arita, as Shigemitsu was distrustful of German policy.

³ Prince Fumimaro Konoye, Japanese Minister President, June 1937-January 1939, Minister of State without Portfolio in the Hiranuma Cabinet, January-August 1939.

No. 456

103/111560

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, August 30, 1939—8:45 p.m.

No. 241 of August 30

Received August 30—8:45 p.m.

With reference to my telegram No. 240 of August 30.¹

The Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has informed me that the new Military Attaché, two other officers and two Secretaries are to leave for Berlin by air via Stockholm tomorrow morning. Their passports have not yet been handed in. Their names will follow by telegram.²

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 453.² See document No. 471 and footnote 2 thereto.

No. 457

8287/E588338

*The Director of the Political Department to the Consulate General
at Danzig*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, August 30, 1939—8:55 p.m.

No. 51 of August 30

Received August 30—9:30 p.m.

With reference to our telegram No. 48 of August 26.¹

It is not intended to publicize the extension of the visit of the *Schleswig Holstein*. The reasons to be given in reply to any enquiries are as follows:

The situation in the Bay of Danzig is so tense, as shown by the firing on German planes,² that for the ship to put to sea would entail considerable danger. The *Schleswig Holstein* is, therefore, to remain in the port of Danzig for the time being.

WOERMANN

¹ Not printed; see document No. 338, footnote 3.² See documents Nos. 355 and 359.

No. 458

147/78851-81

An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy in Great Britain

Telegram

SECRET

[BERLIN], August 30, 1939—9:15 p.m.¹

No. 364 of August 30

For the Chargé d'Affaires personally.

Until further instructions the following proposals are to be kept strictly secret and are not to be communicated to any one else.

PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE DANZIG-CORRIDOR PROBLEM
AS WELL AS THE GERMAN-POLISH MINORITIES QUESTION.

The situation existing between the German Reich and Poland is at the moment such that any further incident may lead to an explosion on the part of the military forces which have taken up their positions on both sides. Any peaceful solution must be so framed as to ensure that the events which lie at the root of this situation cannot be repeated on the next occasion offered and that thus not only Eastern Europe but also other territories shall not be brought into such a state of tension.

The causes of this development lie in:

1. the impossible delineation of frontiers as provided for by the Versailles Dictate;
2. the impossible treatment of the minorities in the ceded territories.

In making these proposals the Reich Government are, therefore, actuated by the idea of finding a final solution which will remove the impossible situation created by this frontier delineation, assure to both parties their vital lines of communication, remove the minority problem—as far as it is at all possible—and, in so far as this is not possible, make the fate of the minorities tolerable by a reliable guarantee of their rights.

The German Government are convinced that in this connection it is essential that economic and physical damage done since 1918 should be revealed and full amends made. They of course regard this obligation as being binding for both parties.

These considerations lead to the following practical proposals:

1. The Free City of Danzig shall immediately return to the German Reich in view of its purely German character and also of the unanimous will of its population.

¹ The hour of despatch is recorded as 9:15 p.m., Aug. 30, and 12:40 a.m., Aug. 31. Presumably the telegram was transmitted in two parts. An unsigned and unnumbered copy of this telegram (147/78808-13) bears the date "28.8.39" in blue crayon.

2. The territory of the so-called Corridor, which extends from the Baltic Sea to the line Marienwerder-Graudenz-Kulm-Bromberg (including these towns) and thence runs in a roughly westerly direction towards Schönlanke, shall itself decide as to whether it shall belong to Germany or to Poland.

3. For this purpose a plebiscite shall take place in this territory. The following shall be entitled to vote: all Germans who were either domiciled in this territory on January 1, 1918, or who were born there up to that date, and similarly all Poles, Cassubians, etc., domiciled in this territory on the above day or born there up to that date. The Germans expelled from this territory shall return to it in order to exercise their vote. To ensure an impartial plebiscite and also to safeguard the extensive preparations necessary therefor, the above territory shall, as in the case of the Saar territory, be placed under the supervision of an international commission, to be formed immediately and consisting of the four Great Powers, Italy, the Soviet Union, France and Britain. This commission shall exercise all rights of sovereignty in this territory. With this end in view, the territory shall be evacuated by the Polish armed forces, the Polish police and the Polish authorities, within a period of the utmost brevity, still to be agreed upon.

4. The Polish port of Gdynia, which is essentially Polish sovereign territory, in so far as it is confined territorially to the Polish settlement, shall be excluded from the above territory. The exact frontiers of this Polish port should be determined between Germany and Poland and, if necessary, delimited by an international arbitration tribunal.

5. With a view to assuring the necessary time for the extensive work involved in carrying out a just plebiscite, this plebiscite shall not take place before twelve months have elapsed.

6. In order to guarantee unrestricted communication between Germany and East Prussia and between Poland and the sea during this period, those roads and railways shall be specified which will render free transit traffic possible. In this connection only such taxes may be levied as are necessary for the maintenance of the means of communication and for the provision of transport.

7. It shall be decided by a simple majority of the votes recorded to whom this territory shall belong.

8. In order to guarantee to Germany free communication with her Province of Danzig-East Prussia, and to Poland her access to the sea, after the plebiscite—regardless of the results thereof—Germany shall, if the plebiscite area goes to Poland, receive an extraterritorial traffic zone, approximately along a line from Bütow to Danzig or Dirschau, in which to construct a Reich Autobahn and a four-track railway line. The road and the railway shall be so constructed as not to affect the

Polish lines of communication, i.e., they shall pass either over or under them. The breadth of this zone shall be fixed at one kilometre and shall be German sovereign territory.

Should the result of the plebiscite be in Germany's favour, Poland shall receive rights analogous to those which she would have accorded to Germany, i.e., similar extraterritorial communications by road and rail for the purpose of free and unrestricted access to her port of Gdynia.

9. In the event of the Corridor reverting to the German Reich, the Reich declares its readiness to proceed to an exchange of population with Poland to the extent to which the Corridor lends itself.

10. Any special rights desired by Poland in the port of Danzig would be negotiated on a basis of parity against equal rights for Germany in the port of Gdynia.

11. In order to remove any feeling in this area that either side was being threatened, Danzig and Gdynia would be given the character of purely mercantile towns, that is to say without military installations or military fortifications.

12. The peninsula of Hela, which as a result of the plebiscite would go either to Poland or to Germany, would be similarly demilitarized in either case.

13. Since the Government of the German Reich have the gravest complaints to make against Polish treatment of minorities, and since the Polish Government, for their part, feel obliged to make complaints against Germany, both parties shall declare that they agree to have these complaints submitted to an internationally constituted commission of enquiry, whose task would be to examine all complaints regarding economic or physical damage as well as any other acts of terrorism. Germany and Poland undertake to make good all economic or other damage done to minorities on either side since the year 1918, and to cancel all expropriations or, as the case may be, to provide complete compensation to persons affected by these and any other encroachments on their economic life.

14. In order to free the Germans remaining in Poland, and the Poles remaining in Germany, from the feeling that they have no rights under international law, and above all to secure them against being called upon to perform actions or render services incompatible with their national sentiments, Germany and Poland shall agree to protect the rights of both minorities by means of the most comprehensive and binding agreements, so as to assure to these minorities the preservation, free development and practice of their national character [*Volkstum*], and in particular to permit them such organization as they may consider necessary for this purpose. Both parties shall undertake not to call upon members of the minority for military service.

15. In the event of agreement on the basis of these proposals, Germany and Poland shall declare themselves ready to order and to carry out the immediate demobilization of their armed forces.

16. The further measures necessary for the more rapid execution of the above arrangements shall be agreed upon between Germany and Poland conjointly.

End of text of proposals.²

SCHMIDT

² The identical text was despatched to Rome as telegram No. 428 (100/64776-80) at 10:53 a.m. on Aug. 31, to Moscow as telegram No. 234 (7992/E575544-49) at 7:10 p.m. on Aug. 31, and to Paris as telegram No. 418 (7991/E575500-05) on Aug. 31, the precise hour of despatch not being recorded in this case.

No. 459

1625/389215

The State Secretary to the Legation in Lithuania

Telegram

No. 120

BERLIN, August 30, 1939—9:15 p.m.
zu Pol. II 3085.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counsellor von Rintelen.

With reference to your telegram No. 73 of August 29.¹

In conversations with the Lithuanian Government you are requested to express still more clearly than has already been done, on the basis of our telegram No. 114,² our sympathies with Lithuanian aspirations to the Vilna area, and to state the view that, in the event of a territorial rearrangement taking place between Germany and Poland, any Lithuanian claims to the Vilna area might also to a large extent be taken into consideration.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 419.

² Document No. 410.

No. 460

247/163912

The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 84 of August 30

COPENHAGEN, August 30, 1939—10:10 p.m.
Received August 30—11:30 p.m.

With reference to my telegram No. 80 of August 29.¹

... (group mutilated) Mohr² informed me:

¹ Document No. 407.

² Secretary General at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

In connection with the British statement to the Western neutrals,³ the Foreign Minister had already expressed to the British Minister⁴ on Monday evening the hope that Britain would also strictly respect Denmark's neutrality, especially in the air. Thereupon the British Minister today gave an assurance to the Danish Government⁵ similar to that given by Germany.

RENTHE-FINK

³ See document No. 379.

⁴ Sir Patrick Ramsay.

⁵ On Aug. 30 in London the Foreign Office issued a statement that the British Minister in Copenhagen had conveyed an assurance to the Danish Government that as long as Danish neutrality was respected by Germany it would of course be respected by the British Government, who had no desire that Denmark should be involved in a war which they still hoped might be avoided.

No. 461

F17/393-95

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, August 31, 1939.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, HENDERSON, AT MIDNIGHT ON AUGUST 30, 1939¹

Henderson first handed over the written communication enclosed. He added two oral communications.²

He said that complete restraint on the part of the Polish Government could only be expected if the German Government adopted the same attitude on their side of the frontier, and if there were no acts of provocation by the German minority in Poland. Reports were circulating to the effect that the Germans in Poland were committing acts of sabotage which would justify the strongest counter measures on the part of the Polish Government.

The Foreign Minister most emphatically contradicted this last remark by the British Ambassador. Germany knew only of Polish acts of provocation, but Polish propaganda had evidently not failed in its effect on the British Government. The most outrageous acts of sabotage were being committed by the Poles. In the German records there were 200 cases alone of murders committed by Poles. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) refused to discuss this subject at all with the British Government. Henderson's third communication referred to the German Government's reply of the previous day,³ in which the German Government had stated their willingness to enter into direct

¹ This document is printed here for the convenience of the reader.

² For the instructions to Sir N. Henderson to make these two communications, see *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, Nos. 580, 538; for his instructions on the British Government's reply, see *ibid.*, Nos. 534, 543, 545, 547 and 548; and for his account of this interview, see *ibid.*, Nos. 570, 571, 574 and 588.

³ See document No. 421.

contact with Poland if the Polish Government would send a plenipotentiary at once. The British Government were not in a position to advise the Polish Government to comply with this procedure. They proposed to the German Government that matters should be set in motion through normal diplomatic channels, i.e., by handing the proposals to the Polish Ambassador, so that he, in consultation with his Government, might be enabled to make preparations for direct German-Polish negotiations. If the German Government would also communicate these proposals to the British Government, and if the latter thought that the proposals formed a reasonable basis for a settlement of the problems at issue, they would bring influence to bear on Warsaw towards achieving a solution.

Henderson, referring to the last paragraph of the German reply of the previous day, asked if the German proposals had already been formulated and whether these proposals could be handed to him.

The Foreign Minister replied that (1) so far British mediation had produced only one definite result, namely, Polish general mobilization. (2) Germany had expected a Polish representative to arrive today. This had not been an ultimatum, as the British Ambassador had wrongly supposed, but, as the Führer had already explained the day before, a practical proposal dictated by the requirements of present circumstances. Up to midnight, Germany had heard nothing from the Poles. The question of possible proposals therefore no longer arose. But in order to show what proposals Germany had intended to make if the Polish representative had arrived, the Reich Foreign Minister read out the German proposals contained in the enclosure.⁴

Henderson replied that the Foreign Minister's statement that the non-arrival of the Polish representative by midnight on Wednesday nullified the proposals which Germany had originally intended to make, seemed to confirm his interpretation that the proposal was an ultimatum.

The Foreign Minister again vehemently contradicted this view and referred to the Führer's statement of the previous day that speed was required owing to the fact that two mobilized armies were facing each other within firing range and an incident might at any moment start a serious conflict.

In conclusion Henderson proposed that the Foreign Minister should summon the Polish Ambassador and hand him the German proposals.

The Foreign Minister refused to do this himself and closed the conversation, having reserved all decisions for the Führer.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister, according to instructions.

DR. SCHMIDT
Minister

⁴ Not attached, but see documents Nos. 458 and 482 with footnote 2 thereto.

[Enclosure]⁵

BERLIN, August 30, 1939.

His Majesty's Government appreciate the friendly reference in the declaration contained in the reply of the German Government³ to the latter's desire for an Anglo-German understanding and to their statement of the influence which this consideration has exercised upon their policy.

2. His Majesty's Government repeat that they reciprocate the German Government's desire for an improvement in relations, but it will be recognized that they could not sacrifice the interests of friends in order to obtain that improvement. They fully understand that the German Government cannot sacrifice Germany's vital interests, but the Polish Government are in the same position, and His Majesty's Government believe that the vital interests of the two countries are not incompatible.

3. His Majesty's Government note that the German Government accept the British proposal and are prepared to enter into direct discussions with the Polish Government.

4. His Majesty's Government understand that the German Government accept in principle the condition that any settlement should be made subject to an international guarantee. The question of who shall participate in this guarantee will have to be discussed further, and His Majesty's Government hope that to avoid loss of time the German Government will take immediate steps to obtain the assent of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics whose participation in the guarantee His Majesty's Government have always assumed.

5. His Majesty's Government also note that the German Government accept the position of the British Government as to Poland's vital interests and independence.

6. His Majesty's Government must make an express reservation in regard to the statement of particular demands put forward by the German Government in an earlier passage in their reply. They understand that the German Government are drawing up proposals for a solution. No doubt these proposals will be fully examined during the discussions. It can then be determined how far they are compatible with the essential conditions which His Majesty's Government have stated and which the German Government have expressed their willingness to accept.

7. His Majesty's Government are at once informing the Polish Government of the German Government's reply. The method of contact and the arrangements for discussions must obviously be agreed with all urgency between the German Government and the

⁵ This document is in English in the original.

Polish Government, but in His Majesty's Government's view it would be impracticable to establish contact so early as today.

8. His Majesty's Government fully recognize the need for speed in the initiation of discussions and they share the apprehensions of the Chancellor arising from the proximity of two mobilized armies standing face to face. They would accordingly most strongly urge that both parties should undertake that during negotiations no aggressive military movements will take place. His Majesty's Government feel confident that they could obtain such an undertaking from the Polish Government, if the German Government would give similar assurances.

9. Further His Majesty's Government would suggest that a temporary *modus vivendi* might be arranged for Danzig, which might prevent the occurrence of incidents tending to render German-Polish relations more difficult.

No. 462

52/35363

The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 544 of August 30

PARIS, August 30, 1939.¹

Received August 31—12:30 a.m.

A usually well-informed confidant, who has connections with French left-wing circles, reports the following:

At his visit yesterday, Blum warned Daladier against allowing himself to be driven by the General Staff into a preventive war. The Chairman of the Parliamentary Group of the Radical Socialist Party² also exerted his influence in this direction. The motive for the *démarche* is said to be the fear prevalent among Socialists and Radical Socialists that on the outbreak of a conflict developments in domestic policy would encourage *Boulangisme*, which would give all the power to the Right and lead to the annihilation of the Socialist Party in particular.

Blum, and also a section of the Radical Socialists, were said to fear that the attitude and the growing power of the General Staff, of which Polish circles in Paris were not unaware, might have serious repercussions in Warsaw and perhaps cause the Poles to launch a rash attack. Daladier had therefore been earnestly requested by the parties mentioned to exert a moderating influence on Warsaw. Observation here on the whole confirms the above information, especially with regard to the growing influence of the General Staff, which takes the view that the present mobilization must help to clarify the European situation: either war or a peaceful solution, which would obviate the necessity of another mobilization for an indefinite period.

BRÄUER

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

² Albert Chichery.

No. 463

323/193739

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 30, 1939.

The Latvian Minister¹ today enquired about the situation and tried to draw optimistic conclusions from the developments of yesterday. I told him that there was not the slightest cause for this. Although it was true to say that, as a result of the German-British conversations, the possibility of the Poles declaring themselves willing to negotiate at the last moment had not yet been written off, we regarded this possibility with the greatest scepticism. The situation was still extremely grave. Our determination to solve the Polish question was unshakeable.

The Minister then asked if there had been any agreement about the Baltic States during the German-Russian talks. I replied in the negative. The Minister referred to various rumours and, in particular, to an article in the *Kölnische Zeitung* which was supposed to have stated that Germany and the Soviet Union had divided between them their *Lebensraum* in the East. I said that I thought it out of the question that the *Kölnische Zeitung* should have published anything of the kind. The only thing that was correct, and I assumed that this was the subject of the article in the *Kölnische Zeitung*, was that we were of the opinion that Eastern [European] questions concerned Germany and the Soviet Union alone.

WOERMANN

¹ Edgars Kreevinš.

No. 464

1571/380170

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

SECRET

BERLIN, August 30, 1939.

Subject: Deliveries of coal to Italy.

The demand that deliveries of coal to Italy under contract should be maintained in spite of the mobilization measures has been conveyed by me both in writing and orally to the Ministry of Transport, as representing the wishes of the Führer and the Foreign Minister.¹ State Secretary Kleinmann assured me that everything possible would be done to carry this out. The only result, however, is the following:

The German railways are at present so heavily engaged in transporting troops that at the most three coal trains daily—a daily total of 3000 tons—can be despatched to Italy by way of Switzerland.

¹ See document No. 394.

Two further trains, which left to go by the Brenner route, are held up in the Nuremberg area.

It is not expected that this state of affairs can be altered until Wednesday, September 6, unless the Führer orders military transport to be reduced accordingly.

From September 6, it will be possible to send 13 trains a day, i.e., 13,000 tons to Italy through Switzerland and over the Brenner. This would give a monthly total of about 325,000 tons. A further increase by way of the St. Gotthard and Brenner lines is technically not possible. The Tauern railway, which is at present closed by the military authorities, would, even if made available, only allow a very slight increase in coal supplies.

Therefore, given these possibilities, of the amount of 755,000 tons a month promised to the Italians by treaty,² barely half can be delivered. The reason for this is that the contractual agreement was made on the basis of the transport conditions hitherto prevailing, when only about 125,000 tons of the promised monthly total of 755,000 tons went by rail—630,000 tons being shipped by sea.

Submitted to the State Secretary for the Foreign Minister.

WIEHL

² See vol. IV of this Series, document No. 451, and vol. VI, document No. 360.

No. 465

2722/532724

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 233

BERLIN, August 30, 1939

Sent August 31—1:40 a.m.

e.o. Pol. VII 1536.

We learn from a strictly confidential but completely reliable source that the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow¹ was instructed on August 27 to bring about a bilateral pact between Russia and Turkey, and also to see what he could do about Soviet anti-Turkish policy. It also appears from the report that the Soviet Ambassador in Turkey² recently addressed enquiries to the Turkish Government about a pact of this kind.

Please obtain information about Turkish-Russian negotiations without revealing our knowledge of the above-mentioned report. We should also be particularly interested to know what bearing the new pact would have on the already existing Turkish-Soviet Pact of Friendship.³

WOERMANN

¹ Ali Haydar Aktay.

² Alexei Terentiev.

³ A Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression between Turkey and the Soviet Union was signed in Paris on Dec. 17, 1925. For the text see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 125, pp. 1001-1002.

No. 466

52/35367

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 667

BERLIN, August 31, 1939.

The British Ambassador telephoned me this morning at 10:15 a.m. and told me the following:

On his own personal responsibility, and although the text of the German proposals for the solution of the German-Polish problem had not been handed to him by the Reich Foreign Minister but had only been communicated orally, he—Henderson—was exploring every conceivable avenue with a view to rendering possible a peaceful solution even now. He had therefore suggested to the Polish Government, with reference to his conversation yesterday with the Reich Foreign Minister,¹ that they should approach the German Government for the purpose of entering into negotiations.

Also on his own personal responsibility, he requested the German Government to refrain from any precipitate action until the result of his personal *démarche* in Warsaw was known.

Purely for my own private information, Henderson added that he was exerting strong pressure in Warsaw through Ambassador Lipski to secure acceptance of his suggestion mentioned above. He was doing the same through London.

In conclusion, Henderson said that what he was doing was done exclusively in the interests of preserving peace between Germany and Britain.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 461.² See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, Nos. 575, 578 and 581.

No. 467

52/35368

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 668

BERLIN, August 31, 1939.

The Italian Ambassador called on me at 11:30 a.m. in order to deliver the following message urgently:¹

Mussolini had made contact with London this morning² in order to inform them that he could do nothing further at the moment in the cause of peace, unless a new factor arose. Such a factor would be the immediate cession of Danzig before other conversations were embarked on. The remainder of the German-Polish problem could

¹ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 491.

then be solved in greater tranquillity and by means of direct negotiations between Berlin and Warsaw.

Mussolini had acquainted Attolico with these matters and instructed him to inform the Foreign Minister and also the Führer, and to add that, obviously, his plan still required a certain margin of time for negotiation.

On the other hand, London had informed Rome that the one difficult problem now was actually a question of procedure, that is, whether the German Government should send for Lipski or whether Lipski should come of his own accord in order to receive our proposals. Could not this last obstacle be surmounted somehow or other.²

WEIZSÄCKER

² See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 580.

No. 468

610/248259-60

The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Slovakia

Telegram

No. 142

BERLIN, August 30, 1939.
Sent August 31—11:40 a.m.
Pol. IV 1082 g. Rs.

With reference to your telegram No. 167 of August 24.¹

For information.

On August 29 the Slovak Minister here submitted the following:²

1. A request that the promise regarding territory lost in 1938 should be extended to the areas lost to Poland in 1920. The Minister was told that while we were favourably disposed towards this question, we could not at present give any assurances. There is, however, no intention at present of promising more.

2. An enquiry whether the promise regarding the territory lost in 1938 also applied in the event of a peaceful settlement. On being answered in the negative, the Minister asked that the promise be extended to cover this. This is not envisaged at present.

3. A request on behalf of his Government for an announcement in the German press putting an end to rumours that Slovakia had been promised to other countries. I told the Minister that the rumours were completely without foundation, but that an announcement in the press would be inopportune.

4. A request for better current political information, in particular exact data on the conversations with Britain. While emphasizing our willingness in principle to supply this, I told the Minister that in

¹ Document No. 237.

² Woermann's memorandum recording this conversation is not printed (610/248256-57).

certain circumstances it was impossible to give information even to good friends. Moreover the State Secretary will give the Minister further information on August 31.³

I thanked the Minister for the understanding attitude of the Slovak Government, particularly the Minister President's appeal.⁴ In conclusion I pointed out to the Minister that it was purposeless to praise Germany in statements and at the same time to attack Hungary, as the Propaganda Chief, Mach, had done. Černák said that he had already protested several times in Bratislava against a provocative attitude towards Hungary.

WOERMANN

³ See document No. 488.

⁴ The reference is presumably to an appeal broadcast by Tiso on the night of Aug. 29 calling on the Slovak people to obey the German troops.

No. 469

6783/E518574

Minute by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, August 31, 1939.

W 1530 g.

Lieutenant Commander Koch (War Economy Staff) enquired at 1 p.m. whether the Foreign Ministry still agreed that the twenty howitzers promised to Holland even in the event of war should be delivered.¹ The howitzers were ready for despatch. The High Command of the Wehrmacht thought that delivery should be made.

After consulting the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department, I stated that the Foreign Ministry agreed.²

S[ABA]TH

¹ See Addendum to vol. VI of this Series.

² A memorandum by Kreutzwald of July 1 (6783/E513560), giving details of the order which the Netherlands Government had placed with Krupps, bears the following marginal note: "The transaction will be carried out. S[abath] 11/9."

No. 470

52/35336

Circular of the State Secretary¹

Telegram

BERLIN, August 30, 1939.

[Sent August 31—1:10 p.m.]²

e.o. Pol. II 3098.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counsellor Rintelen.

For confidential information.

The British Ambassador has communicated to us a proposal by his Government that the German-Polish problem should be solved by

¹ Addressees were all diplomatic Missions, the Consulates General at Calcutta, Ottawa, Sydney and Danzig and the Consulate at Geneva.

² The time of despatch is taken from the Rome copy (2290/483374).

direct German-Polish negotiations. In spite of our scepticism as to the prospects of such an attempt, we have accepted the British proposal and have agreed to the immediate despatch of a Polish plenipotentiary through British mediation.

The seriousness of the situation is still unchanged, as the tension cannot be said to have relaxed, and our determination to settle the problem in one way or another in the shortest possible time remains unshaken.

Repeated to all Missions.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 471

34/23299

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, August 31, 1939.

1. As instructed, I asked Ambassador Count Schulenburg at 2 o'clock today, with reference to his telegram No. 241,¹ when the Soviet Military Delegation would arrive in Berlin. The Ambassador replied that they were leaving Moscow tomorrow morning, September 1, by air. Their passports with their names had already been sent to the Embassy. The officers' military ranks, however, could not be discerned from these passports. He would report further by telegram.²

2. I told the Ambassador that the Foreign Minister wished identical communiqués to be published in Berlin and Moscow on the arrival of the Military Delegation. For this purpose I suggested to him the text given in the enclosure,³ which Count Schulenburg will discuss with the Foreign Ministry in Moscow.

3. Molotov had just sent word to Count Schulenburg that he had advanced the date of his expected speech to today. Ratification will thus be completed today.⁴

WOERMANN

¹ Document No. 456.

² In telegram No. 243 of Aug. 31 (103/111564), Schulenburg gave the names as Maxim Purkayev, Military Attaché, Michael Belyakov, Assistant Military Attaché, Nikolai Skorniyakov, Assistant Military Attaché for air questions, and Alexander Sedych and Ivan Bashanov, Secretaries to the Military Attaché. See also document No. 480.

³ This draft (34/23300) reads: "In connection with the conclusion of the German-Russian Pact of Non-Aggression and Consultation, provision was made for the despatch of a Soviet Russian Military Delegation. This delegation, led by . . . (name and rank) . . . has arrived in Berlin today."

⁴ Schulenburg also recorded this conversation with Woermann in a memorandum (127/69457) dated Aug. 31, 4 p.m.

No. 472

22/13677

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 99 of August 31

OSLO, August 31, 1939—3 p.m.

Received August 31—4 p.m.

Britain's declaration of neutrality towards Denmark¹ is interpreted here as a counter move to Germany's declaration of neutrality.² I suggest that similar German enquiries be addressed to Norway in order to see if this will have the effect of Britain following Germany's example here as well. If Britain does not do so, certain conclusions can then be drawn regarding her attitude to Norway in the event of war.

SAHM

¹ On Aug. 30; see document No. 460.

² See documents Nos. 396 and 407.

No. 473

52/35371

The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

ROME (Vatican), August 31, 1939—3:05 p.m.

No. 74 of August 31

Received August 31—4:01 p.m.

The Pope, through the Cardinal Secretary of State, has asked me to communicate to the Führer and Chancellor the following message, which was handed to me in writing:

"His Holiness is unwilling to abandon the hope that negotiations in progress may lead to a just and peaceful solution for which the whole world is constantly praying.

"His Holiness therefore, in the name of God, entreats the Governments of Germany and Poland to do everything to avoid any incident, and to abstain from taking any measure that might aggravate the present tension. He asks the British, French and Italian Governments to support his entreaty."

The Cardinal Secretary of State added that the Powers concerned would receive a similar communication.¹

BERGEN

¹ The French, Italian and Polish Ambassadors, and the British Minister to the Holy See, communicated the text of the Pope's appeal to their Governments on Aug. 31. See the *French Yellow Book*, No. 310, *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 494, the *Polish White Book*, No. 114, and *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 602.

No. 474

F14/350

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, September 1, 1939.

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, ATTOLICO, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER AT 5 P.M. ON AUGUST 31, 1939

Ambassador Attolico communicated the urgent desire of the Duce that the Führer should receive the Polish Ambassador, Lipski, to establish in this way at least the minimum contact necessary for the avoidance of a final breach.¹

The Foreign Minister informed Attolico briefly about the situation, particularly mentioning the Führer's waiting in vain for the Polish negotiator, and then promised to transmit the Duce's wish to the Führer.

Ambassador Attolico further asked for the German proposals. These, too, were promised him for later in the afternoon.

Submitted to the Foreign Minister, in accordance with instructions.

DR. SCHMIDT
Minister

¹ See also document No. 467.

No. 475

132/323629

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 673

BERLIN, September 1, 1939.

On the afternoon of August 31, on instructions from the Foreign Minister, I spoke to the Polish Ambassador as follows:

I had now been in touch with the Foreign Minister, and had the following further question to ask regarding Lipski's request to be received:¹ Did Lipski come as envoy from the Polish Government with the necessary full powers?

Lipski replied that he came as Ambassador, in order to make a communication to the Government of the Reich from his Government.

I thereupon reported to the Foreign Minister accordingly.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ No German record of this request has been found, but see the *Polish White Book*, Nos. 110 and 111. See also Appendix I to this volume, entry for 1600 hours on Aug. 31.

No. 476

F14/348-49

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RM 42

BERLIN, September 1, 1939.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE POLISH AMBASSADOR, LIPSKI, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON AUGUST 31, 1939, AT 6:30 P.M.

Ambassador Lipski read out the following instructions from his Government:

August 31, 1939.

During the past night the Polish Government were informed by the Government of Great Britain of the exchange of views with the German Government regarding the possibility of direct conversations between the Reich Government and the Polish Government.

The Polish Government are favourably considering the suggestions of the Government of Great Britain and will make them a formal reply on the subject within the next few hours.

Ambassador Lipski replied in the negative to the question repeatedly put to him¹ by the Foreign Minister as to whether he was empowered to negotiate. He only had instructions to remit to the Foreign Minister the instructions already read out, which he thereupon handed to him in writing.²

The Reich Foreign Minister then briefly outlined the exchange of views between the German and British Governments, and Germany's proposal that in the course of August 30 a Polish representative should come to Berlin. The Führer had waited throughout the whole day, but only in the evening had he received a somewhat non-committal statement from the British Government.

In reply to a further question by the Foreign Minister as to the possibility of Lipski being empowered to negotiate, the latter again stated that he had no plenary powers for any negotiations.

Submitted to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.

DR. SCHMIDT
Minister

¹ See also document No. 475.

² The written communication (52/35385) is identical with the text cited above; see also the *Polish White Book*, Nos. 110 and 112, and *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 630.

No. 477

323/193741-42

The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 117 of August 31

RIGA, August 31, 1939—6:35 p.m.

Received August 31—9:00 p.m.

The Foreign Minister¹ told me formally today that the Latvian Government in no way felt themselves affected by the German-Russian Agreement, and, in the event of a conflict in Eastern Europe, expected the Agreement to be a further strengthening of Latvia's neutrality, or, in the event of a peaceful settlement, a contribution to the *rapprochement* between the peoples of Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, as he had told me several times, there was still uneasiness among the public because they feared they were being abandoned to Russia.² This idea was eagerly fostered by British and Polish propaganda. He was therefore wondering whether, in addition to the Government's efforts at enlightenment, Germany herself could not make some reassuring gesture. This need not be an official declaration by the German Government, or even a statement by the Legation, as in the case of Finland.³ If we agreed, he had it in mind to send an official announcement to the press, in connection with one of our next conversations, stating that in an exhaustive conversation the German Minister had, among other things, repeated the statements already made by the competent authorities that the conclusion of the German-Russian Pact did not lessen the independence, integrity and security of the Baltic States, and that it was not connected with any agreements affecting the Baltic States. During the conversation mention was also made of the declarations recently given by Germany to several European States, with regard to respecting their neutrality. It was agreed by both sides that the Non-Aggression Pact of June 7⁴ between Germany and Latvia rendered a declaration of this kind to Latvia unnecessary.

Unless I receive instructions to the contrary by the morning of September 2, I shall assume that I am authorized to agree to this announcement.⁵

KOTZE

¹ Vilhelms Munters.

² In despatch No. A 1400 of Aug. 30 (1807/411583-85), received at the Foreign Ministry on Aug. 31, Kotze had reported a conversation between a member of his staff and the Head of the Press Department of the Latvian Foreign Ministry. The latter had declared, very probably on instructions from his Minister, that "the prevailing mood in Latvia was one of considerable irritation and anger against Germany since the latter, by the conclusion of the Russo-German Pact, had moved from its old position of hostility, on which the Baltic States had thrived, to a relationship which abandoned these States to any Russian action without any possibility of defence . . .".

³ See document No. 339 and footnote 5 thereto.

⁴ See vol. vi of this Series, Editors' Note, p. 664.

⁵ In telegram No. 186 of Sept. 1 (823/193743), Weizsäcker requested Kotze not to make any statement nor to agree to any announcement for the time being, but to await further instructions. See also document No. 511.

No. 478

147/78814-15

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, September 1, 1939.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE
ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, ATTOLICO, AT 7 P.M. ON AUGUST 31, 1939

The Führer handed the Italian Ambassador a copy of the German proposals and a press notice, observing that, owing to the attitude of the Polish Government, the proposals no longer held good. The British attempt at mediation must thus be regarded as having failed.

Ambassador Attolico then mentioned that, on the occasion of an offer to mediate made by Mussolini some days previously, the Führer had stated that Britain had just made a proposal and that it was desired first to wait and see its effect. Now that the Führer had himself stated that the British proposal must be looked upon as having failed, the question arose whether the Duce could not for his part undertake mediation. He therefore asked the Führer whether he would agree to the Duce now acting as mediator.

The Führer answered that we must first await the course of events. He had no desire to expose himself to repeated slaps in the face from the Poles, and did not want to place the Duce in an awkward position by accepting his mediation. He was convinced that in their present frame of mind the Poles would pay no attention to the Duce either.

To Attolico's question as to whether everything was now at an end, the Führer replied in the affirmative.¹

Submitted to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.

DR. SCHMIDT
Minister

¹ For Attolico's account of this conversation, see *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. xiii, No. 507.

No. 479

136/73839

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 880 of August 31

SAN SEBASTIAN, August 31, 1939—7 p.m.

Received August 31—8 p.m.

It is to be expected that, on the outbreak of war, the Spanish Government will find themselves compelled by French and British pressure to define their attitude and to proclaim their neutrality.

Judging from the personal assurances of Franco to Ciano (my telegram No. 671 of July 13),¹ from the latest statements of the new Foreign Minister,² and from the definition given here, in this respect, to the German-Spanish Treaty of Friendship,³ we can certainly look forward to this Spanish neutrality being exercised in a manner thoroughly friendly to us. Nevertheless, we should be prudent, especially at the start of the war, not to put too heavy a burden on the good will of the Spaniards, which undoubtedly exists, by making demands which are too obvious to the outside world. Otherwise, as happened in the Great War, Spain might well be compelled by severe French and British pressure, which must then be expected, to practise towards us a less benevolent neutrality. Bismarck⁴ and the new Italian Ambassador⁵ share this opinion.

STOHRER

¹ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 668.

² Col. Beigbeder.

³ Of Mar. 31, 1939. See vol. III of this Series, document No. 773.

⁴ Deputy Director of the Political Department; no evidence has been found as to the purpose of his visit to San Sebastian.

⁵ Gen. Gastone Gambara, previously head of the Italian Military Mission in Spain.

No. 480

103/111562

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, August 31, 1939.

Ambassador Count Schulenburg telephoned from Moscow at 7:20 p.m. and reported as follows:

1. The Russian officers¹ are to arrive at Tempelhof tomorrow afternoon, September 1, via Stockholm.

Their ranks are: General, Brigadier General, Colonel, Major.

2. After a brilliant speech by Molotov,² the Supreme Soviet have ratified the Treaty. It will be published in the Soviet press tomorrow. The Ambassador requests that the German ratification should be published simultaneously.

WOERMANN

¹ See document No. 471.

² For a translation of this speech see *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, Appendix III.

No. 481

321/193112-13

The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 76 of August 31

KOVNO, August 31, 1939—9:06 p.m.

Received August 31—11 p.m.

Minister President Černius has stated in a speech to Lithuanian journalists that Lithuania would preserve her neutrality and defend Lithuanian territory against any aggressor with all her means. The necessary military measures for safeguarding her neutrality had been taken. The entire Lithuanian press underlines the determination to remain neutral, and the German move¹ is mentioned with special satisfaction. In fact the press in general has also taken up a neutral attitude, apart from a few deviations which I have raised with the Foreign Ministry.

In so far as there is any concern here about violation of Lithuanian neutrality, it is directed against Poland, as no Lithuanian-Polish non-aggression pact exists and no official Polish statement on respecting Lithuanian neutrality has as yet been made during the present crisis. This, however, according to rumours current here, seems to be expected tomorrow. As General Rastykis² has informed the Military Attaché³ in the strictest confidence, the military measures taken consist almost exclusively of troop reinforcements along the Polish frontier, whereas only very few formations have been brought up to war-time strength along the German frontier. However, the strictest secrecy is being observed regarding this, as it is desired to avoid any outward demonstration against Poland. Bizauskas,⁴ too, to whom in accordance with your telegram No. 115 (Pol. II 1114 g. Rs.)⁵ I suggested demonstrative action along the Polish frontier in view of the Polish attitude up to the present, avoided discussion on it and confined himself to replying that Rastykis had informed the Military Attaché in strict confidence of the Lithuanian measures. The Government at present are all the less inclined to take action against Poland because, while on the one hand one section of public opinion entertains the hope of acquiring Vilna, another section, also within the Government, inclines, if not actually towards Poland, in any case towards Britain and France. I shall continue to work in the sense of your telegrams No. 115 of August 29 and No. 116 of August 30.⁶

ZECHLIN

¹ See document No. 419.² C.-in-C. of the Army.³ Lt. Col. Just.⁴ Deputy Minister President.⁵ Document No. 429.⁶ Document No. 470, which was telegram No. 116 to Kovno.

No. 482

116/66552

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 671

BERLIN, August 31, 1939.

This evening between 9 and 10 o'clock I handed over, as instructed, the German Government's communiqué¹ and proposals² for the settlement of the problems of Danzig, the Corridor, etc., to the following Heads of Missions:

- 1) the British Ambassador
- 2) the French Ambassador
- 3) the Japanese Ambassador
- 4) the United States Chargé d'Affaires
- 5) the Russian Chargé d'Affaires (Nikolai Ivanov).

I told each of the five diplomats that the German Government considered it important to describe in the documents handed over the situation as it appeared to them at the present moment. In no case did I add any further remark on the subject, nor did any of my visitors ask a question.

The Japanese Ambassador alone said a few words on receiving the documents; he said he had always been convinced that the victory of Germany would at the same time be in the interests of Japan.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]³

BERLIN, August 31, 1939.

His Britannic Majesty's Government informed the German Government, in a Note dated August 28, 1939,⁴ of their readiness to offer their mediation towards direct negotiations between Germany and Poland over the problems in dispute. In so doing they made it abundantly clear that they, too, were aware of the urgency of the matter in view of the continuous incidents and the general European tension. In a reply dated August 29, 1939,⁵ the German Government, in spite of being sceptical as to the desire of the Polish Government to come to an understanding, declared themselves ready in the interests of peace to accept the British mediation or suggestion. After considering all the circumstances prevailing at the time, they

¹ See enclosure.

² Not attached. According to Sir N. Henderson's account (see *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. vii, Nos. 619 and 622), the "Proposals" contained in document No. 458 were communicated to him at the same time as the enclosure here printed.

³ The text of the enclosure and of the "Proposals" (see footnote 2 above) was broadcast by the German radio at 9 p.m. on Aug. 31.

⁴ See document No. 384, enclosure.

⁵ See document No. 421.

thought it necessary in their Note to point out that, if the danger of a catastrophe was to be avoided, then action must be taken promptly and without delay. In this sense they declared themselves ready to receive a personage appointed by the Polish Government up to the evening of August 30, with the proviso that he was, in fact, empowered not only to discuss but to conduct and conclude negotiations.

Further, the German Government pointed out that they felt they could make the basic points regarding the offer of an understanding available to the British Government by the time the Polish negotiator arrived in Berlin.

Instead of a statement regarding the arrival of an authorized Polish personage, the first answer the Government of the Reich received to their readiness for an understanding was the news of the Polish mobilization, and only towards 12 o'clock on the night of August 30, 1939,⁶ did they receive a somewhat general assurance of British readiness to help towards the commencement of negotiations.

Although the non-arrival of the Polish negotiator expected by the Government of the Reich removed the necessary condition for informing His Majesty's Government of the views of the German Government as regards possible bases of negotiation, since His Majesty's Government themselves had pleaded for *direct* negotiations between Germany and Poland, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Ribbentrop, gave the British Ambassador, on the occasion of the presentation of the last British Note, precise information as to the text of the German proposals which would be regarded as a basis for negotiations in the event of the arrival of the Polish plenipotentiary.

The Government of the German Reich considered themselves entitled to claim that in these circumstances a Polish personage should, at least belatedly, be nominated forthwith. For the Reich Government cannot be expected for their part not only to emphasize continually their willingness to start negotiations, but actually to be ready to do so, while being, from the Polish side, merely put off with empty subterfuges and meaningless declarations.

It has once more been made clear, as a result of a *démarche* which has meanwhile been made by the Polish Ambassador,⁷ that the latter himself has no plenary powers either to enter into any discussion, or even to negotiate.

The Führer and the German Government have thus waited two days in vain for the arrival of a Polish negotiator with plenary powers.

In these circumstances the German Government regard their proposals as having, this time too, been to all intents and purposes rejected, although they consider that these proposals, in the form in

⁶ See document No. 461.

⁷ See document No. 476.

which they were made known to the British Government also, were more than loyal, fair and practicable.

The Reich Government consider it advisable to inform the public of the bases for negotiation which were communicated to the British Ambassador by the Reich Foreign Minister, Herr von Ribbentrop.

No. 483

169/82699-700

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 401 of August 31

BUCHAREST, August 31, 1939—9:40 p.m.

Received September 1—4:15 a.m.

A report was broadcast on the London shortwave transmitter on August 30 at 6 p.m. London time, that an official (group mutilated—? person)¹ in Bucharest had told a correspondent that transparently tendentious reports had been made concerning Rumania's political attitude in the event of a conflict, and that in view of this (two groups mutilated)² should be made clear:

a) The existence of a Rumanian-Polish alliance,³

b) Rumania's growing friendship with Turkey, who belonged to the peace front.

Foreign Minister Gafencu told me the following today:

1. The Rumanian-Polish Alliance did not (group mutilated)⁴ against Germany. This attitude of the Rumanian Government's, which he had already explained to me previously, remained unalterable.

2. Relations with Turkey continued as before to be solely concerned with obligations under the Balkan Pact. He had again declared unequivocally to Turkey that Rumania was not joining any combination of Powers in the Mediterranean, and had called on her to associate herself with the policy of neutrality which Rumania and Yugoslavia intended to pursue. Turkey showed a strong inclination to comply, if Italy did not attack and Bulgaria remained neutral. All rumours about the aggressive intentions of Turkey and Rumania towards Bulgaria were inventions.

¹ The Bucharest draft (8377/E591192-93) here reads: "personage".

² The Bucharest draft here reads: "two facts".

³ A Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Poland and Rumania was signed at Bucharest on Mar. 26, 1926, and renewed in substantially the same form on Jan. 15, 1931, with provision for automatic extension at five-yearly intervals unless denounced; for the texts see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 125, pp. 981-983, and vol. 134, pp. 1050-1051. For details of successive Polono-Rumanian secret military conventions or *arrangements techniques*, see *Polskie Siły Zbrojne w Drugiej Wojnie Światowej* (*Polish Armed Forces in the Second World War*), published by the General Sikorski Historical Institute in London, 1951, vol. 1, Pt. 1, pp. 106-107; it is there stated that these Conventions, of which the most recent was concluded in 1931, provided for mutual aid in case of aggression "by Eastern neighbours".

⁴ The Bucharest draft here reads: "apply".

Political contact and coordination with Yugoslavia were again complete; Rumania had not exerted any influence on Poland recently. If we wished Rumania to do so, he was willing, but here he wished to emphasize that this offer was made on his own initiative and not on that of Poland.

He had made the proposal for a non-aggression pact with Hungary in order to prove also to Germany and Italy that Rumania wished to remain outside a conflict. On Hungary's proposal for a minorities pact, Rumania held the view that such an agreement would afford Hungary the possibility of interference in Rumania's domestic affairs.⁵

He had in mind, rather, a reciprocal declaration in favour of minorities. Discussions with the Hungarian Minister⁶ were being continued.

FABRICIUS

⁵ See also documents Nos. 245, 361, 380 and 385.

⁶ László de Bárdossy.

No. 484

91/100080-61

The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

DUBLIN, August 31, 1939—10:50 p.m.

No. 52 of August 31

Received September 1—2:30 a.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 72 of August 29.¹

I carried out my instructions today in the presence of Walshe.² De Valera repeated the statement, previously mentioned in my report A 143 of February 23, 1939,³ that the Government's aim was to remain neutral. The final decision would have to be taken by the Irish Parliament in due course. It was also his wish to maintain friendly relations with Germany. He feared that an expression of unimpeachable neutrality, translated as "non-objectionable", might easily give us cause for objections. He said that in spite of the Irish Government's sincere desire to observe neutrality equally towards both belligerents, Ireland's dependence on Britain for trade vital to Ireland on the one hand, and on the other the possibility of intervention by Britain if the independence of Ireland involved an immediate danger for Great Britain, rendered it inevitable for the Irish Government to show a certain consideration for Britain, which in similar circumstances they would also show to Germany. Other

¹ Document No. 428.

² Joseph P. Walshe, Secretary to the Department of External Affairs.

³ Not printed (3730/E037370-75). The report dealt with De Valera's statement of Feb. 16, 1939, to the Dail on Eire's international position in the event of a war.

danger points were, in particular, any violation either by Britain or by us of Irish territorial waters, exploitation of the anti-British radical nationalist movement, and finally any hostile action against the population on the other side of the Northern Ireland frontier who wanted to return to the Irish State. My general impression was one of a sincere effort to keep Ireland out of the conflict, but of great fear, which De Valera discussed in the usual doctrinaire fashion which betrays his real weakness. Nevertheless our *démarche* has made a definitely favourable impression. De Valera intends to submit my statement, of which I had to promise a brief version in writing, to the Cabinet without delay, and will then, if the occasion demands, give me further information. The Government also wanted a short announcement in the press that, in view of friendly German-Irish relations, I, on behalf of the Reich Government, had promised respect for Irish neutrality, and De Valera for his part also said that the maintenance of friendly relations with Germany, as well as with other countries, was desirable, and referred again to the declaration of February 17, that the policy of the Irish Government was directed towards neutrality. The Government consider it important that our announcements should be identical and simultaneous. Please telegraph whether you agree and the date of the announcement.⁴

HEMPEL

⁴ See also documents Nos. 499 and 527.

No. 485

1559/377958

*The Führer and Chancellor to The Duke of Windsor, Antibes, France*¹

BERLIN, August 31, 1939.

I thank you for your telegram of August 27.² You may rest assured that my attitude towards Britain and my desire to avoid another war between our peoples remain unchanged. It depends on Britain, however, whether my wishes for the future development of German-British relations can be realized.

ADOLF HITLER

¹ This document was found in the files of the Brussels Embassy. There is no indication of how or why it got there. It bears the marginal note: "To be filed. B[argen] 7/9."

² Not found.

No. 486

B21/B005083

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States

Telegram

No. 240

August 31, 1939.¹

Please inform the State Department, in suitable form, that President Roosevelt's messages of August 25 and 26 [sic]² have been fully appreciated by the Führer. The Führer has, for his part, left no stone unturned in order to settle the German-Polish question in an amicable manner, and, in particular, has even at the eleventh hour accepted a British offer of mediation. All these attempts have been unsuccessful, however, owing to the Polish Government's attitude. Please take all particulars regarding this from today's official DNB communiqué and make use of them accordingly.

RIBBENTROP

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.² See document No. 328.

No. 487

129/120874-76

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Portugal

Telegram

No. 199

BERLIN, August 31, 1939.¹

e.o. Pol. II . . .

Drafting officer: Senior Counsellor von Rintelen.

With reference to your telegrams No. 152 of August 25² and No. 162 of August 29.³

Information transmitted from Lisbon concerning the ambiguous attitude of the Portuguese Government makes it appear necessary, in view of the general situation which is strained to the uttermost as a result of Poland's conduct, that a clear picture should be obtained of the attitude of the Portuguese Government in the event of hostilities in Europe. I request you, with this object, immediately to make the following statement to the Portuguese Minister President.⁴

We are determined, should hostilities break out, to refrain from any aggressive act towards Portugal, in conformity with the friendly relations we cultivate with that country, and to respect the inviolability of Portuguese national territory as well as Portuguese possessions, if Portugal maintains an impeccable neutrality towards us in

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.² Document No. 278.³ Document No. 416.⁴ António de Oliveira Salazar.

any future conflict. Only if this condition should, contrary to our expectation, not be fulfilled, would we naturally be compelled, as regards Portugal also, to protect our interests in the sphere of warfare in such a way as the situation then prevailing might dictate.

You are requested, when making this statement, to enquire in addition whether we may count on impeccable neutrality from Portugal, should war break out between Germany and Great Britain. In case of need, kindly refer to the Havas report contained in telegram No. 162, which gives us every reason for making such an enquiry. If the Minister should reply to this enquiry with a reference to Portugal's treaty obligations towards Great Britain, you are requested to answer that we are unable to admit an appeal to these treaty obligations. The intervention of Great Britain in the German-Polish conflict could in no way be justified by any British interest in the questions in dispute between Germany and Poland, but would rather be a war of aggression against us, for which we have not given the British Government the slightest cause. In these circumstances, we would naturally have to regard a non-neutral attitude by Portugal in exactly the same light as a completely unjustified hostile action by Portugal against us. We should, of course, deeply regret this in view of the good relations hitherto existing between Germany and Portugal, but we deem it necessary to make this point perfectly clear between our two Governments now.

Report by telegram on action taken.⁵

RIBBENTROP

⁵ See document No. 522.

No. 488

506/235075

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 670

BERLIN, August 31, 1939.

I have just received the Slovak Minister¹ in order to tell him that the situation was becoming increasingly accute. I answered the Minister's question as to whether there were now no longer any prospects of a peaceful solution by saying that this did not depend on us. Equally I evaded the question as to whether hostilities might not even break out tonight. I noted in a friendly manner the Slovak Minister's request that, in the event of a peaceful settlement, Slovakia's territorial desires should also be considered, and that, in the event of a solution by force of arms, those Slovak areas lost to Poland twenty years ago should also be returned to Slovakia. I said, however, that in view of the fact that leading officials were overburdened with work, I was not at present in a position to give a more precise answer.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See also document No. 468.

No. 489

73/51993

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 31, 1939.

As instructed,¹ I informed the Hungarian Minister today that certain events in Hungary were being watched here with justifiable mistrust. On August 28, an international [? football] match took place between Hungary and Poland. A large section of the Hungarian press adopted a pro-Polish attitude, supporting evidence of which I handed to him,² emphasizing that these were only a few examples out of many. The Minister had, indeed, said that all reports about a declaration of neutrality by Hungary were inventions, but a declaration to this effect had been made by Tibor von Eckhardt.³ Count Bethlen's⁴ visits to London and Paris were also regarded here with mistrust. I finally reminded him of the Hungarian-Polish fraternization on the frontier.

I further informed the Minister that General Keitel had, according to instructions,⁵ refused to deliver to Hungary certain war material as long as the Hungarian attitude in the present crisis remained as uncertain as hitherto.

M. Sztójay was visibly taken aback by this revelation. He protested again that there could not be the slightest doubt about Hungary's loyal attitude to the Axis. The Hungarian Government had never done or said anything which could justify suppositions to the contrary. He could not deny the facts I gave; perhaps there was a lack of control over the press.

I requested the Minister most urgently to exert his influence to bring about the disappearance of those symptoms, which were being very carefully watched here, and to have the attitude of Hungary made clear.

Further, I drew the Minister's attention to the non-arrival of Polish negotiators and the serious position thereby created.⁶

WOERMANN

¹ In an undated minute by Weizsäcker (73/51992).

² Not found. However, in a letter of Sept. 1, addressed to Woermann (73/51998), Sztójay listed and replied to three press items in turn. The letter concluded that the cuttings were of no importance for assessing either Hungarian public opinion or the political attitude of the Hungarian Government whose views were contained in the statement handed to Ribbentrop that afternoon. See document No. 533.

³ Leader of the Hungarian Smallholders Party. In a speech of Aug. 19 he had stated that Germany must recognize that Hungary could not give a monopoly—even of friendship—to anyone.

⁴ Count István Bethlen, former Hungarian Minister President, life member of the Hungarian Upper House.

⁵ No further record of such instructions has been found in the Foreign Ministry archives.

⁶ A résumé of this conversation was sent by Woermann to Budapest as telegram No. 256 of Aug. 31 (73/51994) with the request that the same line should be followed in conversations there.

No. 490

1571/380171

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

SECRET

BERLIN, August 31, 1939.

Subject: Delivery of coal to Italy.

After further enquiries and efforts by the Ministry of Transport, it appears that the maximum amount of coal which we can deliver to Italy by rail from September 6 is somewhat better than that given in yesterday's memorandum,¹ in fact our daily delivery could be:

9 trains of 800 tons each via Basle	=	7200 tons
3 trains of 800 tons each via Schaffhausen	=	2400 tons
8 full trains of 800 tons each via the Brenner	=	6400 tons

Total per working day	16,000 tons
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Monthly total	400,000 tons
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Submitted through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister.

WIEHL

¹ Document No. 464.

No. 491

1571/380172

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

SECRET

BERLIN, August 31, 1939.

Subject: Delivery of coal to Italy.

With reference to the memorandum¹ submitted this morning, it should further be pointed out that the figures hitherto given as feasible by the Ministry of Transport cannot be maintained in the event of war with France, as in that case it will hardly be possible to use the railway line via Basle. According to information from the Ministry of Transport, the use of the Stuttgart-Schaffhausen railway line for the transport of coal to Italy would also in that event hardly be possible, as this section of the line would then be fully taken up with military traffic. As freight traffic to Italy over the St. Gotthard would in that case be practically out of the question for other goods, and as these goods also would have to be routed via the Brenner, the coal trains scheduled to carry 6400 tons a day, or 160,000 tons a month, over the Brenner could very probably not be maintained, but would, according to circumstances, have to be reduced to about 120,000-150,000 tons a month.

Submitted herewith through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister.

WIEHL

¹ Document No. 490.

1132/323634

No. 492

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VIII

BERLIN, August 31, 1939.

In No. 8 of the White Book,¹ which reproduces the Führer's conversation with Ambassador Henderson,² there is a passage in which the Führer declares himself ready not only to guarantee the continued existence of the British Empire, but also to cooperate in its defence at any given point.

I would point out that the publication of this passage might not only bring about a complete break with Japan, but might one day serve as a pretext for Japan's entry into the war on the side of our enemies.

Herewith submitted to Under State Secretary Woermann.

KNOLL

¹ i.e., *Urkunden zur letzten Phase der deutsch-polnischen Krise* (Berlin, 1939); see also Appendix IV.

² On Aug. 25; see document No. 265, of which the text is the same as that of No. 8 of the White Book cited above.

No. 493

Nuremberg document 126-C
Exhibit GB-45

Directive by the Führer

TOP SECRET MILITARY
OFFICERS ONLY

BERLIN, August 31, 1939.

OKW/WFA No. 170/39 g.K.Chefs. L I

8 copies.
2nd copy.

DIRECTIVE NO. 1 FOR THE CONDUCT OF WAR

1. Now that every political possibility has been exhausted for ending by peaceful means the intolerable situation on Germany's eastern frontier I have determined on a solution by force.

2. The attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance with the preparations made for "Operation White [*Fall Weiss*]",¹ with the alterations, in respect of the Army, resulting from the fact that strategic deployment has by now been almost completed.

Assignment of tasks and the operational objective remain unchanged.

Day of attack	September 1, 1939.
Time of attack	4:45 a.m.

This timing also applies for the Gdynia-Gulf of Danzig, and Dirschau Bridge operations.

¹ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 185, enclosure 2.

3. In the West, it is important that the responsibility for the opening of hostilities should be made to rest squarely on Britain and France. Insignificant frontier violations should, for the time being, be opposed by purely local action.

The neutrality about which we have given assurances to Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Switzerland must be scrupulously respected.

On land, the German western frontier is not to be crossed at any point without my express permission.

At sea, the same applies for all warlike actions or actions which could be regarded as such.²

The defensive measures of the Luftwaffe are, for the time being, to be restricted to those necessary to counter enemy air attacks at the Reich frontier, whereby the frontiers of neutral States are to be respected as long as possible in countering single aircraft and smaller units. Only if large French and British formations are employed over the neutral States in attacks against German territory and the air defence in the West is no longer assured, are counter measures to be allowed even over these neutral territories.

The speediest reporting to OKW of any violation of the neutrality of third States by our western opponents is particularly important.

4. If Britain and France open hostilities against Germany, it is the task of the Wehrmacht formations operating in the West to conserve their forces as much as possible and thus maintain the conditions for a victorious conclusion of the operations against Poland. Within these limits enemy forces and their military economic resources are to be injured as much as possible. Orders to go over to the attack are reserved to me in every case.

The Army will hold the West Wall and make preparations to prevent its being outflanked in the north through violation of Belgian or Netherlands territory by the Western Powers. If French forces enter Luxembourg, the demolition of frontier bridges is authorized.

The Navy will carry on warfare against merchant shipping, directed mainly at Britain. To intensify the effects a declaration of danger zones may be expected. OKM will report in which sea areas, and to what extent, danger zones are considered expedient. The wording of a public announcement is to be prepared in consultation with the Foreign Ministry and submitted to me through OKW for approval.

The Baltic Sea is to be protected from enemy raids. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy will decide whether the approaches to the Baltic Sea should be blocked by mines for this purpose.

The Luftwaffe is, in the first place, to prevent the French and

² Marginal note: "Thus, Atlantic forces will for the time being remain in a waiting position."

British Air Forces from attacking the German Army and German living space.

In conducting the war against Britain, preparations are to be made for the use of the Luftwaffe in disrupting British supplies by sea, the armaments industry, and the transport of troops to France. A favourable opportunity is to be taken for an effective attack on massed British naval units, especially against battleships and aircraft carriers. Attacks against London are reserved for my decision.

Preparations are to be made for attacks against the British mainland, bearing in mind that partial success with insufficient forces is in all circumstances to be avoided.

ADOLF HITLER

Distribution List

OKH	= 1 (Copy No. 1)
OKM	= 1 (Copy „ 2)
R.d.L.u.Ob.d.L.	= 1 (Copy „ 3)
OKW:	
Chief WFA	= 1 (Copy „ 4)
L.	= 4 (Copies Nos. 5-8)

No. 494

B21/B005084

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 297 of September 1 WASHINGTON, September 1, 1939—1:23 a.m.
Received September 1—10:15 p.m.

Germany's 16 points¹ for an understanding with Poland were at first commented on by radio and press with surprise and relief, and subsequently referred to as an astute manoeuvre aimed at misleading the public and concealing the fact that Germany is giving ground.

As Britain's attitude is not yet known here, President Roosevelt is holding back. Up to the present he has only issued the appeal for the humanization of air warfare,² which has been reported verbatim by the DNB, and appeased the American press at his conference by saying that he confidently hoped and believed America could be kept out of a war.

THOMSEN

¹ See document No. 458.

² See document No. 530.

No. 495

800/274179

Circular of the State Secretary¹

Telegram

BERLIN, September 1, 1939 [5:45 a.m.]²
e.o. Pol. II . . .

Drafting Officer: Senior Counsellor von Rintelen.

For your confidential information.

Our expectation that, in accordance with our proposal transmitted by the British Government to Warsaw, a Polish plenipotentiary would be sent immediately to take up direct German-Polish negotiations, has not been fulfilled. On the contrary, Poland, as is known, ordered general mobilization yesterday.³ In these circumstances the situation has undergone a further extremely grave deterioration.

Repeated to all Missions.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Addressees were all diplomatic Missions, the Consulates General at Calcutta, Ottawa and Sydney, and the Consulate at Geneva.

² The hour of despatch is taken from the Rome copy (7987/E575390).

No. 496

215/146400

Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union

Moscow, September 1, 1939.

At 7:30 a.m. General Martini (?)¹ rang up from the Air Ministry in Berlin and wanted to speak to General Köstrig. As it was impossible to transfer the call, I took the message. It reads as follows:

"The Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe² would be very much obliged to the People's Commissariat for Telecommunications if—for urgent navigational tests—the Minsk Broadcasting Station could, until further notice and commencing immediately, send out a continuous dash with intermittent call-sign 'Richard Wilhelm 1.0.' in the intervals between its programmes, and introduce the name 'Minsk' as often as possible in the course of its programme."

A reply is requested as to whether and from what time onwards this transmission will take place.³

To the Military Attaché with my compliments.

COUNT V.D. SCHULENBURG

¹ Lt. Gen. Wolfgang Martini, Director of Signals Communications of the Luftwaffe.

² Maj. Gen. Hans Jeschonnek.

³ In telegram No. 250 of Sept. 1 (215/146403-04), Schulenburg sent the following reply: "The Soviet Government are prepared to meet your wishes in such a manner that the Minsk Broadcasting Station will introduce as often as possible the word 'Minsk' during the course of its programme, which could be extended by two hours for this purpose. Please advise whether any definite periods are particularly required for this. The Soviet Government would prefer to omit the addition of a call-sign, so as to avoid attracting attention."

No. 497

5556/E395409

*The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Legation in Rumania*

Telegram

No. 375 of September 1

BERLIN, September 1, 1939—9:05 a.m.
zu W 1510 g.¹ [Ang.] I.With reference to your [telegram] No. 392.¹

I. 1. Anti-aircraft and machine-guns have been released and are already in transit by rail to Yugoslavia.

2. Delivery of the second series of Heinkel fighters will be made as soon as the Rumanian pilots have arrived by air, probably at the beginning of next week.

3. The contract for engines² has been signed by Junkers and submitted to the Foreign Ministry for forwarding to Bucharest by the next courier.

II. All departments are agreed that armaments deliveries to Rumania are to be carried out in all circumstances.

For guidance on language to be held: Delivery is at present made extremely difficult by the other demands on the railways. We are trying to fit the transport trains into the military timetable.

III. Please inform Gerstenberg.³

CLODIUS

¹ Document No. 454.² Not found, but see document No. 243.³ Col. Gerstenberg, the Air Attaché.

No. 498

52/35396

Unsigned Memorandum

Telephoned from Danzig—Consul General von Janson—at 9:35 a.m., September 1, 1939.

Consul General von Janson has communicated the following:

1. The High Commissioner, together with his secretary, has left Danzig by car in the direction of East Prussia.

2. President Nederbracht [*sic*]¹ also has received permission to cross the frontier into East Prussia by car.

3. The foreign Consuls wish to remain here with the exception of those of Portugal, Brazil and Norway, who have so far not been contacted.

4. The British Consul General² has asked for safe conduct for his staff and himself.¹ Dr. Nederbragt, President of the Danzig Harbour Board.² F. M. Shepherd.

5. Chodaeki is at his home. The Polish Mission has not yet been occupied.

6. The Russian Consul General³ has asked for facilities to telephone Moscow, Berlin or Warsaw.

The American Consul⁴ has requested permission to telephone or send a telegram to Washington.

7. Sharp fighting has taken place around the Polish Post Office in the Heweliusplatz and around the Westerplatte.

8. The Oberpräsident of Königsberg⁵ should be duly notified of the fact that these people have left for East Prussia.

³ I. Vlassov.

⁴ C. P. Kuykendall.

⁵ Erich Koch; his office was that of senior official in the civil administration. Koch was also Gauleiter of East Prussia.

No. 499

91/100062

The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

DUBLIN, September 1, 1939—10:36 a.m.

No. 53 of September 1

Received September 1—12:30 p.m.

With reference to my telegram No. 52 of August 31.¹

I mention, in order to avoid misunderstandings, that my declaration to De Valera adhered of course closely to instructions. The draft of the proposal for a press announcement originates with Walshe. If, in view of the rapid developments which have meanwhile taken place, I am compelled to make an independent² decision, I shall only agree to a public statement which conforms to the text of the instructions.³ The wording noted⁴ by the Government would perhaps enable them to adopt a firmer attitude towards Britain.⁵

HEMPEL

¹ Document No. 484.

² The original reads "*selbstverständlich*" ("obvious") presumably an error for "*selbständig*", i.e., "independent".

³ See document No. 428.

⁴ This word, "*beachtet*", has been queried as a dubious group in the original.

⁵ See also document No. 527.

No. 500

147/78882

The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 439

BERLIN, September 1, 1939—9:40 a.m.

Sent 11:00 a.m.¹

For the Ambassador.

Please give the following message to the Duce immediately:²

DUCE: I thank you most cordially for the diplomatic and political support which you have been giving recently to Germany and her just cause. I am convinced that we can carry out the task imposed upon us with the military forces of Germany. I do not therefore expect to need Italy's military support in these circumstances. I also thank you, Duce, for everything which you will do in future for the common cause of Fascism and National Socialism.³

ADOLF HITLER

¹ See also document No. 505, according to which this letter was also telephoned through.

² It would appear that this telegram was sent in response to a personal message from Mussolini to Hitler, conveyed through Attolico early that morning. See *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 529, and Appendix I, Pt. II, entries of Sept. 1, 8:30 a.m. and 9:15 a.m., and for the text of Mussolini's message, No. 563. See also the *Ciano Diaries*, entry of Sept. 1, 1939.

³ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 530.

No. 501

52/35400-01

*Memorandum by the Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain*¹

LONDON, September 1, 1939.

While members of the Embassy were gathered together in the large Conference Room in order to hear the Führer's speech,² an urgent telephone message came from the Foreign Office, requesting me to come immediately to 10 Downing Street for an interview. In Downing Street, I caught a glimpse of the Polish Ambassador,³ who had obviously just had an interview with Lord Halifax.

In a few minutes, Lord Halifax received me in Sir Horace Wilson's room, a secretary being present who took down the conversation in shorthand. After formally greeting me by shaking hands, Lord Halifax informed me of the following:

The British Government had received reports that German armed forces had crossed the Polish frontier at various places. The Polish

¹ Typewritten marginal note: "Telephone message from London, September 1, 11:45 a.m."

² To the Reichstag, summoned in special session. A translation of this speech is printed in the *British Blue Book*, Cmd. 6106, No. 106.

³ Count Raczynski.

Ambassador had mentioned four such places. Moreover, several Polish towns, among them Warsaw, had been subjected to air attack. Lord Halifax then asked me whether I had any information from my own Government. I replied that no instructions had reached me, except the Notes concerning restrictions on shipping and air traffic in the Bay of Danzig,⁴ which I had forwarded to him this morning. Lord Halifax had not as yet been informed of these Notes. I went on to tell Lord Halifax that, when his request arrived for me to come to Downing Street, I was just listening to the relay of the Führer's speech to the German Reichstag. Up to the moment, however, when I left the room, there had been no mention in the speech of German troops having crossed the frontier.

Lord Halifax then continued in these words:

"These reports create a very serious situation."⁵ He had nothing further to add to this at the moment, except to tell me that the Cabinet would meet this morning and that any further communications would be made to the Reich Government in Berlin. Lord Halifax would inform me of their nature.

On my departure we again shook hands.⁶

TH. KORDT

⁴ Not found.

⁵ In the original the words "... create a very serious situation" are set in English alongside the German.

⁶ See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 690.

No. 502

52/35402

The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry¹

[LONDON, September 1, 1939.]

On the basis of a telephone communication received by Dr. Hesse, the Press Adviser, from the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry, I have just rung up Lord Halifax and informed him as follows:

The reports of the bombardment of Warsaw and Polish towns are described by the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry in Berlin as entirely untrue.

I also told Lord Halifax that, according to the account by the members of the Embassy,² the Führer used somewhat the following turn of phrase in his speech which has just ended: "The Poles have been firing repeatedly across the frontier during the night, and since this morning we have been firing back." I emphasized that I had

¹ Typewritten marginal note: "Telephoned from the German Embassy in London."

² A postscript by Welck, of the German Embassy in London (52/35403), who evidently telephoned to Berlin the above message, reads: "To the report made from London by Counsellor of Embassy Dr. Kordt, I desire to add the following observation: The Chargé d'Affaires was summoned to Mr. Chamberlain [*sic*] during the Führer's speech; therefore he could not hear the second part." See document No. 501.

considered it my duty to bring this important communication to his notice. Lord Halifax thanked me. He repeated every single expression, so I assume that this information too has been recorded verbatim.³

KORDT

³ See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 690, according to which the telephone conversation took place at 11:30 a.m.

No. 503

52/35453

The Embassy in France to the Foreign Ministry

Radio-Telegram

No. 554

PARIS, September 1, 1939—12:45 p.m.

Received September 1—1 p.m.

General mobilization ordered; first day of mobilization September 2.

MILITARY ATTACHÉ¹¹ Lt. Col. von Horn.

No. 504

147/78879-81

The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 440

BERLIN, September 1, 1939—12:45 p.m.¹

To the Italian Minister President, Benito Mussolini.

For the Ambassador personally. Await receipt of further instructions by telegram before handing over [following text].²

The latest attempt by Britain at mediation has also failed. I had once more declared myself ready to solve the problem between Germany and Poland by way of negotiations. For two whole days I have waited in vain for a Polish negotiator. Instead:

1) Polish general mobilization has been declared, and

2) a series of further intolerable acts of terrorism have been committed. Last night alone there were fourteen more cases of frontier violation, three of which were very serious. In these circumstances, after having repeatedly warned Poland against continuing such acts, I have now decided to answer force with force. Come what may, I will carry through this struggle with all the fanaticism of which I and the German people are capable. I thank you, Duce, for all your efforts. I thank you in particular also for your offers of mediation.

¹ Marginal note: "May be sent off without being initialled: B[runs] 1/9." See also document No. 505, according to which the letter was also telephoned through.

² These instructions were superseded by a telephone conversation; see document No. 505.

But from the start I was sceptical about these attempts, because the Polish Government, if they had had even the slightest intention of solving the matter amicably, could have done so at any time. But they refused even to embark on any true understanding which, as things stood, would have involved concessions on their part. For, after all, it was not Germany who took away something from Poland, but Poland from Germany; and, conversely, it was not the Poles in Germany who were maltreated, but the Germans in Poland. For this reason, Duce, I did not want to expose you to the danger of assuming the role of mediator which, in view of the Polish Government's intransigent attitude, would in all probability have been in vain.

Come what may, National Socialist Germany will ensure, in one way or another, that that state of peace and calm shall also come to her eastern frontier which we happily enjoy on all our other frontiers.³

ADOLF HITLER

³ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 542.

No. 505

100/64734-35

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy

ROME, September 1, 1939.

At 11:15 a.m. Senior Counsellor Kordt telephoned on behalf of the Foreign Minister informing me that two telegrams, numbered 439¹ and 440,² were on the way to me. The Foreign Minister requested me to get in touch with the postal authorities here, and ask that these telegrams be sent to me with all possible speed. They contained the text of two letters from the Führer to the Duce, but this fact was only for my information. I was to hand these to the Duce personally at the very earliest moment. Also the communication contained in telegram No. 440, as the further telegraphic instructions announced therein, and for which I was to wait, would not now follow. When I asked when the telegrams had been despatched and how long they were—which I had to know, so that I could judge approximately when I should call on the Duce—Herr Kordt confirmed that so far only No. 439 had been sent off, at 10:30 a.m., but that No. 440 was still being enciphered. The first telegram was about half a page in length and the second two pages. I told Herr Kordt that I would take the necessary steps, but must make it clear at once that, in view of the time required, no false hopes should be entertained.

At 11:50 a.m., the Foreign Minister rang me up personally from

¹ Document No. 500.

² Document No. 504.

the Reich Chancellery and asked me to have the two letters from the Führer to the Duce taken down immediately over the telephone, as their transmission by telegraph would probably take too long, and then to hand the letters to the Duce as quickly as possible. Following immediately on this, the text of the two telegrams was transmitted here by telephone.

Immediately afterwards I was rung up by Senior Counsellor Kordt, who informed me that he had just telephoned to us the two letters from the Führer to the Duce. Referring to our previous telephone conversation, he requested me to take the further action necessary. I replied that in the meantime I had been rung up by the Foreign Minister personally, and had already been given the text of the letters by telephone on another line. We confirmed jointly that the text of these letters had therefore arrived here by three channels.

At 12:15 p.m. I further informed the Foreign Minister's Secretariat by telephone that the Duce would receive me at 1 p.m.³

After the audience with the Duce, I reported by telephone to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat at 1:50 p.m. that the letters had been handed over, adding that a telegram dealing with my conversation with the Duce would be despatched without delay.⁴

MACKENSEN

³ *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series vol. XIII, Appendix I, Pt. II, states that the first letter was transmitted to the Duce by the German Ambassador at 10 a.m., and the second at 3 p.m.

⁴ See document No. 507.

[EDITORS' NOTE: On September 1, in Rome, the Council of Ministers met at 3 p.m. under the chairmanship of Mussolini. Following the meeting an announcement was broadcast at 4:30 p.m., which declared to the Italian people that Italy would take no initiative in the way of military operations (for the full text, see *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 665). Immediately after this announcement Hitler's message to Mussolini (document No. 500) was broadcast. See also the *Ciano Diaries*, entry of September 1.]

No. 506

5556/E395410-11

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 406 of September 1

BUCHAREST, September 1, 1939—3 p.m.

Received September 1—6:20 p.m.

W 1556 g.

For the Air Ministry. To be submitted immediately to the Commander-in-Chief for a decision.

Position on petroleum supplies from Rumania: The Rumanian Government and firms are ready to continue petroleum deliveries.

The Rumanian Government released, during the past week alone, additional petroleum exports amounting to 8 million Reichsmark. Further supplies are possible through the clearing account if German armament deliveries continue. I request you, therefore, to arrange for the release of Rheinmetall anti-aircraft guns and 360 Ford lorry chassis. Before the danger of freezing sets in, it is possible to transport 400,000 tons by the Danube. Possibilities for rail transport depend upon chartered tank trucks which the Rumanian Government, as a concession to Germany, are allowing to be sent out of Rumania. The tank trucks, all of which are owned by private firms, are at present needed almost exclusively for local transport.

It would make a difference if the port of Constanța could no longer be used owing to a blockade of the Mediterranean, and also if favourable terms of payment were obtained from German transport firms.

I suggest that orders be placed at once, the petroleum purchased be transported also by rail, and the trucks be chartered through transport firms. If we do not charter the tank trucks soon, there is a danger of our enemies laying hands on them.

Rumania will deliver to Poland within the next few days roughly 800 tons of petroleum products by the Cernauți-Lwów route. I would like to point out that this route out of Rumania is the only one for Polish supplies, and is therefore gaining in importance.

FABRICIUS

No. 507

583/242167-68

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, September 1, 1939—4:30 p.m.

TOP SECRET

Received September 1—5:50 p.m.

No. 398 of September 1, 1939

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 439¹ and 440² of today.

At 1:10 p.m. I handed to the Duce, in the presence of Ciano, the two letters from the Führer. He will reply to the Führer at once.

The Duce said he was very grateful for the letters. In particular it was of the highest value to him that it should be perfectly clear that the Führer, as matters stood, was convinced that he could carry out the task to be performed with his own military forces. The news of our intended offer to Poland had had a very favourable effect here, even in circles which had previously been critical of our attitude. The offer was felt unanimously in all quarters to be fair (*equo*).³ It was most regrettable that the British had not been able to bring

¹ Document No. 500.

² Document No. 504.

³ In Italian in the original.

Poland to accept it. He had no doubt that we should soon finish off Poland. The only question was what Britain and France would do. But in that respect also he awaited developments with complete calm, as he could not envisage the possibility of immediate help being given to Poland. He was holding himself in a state of the highest military preparedness of a defensive character, and was certain he could send off over 300,000 men even now. Furthermore he would support our cause by all means, especially through the press, and he was also energetically attending to the request for Italian workers. I thanked him for this latter (renewed) assurance, and emphasized the importance of this question. The Duce thereupon remarked that he thought he could put a considerable number at our disposal, as, with the troops now called up, he would reach a figure of about 1½ million under arms, which would be sufficient for the present. He hoped to be able to send us a very considerable number of workers, in particular from the province of Venetia. When I said that we needed miners most, he observed that the worker from Venetia was so versatile that, even if he were not a skilled miner, he would attain a miner's average output within a month or two.

In conclusion the Duce emphasized that he looked forward to developments in the military field too with calmness and confidence.

Count Ciano, in our conversation this morning,⁴ assessed the situation with considerably less optimism and expects speedy and determined intervention by the Western Powers. [Also] active participation by the U.S.A., and that in the near future, and an anti-Axis attitude on the part of a large section of South America.

MACKENSEN

⁴ See also document No. 508.

No. 508

583/242169-70

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, September 1, 1939—7:10 p.m.

No. 399 of September 1

Received September 1—8:25 p.m.

Ciano mentioned, during my visit this morning, that the British Ambassador had been repeatedly to see him yesterday¹ in order to make a further attempt, in conversation with him, to discover some possibility of action by the Duce to prevent an already tense situation from violent explosion. François-Poncet, too, had called on him yesterday,² but their conversation had hardly gone beyond François-Poncet's pet subject, philosophy, and (group mutilated).³

¹ See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, Nos. 584, 595 and 621.

² See also the *French Yellow Book*, No. 306.

³ The Rome draft (100/64741-42) reads: "morals [Moral]".

This last remark does not quite tally with the fact that, on our way to the Duce at midday today, Ciano told me that he had just received the French Ambassador for the second time,⁴ and had gained the definite impression that, in spite of the failure of the British mediation, and the German-Polish conflict which had broken out openly in the meantime, the French considered it possible, even now, to prevent a general conflagration, if an immediate armistice could be arranged with the purpose of convening a major conference at once to negotiate a general settlement of the disputes which had arisen since Versailles. He could say nothing more, for he had first to report to the Duce on his conversation with François-Poncet. I confined myself to replying that for us the very word "conference" had an unpleasant ring. To which Ciano observed that really we could hardly complain at the results of the only conference in which we had taken part, namely "Munich".⁵

MACKENSEN

⁴ See also the *French Yellow Book*, No. 332.⁵ See also the *Ciano Diaries*, entries of Aug. 31 and Sept. 1, 1939.

No. 509

52/35420

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, September 1, 1939.

The Second Secretary at the British Embassy, Mr. Harrison, telephoned at 7:15 p.m. to make the following communication:¹

The British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, and the French Ambassador, M. Coulondre, requested the Foreign Minister to receive them together on a matter of urgency as soon as possible.

I said that the British Embassy could not request an interview for the French Ambassador as well, to which Mr. Harrison replied that he took note of this statement and that the French Embassy would themselves likewise telephone later on.

KORDT

¹ See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 680.

No. 510

52/35421

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, September 1, 1939.

The French Counsellor of Embassy, M. Tarbé de St. Hardouin, rang up at 7:30 p.m. in order to communicate the following:

The French Ambassador, M. Coulondre, requested the Foreign Minister to receive him this same evening on a matter of urgency. The French Ambassador requested to be received at the same time as the British Ambassador who a short time ago had also asked for an interview.¹

KORDT

¹ See document No. 509.

No. 511

127/69859

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, September 1, 1939—8:21 p.m.

No. 240 of September 1

Received September 2—3:25 a.m.

The Minister at Helsinki has recently been authorized to say in reply to the question put by the Finnish Foreign Minister that in the German-Russian negotiations no agreements of any kind have been made concerning Finland.¹ Now the Latvian Foreign Minister has approached our Minister in Riga with the same question,² and wishes to publish our Minister's reply. We intend to authorize our Minister to reply that the basis of our relations with Latvia is the Non-Aggression Pact recently concluded with her,³ and that we have naturally not entered into any kind of arrangements which would be contrary to this Pact. But before authorizing him to say this we would like to ascertain whether the Soviet Government have answered in the same manner any questions which may have been put to them.

Please discuss the matter with M. Molotov and telegraph the result immediately.⁴

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 332, and footnote 2 thereto.

² See document No. 477.

³ See vol. VI of this Series, Editors' Note, p. 664.

⁴ See document No. 550.

No. 512

52/35447

Circular of the State Secretary¹

Telegram

BERLIN, September 1, 1939—[8:35 p.m.]²

Pol. I M 856.

For guidance on language to be held:

In defence against Polish attacks, German troops moved into action against Poland at dawn today. This action is for the present not to be described as war, but merely as engagements which have been brought about by Polish attacks.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Addressees were diplomatic Missions, the Consulates General at Ottawa, Sydney, Danzig and Calcutta, and the Consulate at Geneva. The list of the diplomatic Missions to which the telegram was sent has not been found.

² The hour of despatch is taken from the Rome copy (7987/E575407).

No. 513

F14/344-47

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RM 43

BERLIN, September 2, 1939.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER
AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, SIR NEVILLE HENDERSON, AT
9 P.M. ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1939

On the instructions of his Government Sir Neville Henderson handed over the following communication together with an unofficial written translation into German in writing:¹

"1st September, 1939.²

Your Excellency,

On the instructions of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs I have the honour to make the following communication.

Early this morning the German Chancellor issued a proclamation to the German Army which indicated clearly that he was about to attack Poland.

Information which has reached His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government indicates that German troops have crossed the Polish frontier and that attacks on Polish towns are proceeding.

In these circumstances it appears to the Governments of the United Kingdom and France that by their action the German Government have created conditions (viz. an aggressive act of force against Poland threatening the independence of Poland) which call for the implementation by the Governments of the United Kingdom and France of the undertaking to Poland to come to her assistance.

I am accordingly to inform Your Excellency that, unless the German Government are prepared to give His Majesty's Government satisfactory assurances that the German Government have suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will without hesitation fulfil their obligations to Poland.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

His Excellency
The Minister for Foreign Affairs,
etc., etc., etc."

¹ Not printed (F12/109-08).

² The text of this communication is in English in the original; for the instructions to Sir N. Henderson see *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, Nos. 664 and 669.

The Foreign Minister replied that there was no question of German aggression, but that Poland had been committing acts of provocation against Germany for months. It was not Germany who had mobilized against Poland, but Poland against Germany. The previous day there had been direct incursions of regular and irregular Polish formations into German territory.

He would transmit to the Führer the communication just handed over by the British Ambassador and would then give an immediate answer. The Foreign Minister added that if the British Government had displayed the same activity towards Poland as they apparently now intended to display towards Germany, a settlement with Poland would have been found long ago.

Sir Neville Henderson replied that he would communicate these observations to his Government and asked that the contents of the communication be passed on to the Führer. He requested an answer as soon as possible.

The Foreign Minister replied that there had actually been no occasion to bring the German proposals to the notice of the British Government, as the non-appearance of a Polish negotiator had rendered these proposals invalid. Nevertheless he (the Foreign Minister) had read out these proposals to Henderson³ in the secret hope that Britain would after all bring Poland to see reason. The Führer had waited another whole day in vain. Nothing had come from the Polish side but further acts of serious provocation.

Sir Neville Henderson replied that he deeply regretted that, at his last conversation, the Foreign Minister had refused to give him (Henderson) the text of the proposals. It was understandable that when the German text was read quickly he had not grasped the greater part of this rather long and complicated document.

The Foreign Minister pointed out that he had read the document slowly and clearly, and had even given oral explanations on the main points (Danzig, plebiscite in the Corridor, protection of minorities). He had not been authorized to hand him the document and had therefore read it out in the hope that at least the following day Poland would yet agree to it. The Führer had waited another whole day and in the end had gained the impression that Britain was unwilling to do more.

When Henderson again expressed his regret that in spite of his request the proposals had not been handed to him, the Foreign Minister repeated that he had read out the document slowly and had explained individual points, so that he could suppose Henderson had understood everything.

Submitted to the Foreign Minister according to instructions.⁴

DR. SCHMIDT, Minister

³ See document No. 461.

⁴ For Sir Neville Henderson's account of this interview see *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, Nos. 682 and 684.

No. 514

34/24075

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

BERLIN, September 1, 1939.

Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg rang up at 9:25 p.m. in order to communicate the following:

The officers announced by the Soviet Government will leave tomorrow by plane for Stockholm at 8 o'clock Russian time. They will expect to be fetched from there by a German Government plane.²

As regards the proposed communiqué,³ the Soviet Government would prefer not to make a public announcement until after the arrival of the Soviet officers in Germany. A cipher telegram will follow, giving the reasons which have caused the Soviet Government to take this view.⁴

¹ Below the distribution list is a typewritten "K[ordt] Sept. 1"; the memorandum was initiated by Weizsäcker on Sept. 1. See also document No. 471.

² A memorandum by Heyden-Rynsch of even date (103/111565) reported the same information, which had been obtained by Captain von Albedyll of the Attaché Group of the OKH by telephone from Gen. Köstring in Moscow, and further stated that the Führer had ordered a guard of honour to be drawn up for the arrival of the Russian officers.

³ See document No. 471, footnote 3.

⁴ See document No. 534.

No. 515

F14/341-43

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RM 44

BERLIN, September 2,¹ 1939.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER
AND THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, COULONDRE, AT 10 P.M. ON
SEPTEMBER 1, 1939

Ambassador Coulondre handed over the following communication which is in similar terms to that previously handed over by Henderson,² without attaching a German translation:

"Berlin, September 1, 1939."³

Your Excellency,

According to instructions from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to make the following communication:

Early this morning the German Chancellor issued a proclamation to the German army which indicated clearly that he was about to attack Poland.

¹ This document is printed here for the convenience of the reader.

² See document No. 513.

³ The text of this communication is in French in the original; see also the *French Yellow Book*, No. 345.

Information which has reached the French Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom indicates that German troops have crossed the Polish frontier and that attacks upon Polish towns are proceeding.

In these circumstances it appears to the Governments of France and the United Kingdom that by their action the German Government have created conditions (viz. an aggressive act of force against Poland threatening the independence of that country) which call for the implementation by the Governments of France and the United Kingdom of their undertaking to Poland to come to her assistance.

I have accordingly to inform Your Excellency that unless the German Government are prepared to give the French Government satisfactory assurances that the German Government have suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, the French Government will without hesitation fulfil their obligations to Poland.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

COULONDRE

To His Excellency
The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs."

The Foreign Minister answered that he could do no more than make the same statement to Ambassador Coulondre as he had already made to the British Ambassador: It was not Germany who had committed an act of aggression against Poland, but Poland who for months past had provoked Germany in unprecedented fashion, by cutting off Danzig economically, cruelly harassing the German minority in Poland and continually violating the frontier. The Führer had displayed incomparable patience and had never abandoned hope that Poland would become reasonable. The reverse had been the case. Poland, after starting to mobilize months ago, had now officially ordered general mobilization and yesterday evening had not merely violated the frontier, but had made three serious incursions into German territory. Because of these facts, therefore, Germany rejected the version alleging German aggression against Poland.

In conclusion the Foreign Minister promised to inform the Führer of the content of the communication and then to give the French Ambassador a reply.

Submitted, according to instructions, to the Foreign Minister.⁴

DR. SCHMIDT
Minister

⁴ For Coulondre's account of the interview see *ibid.*, No. 344.

No. 516

370/207871

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, September 1, 1939—10:00 p.m.

No. 241 of September 1

Received September 2—5:40 a.m.

We assume with some degree of certainty that in the event of a conflict, even if France and Britain intervene, Turkey will remain neutral, at any rate as long as the conflict does not spread to the eastern Mediterranean and no attack is made by any Power on Rumania or Greece. The assumption about the Mediterranean holds good as long as Italy does not join in the war. In the same way we do not assume that any of the Powers in question would attack Rumania or Greece, or that there would be an attack on Turkey. Beyond this we ask the Soviet Government to use their influence with Turkey so that she remains neutral in any conflict. Ambassador von Papen telegraphs that Ankara attaches the greatest importance to Russia's attitude.¹ Report by telegram.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Papen had expressed this view in telegram No. 255 of Aug. 31 (96/107962), received at the Foreign Ministry on the same day, at 9 p.m.

² See document No. 551.

No. 517

169/82703

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, September 1, 1939—10:15 p.m.

SECRET

Received September 2—3:45 a.m.

No. 410 of September 1

I am reliably informed that the Reich War Ministry has sent Captain A. to Budapest with the task of accompanying the Hungarian troops in their advance into the Szatmar district, in order to safeguard the interests of the *Volksdeutsche*.

For this purpose five motor trucks with trailers manned by German Army personnel have been put at Captain A.'s disposal. In preparation for the Hungarian advance, the well-known Hungarian Colonel Homloc has already, it is said, infiltrated his bands into the Szatmar district to the number of 5000.

I learn independently of this that members of the Reich War Ministry have informed the well-known Szatmar *Volksdeutsch* organization of the receipt of instructions from Vienna, according to which Hungarian troops are moving into Szatmar and have been [sic]

accompanied by German officers, and that during the advance *Volksdeutsch* officials should hide themselves and arrange for hoisting the swastika flag on the "German House". Thereupon the *Volksdeutsch* leaders had issued appropriate orders.

The mere fact of Captain A.'s mission and of the *Volksdeutsch* instructions becoming known is bound to throw Rumanian politics into confusion. A conflict between Hungary and Rumania might, for the period of neutrality, be described . . . (group mutilated) smooth running.¹ Preparations would be desirable in case Rumania were to abandon her policy of neutrality. As, however, this neutrality is fully assured, especially after the German-Russian Pact, it would seem to be much more useful for us to exercise a moderating influence on Hungary.

FABRICIUS

¹ The Bucharest draft has not been found, so that missing and doubtful groups cannot be ascertained.

No. 518

52/35459

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

BUCHAREST, September 1, 1939—10:15 p.m.

No. 411 of September 1

Received September 2—2 a.m.

With reference to my telegram No. 401 of August 31.¹

During yesterday's conversation, the Minister President assured me once again of Rumania's strict neutrality and of the non-application of the Polish-Rumanian Assistance Pact as far as Germany is concerned. He referred to Rumania's secret hope that Germany would influence Hungary towards pacification and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. The Balkans desired to remain at peace, and this was also in Germany's interests. Rumania was endeavouring to influence Turkey too in this direction, and, it seemed to him, with success.

FABRICIUS

¹ Document No. 488.

No. 519

73/51995

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Hungary

Telegram

No. 261

BERLIN, September 1, 1939.¹

Pol. IV.

With reference to our telegram No. 256.²

Please inform the Foreign Minister at once that, as the Hungarian Government are of course aware, we do not at present expect any

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

² Not printed; see document No. 489, footnote 6.

armed assistance from Hungary. But so as not to anticipate future developments, and in order to keep all possibilities open in Hungary's own interests, we are assuming that the Hungarian Government will not declare themselves neutral. Please ascertain for certain their intentions in this respect, and if their attitude is at all doubtful bring strong influence to bear on the Hungarian Government.

RIBBENTROP

No. 520

73/51996

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUDAPEST, September 1, 1939—10:40 p.m.

No. 263 of September 1

Received September 1 [*sic*]-3:45 a.m.

With reference to your telegrams No. 256 of August 31,¹ and No. 261 of September 1.²

I have also, for my part, strongly emphasized our complaints to the Foreign Minister.

Csáky stated that he had instructed the Hungarian Minister in Berlin to declare to the Reich Foreign Minister, in the name of the Hungarian Government, their determination to maintain friendship with Germany to the utmost. On his instructions, this evening's press had stressed Poland's war guilt and the great moral strength of Germany's position. Censorship would be introduced tomorrow, which would give him better control over the opposition press.

The Hungarian Minister in Berlin, who actually had only been instructed to deny the assertion made by the opposition press that the Hungarian Government had issued a declaration of neutrality, had gone further and told Under State Secretary Woermann yesterday afternoon³ that the Hungarian Government would not do (group mutilated) in the future either. Csáky had shown his report on this to the Regent and Minister President, who had approved. The Foreign Minister, who showed full understanding for the reasons put to him, expressly assured me again that the Hungarian Government had not the slightest intention of making a declaration of neutrality.

ERDMANNSDORF

¹ Not printed; see document No. 489, footnote 6.

² Document No. 519.

³ The only record found of a conversation between Woermann and the Hungarian Minister on Aug. 31 is contained in document No. 489.

No. 521

141/127263-65

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 113 of September 1 BRUSSELS, September 1, 1939—10:45 p.m.

Received September 2—4:00 a.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 168 of August 30 (Inf.).¹

Propaganda work in Belgium must be conducted with a view to strengthening the forces working for the maintenance of neutrality and weakening opposition forces. At present the former appear to be very strong, although the mass of the Belgian people, even in the Flemish areas, sympathize with Britain and France.

The main props of the policy of neutrality are the authority of the King, the resolute will of the Government, the disinclination of the Flemish element to intervene on behalf of French interests, and the general desire of the Belgian people to live in peace. It is expedient, however, not to mention King or Government in propaganda. The Walloon element, incidentally, predominates in the Government. The weakness of the Belgian State is the opposition between Walloons and Flemings.

Five-eighths are Flemings and three-eighths Walloons. In spite of this the Walloons still predominate in the State, and the language question has not been satisfactorily solved. Nationalistic Flemings declare that they do not wish to fight against Germany. It would therefore be desirable to strengthen them to ensure neutrality. The army too suffers from the Walloon-Flemish antagonism.

The weakness of Belgian economy lies in the need for imports from overseas, which, however, are wholly dependent upon Britain and France. Hence economic questions offer no useful material for propaganda. Social policy is still undeveloped and lags behind that of Germany. The living conditions of the lower classes are, however, not unfavourable, so that there are few points for attack.

As the Belgian people are very religious and attached to the Church, especially in the Flemish areas, the Catholic Church must be left out of propaganda as long as it does not commence working against us—which, in spite of many critical utterances, cannot be asserted at present.

Propaganda must work along the following lines:

1. Belgium has nothing to gain by a possible entry into the war, but much to lose.
2. Belgium would, in this case, once again become a theatre of war and, in view of the powerful effect of modern weapons, would suffer more than in the World War.

¹ Not found.

3. Awakening Flemish nationalism will not shed its blood for French interests. Entry into the war therefore means the disruption and end of the Belgian State.

Please remember in all actions that readiness to accept German propaganda is very limited in view of the unfriendly mood prevailing in Belgium. Useful results are therefore only to be expected from very skilfully planned actions. I suggest the possible despatch of experts for personal consultation.

BÜLOW

No. 522

120/120377

The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 176 of September 1 LISBON, September 1, 1939—11:22 p.m.
Received September 2—7:40 a.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 199 of August 31.¹

Minister President Salazar noted the statement with satisfaction and then told me categorically that Portugal's alliance with Britain placed her under no obligation whatever to render assistance. Not even in the case of a defensive war. Neither could he see the slightest reason which might compel Portugal in the future to render assistance. In the long run, he thought that it must be in Britain's interests to confine the theatres of war to as few as possible, and that the most welcome solution for her would be for the whole of the Iberian Peninsula to constitute a neutral zone. It is strange that, as recently as a few days ago, when discussing the same problem, Salazar added both to the Spanish Ambassador (cf. telegram No. 152 of August 25)² and to the Italian Minister³ that he nevertheless did not know whether he would be able to withstand strong pressure from Britain. He did not add this today, although I tried several times to give him a lead for such a statement. Secretary General de Sampaio,⁴ to whom I then spoke, was more reserved, as is his nature, but he also declared that no obligations of any kind for Portugal to abandon her neutrality could be deduced from her Treaty of Alliance with Britain, and that he did not think Portugal would be compelled to do so. In any case Britain had never yet made any such suggestion.

HUENE

¹ Document No. 487.

² Document No. 278.

³ Francesco Giorgio Mameli; see also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 485.

⁴ L. Teixeira de Sampaio, Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

No. 523

52/35451-52

*The Deputy Director of the Political Department to the Embassies
in Great Britain and France*

Telegram

1. To London, No. 380

BERLIN, September 1, 1939.¹

2. To Paris, No. 433

The British, and after him the French, Ambassador this evening made the following representations to the Reich Foreign Minister on instructions from their Governments.²

The British and French Governments respectively had received information that German troops had crossed the Polish frontier and were proceeding to attack Polish towns. In these circumstances, the British and French Governments had reached the conclusion that the Government of the Reich had created conditions—that is to say an act of aggressive force against Poland, threatening her independence—which made it necessary for the Governments of Great Britain and France to intervene and come to Poland's aid.

They were accordingly instructed to inform the Reich Foreign Minister that their Governments would fulfil their obligations to Poland without hesitation, unless the Reich Government were prepared to give definite assurances to the British and French Governments that the Government of the Reich would suspend all attacks on Poland and had made all preparations to withdraw their armed forces from Polish territory immediately.

A reply will be given to both Ambassadors, probably tomorrow morning.

BISMARCK

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.² See documents Nos. 513 and 515.

No. 524

136/73840

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 889 of September 1

SAN SEBASTIAN, September 1, 1939.¹

Received September 2—4:00 a.m.

I called at once on the Spanish Foreign Minister and the Minister of the Interior² today at . . .³ in order to discuss in detail the attitude of the Spanish Government in the imminent conflict.

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.² Col. Beigbeder and Ramon Serrano Suñer respectively.³ Typewritten marginal note: "The word 'Burgos' is presumably missing here."

The Foreign Minister began by stating that, as on the outbreak of all recent wars, the Spanish Government would presumably issue the customary declaration of neutrality. It is, however, intended to notify us of this declaration beforehand in a friendly manner.

When I pointed out that Spain could certainly not remain really neutral in this war, since her future and the fulfilment of her national hopes depended on our victory, the Minister fully agreed and assured me in a tone of the greatest sincerity that Spain was willing to assist us as far as she possibly could. He said straight out that Spain's attitude in the impending struggle would be governed by two motives: her own interests and her sense of honour. The first was closely bound up with our own; the second demanded that help should be given to a tried friend who had helped Spain in her own hour of need. The Minister of the Interior was equally forthright in his remarks: "Should the outcome of the war be victory for France and Great Britain, then all the sacrifices made by Spain in the Civil War would have been made in vain." We might therefore count on Spanish support.

As a first practical measure, the Minister promised to influence the attitude of the Spanish press completely in our favour.

STOHRER

No. 525

52/35448-50

The State Secretary to the Legations in Norway, Sweden and Finland

1. To Oslo No. 154

BERLIN, September 1, 1939.¹

2. To Stockholm No. 196

e.o. Pol. II.

3. To Helsinki No. 182

Drafting Officer: Senior Counsellor von Rintelen.

As is known, we have in the past week, on account of the threatening crisis in the conflict with Poland, made declarations to a number of States bordering upon the Reich,² to the effect that we will respect their integrity in so far as they maintain strict neutrality. As there now exists the danger of an extension of the conflict, it appears to us necessary to make declarations also to Norway, Sweden and Finland, which would make it clear what attitude we will observe towards these countries, and what attitude we, for our part, shall expect from them if more extensive hostilities should develop. Please therefore make the following declaration to the Foreign Minister there:

We are resolved, in accordance with the friendly relations existing between our countries, not to injure, in any circumstances, the

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

² See documents Nos. 272, 304, 313, 315, 321 and 396.

inviolability and integrity of (1) Norway (2) Sweden (3) Finland and at all times to respect the territory of the (1) Norwegian (2) Swedish (3) Finnish State.

In making this Declaration we naturally expect on our side that (1) Norway (2) Sweden (3) Finland will observe strict neutrality towards us, and will especially not tolerate breaches of (1) Norwegian (2) Swedish (3) Finnish neutrality by third parties.

Only for 1 and 2. Should, contrary to our expectation, the attitude of the Government there, in case of such a breach of neutrality by third parties, be otherwise, we would naturally be compelled to safeguard our interests in accordance with what the situation then arising might demand.

For 1, 2, and 3. Please couch this declaration in clear, but decidedly friendly terms, in a manner in keeping with the good relations which we wish to maintain and further cultivate with (1) Norway (2) Sweden (3) Finland.

Corresponding instructions are being sent simultaneously to:

For 1. The Legations at Stockholm and Helsinki.

For 2. The Legations at Oslo and Helsinki.

For 3. The Legations at Oslo and Stockholm.

Report by telegram on action taken.³

WEIZSÄCKER

³ See documents Nos. 543 and 546 for the replies from Helsinki and Oslo. A reply from Stockholm has not been found.

No. 526

52/35424

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in the Netherlands

Telegram en clair

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, September 1, 1939.¹

No. 154

Please request the Netherlands Government to instruct their Legation in Warsaw to notify the Polish Government of the following:

The German air forces have received orders to confine their operations to military objectives. It is an obvious condition for the maintenance of this order that the Polish air forces should observe the same rule. Should that not be the case, Germany will immediately take the most severe reprisals.²

RIBBENTROP

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

² In telegram No. 85 of Sept. 2 (52/35426), Zech replied: "The Foreign Ministry states that it has notified the Polish Government through the Netherlands Legation in Warsaw and through the Polish Legation here, in accordance with your telegram No. 154."

No. 527

91/100063

The State Secretary to the Legation in Eire

Telegram

No. 85

BERLIN, September 1, 1939.¹
 zu Pol. II 8135.
 3147.²

With reference to your telegrams No. 52 of August 31³ and No. 53 of September 1.⁴

We are in agreement with a press announcement as proposed by De Valera. But when our promise is referred to, the words "conditional on a corresponding attitude by Ireland" must be added. Publication would take place here in the morning press of September 3.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

² These references are uncertain; presumably the documents referred to in footnotes 3 and 4 below.

³ Document No. 484.

⁴ Document No. 499.

No. 528

183/85957

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 672

BERLIN, September 1, 1939.

The Swiss Minister¹ handed me today the two attached *notes verbales*,² dealing with the neutrality of Switzerland and Liechtenstein.

I thanked the Minister for his communication. I pointed out, moreover, that the German attitude towards Switzerland had been clearly defined to the Federal Counsellor³ a few days previously by Minister Köcher. In conclusion, I noted with gratitude that, in the second part of the *note verbale*, the Swiss Government declared their readiness to lend every assistance to furthering humanitarian work.

I then made the further observation that, although at the moment Germany was involved in hostilities with Poland, yet in our opinion a state of war in the true sense of the term did not exist, at least not yet. From what I had myself personally seen, I could only assure the Minister that we had done everything imaginable to avert the outbreak of hostilities.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Hans Frölicher.

² Not printed (183/85958-59); see also Editors' Note below.

³ See document No. 304.

[EDITORS' NOTE: Declarations of Neutrality presented in Berlin by the representatives of the following countries have been found in the Foreign Ministry archives. (The serial and frame numbers given

after the names of the various countries include both the Notes and the Foreign Ministry memoranda recording their reception.)

September 1: Switzerland and Liechtenstein. (See document No. 528, footnote 2.)

September 2: Sweden and Finland, in the German-Polish conflict. (Reception recorded in the same memorandum by the Foreign Ministry, 52/35475-78; for Finland see also document No. 543.)

Denmark and Iceland, in the German-Polish conflict (247/163915-16).

September 3: The Netherlands. The Declaration was not confined to the German-Polish war but covered the war as a whole (173/83933-34).

Denmark and Iceland. A second Declaration in the form of two Notes to cover the war (i) between Germany and France and (ii) between Germany and Britain (9989/E697456-58).

September 4: Sweden. A second Declaration covering the war between Germany and other Powers (205/141857-58).

Finland. A further Declaration covering the war between Germany and the Western Powers (B18/B003034-36).

Belgium. A *note verbale* enclosing the official Belgian Declaration [for which see *Belgium: The Official Account of what happened*, pp. 72-77] covering the war as a whole (141/127267-68).

September 6: Yugoslavia. This Declaration covered the war as a whole (230/152025-26).

Lithuania. A Note from the Lithuanian Minister in Berlin has not been found in the Foreign Ministry archives, but on September 2 Zechlin reported by telegram from Kovno that the Lithuanian Government had brought into force neutrality legislation based on Article 3 of the Lithuanian Neutrality Act of January 25, 1939 (321/193115).

Estonia. A Note from the Estonian Minister in Berlin has not been found, but see document No. 548.

Norway. A Note from the Norwegian Minister in Berlin has not been found, but the Royal Decree of September 3 proclaiming Norway's neutrality was reported to Berlin from Oslo by Sahn in telegram No. 112 of September 4 (22/13680).]

No. 529

583/242171

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 674

BERLIN, September 1, 1939.

The Italian Ambassador called on me today to find out whether perhaps the British and French Ambassadors had already informed us of the attitude of their Governments.

I told him that I had no further information, but that I assumed that Henderson and Coulondre would present us with statements from their Governments today or tomorrow.

When I, in turn, asked him what attitude London and Paris were taking towards Rome at present, Attolico said that France would most prefer to attack Italy, in particular to make a descent on Libya: Britain, however, would not hear of any such thing.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 530

52/35443-44

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, September 1, 1939.

The American Chargé d'Affaires called on me today and handed me the enclosed copy of a Note which concerns a message from the President of the United States of America to the German Government on bombing attacks from the air, and which is similarly to be addressed to all Governments who become involved in hostilities. Because of the urgency, he had already had the original of the Note delivered at the Foreign Ministry at lunch time.

I told the Chargé d'Affaires that I could not express any official views on the Note: I could only privately refer him to what the Führer had said on the subject in the Reichstag today.¹ In refutation of the mendacious British reports, it had also already been given out today over the German radio that the German Luftwaffe was bombing military objectives only. I pointed out to him that the antiquated theory of open towns was generally rejected today, and that it was generally recognized that military objectives might be bombed wherever they were.

WOERMANN

[Enclosure]

URGENT
No. 532

BERLIN, September 1, 1939.²

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have been requested by my Government to deliver the following message immediately in the name of the President of the United States to the Government of the German Reich:

"The ruthless bombing from the air of civilians in unfortified centers of population during the course of the hostilities which have raged in various quarters of the earth during the past few years which has resulted in the maiming and in the death of thousands of defenseless men, women and children has sickened the hearts of every

¹ A translation of this speech is printed in the *British Blue Book*, Cmd. 6106, No. 106

² This Note is in English in the original.

civilized man and woman and has profoundly shocked the conscience of humanity. If resort is had to this form of inhuman barbarism during the period of the tragic conflagration with which the world is now confronted hundreds of thousands of innocent human beings who have no responsibility for and who are not even remotely participating in the hostilities which have now broken out will lose their lives. I am therefore addressing this urgent appeal to every government which may be engaged in hostilities publicly to affirm its determination that its armed forces shall in no event and under no circumstances undertake the bombardment from the air of civilian populations or of unfortified cities upon the understanding that these same rules of warfare will be scrupulously observed by all of their opponents. I request an immediate reply. Franklin D. Roosevelt."

I have the honor to add that I have been instructed to transmit at once by telegraph the reply to the foregoing message, and accordingly I place myself at Your Excellency's disposition for the transmission of the reply to my Government.

I avail myself of this occasion to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

ALEXANDER KIRK

His Excellency

Joachim von Ribbentrop

Minister for Foreign Affairs

Berlin.

No. 531

2422/511792

*The Reich Foreign Minister to the United States Chargé d'Affaires
in Berlin*

RM 443 I

BERLIN, September 1, 1939.

MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES: With reference to your Note of today's date¹ in which you transmitted to me a message from the President of the United States of America regarding the dropping of bombs on non-military objectives, I have the honour to give you below the reply of the German Chancellor to this message:

"The opinion expressed in President Roosevelt's message, that it is a law of humanity to refrain in all circumstances during military operations from dropping bombs on non-military objectives, entirely coincides with my own view, which I have always held. I therefore agree without reservation to the proposal that the Governments taking part in the present hostilities make a public declaration to that effect. For my part, I have already stated publicly in my speech in

¹ Document No. 530, enclosure.

the Reichstag today that the German air forces have received the order to confine their operations to military objectives. It is of course a condition for the maintenance of this order that the air forces of the enemy observe the same rule.

ADOLF HITLER"

I would be grateful if you would transmit the above reply to President Roosevelt immediately.

At the same time I avail myself of this opportunity, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, to renew to you the assurance of my highest consideration.

V. RIBBENTROP

No. 532

280/152018

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, September 1, 1939.

The Yugoslav Minister, who called on me in connection with a special commission not relevant here,¹ expressed himself, without special instructions, on Yugoslavia's probable attitude as follows:

1. Yugoslavia, in accordance with her repeated assurances, would adopt a strictly neutral attitude.

2. The Yugoslav Foreign Minister was continuing his efforts to induce the States of the Balkan Entente and Bulgaria to adopt a similar attitude.

I told M. Andrić that we expected benevolent neutrality from Yugoslavia. The Minister gave it as his personal opinion that such would be the attitude of his Government.

WOERMANN

¹ In a memorandum of the same date (230/152019), Woermann recorded that Andrić had informed him that all Yugoslav deliveries to Germany, including cattle, were being held up at the German frontier.

No. 533

73/51997

Memorandum from the Hungarian Legation

518/B

BERLIN, September 1, 1939.

The Hungarian Government cannot comprehend or understand why the German Government should consider Hungary's attitude as uncertain or not entirely reliable.¹

It is known to the German Government that Hungary's *loyalty in her friendship with Germany* is a basic principle of Hungarian foreign policy.

The Hungarian Government request the German Government not to be misled by others, but to count on that correct attitude which Hungary has proved to her friends by her actions in the past and which Hungary will always uphold in future too.

¹ See also document No. 489.

No. 534

103/111567

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 249 of September 1

Moscow, September 2, 1939—1:30 a.m.

Received September 2—3:45 a.m.

With reference to my telegram No. 243 of August 31.¹

Molotov requested me to call on him this evening at 10:30, and stated that the Soviet Government do not consider the communiqué announcing the arrival of the Soviet officers in Berlin desirable, for reasons of their safety. They desire that, even after arrival of these gentlemen, nothing be said about a Military Mission but that the German press merely mention the appointment of new Soviet Military Attachés. The Soviet press will act on similar lines.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Not printed; see document No. 471, footnote 2.

No. 535

583/242172-73

Memorandum by the State Secretary

BERLIN, September 2, 1939.

At 10 o'clock this morning the Italian Ambassador, on instructions from the Duce, handed me the enclosed document for the Führer and the Foreign Minister.

The Ambassador added orally that he was of course at the disposal of the Führer and the Foreign Minister at all times.¹

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]²

September 2, 1939.

For purposes of information, Italy wishes to make known, naturally leaving any decision to the Führer, that she still has the possibility of getting France, Britain, and Poland to agree to a conference on the following bases:

1. An armistice, which leaves the armies *where* they now are.
2. Convening of the conference within two to three days.
3. Settlement of the Polish-German dispute which, as matters stand today, would certainly be favourable to Germany.

The idea, which originally emanated from the Duce, is now supported particularly by France.

¹ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. xiii, No. 572, for Attolico's report that, as Ribbentrop was unwell, he left the communication with Weizsäcker.

² Translated from the German; an Italian text is printed in *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. xiii, No. 571.

Danzig is already German, and Germany has already in her hands pledges which guarantee her the greater part³ of her claims. Moreover, Germany has already had her "moral satisfaction". If she accepted the proposal for a conference she would achieve all her aims and at the same time avoid a war, which even now looks like becoming general and of extremely long duration.

The Duce does not wish to insist, but it is of the greatest moment to him that the above should be immediately brought to the attention of Herr von Ribbentrop and the Führer.⁴

³ The Italian text here reads: "a part of her claims".

⁴ The text of the enclosure was repeated by Woermann on Sept. 2 (52/35479-80) to the Embassies in Paris, London, Rome and Moscow for the personal and confidential information of the Heads of Missions.

No. 536

2642/527010-11

The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Denmark

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, September 2, 1939—11:50 a.m.

No. 165

e.o. Pol. VI 2022.

Möller, in Gravenstein, has issued an appeal in the *Nordschleswigsche Zeitung*,¹ in which he proclaimed the steadfast solidarity of the inhabitants of North Schleswig with the [German] People, Führer and Reich. He urges them to maintain discipline and to await instructions from the leaders of the Party. The intended instructions are likely to be to the effect that North Schleswigers in Germany should join in the fight.²

As Möller's appeal has certainly caused a considerable sensation in the Danish press and in Danish public opinion, and may have political repercussions, please exert the utmost influence on Möller to ensure that he, either in a speech in the Rigsdag or in some other pronouncement, emphasizes the loyalty of the North Schleswigers to the Danish Government.

(The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle draws Möller's attention to the fact that if he does not comply he will have to resign at once, and he will no longer be recognized by the Reich as *Volksgruppenführer*. Moreover, Möller is expressly forbidden to make any declaration in public without previously informing either the Legation or the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle.)³

WOERMANN

¹ Not reprinted (2642/527012-13). The appeal appeared in the *Nordschleswigsche Tageszeitung* of Sept. 1, 1939. Jens Möller was leader of the German national group in Denmark; see also vol. vi of this Series, document No. 600.

² Marginal note in Grundherr's handwriting: "Report from Schroeder, Flensburg." For Schröder see vol. v of this Series, document No. 417.

³ Typewritten marginal note: "The text in brackets was dictated by Oberführer Behrens, Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle."

No. 537

26/17028

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 106 of September 2

OSLO, September 2, 1939.

Received September 2—12:20 p.m.

Pol. VI 2028.

In accordance with the resolution passed by the Norwegian State Council the General Officer Commanding called out the regular neutrality guard of the districts of the first to fifth divisions for all arms; in the district of the sixth division (Northern Norway) units of recruits have been retained. The Admiral Commanding has ordered torpedo boats and patrol boats to be put on a war-time footing. Garrisons along the Norwegian coast have been reinforced.

SAHM

No. 538

2798/548124-25

The Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry

Radio-Telegram

No. 566 of September 2

PARIS, September 2, 1939—12:20 p.m.

Received September 2—12:55 p.m.

1. The general mobilization proclaimed yesterday has been accepted quietly by the French population and, in the view of our Service Attaché, is being carried out in an orderly manner and according to plan. Certain incidents in a Senegalese company, and displays of unwillingness to fight in Europe by Mohammedan units, which have been reported to me by agents, do not yet alter the existing picture here.

2. The press, which has been subjected to censorship for several days, is unanimous in representing the beginning of the war as a German attack and in describing both the readiness expressed by Germany on August 29 for direct negotiations with Poland and the offer formulated by Germany as a feint. (Against this I uphold our point of view as far as is still possible—also with regard to the character of our action to counter the Polish encroachment.) In conformity with the British view, responsibility for the attack is being exclusively and quite unanimously ascribed to Germany and, obviously on instructions, to the Führer personally. The attitude toward Germany is in consequence becoming hourly more hostile, and insults to the Führer multiply which, in view of the means of prevention possessed but not used by the Government, take on special

significance. (I have protested most sharply against them, at his instance [*sic*].)

3. Even though I succeeded in securing wide publicity in the press for the Führer's letter to Daladier,¹ and although our offer to Poland and the Führer's Reichstag speech were also published in detail, the news agencies of France, England and Poland are in sole possession. As far as can be seen, Molotov's speech² has not been reported in any of the newspapers here.

4. That France will fulfil her treaty obligations to Poland cannot be doubted. It is, however, an open question whether France will in consequence immediately enter into hostilities; part of this morning's press affirms that she will, while, on the other hand, a certain reserve is still noticeable.

5. In this connection the friendly attitude towards Italy stands out. Havas reports that the French Government on September 1 had before them the Italian proposal for a settlement of the difficulties which have arisen in Europe, and that a positive reply has been returned.

BRÄUER

¹ Document No. 354.

² i.e., on Aug. 31, on the ratification of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.

No. 539

F14/335-37

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RM 45

BERLIN, September 2, 1939.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, ATTOLICO, AT 12:30 P.M. ON SEPTEMBER 2, 1939

Ambassador Attolico asked what the German attitude was to the Duce's latest proposal for a conference, which is enclosed and which he had handed to State Secretary von Weizsäcker this morning.¹

The Foreign Minister replied that he had discussed the matter with the Führer and that the following question had arisen: Last night the British and French Ambassadors had each handed over a similar declaration,² having the character of an ultimatum, which could not be reconciled with the Duce's proposal. When the Duce's message arrived, Germany was just on the point of returning a negative answer to the two declarations which had been handed to her. This negative answer had, however, not yet been given.

Ambassador Attolico interrupted the Foreign Minister by observing

¹ Document No. 535, enclosure.

² See documents Nos. 513 and 515.

that the two declarations of last night which amounted to ultimata had been superseded by the latest communication from the Duce.

The Foreign Minister repeated that first the question must be made clear as to whether the French and British declarations were ultimata or not. The declarations had in any case had the character of ultimata and their real meaning must first of all be clearly established.

Ambassador Attolico answered that the British and French declarations no longer came into consideration. Count Ciano had telephoned only at 8:30 this morning, that is to say at a time when the declarations had already been given out on the radio, in Italy as well. It followed from this that the two declarations must be considered as superseded.

Count Ciano stated, moreover, that France in particular was greatly in favour of the Duce's proposal. ("The pressure comes at the moment from France, but England would follow.")³

The Foreign Minister replied that some time would be necessary for the study and drafting of more precise proposals, and that therefore he could hold out no prospect of a definite answer for a day or two, that is before Sunday evening⁴ at the latest.

Ambassador Attolico answered that we could take our time ("you have all the time you want"),⁵ and that the Duce's new proposal superseded everything else ("it supersedes everything").³

The Foreign Minister requested the Italian Ambassador to ascertain in Rome what the position was, and agreed to Attolico's suggestion that, in order to save time, this clarification should be obtained by enquiring of the French and British Ambassadors in Berlin.

In conclusion, the Foreign Minister again pointed out that nothing must be made public concerning the Duce's proposal.

Submitted, according to instructions, to the Foreign Minister.⁵

DR. SCHMIDT
Minister

³ The words in brackets are in English in the original.

⁴ i.e., Sept. 3.

⁵ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, Nos. 581 and 582.

No. 540

103/111566

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, September 2, 1939.

I telephoned Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg at 12:30 p.m. to tell him the following:

1. The German Government had given the *agrément* for the appointment of the new Soviet Ambassador Shkvarzev. The Foreign Minister asked our Ambassador to inform the Soviet Government of this at once.

2. In reply to my question whether M. Vladimir Pavlov, till now private secretary to Molotov, was accompanying the Ambassador in the aircraft, Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg said yes.

3. Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg told me that the appointment of the new Ambassador had been announced by the Soviet press this morning. No statement about his departure had so far been issued.

4. With regard to the communiqué about the arrival of the Soviet officers, Ambassador von der Schulenburg referred to his telegram No. 249 of September 1,¹ which is enclosed.

KORDT

¹ Document No. 534.

No. 541

F14/339-40

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RM 46

BERLIN, September 2, 1939.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, ATTOLICO, AT 12:50 P.M. ON SEPTEMBER 2, 1939¹

Ambassador Attolico reported that Ambassador Henderson had just told him that the declaration which he had handed over yesterday was not an ultimatum. If the Foreign Minister had put a question to this effect to him (Henderson) last night, he would then have explained at once last night that there was no question of an ultimatum.²

The Foreign Minister asked Ambassador Attolico if he could perhaps once more ascertain from Rome the character of the declaration and at the same time inform Rome that a German reply to the Anglo-French declaration could only be negative.

The Führer, moreover, was examining the Duce's proposals and, if Rome confirmed that there had been no question of an ultimatum in the Anglo-French declaration, would draft an answer in a day or two.

Ambassador Attolico replied that it was important for him to obtain the general principles of an answer by the evening. Details could then be worked out later.

The Foreign Minister promised to reply by noon on Sunday³ and requested Attolico to communicate with Rome as quickly as possible.

Submitted to the Foreign Minister according to instructions.⁴

DR. SCHMIDT
Minister

¹ For the preceding conversation see document No. 539.

² See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 707.

³ i.e., Sept. 3.

⁴ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, Nos. 584 and 586.

No. 542

2872/565043

The State Secretary to the Legation in Luxembourg

Telegram

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, September 2, 1939—12:50 p.m.

No. 53 of August 29

Received September 2—2:45 p.m.

For the Head of Mission.

With reference to your report Pol. 2 No. 1 g. of August 14.¹

I. Please inform Minister of State Dupong that we could not in any way accept the Luxembourg Government's proposal to bring the whole of the ore and metallurgical industry of the country to a standstill in the event of war between her neighbours. The realization of this plan would not, as asserted by the Luxembourg Government, mean the maintenance of the strictest neutrality, but on the contrary would be a measure difficult to reconcile with Luxembourg's neutral attitude, and be unilaterally directed against German interests, as in normal times Germany purchases much the greater part of Luxembourg's production. We expect Luxembourg, even in the event of a conflict, at least to ensure that normal deliveries to Germany are maintained.

II. We intend, should hostilities break out, to send Ambassador Ritter as the plenipotentiary of the Reich Government to Brussels and also to Luxembourg immediately on a special mission to make clear Germany's views on the continuation of economic relations. The Embassy in Brussels has been instructed already to inform the Belgian Government of this mission, which is envisaged in the event of a conflict, without mentioning Ritter's name.

Please inform the Luxembourg Government accordingly.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 402 and footnote 8 thereto.² Marginal note; "Statements about I and II made to Dupong on Sept. 2 at 6 p.m. R[adowitz]." See also vol. VIII of this Series, documents Nos. 17, 18 and 20.

No. 543

B18/B003031

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, September 2, 1939—12:50 p.m.

No. 150 of September 2

Received September 2—2:50 p.m.

The Finnish Government yesterday issued a declaration of neutrality¹ and put into force the neutrality regulations proposed by the

¹ The text of this declaration was transmitted by Blücher in despatch No. 2211 of Sept. 2 (9990/E697461-64).

Northern Powers on May 27, 1938,² in accordance with the Decree of June 3, 1938.

I made the German declaration today, in accordance with telegram No. 182.³ The Foreign Minister took note of this, thanked me and said that Finland would of course observe strict neutrality and would tolerate no infringements of it.

BLÜCHER

² See vol. v of this Series, document No. 430.

³ Document No. 525.

No. 544

141/127266

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 115 of September 2 BRUSSELS, September 2, 1939—1:38 p.m.
Received September 2—3:15 p.m.

The start of hostilities in Poland was received in Belgium with comparative calm. After the German entry into Poland had become known, the Government ordered a further reinforcement of the Army, i.e., roughly restored the state of affairs existing at the end of the September crisis last year, but have not yet decided on general mobilization.

The Belgian public is surprised and taken aback by our action. The French-speaking press of all parties declares that Germany will be solely responsible should a European war break out. The Flemish press is reserved on the question of blame, but apart from this all newspapers express in gratifyingly unequivocal and emphatic terms a determination to maintain neutrality; the newspapers, obviously on a hint from higher authority, recommend reserve, discretion and impartiality, as required by neutrality. Special press telegram follows on this.¹ The population is calm, and the impression so far gained of Belgium's political and military attitude is completely satisfactory.

BÜLOW

Not found.

No. 545

1318/350816-17

The Legation in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 89 of September 2 THE HAGUE, September 2, 1939—2:30 p.m.
Received September 2—3:20 p.m.

After previously visiting Foreign Minister van Kleffens, I¹ have today, in the company of our Minister, explained to Minister President de Geer that with reference to Germany's recent general declaration of neutrality towards Holland,² the Reich Government seriously intend to observe neutrality in the economic field also. Economic neutrality implied the right and the duty to maintain normal exchange and transit of goods. The Reich Government would do this and expected the same from Holland.

The Minister President expressed his satisfaction at this statement, requested that his thanks should be conveyed to the Reich Government and expressly accepted our point of view. I am emphasizing this, because previously the Foreign Minister had attempted to characterize my explanations as a unilateral declaration.

During the subsequent conversation, which was carried on in a friendly tone, the Minister President asserted that Holland had adopted the same attitude in the last World War also. I corrected this, pointing out that Holland, albeit under British pressure, had, in fact, submitted to restrictions and formal controls which could not be reconciled with the interpretation of neutrality I had given. We considered it as Holland's right to continue normal economic relations with Great Britain, but we must insist on similar treatment for Germany. The purpose of my visit was precisely to make this interpretation perfectly clear, as it was contrary to what had been practised during the last World War. If Holland again submitted to this sort of British interference, Germany would be faced with a fresh situation. The Minister President had to admit, even if reluctantly, that the British attitude towards Holland in the last World War did not accord with neutrality. He admitted this particularly as far as the goods traffic between Holland and her own colonies was concerned.

I then stressed that any adjustment of normal economic relations to the present situation, which might become necessary for particular points, should not be made unilaterally, but only by means of bilateral arrangements. This was acknowledged.

The Foreign Minister informed us that Directeur Suetens³ from

¹ Ambassador Ritter who was on a special mission to the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg; see documents Nos. 402 and 542.

² See documents Nos. 272 and 313.

³ Director of the Foreign Trade Department of the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels was here yesterday, to take soundings on the preliminaries for economic neutrality. It appeared from further conversations that the Dutch Government do not expect great results from acting in common with the other Oslo States, but will cooperate closely with Belgium. I am going on to Brussels today by air; the Representative⁴ here will be kept informed.

RITTER

ZECH

⁴ The text at this point is marked as doubtful in transmission.

No. 546

22/13678

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 109 of September 2

OSLO, September 2, 1939—2:30 p.m.

Received September 2—4:00 p.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 154 of September 1.¹

This morning I made the declaration to Foreign Minister Koht and began by emphasizing our desire to maintain and foster good relations. This, he replied, was entirely in keeping with the intentions of the Norwegian Government. Concerning the declaration he said: We have already publicly announced that we wish to maintain complete neutrality. He will give the German declaration to the press.

SAHM

¹ Document No. 525.

No. 547

169/82706-07

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

BUCHAREST, September 2, 1939—4:00 p.m.

MOST URGENT

Received September 2—8:30 p.m.

No. 417 of September 2

With reference to my telegram No. 410 of September 1.¹

According to a reliable report, a person in authority, in spite of the Intelligence Department [*Abwehr*] [*sic*],² yesterday made the following statements to Major D. of the Reich War Ministry in Budapest: "Twenty-one Hungarian divisions were standing ready on the Rumanian frontier. Hungary had been assured by telephone from

¹ Document No. 517.

² The Bucharest draft (8378/E591201-02) here reads: "an influential person of the Hungarian Intelligence Department."

Germany (Intelligence Department [*Abwehr*]) that ten German transport trucks [*sic*]³ were on the way to the Hungarian Army and that a German officer with German troops had been assigned to each Hungarian regiment for the advance into the *Volksdeutsch* area⁴ of Rumania. From this, the Hungarians concluded that they had a free hand, as far as Germany was concerned, for an advance into Rumania."

Major D. expects that Hungary will attack Rumania in three or four days' time, and has therefore already given the *Volksdeutsch* liaison men in Transylvania an order, providing in this event for the formation of a *Volksdeutsch* Home Guard [*Selbstschutz*].⁵ The *Volksdeutsch* leader declared to me again yesterday that the German national group did not wish in any circumstances to come under Hungarian rule, and that they were happier under Rumania.

The Hungarian action would bring Germany into the conflict as well, and this would result in the supply of petroleum from Rumania being suspended, whereas this (2 groups missing) neutrality of Rumania is certain [*sic*].⁶

FABRICIUS

³ The Bucharest draft here reads: "loudspeaker trucks."

⁴ The Bucharest draft here reads: "the *Volksdeutsch* areas of Rumania."

⁵ The Bucharest draft here reads: "an order to form the *Volksdeutsch* Home Guard [*Selbstschutz*] envisaged for this eventuality."

⁶ The Bucharest draft here reads: "and would render impossible Rumanian petroleum supplies, whereas these, in the event of her neutrality, would be secure."

No. 548

406/214414

The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 106 of September 2 TALLINN, September 2, 1939—4:45 p.m.
Received September 2—6:45 p.m.

The Foreign Minister has just handed to me officially the following declaration of neutrality by Estonia:

"Decree of September 1, 1939, by the President of the Republic.¹ I hereby proclaim that the Republic of Estonia will observe the strictest neutrality in the war which has just broken out between foreign Powers. In order to safeguard this neutrality, I hereby put into effect, as from September 1, 1939, in respect of all belligerents, the provisions of the Law governing neutrality."²

The Minister then told me, by way of information, that similar declarations of neutrality would also be made by the other Baltic and Scandinavian States.³ He then asked me whether the statement

¹ Konstantin Päts.

² This paragraph is in French in the original.
See Editors' Note, p. 504.

recently made at an interview by the Finnish Foreign Minister, to the effect that Germany had stated that she would respect Finland's neutrality, was to be interpreted as meaning that Germany had made the same solemn declaration to Finland as to Holland, Belgium, Switzerland⁴ and Lithuania.⁵ I said that I knew nothing of a solemn declaration of this kind to Finland; Minister Erkko had probably deduced the German attitude, as he represented it, from the normal diplomatic exchange of views with Germany. As the Foreign Minister is very much interested in this empirical point, I should be grateful for information as to whether this is correct. The Minister added, moreover, that he by no means wanted to convey that there was any necessity for a solemn declaration by Germany that she would respect Estonia's neutrality, for Estonia was far from the scene of hostilities, and the German-Estonian Non-Aggression Pact had only just been concluded.⁶ I said that it was also my opinion that Germany's intention to respect Estonia's neutrality was clearly evident from the Non-Aggression Pact. Estonia's Neutrality Law,⁷ which corresponds to the Scandinavian neutrality regulations (see report No. 5347 of December 17, 1938.⁸) [*sic*].⁹

FROHWEIN

⁴ See documents Nos. 272, 304, 313 and 315.

⁵ See documents Nos. 410 and 419.

⁶ On June 7; see vol. vi of this Series, Editors' Note, p. 664.

⁷ See vol. v of this Series, document No. 430.

⁸ Not printed (8513/E597386-95).

⁹ This sentence is incomplete in the original.

No. 549

2422/511794-95

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 305 of September 2 WASHINGTON, September 2, 1939—5:31 p.m.

Received September 3—3:00 a.m.

Pol. IX 1843.

Based on Chamberlain's speech¹ and the widely publicised British White Paper,² the view continues to predominate here that the German Government never regarded the sixteen points³ as a serious basis for negotiations, but deliberately produced them only when the invasion had already been set in motion. Poland's scornful rejection of these sixteen points is suppressed. The German standpoint that our military actions were first and foremost precipitated

¹ On Sept. 1 in the House of Commons; for the text see the *British Blue Book*, Cmd. 6106, No. 105.

² *Correspondence between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the German Government, August, 1939*, Cmd. 6102, published on Sept. 1, 1939.

³ See document No. 458.

by Polish general mobilization is not accepted by public opinion. Responsibility is placed exclusively on the German leadership which has cleverly understood how to exploit for its own purposes the always aggressive and warlike nature of the German people. Interventionist circles are attempting to silence the supporters of American isolation by accusing them of a lack of patriotism on the one hand, and, on the other, by appealing through their press to the American people to stand together in this critical hour for the defence of American ideals and for the vindication of American claims to exercise a decisive influence in world politics. The first demand of the hour is said to be the establishment of a workable relationship between President and Congress. Congress must shelve domestic considerations and, instead of hampering the President, support his foreign policy.

Characteristic of the feelings in official circles here are the following remarks made by the deputy of the Press Chief in the State Department to the DNB representative: "The position is no longer as in 1914, nor even 1917—there is no division of opinion; no for and against. We only pity your people, your Government already stand convicted; they are condemned from one end of the earth to the other; for this bloodbath, if it now comes to war between Britain, France and Germany, will have been absolutely unnecessary. The whole manner of conducting negotiations was as stupid as it could possibly be."

THOMSEN

No. 550

323/193746

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, September 2, 1939—5:48 p.m.

No. 253 of September 2

Received September 2—5:45 p.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 240 of September 1.¹

After consultation with Stalin, Molotov told me at 3 p.m. that the Soviet Government were in agreement with the reply which we intended making to Latvia.

Soviet representatives abroad would be instructed to make similar statements and generally to base their language on the content of Molotov's speech.²

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 511.

² i.e., made on Aug. 31, on the ratification of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.

No. 551

103/111568

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, September 2, 1939—5:49 p.m.

No. 254 of September 2

Received September 2—6:10 p.m.

With reference to your telegrams No. 233 of August 30¹ and No. 241 of September 1.²

To my soundings as to whether Istanbul rumours that Turkey was already negotiating with the Soviet Union were correct, Molotov replied that the Soviet Government were actually engaged in an exchange of views and were in contact with Turkey.

After consultation with Stalin, Molotov informed me, at a second interview at 3 p.m., that there was only a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Turkey³ and relations in general were good; the Soviet Government were prepared to work to keep Turkey permanently neutral as desired by us. Our views on the position of Turkey in the present conflict were shared by the Soviet Government.

Please make no use of the above statements by Molotov in conversations with the Turks.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 465.

² Document No. 516.

³ Signed in Paris on Dec. 17, 1925 (for the text see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 125, pp. 1001-1002) and periodically renewed, most recently for a ten-year period on Nov. 7, 1935.

No. 552

2916/566638-39

The Legation in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 91 of September 2 COPENHAGEN, September 2, 1939—7:00 p.m.

Received September 2—8:00 p.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 150 of August 31 (W 1477 g. Rs.),¹ and to my telegram No. 86 of September 1.²

At 9:45 a.m. today, accompanied by our Minister, I called on Minister of State Stauning, who received me in the presence of the Foreign Minister. In reply to my statements on the lines of my instructions,³ Stauning and Munch replied that they were very grate-

¹ Not found.

² Not printed (2916/566640). In this telegram Renthe-Fink reported that he had carried out the instructions transmitted to him by telegram No. 150 [see footnote 1] and that the Danish Foreign Minister was prepared to receive a German plenipotentiary (i.e., Hassell).

³ See also document No. 402.

ful for the German declaration and that they were inspired by the same spirit with regard to maintaining economic relations to the fullest possible extent. The Danish Government, too, regarded the economic agreement⁴ as well as the relevant terms of the Non-Aggression Pact,⁵ as the legal basis, and the present ratio between imports and exports as a practical guide. My reference to biased measures contrary to neutrality, or toleration of unilateral controls by a hostile Power, passed uncontradicted. Munch, and in a later conversation Minister Mohr⁶ too, repeatedly referred to the possibility of war impeding Danish shipping and in particular to the decisive importance of the import of feeding stuffs, which were necessary, especially in autumn and winter, to maintain Danish production at its old level. In reply I pointed out Britain's own interest in imports from Denmark. I also emphasized that, if necessary, the German Government were prepared to negotiate on adjustments to the position through the customary way of bilateral agreements. Replying to Danish observations that Anglo-Danish trade must not be obstructed by German naval forces, I referred to the spirit of the economic terms of the Non-Aggression Pact. I also emphasized that I could not discuss questions of detail, which should be reserved for discussions for which Germany was always ready. My impression was that, on the one hand, the Danish gentlemen are very strongly influenced by their economic dependence on Britain and, on the other, very pleased about Germany's attitude and the declaration made by us, which entirely corresponds with Denmark's attitude. The communiqué agreed upon⁷ has been transmitted by telephone. I am leaving for Stockholm this evening.

HASSELL
RENTHE-FINK

⁴ The Trade Agreements of Mar. 1, 1934, and Jan. 24, 1935, were periodically extended, most recently in the protocol of Nov. 11, 1938, extended until Dec. 31, 1939. See *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1938, Part II, p. 880.

⁵ See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 461.

⁶ Secretary General of the Danish Foreign Ministry.

⁷ Not found.

No. 553

96/107967-68

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 257 of September 2

ANKARA, September 2, 1939—7:05 p.m.

Received September 3—1:40 p.m.

In today's conversation with the Foreign Minister, I denied most emphatically the British assertion that our offer to Poland had not been serious. Saracoğlu said that he had been told that the Foreign

Minister had refused to receive Lipski as the authorized Polish negotiator. I replied that the blame for what had happened lay solely with Britain and that the conversations of the last few days could not alter that. I again referred to Molotov's speech¹ and Russia's attitude.

On being questioned about Turkey's attitude, the Foreign Minister said that he was glad to be able to remain neutral but he was afraid that, as a result of conditions imposed by Britain, Italy would be forced into taking part. In that case Turkey would be on Britain's side. Welcome as Italy's declaration² was here, it remained nevertheless necessary to define the relationship with Italy once and for all.³

Turkey hoped to remain outside a European conflagration. The Foreign Minister asked whether I thought a truce possible on condition that Poland was prepared to negotiate at once on the basis of the Führer's offer. I replied that, although I could say nothing without instructions, I thought that the Führer would be prepared to avoid a general war if the Polish question were settled.

The departure of those liable for military service took place without difficulties.

I proposed to the Foreign Minister that if (group mutilated) the Trade Agreement be provisionally prolonged in accordance with the previous proposal.⁴

It is noteworthy that the President's answer to the King's message⁵ contained no reference to alliance. It is thought here that the message is meant to allay rumours of Anglo-Italian negotiations which are regarded with scepticism.

PAPEN

¹ i.e., made on Aug. 31, on the ratification of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.

² i.e., the official announcement on Sept. 1, that Italy would take no initiative in military operations. See Editors' Note, p. 487.

³ See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 590.

⁴ See document No. 406.

⁵ On Sept. 1 the British Ambassador had delivered a message from the King to the President of Turkey, expressing deep satisfaction at the firm bonds of friendship uniting the two countries. In reply the President conveyed his thanks and reciprocal feelings.

No. 554

F18/001

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RM 47

BERLIN, September 2, 1939.

The Foreign Minister received the Italian Ambassador in the Reich Chancellery at 8:50 p.m. today.

The Italian Ambassador brought the Foreign Minister the information that the British were not prepared to enter into negotiations on the basis of the Italian proposal of mediation.¹ The British de-

¹ See documents Nos. 535, 539 and 541.

manded, before starting negotiations, the immediate withdrawal of all German troops from the occupied Polish areas and from Danzig.²

The Italian proposal of mediation had originally been an idea of Mussolini's, which had then at once been taken up by Paris. Mussolini had therefore been under the impression that Paris would not have declared in favour of his mediation proposal without previously consulting London, especially as Paris had also held out the prospect of exerting influence on Poland. It was only after direct Italian enquiries had been made in London that it was realized that the British Government were of the opposite opinion.

In conclusion, the Italian Ambassador stated that the Duce now considered his mediation proposal as no longer in being. The Foreign Minister received the communication from the Italian Ambassador without comment.³

BRÜCKLMEIER

² See also *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. XIII, Nos. 589 and 592.

³ This document was initialled by Ribbentrop.

No. 555

2855/551418

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

URGENT

BERLIN, September 2, 1939.
zu Pol. V 8690.¹

Submitted to the State Secretary for Senior Counsellor Bergmann.

The Foreign Minister has signified his agreement to the abolition of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig² and requests you to take the necessary measures at once.

SONNLEITHNER

¹ Not printed (8394/E591838); this was a teleprint from Veesenmayer sent at 9:40 a.m. on Sept. 2 requesting, on Forster's behalf, Ribbentrop's views on the proposed abolition.

² Veesenmayer was so informed by teleprint (2855/551417) sent at 9:10 p.m. on Sept. 2.

No. 556

1871/394591

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

ROME, September 2, 1939—9:50 p.m.
Received September 2—11:00 p.m.
Pol. VIII 2343 g.

No. 403 of September 2¹

For the Foreign Minister.

The Japanese Ambassador² called on me today to tell me that he had now received his expected notice of recall. He intended to leave

¹ The Rome draft (967/302389) of this telegram was numbered 404.

² Toshio Shiratori.

in about three weeks. He would be particularly glad if, on his way home, which would perhaps be via Moscow, he might even have a detailed conversation with the Foreign Minister. He seemed to be of the opinion that, with the new Japanese Cabinet,³ there were reasonable prospects that the further *rapprochement* to the Axis Powers, which had come to a standstill, might continue to be successfully pursued. It was precisely for this reason that he was going to Tokyo in order to exert stronger personal influence than would be possible from Rome. The Ambassador further mentioned that there was a growing feeling in Japan in favour of some form of settlement with Russia, which could be carried out by stages through the medium of economic talks and might result in a non-aggression pact. The question was also of considerable importance for us, as a Japan freed from the threat of Russia might be expected to modify any possible tendency on the part of the United States to interfere in Europe. Finally the Ambassador remarked that the dissatisfaction with us after the conclusion of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact had considerably lessened through the change of Cabinet.

MACKENSEN

³ The Abe Cabinet had taken office on Aug. 30. See documents Nos. 403 and 455.

No. 557

2092/452670-71

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, September 2, 1939.

W IV 3336.

WORKING PROGRAMME FOR RUSSIA

I. The questions left open in the negotiations on the Credit Agreement,¹

(a) new regulations on arbitration procedure, and

(b) redrafting of terms of delivery,

are to be settled with the Trade Delegation at the earliest date. The negotiations are difficult, in particular regarding the arbitration procedure, as the old differences on the question of arbiters and the seat of the court of arbitration have, if anything, become more acute.

II. The volume of production of German industry must, in all circumstances, be secured, in order to ensure, within the shortest possible periods, deliveries to the Soviet Union under the credit and deliveries in current trading. Moreover, the question should be examined as to what proposals we could make to the Russians beyond this in order to increase further the volume of cash transactions.

¹ Document No. 131.

I have taken up this question with the Ministry of Economics, the War Economy Staff and the Office of the Four Year Plan.

III. After settling the points in paragraph II, the following two questions must be discussed with the Russians:

a) Advancing the dates of the Russian raw material deliveries which have been agreed upon for the next two years. This can be achieved, if at all, only by a corresponding reduction in the German delivery periods.

b) Attempting to obtain further raw materials over and above the amount of 180 million RM. The precondition for this is to have in reserve further supplies which are of interest to the Russians.

IV. Whether the Russians will be prepared, for reasons other than purely economic ones, to support the Reich by supplying raw materials, is an open question and should be clarified together with the questions under paragraph III.

V. I suggest that I be sent to Moscow on completion of the preparatory work (see paragraphs I and II), in order to confer with People's Commissar Mikoyan along the above-mentioned lines. The Trade Delegation are not suitable for such negotiations.

SCHNURRE

No. 558

52/35573-74

The Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 375 of September 2

LONDON, September 3, 1939.¹

Received September 3—2:00 a.m.

For the Führer and the Foreign Minister personally.

First priority for deciphering.

I saw Wilson² at 10 p.m. this evening. He received the proposal³ in a friendly but negative manner. He said that as long as German aggression in Poland continued, it was impossible for the British Government to enter into a conference. It followed, therefore, that conversations of any kind were also impossible for him, Wilson. The *status quo* must first of all be fully restored by the withdrawal of German troops from Polish territory. After this, the British Government would be prepared to let bygones be bygones and to start negotiations immediately on the basis of the state of the conversations before the German aggression commenced. But for Mussolini's intervention, Henderson would this evening have presented in Berlin the British declaration of war, which the Cabinet had

¹ The hour of despatch is not recorded.

² Sir Horace Wilson, Permanent Secretary to the British Treasury and official head of the Civil Service.

³ Not found.

drafted this morning. By his statement today in the House of Commons⁴ on the reasons for Great Britain's delay in taking action, Chamberlain had excited the most violent indignation in the House of Commons and in the Cabinet, and the latter had threatened to resign in a body this evening unless Chamberlain tomorrow finally gave Germany a declaration with a brief time limit. Chamberlain had just telephoned to Daladier,⁵ in order to obtain his final assent. Thereafter a Cabinet meeting would decide this very night on the final statement to be made in the House of Commons tomorrow at 12 noon. In view of these facts, it appeared to him impossible to agree to the suggestion. Nevertheless he was at my disposal at any time should I have a further communication to make. I got the impression that Daladier was putting the brake on heavily, whereas public opinion here, owing to the German victories in Poland, was getting more and more excited at the inaction of the British Government.

HESSE⁶

KORDT

⁴ i.e., on Sept. 2. For the text of this speech, see the *British Blue Book*, Cmd. 6106, No. 116.

⁵ See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 740.

⁶ Dr. Fritz Hesse, Press Adviser to the German Embassy in London and DNB representative there.

No. 559

52/35517

*Circular of the Foreign Minister.*¹

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, September 2, 1939.

[Sent September 3—4:50 a.m.]²

RAM 449.

German-Italian policy is based on complete and clear agreement between the Führer and the Duce. In case you are addressed on the subject, you should adopt this point of view.

There must be no criticism of the Italian attitude and if made it will be severely punished. Subordinate officials are to be correspondingly instructed at your discretion.³

RIBBENTROP

¹ Addressees were all diplomatic Missions.

² Ascertained from the Moscow copy (363/205213).

³ A further short circular telegram on the Italian attitude was addressed to all Missions for guidance on language to be held, on Sept. 3 (52/35542). In this Weizsäcker drew attention to the speech of Sept. 1 [see document No. 501, footnote 2] in which the Führer had thanked Italy for her support but had also stated that no foreign aid would be called upon for the struggle.

No. 560

F12/112

The British Ambassador to the Reich Foreign Minister

No. 370

BRITISH EMBASSY, BERLIN.

September 3rd, 1939.¹

YOUR EXCELLENCY: In the communication which I had the honour to make to you on September 1st² I informed you on the instructions of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that, unless the German Government were prepared to give His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom satisfactory assurances that the German Government had suspended all aggressive action against Poland and were prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would without hesitation fulfil their obligations to Poland.

2. Although this communication was made more than twenty-four hours ago, no reply has been received, but German attacks upon Poland have been continued and intensified. I have accordingly the honour to inform you that, unless not later than 11 a.m. British Summer Time today, September 3rd, satisfactory assurances to the above effect have been given by the German Government and have reached His Majesty's Government in London, a state of war will exist between the two countries as from that hour.

3. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration. NEVILLE HENDERSON

His Excellency

The Minister for Foreign Affairs,

etc., etc., etc.

¹ The text is in English in the original. See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, Nos. 756 and 757. For Henderson's report that he handed this Note to the interpreter Schmidt at 9 a.m., see *ibid.*, No. 760.

² See document No. 513.

No. 561

52/35547-51

Unsigned Memorandum¹

BERLIN, September 3, 1939.

The German Government have received the British Government's ultimatum of September 3, 1939.² They have the honour to reply as follows:

1. The German Reich Government and the German people refuse

¹ See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 766, according to which this document was handed to Henderson by Ribbentrop at 11:20 a.m.

² See document No. 560.

to receive or accept, let alone to fulfil, demands in the nature of ultimata made by the British Government.

2. On our eastern frontier a virtual state of war has existed for many months. After the Versailles Treaty first tore Germany to pieces, every peaceful settlement has been refused to all German Governments ever since. The National Socialist Government also have, since the year 1933, tried again and again to remove by peaceful negotiations the worst violations and breaches of justice in this Treaty. The British Government have been among those who, by their intransigent attitude, took the chief part in frustrating every practical revision. But for the intervention of the British Government—of this the German Government and the German people are fully conscious—a reasonable solution doing justice to both sides would certainly have been found between Germany and Poland. For Germany did not intend, neither did she demand, the annihilation of Poland. The Reich demanded only the revision of those articles of the Versailles Treaty which, already at the time of the formulation of that Dictate, had been described by understanding statesmen of all nations as being in the long run unbearable, and therefore impossible, for a great nation, and also for the entire political and economic interests of Eastern Europe. British statesmen, too, described the solution in the East, which was then forced upon Germany, as containing the germ of future wars. To remove this danger was the desire of all German Governments and especially the intention of the new National Socialist People's Government. The blame for having prevented this peaceful revision lies with British Cabinet policy.

3. The British Government have—an occurrence unique in history—given the Polish State full powers for all actions against Germany which that State might conceivably intend to undertake. The British Government assured the Polish Government of their military support in all circumstances, should Germany defend herself against any provocation or attack. Thereupon the Polish terror against the Germans living in the territories which had once been torn from Germany immediately assumed unbearable forms. The Free City of Danzig was, in violation of all legal provisions, first threatened with destruction economically and by measures of customs policy, and was finally subjected to a military blockade and its communications strangled. All these violations of the Danzig Statute, which were well known to the British Government, were approved and covered by the blank cheque given to Poland. The German Government, though moved by the sufferings of the German population which was being tortured and treated in an inhuman manner, nevertheless remained a patient onlooker for five months, without undertaking even once any similar aggressive action against Poland. They only warned Poland that these happenings would in the long run be

unbearable, and that they were determined, in the event of no other assistance being given to this population, to help them themselves. All these happenings were known in every detail to the British Government. It would have been easy for them to use their great influence in Warsaw in order to exhort those in power there to exercise justice and humanity and to keep to the existing obligations. The British Government did not do this. On the contrary, in emphasizing continually their obligation to assist Poland in all circumstances, they actually encouraged the Polish Government to continue in their criminal attitude which was threatening the peace of Europe. In this spirit, the British Government rejected the proposal by Mussolini,³ which might still have been able to save the peace of Europe, in spite of the fact that the German Government had declared their willingness to agree to it. The British Government, therefore, bear the responsibility for all the unhappiness and misery which have now overtaken and will overtake many peoples.

4. After all efforts at finding and concluding a peaceful solution had been rendered impossible by the intransigence of the Polish Government, covered as they were by England, after the conditions resembling civil war, which had existed already for months on the eastern frontier of the Reich, had gradually developed into open attacks on German territory, without the British Government raising any objections, the German Government determined to put an end to this continual threat, unbearable for a great Power, to the external and finally also to the internal peace of the German people, and to end it by those means which, since the Democratic Governments had in effect sabotaged all other possibilities of revision, alone remained at their disposal for the defence of the peace, security and honour of the German Reich. The last attacks of the Poles threatening Reich territory they have answered with similar measures. The German Government do not intend, on account of any sort of British intentions or obligations in the East, to tolerate conditions which are similar to those conditions which we observe in Palestine, which is under British protection. But above all the German people do not intend to allow themselves to be ill-treated by Poles.

5. The German Government, therefore, reject the attempts to force Germany, by means of a demand amounting to an ultimatum, to recall their forces which are lined up for the defence of the Reich, and thereby to accept the old unrest and the old injustice again. The threat that, failing this, they will go to war with Germany, corresponds to the intention proclaimed for years past by numerous British politicians. The German Government and the German people have assured the English people countless times how much they desire an understanding, indeed the closest friendship, with

³ See documents Nos. 535, 539 and 541.

them. If the British Government have hitherto always refused these offers and now answer them with an open threat of war, it is not the fault of the German people and of their Government, but exclusively the fault of the British Cabinet or of those men who for years have been preaching the destruction and extermination of the German people. The German people and their Government do not, like Great Britain, intend to dominate the world, but they are determined to defend their own liberty, their independence and above all their life. The intention, communicated to us by order of the British Government by Mr. King-Hall,⁴ of carrying the destruction of the German people even further than was done through the Versailles Treaty, is taken note of by us and we shall therefore answer any aggressive action on the part of England with the same weapons and in the same form.

⁴ The reference appears to be to Comdr. Stephen King-Hall's *News-Letters* which were being distributed in Germany. For an account of this private venture, see Stephen King-Hall: *Total Victory* (London, 1941). See also vol. VI of this Series, document No. 671.

No. 562

52/35527

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 675

BERLIN, September 3, 1939.

The French Ambassador called on me at 12 noon today as the Foreign Minister had not been able to receive him himself owing to the ceremony of presentation of the new Russian Ambassador.¹

The Ambassador asked me whether I was in a position to give a satisfactory answer to the communication made by him in the name of his Government² during the evening of the day before yesterday (readiness to negotiate if the German troops were withdrawn to German territory).

I informed the Ambassador that I was not in a position to give him any kind of reply.

The Ambassador was minded in these circumstances to treat my silence as a negative reply and to hand me a new declaration by his Government which he had brought with him.

I suggested to the Ambassador that instead of so doing, he should be good enough to be patient a little longer and see the Foreign Minister personally. Coulondre agreed to this, and after twenty minutes was conducted to the Reich Chancellery.³

The period of waiting was almost entirely taken up by a conversation on politically unimportant matters.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Alexander Shkvarzev.

² See document No. 515.

³ See document No. 563.

No. 563

F18/008-06

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RM 48

BERLIN, September 3, 1939.

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, COULONDRE, IN THE REICH CHANCELLERY AT 12:20 P.M. ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1939

In reply to Coulondre's question whether the Foreign Minister was now in a position to give a satisfactory answer to the question contained in the Note handed over at 10 p.m. on September 1,¹ the Foreign Minister said that, after Britain² and France had handed over their Notes, the Head of the Italian Government had made a new offer of mediation, and that with the observation that the French Government approved this proposal.³ Germany had informed the Duce yesterday that she also was prepared to agree to the proposal.⁴ Later in the day, however, the Duce reported that his proposal had been wrecked by the intransigence of the British Government.⁵ This morning, England had presented Germany with a two-hour ultimatum.⁶ Germany had rejected in writing the demands it contained.⁷ The reasons for rejecting the British ultimatum were set out in the document, which he (the Foreign Minister) handed to the French Ambassador for information. Should the attitude of France towards Germany be determined by the same considerations as influenced the British Government, then the German Government could only regret this. Germany had always striven to reach a settlement with France. If, in spite of this, the French Government, because of their obligations to Poland, adopted an attitude of hostility towards Germany, the German Government would in that event regard it as an entirely unjustified war of aggression by France against Germany. Germany herself would refrain from any attack on France. Should France, however, adopt a different attitude, then Germany would be compelled to retaliate accordingly.

Coulondre answered that he gathered from the remarks of the Foreign Minister that the German Government were unable to accept the suggestion contained in the French Note of September 1.

The Foreign Minister stated that this was the case.

To this Coulondre replied that, in these circumstances, it was his

¹ See document No. 515.

² See document No. 513.

³ See document No. 535.

⁴ See documents Nos. 539 and 541.

⁵ See document No. 554.

⁶ See document No. 560.

⁷ See document No. 561.

unpleasant duty to point out once more to the Reich Government the heavy responsibility which they had incurred by opening hostilities against Poland without a declaration of war, and to inform them that as from 5:00 p.m. today, September 3, 1939, the French Government were compelled to fulfil the obligations they had entered into towards Poland. At the same time, Coulondre handed over the attached written communication. After reading it, the Foreign Minister concluded the interview by saying that Germany had no intention of attacking France, and that the entire responsibility for the suffering inflicted on the nations, if France attacked Germany, would fall on the present French Government.⁸

Respectfully submitted to the Foreign Minister.⁹

SCHMIDT
Minister

FI/0370-71

[Enclosure]¹⁰

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE À BERLIN.

September 3, 1939.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: Not having received by noon on September 3 a satisfactory reply from the Government of the Reich to the letter which I presented to you on September 1 at 10 p.m., I have the honour, on the instructions of my Government, to make the following communication to you:

The Government of the French Republic consider it their duty to point out for the last time the heavy responsibility assumed by the Government of the Reich in opening hostilities against Poland without a declaration of war and in not taking up the suggestion made by the Governments of the French Republic and of His Britannic Majesty to suspend all aggressive action against Poland and to declare themselves ready promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory.

In consequence the Government of the Republic have the honour to inform the Government of the Reich that they find themselves obliged to fulfil, as from today, September 3, at 5 p.m., the obligations which France has entered into towards Poland and which are known to the German Government.

Pray accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

COULONDRE

⁸ See also the *French Yellow Book*, Nos. 364-367.

⁹ Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "For use in propaganda [*Propaganda-Verwertung*]."

¹⁰ The original of this enclosure is in French.

No. 564

52/35558

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

September 3, 1939.

Counsellor of Embassy Kordt telephoned at 12:30 p.m. and reported as follows:

The British Government had just addressed three Notes to the German Embassy:

1. A Note stating that the British Government considered themselves as being in a state of war with Germany as from 11 a.m. (see enclosure).

2. A Note dealing with the departure of the German career consuls, officials and employees subject to a promise of reciprocity (see enclosure).

3. A Note dealing with bombing etc., outside the area of hostilities. (Identical with the Note handed to the Chief of Protocol by the British Embassy.)¹

The staff of the German Embassy would leave for Berlin at 6:30 p.m. on Monday via Gravesend-Rotterdam. The British Embassy [*sic* ? Government] had promised that all facilities would be afforded for the transport of the staff and their luggage.

ERICH KORDT

¹ Marginal note in Woermann's handwriting on another copy (1132/323596): "Missing". A memorandum by Erich Kordt dated Sept. 6 (52/35676) reads: "The enclosed Note [here printed, for the convenience of the reader, as Enclosure 3] was brought by Counsellor of Embassy [Theodor] Kordt on Sept. 6. It had been handed to the German Embassy in London on Sunday afternoon [Sept. 3]. On enquiry, the Foreign Office official who handed over the Note stated that, as far as he knew, an identical Note was being handed over in Berlin by the British Embassy. There is apparently a misunderstanding here, since the British Embassy in Berlin has only handed over a Note concerning gas warfare." [See document No. 571.] A memorandum by Woermann dated Sept. 9 (52/35765) reads: "Under State Secretary Gaus telephoned from the train and said that the Foreign Minister had directed that no answer should be given to the British Note on humane warfare which Counsellor of Embassy Kordt had brought with him. No reply was requested in the Note. On the point of gas warfare, which was also mentioned in the Note, a Note had already been handed over by Henderson in Berlin and had been answered via Berne. Moreover, we had already publicly stated our views on most of the points. Herr Gaus asked that Herr Albrecht should send him a copy of our telegram to Berne containing the reply to the British Government concerning gas warfare." [This reply has not been found, but it was stated in the House of Commons on Oct. 4, 1939, that the German Government had given this assurance and, on Nov. 15, the date of receipt was stated to have been Sept. 9. See *Parl. Deb., H. of C.*, vol. 351, cols. 1923-1924, and vol. 353, col. 685.]

F12/115

[Enclosure 1]²

[By telephone from London]
Foreign Office, S.W.1.
3rd September, 1939.

SIR: On September 1st His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin, acting upon my instructions, informed the German Government that unless they were prepared to give His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom satisfactory assurances that the German Government had suspended all aggressive action against Poland and were prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would, without hesitation, fulfil their obligations to Poland.³

2. At 9 a.m. this morning His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin, acting upon my instructions, informed the German Government that unless not later than 11 a.m., British Summer Time, today September 3rd, satisfactory assurances to the above effect had been given by the German Government and had reached His Majesty's Government in London, a state of war would exist between the two countries as from that hour.⁴

3. No such assurances having been received, I have the honour to inform you that a state of war exists between the two countries as from 11 a.m. today, September 3rd.⁵

I have the honour to be with high consideration,

Your obedient servant,

HALIFAX

The German Chargé d'Affaires,
etc., etc., etc.

52/35559

[Enclosure 2]

By telephone from London.
September 3, 1939—12:30 p.m.
Foreign Office.
September 3, 1939.

SIR: I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom intend to follow the customary international practice of permitting career consular officers of the enemy Government and non-career officers and consular employees of enemy nationality to depart freely from the United Kingdom.

² The texts of all three Notes are in English in the original. The text of Enclosure 1 as telephoned from London (52/85560) contains minor verbal mistakes. The copy here printed is that signed by Lord Halifax and addressed to the German Embassy in London.

³ See document No. 513.

⁴ See document No. 560.

⁵ See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. VII, Nos. 756 and 760.

Effect will be given to this decision as soon as a formal assurance is received from the German Government that similar treatment will be accorded in the corresponding classes of British consular officers in Germany.

In the meantime I have the honour to request that you will inform German consular officers in the United Kingdom that special passes will be issued to them as soon as the above mentioned assurance has been received and that they should not attempt to leave the United Kingdom until they have been provided with these passes.

I have the honour to be with high consideration,

Your obedient servant,

HALIFAX

52/35677-79

[Enclosure 3]

Foreign Office, S.W.1.
3rd September, 1939.

SIR: I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a joint declaration made by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government.

2. I shall be grateful if you will be so good as to cause its terms to be brought to the notice of your Government.

I have the honour to be, with high consideration, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

HALIFAX

The German Chargé d'Affaires,
etc., etc., etc.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and France solemnly and publicly affirm their intention should a war be forced upon them to conduct hostilities with a firm desire to spare the civilian population and to preserve in every way possible those monuments of human achievement which are treasured in all civilized countries.

In this spirit they have welcomed with deep satisfaction President Roosevelt's appeal on the subject of bombing from the air.⁶ Fully sympathizing with the humanitarian sentiments by which that appeal was inspired they have replied to it in similar terms.

They had indeed some time ago sent explicit instructions to the Commanders of their armed forces prohibiting the bombardment whether from the air, or the sea, or by artillery on land of any except strictly military objectives in the narrowest sense of the word.

Bombardment by artillery on land will exclude objectives which have no strictly defined military importance, in particular large urban areas situated outside the battle zone. They will furthermore make every effort to avoid the destruction of localities or buildings which are of value to civilization.

⁶ See document No. 530, enclosure.

As regards the use of naval forces, including submarines, the two Governments will abide strictly by the rules laid down in the Submarine Protocol of 1936⁷ which have been accepted by nearly all civilized nations. Further they will only employ their aircraft against merchant shipping at sea in conformity with the recognized rules applicable to the exercise of maritime belligerent rights by warships.

Finally, the two allied Governments reaffirm their intention to abide by the terms of the Geneva Protocol of 1925⁸ prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating or poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare. An enquiry will be addressed to the German Government as to whether they are prepared to give an assurance to the same effect.

It will, of course, be understood that in the event of the enemy not observing the restrictions which the Governments of the United Kingdom and France have thus imposed on the operations of their armed forces, these Governments reserve the right to take all such action as they may consider appropriate.

⁷ See document No. 575, footnote 3.

⁸ For the text see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 126, pp. 324-325.

No. 565

100/64761-70

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram en clair

No. 459

BERLIN, September 3, 1939—8:51 p.m.

[Received—11:00 p.m.]¹

For the Ambassador.

Please hand to the Duce personally the following message from the Führer.

DUCE: I must first thank you for your last attempt at mediation. I would have been ready to accept, but only on condition that some possibility could have been found to give me certain guarantees that the conference would be successful. For the German troops have been engaged for two days in an, in parts, extraordinarily rapid advance into Poland. It would have been impossible to allow blood which was there sacrificed to be squandered through diplomatic intrigue. Nevertheless I believe that a way could have been found if England had not been determined from the outset to let it come to war in any case. I did not yield to England's threats because, Duce, I no longer believe that peace could have been maintained for more than six months or, shall we say, a year. In these circumstances I considered that the present moment was, in spite of everything, more suitable for making a stand.

¹ Taken from the copy prepared in Rome for submission to the Duce (100/64747-50).

At present the German Wehrmacht in Poland is so vastly superior in all technical fields that the Polish Army will collapse in a very short time. Whether it would have been possible to achieve this quick success in another year or two is, I must say, very doubtful in my opinion. England and France would have gone on arming their allies to such an extent that the decisive technical superiority of the German Wehrmacht could not have been in evidence in the same way. I am aware, Duce, that the struggle in which I am engaging is a struggle of life and death. In it my own fate is of absolutely no importance. But I am also aware that such a struggle cannot in the end be avoided, and that the moment for resistance must be chosen with icy deliberation so that the likelihood of success is assured; and in this success, Duce, my faith is as firm as a rock.

You kindly assured me recently that you believe you can help in some fields. I accept this in advance with sincere thanks. But I also believe that, even if we now march down separate paths, Destiny will yet bind us one to the other. If National Socialist Germany were to be destroyed by the Western Democracies, Fascist Italy also would face a hard future. I personally was always aware that the futures of our two régimes were bound up, and I know that you, Duce, are of exactly the same opinion.

Concerning the situation in Poland I would only briefly remark that naturally we are leaving aside everything which is not important and are not wasting a single man on inessential tasks, but that all our actions are being directed by considerations of grand strategy. The Polish Northern Army, which is in the Corridor, has already been completely surrounded by this action of ours. Either it will be wiped out or it will surrender. For the rest, all operations are proceeding according to plan. The daily achievements of our troops have greatly exceeded all expectations. The mastery of our Luftwaffe is complete, although scarcely a third of it is in Poland.

In the West I shall remain on the defensive. France can shed her blood there first. The moment will then come when we can pit ourselves there also against the enemy with the whole strength of the nation.

Please accept once more my thanks, Duce, for all the support you have given me in the past, and which I ask you not to refuse me in future either.²

ADOLF HITLER

End of message. Please report by telegram.³

RIBBENTROP

² Both the German and Italian versions are printed in *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. xiii, No. 639.

³ In telegram No. 414 of Sept. 3 (52/35543) sent at 12:10 a.m. on Sept. 4, Mackensen reported that Mussolini would see him at 9:30 a.m. on Sept. 4 in order to receive Hitler's letter. For Mackensen's subsequent telegram see vol. viii of this Series, document No. 1.

No. 566

7895/E573255-56

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, September 3, 1939—6:45 p.m.

No. 430 of September 3

Received September 3—9:00 p.m.

W 1583 g.

The British are making preparations for unusually large purchases of petroleum in order to seal off the only German source of supply and at the same time supply the British air force in Poland. Transport is to be effected in Polish tank trucks. Payment is to be made in gold or in foreign exchange. As the position about Rumania's supplies of raw materials is at present very serious due to lack of exports against foreign exchange, she is prepared to conclude fairly large contracts. I will remind the Minister President of the undertakings, in all circumstances, to continue to grant Germany and the Protectorate their previous share of Rumanian exports. This share has constituted, for 1939, to date roughly 40 per cent of Rumania's total petroleum exports. For the remainder of the year this share amounts therefore to 600,000 tons. We cannot, under the contractual agreements with Rumania, pay for a larger quantity through the clearing system (see telegram No. 367 IV),¹ nor could we transport it should the sea route be closed. Our requirements can only be secured if Rumania's exports come under Government control for which, as I am reliably informed, a decree is in process of being drafted.

I submit that the only Rumanian-Polish railway line in Poland be destroyed.

FABRICIUS

¹ Not printed; see document No. 454, footnote 6.

No. 567

127/69855

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, September 3, 1939—6:50 p.m.

TOP SECRET

Received September 4—12:30 a.m.

No. 253 of September 3

Exclusively for the Ambassador: For the Head of Mission or his representative personally. Special security handling. To be decoded by himself. Most secret.

We definitely expect to have beaten the Polish Army decisively in a few weeks. We should then keep the territory that was fixed at

Moscow as a German sphere of interest under military occupation. We should naturally, however, for military reasons, have to continue to take action against such Polish military forces as are at that time located in the Polish territory belonging to the Russian sphere of interest.

Please discuss this at once with Molotov and see if the Soviet Union does not consider it desirable for Russian forces to move at the proper time against Polish forces in the Russian sphere of interest and, for their part, to occupy this territory. In our estimation this would be not only a relief for us, but also be in the sense of the Moscow agreements,¹ and in the Soviet interest as well.

In this connection please determine whether we may discuss this matter with the officers who have just arrived here² and what the Soviet Government generally intend their position to be.

RIBBENTROP

¹ See documents Nos. 229, 284 and 358.

² See document No. 514.

No. 568

2901/565799

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 108 of September 3 STOCKHOLM, September 3, 1939—9:00 p.m.
Received September 3—10:15 p.m.

This afternoon in the presence of our Minister I made, as instructed,¹ the statement on Germany's intention to maintain economic relations to the Swedish Minister of State and the Foreign Minister. In so doing I referred to Germany's fundamental attitude as expressed in the economic stipulations of the German-Danish Non-Aggression Pact.² I also stressed particularly the maintenance of the present ratio and the necessity to handle the Swedish licensing system in such a way as to be in keeping with Germany's willingness to continue deliveries of goods. The Swedish Ministers thanked me for the statement and for the friendly spirit in which it was made, and said they were inspired by the same desire. Sweden too wished to maintain trade and to settle . . . (group missing)³ which arose by normal methods of negotiation. They raised no objections to my repeated emphasis on the ratio, but did not go into details. Any restrictions which might become necessary on account of Swedish requirements would in no case be applied onesidedly against a Power which respected Sweden's neutrality and integrity. Sandler recalled the

¹ See document No. 402.

² See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 461.

³ Typewritten marginal note; "Presumably 'difficulties'."

statement made by Minister Richert in April 1939.⁴ The communiqué agreed upon⁵ has been transmitted by telephone. I am leaving tonight for Oslo.

HASELL
WIED

⁴ See vol. VI of this Series, documents Nos. 229 and 242.

⁵ Not found.

No. 569

52/35540-41

Circular of the State Secretary¹

Telegram

BERLIN, September 3, 1939.
[Sent September 4—1:26 a.m.]²
e.o. Pol. II 3185.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counsellor von Rintelen.

After the attempt at direct German-Polish discussions had proved fruitless owing to the non-appearance of the Polish plenipotentiary, though the German Government waited two days, and after we had been forced to answer Polish military encroachments by military action of our own, Great Britain and France demanded on September 1 that we should withdraw the German troops from Polish territory. It seemed that even then the threat of war might be exorcised through the intervention of Mussolini, who proposed an armistice followed by a conference in order to settle the German-Polish conflict. This proposal was answered by us and also by the French Government in a positive sense; the British Government, on the contrary, have today repeated their demand for the withdrawal of the German troops within two hours and, on the expiry of this time limit, declared themselves to be at war with Germany. France then followed with the announcement that she considered herself compelled to stand by Poland.

A reasonable settlement between Germany and Poland would certainly have been achieved long since, had it not been for the interference of Great Britain and her anti-German encirclement policy. Instead, however, of exhorting Poland to be conciliatory, Britain gave her full powers against Germany, made herself dependent on Poland's decisions, and, finally, by her conduct also doomed Mussolini's proposal to failure at the last moment. Thus has sprung up the seed sown by men in Britain who for years have preached the annihilation of Germany. This sequence of events clearly shows Britain's sole responsibility for the outbreak of war.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ The list of addressees has not been found.

² Taken from the Moscow copy (477/229824-25).

No. 570

8390/E591805

The State Secretary to the Legation in Latvia

Telegram

No. 195 of September 3

BERLIN, September 4, 1939—6:10 a.m.

Received September 4—9:25 a.m.

For the Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 186.¹

You are empowered to inform the Foreign Minister there orally that our relations with Latvia are based on the Non-Aggression Pact concluded on June 7,² and that we have naturally not made any agreements contradictory to this Pact. We have no objection to publication in the press by the Latvians provided it is stated that your statement represents an answer to a question by Latvia in the course of current discussion of the political situation.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Not printed; see document No. 477, footnote 5.² See vol. VI of this Series, Editors' Note, p. 664.

No. 571

1132/323598

The British Ambassador to the Reich Foreign Minister

Copy R20923

BRITISH EMBASSY, BERLIN.¹

3rd September, 1939.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: I have the honour, by direction of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to enquire whether the German Government are prepared to give an assurance to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that they will observe the provisions of the Geneva Protocol, signed on the 17th June 1925,² prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare.

2. The German Government will be aware that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are themselves party to this Protocol.

3. I request that you will be so good as to communicate the reply of your Government to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, through the representative in London of the Power taking charge of the German Government's interests in the United Kingdom.³

4. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

NEVILLE HENDERSON

His Excellency

The Minister for Foreign Affairs,

etc., etc., etc.

¹ This document is in English in the original.² For the text see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 126, pp. 324-325.³ See also document No. 564 and footnote 1 thereto.

No. 572

73/52001

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

VERY URGENT

BERLIN, September 3, 1939.

The Hungarian Minister asked me today if the embargo imposed by Colonel General Keitel on certain armaments deliveries to Hungary¹ has been lifted now that he had made the statement² to the Foreign Minister of which I had knowledge.

I promised to let the Minister have an answer soon.

WOERMANN

¹ See document No. 489.

² See document No. 533.

No. 573

8350/E590349-52

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

W II 5388.

MINUTES ON MY CONVERSATIONS IN BRUSSELS ON SEPTEMBER 3

In company with Ambassador von Bülow, I called on the Belgian Minister President, Pierlot, who was then still Foreign Minister¹ also.

I referred to the general declaration of neutrality towards Belgium which the Reich Government had made recently.² This general declaration of neutrality signified the Reich Government's earnest intention of adopting a neutral attitude in the economic field as well. The Reich Government expected Belgium to adopt the same attitude. Economic neutrality meant the maintenance of the normal exchange and transit of goods. This automatically had various consequences.

Germany was prepared to maintain normal supplies to Belgium and to take the normal Belgian exports to Germany.

In return Germany must expect Belgium also to adhere to the principle of maintaining her normal exchange and transit of goods with Germany.

Germany raised no objection to Belgium maintaining her normal trade with Powers hostile to Germany. Belgium need not expect that Germany would demand of Belgium, in this respect, measures of control, as Britain had done in the previous war. We must, however, also expect Belgium not to submit to such measures of control or restrictions from another quarter. Any such demand by Britain would not be consistent with neutrality; nor would it be so if Belgium were to submit to such a demand.

¹ The Belgian Cabinet was remodelled on Sept. 4 to form a Cabinet of national union, M. Henri Spaak becoming Foreign Minister.

² See documents Nos. 272 and 315.

If for some categories of goods adjustments to meet the future situation should prove necessary, changes must not be made unilaterally but only by way of negotiation and bilateral agreements. For these the two Government Committees were competent.

Moreover, the Belgian Government could quite generally rest assured that the German Government would deal with the economic questions concerning Belgium in a positive and friendly spirit.

The Minister President welcomed this statement and accepted these principles also for Belgium. As to possible adjustments, he also accepted the principle of negotiating on these, with the proviso that in the last resort if agreement could not be reached, Belgium must also take independent decisions so as to ensure her own essential requirements. He drew attention to the precarious position in which Belgium would probably find herself with regard to British intervention. I replied that Germany had taken an unexceptionable position on this point, in that she had from the beginning declared herself in agreement with the maintenance of normal trade with countries hostile to Germany. Belgium could use this argument with Britain. Moreover, the very object of my visit was to clarify this point with Belgium from the start. Britain had, if she really wished to remain neutral towards Belgium, no right actually to interfere with German-Belgian trade or to introduce controls. If Belgium were to submit to such interference, this would not be consistent with neutrality. Presumably Belgium would be in a position similar to that of other neutral States and it was advisable that these should adopt a uniform attitude towards Britain.

Referring to the *union économique* between Belgium and Luxembourg, I then spoke of the statement made by the Luxembourg State President, Dupong, that to prevent complaints from any quarter, Luxembourg intended to close down the whole of her iron industry.³ The German Government felt that such action would be contrary to the principle of economic neutrality. We had no objection to Luxembourg keeping up her normal supplies to the other side, but we must demand that she also maintain her normal deliveries to Germany.⁴ As Germany had been the chief purchaser of Luxembourg iron and steel, Germany would be at a greater disadvantage than other countries. Pierlot said that only a *union douanière* existed between Belgium and Luxembourg. He certainly considered it right and necessary that I had raised this matter with him. Nevertheless, it was now not so much an economic question as one of neutrality which Luxembourg, as a Sovereign State, had to decide for herself. He therefore considered it necessary that the German Government

³ See document No. 402.

⁴ See also document No. 542.

should discuss this with the Luxembourg Government direct. I told him that this was also our intention.⁵

The conversation, on the whole, left an agreeable and objective impression. Pierlot gives the impression of a man who gives careful thought to what he says and then stands by it.

I then also informed the Secretary General in the Foreign Ministry, van Langenhove, of the object of my visit and the substance of my conversation with Pierlot. Langenhove, too, expressed doubts as to Britain's conduct. I also represented our views to him.

I then spoke also briefly to Directeur Suetens⁶ in the Foreign Ministry, with whom I could not, however, have a thorough discussion as he was busy. He merely said that he assumed the two Government Committees would meet shortly.

RITTER

⁵ See also vol. VIII of this Series, documents Nos. 17, 18 and 20.

⁶ Director of the Foreign Trade Department in the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

No. 574

52/35567

Decree by the Führer and Chancellor

BERLIN, September 3, 1939.

1. As from today, for the duration of the war, all representatives abroad of the civil authorities or the Party offices and officials sent by them to uphold the policy of the Reich are to come under the authority of the Head of the German Mission in the country in question. The sending of new representatives or officials of the civil authorities or Party offices requires the sanction of the Foreign Ministry.

2. The above mentioned representatives and officials are to send their reports to the Foreign Ministry through the Head of the Mission.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 575

51/33833-35

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Department

BERLIN, September 3, 1939.

Respectfully submitted to the State Secretary with the enclosed memorandum.

Captain Fricke, Chief of the Operations Division of the Naval Staff, informed me by telephone that the matter had already been submitted to the Führer. He had, however, the impression that the political aspects should be put before the Führer again in detail. Captain Fricke has therefore sent Lieutenant Commander Neubauer to the Foreign Ministry to discuss the matter further.

ALBRECHT

[Enclosure]

In the attached documents,¹ which were sent by the Naval High Command, the question of unrestricted submarine warfare against England is discussed.

The Navy has come to the conclusion that the greatest possible degree of damage to England can be achieved with the available forces only if the submarines are permitted to use their weapons without restrictions and without warning against enemy and neutral ships in a prohibited area which is indicated on the attached map.²

The Navy does not fail to recognize that:

a. Germany would thereby openly disregard the 1936 agreement concerning the conduct of warfare against merchant shipping;³

b. such warfare cannot be justified on the basis of the principles of international law generally recognized so far;

c. this would seriously damage neutrals politically and economically important to us, would cause their attitude towards us to deteriorate, and would undermine their determination to remain neutral and to resist British pressure, as well as their readiness to trade with us.

The Naval Staff does not say that England can be defeated by unrestricted submarine warfare. For the neutrals, the disruption of traffic with England, the centre of world trade, would constitute serious disturbances in their economies, for which we cannot offer them any compensation.

Considerations of foreign policy would favour using the weapon of unrestricted submarine warfare only after England, by her methods of warfare, had given us a pretext for ordering this type of warfare as a reprisal measure.

Since the decision to be reached is of great significance for foreign policy, it appears necessary that it should be made in full recognition of the requirements of foreign policy and not on the basis of military considerations alone.

¹ Not found.

² Not found.

³ On Nov. 28, 1936, Germany gave formal notification of her accession to a *procès-verbal* relating to the rules of submarine warfare set forth in Part IV of the London Naval Treaty of April 22, 1930; this *procès-verbal* had already been signed in London on Nov. 6, 1936, by the United States, Japan, France, Italy, Great Britain, the British Dominions, and India; the Soviet Government signified their adherence on Feb. 16, 1937. The text is printed in *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 140, pp. 300-302.

No. 576

8589/E602560-63

Directive by the Führer

TOP SECRET MILITARY

BERLIN, September 3, 1939.

OKW/WFA No. 175/39 g.K.Chefs. L.I

8 copies.

2nd copy.

DIRECTIVE NO. 2 FOR THE CONDUCT OF WAR

1. After the declaration of a state of war by the British Government,¹ the British Admiralty on September 3, 1939, at 11:17 a.m. gave orders for the opening of hostilities.

France has declared that from 5:00 p.m. on September 3, 1939, she will be in a state of war with Germany.²

2. The German war objective remains for the time being the speedy and victorious conclusion of the operations against Poland.

Any decision to transfer sizable forces from the East to the West rests with me.

3. The principles for the conduct of the war in the West, in accordance with Directive No. 1,³ remain in force.

After the opening of hostilities by Britain, now announced, and the declaration of a state of war by France, the following conclusions have been reached:

*(a) Against Britain**Navy*

Offensive operations are permitted. The warfare against merchant shipping is for the time being to be conducted according to the prize regulations, also by submarines. Preparations are to be made for intensification [of the war] pending the declaration of danger zones. The decision to put intensification measures into force rests with me.

The approaches to the Baltic Sea are to be blocked by mines without infringing on neutral territorial waters.

Barrage measures in the North Sea intended for our own defence and for the attack against Britain are to be carried out.

Luftwaffe

Offensive operations against British naval forces in naval ports and on the open sea (including the Channel), as well as against troop transports definitely identified as such, are only to be permitted if British attacks from the air on similar targets have taken place and

¹ See document No. 560.

² See document No. 563.

³ See document No. 493.

if prospects of success are particularly favourable. The same applies to operations by naval air formations.⁴

The decision on attacks against the British mainland and merchant shipping rests with me.

(b) *Against France*
Army

In the West the opening of hostilities is to be left to the enemy. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army will decide on reinforcements for the Western Army from the forces still available.

Navy

Offensive operations against France are only to be permitted if she opens hostilities. If she does so, then the orders given against Britain apply also against France in the same way.

Luftwaffe

Offensive operations against France are only to be permitted after French attacks have been made against German territory. The principle to be followed is that the beginning of the war in the air should not be caused by German measures.

Generally, in the use of the Luftwaffe in the West, it is to be borne in mind that its fighting power must be conserved for the decision against the Western Powers after the defeat of Poland.

4. The X Order issued with OKW No. 2100/39 g.K. WFA/L. II c on August 25, 1939,⁵ will be extended to the whole of the Wehrmacht with effect from September 3, 1939.

The conversion of the whole of industry to war economy is ordered.

Further mobilization measures in the civil sphere will be taken, on application from the Supreme Reich Authorities, by the High Command of the Wehrmacht.


ADOLF HITLER

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⁴ On Sept. 6 the following supplement (8589/E602564) was issued, to be added after "Naval Air Formations": "In Heligoland Bay and in the declared mined area West, as well as in direct support of naval actions, these restrictions do not apply. OKW/L."

⁵ Not found, but see Editors' Note, p. 302.



Appendix I

EXTRACTS FROM THE NOTEBOOK OF COLONEL GENERAL HALDER¹ AUGUST 14-SEPTEMBER 3, 1939

The whole notebook, which covers the period 14 August 1939 to 24 September 1942, was lodged as an exhibit in the case against von Leeb *et al.* Short extracts were subsequently published in *Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals*, U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, 1951), vols. X and XI.

The notebook, which consists of shorthand notes made personally by Halder in connection with his daily tasks as Chief of the General Staff of the Army, should not be confused with the official War Diaries kept by the High Command of the Army. The transcript of the notes, which were written in the Gabelsberger system of shorthand, was prepared by the staff of the Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel for War Crimes (OMGUS).

All those entries which deal primarily with matters of purely military interest have been omitted. All omissions are indicated by a series of dots. The translation has been revised to tally more exactly with the somewhat telegraphic style of the original. Some of the explanatory information supplied in the footnotes provided by the American editors at Nuremberg, who worked over the shorthand text with General Halder, has been used; these footnotes are marked with an asterisk. All the footnotes have been numbered in daily series.

¹ Nuremberg document NOKW 3140; Case 12, Prosecution Exhibit 1359.

14 AUGUST 1939 (Obersalzberg)¹

First of all the fact must be recognized that any political or military success involves taking risks: In the political field, because there is opposition to overcome, in the military, because sober assessment of all factors often reveals the possibility of failure.

Clear appraisal of the conditions!—Historical facts.

England's position must be viewed in the light of internal politics. Decision in 1914. England would not have stepped in if she had foreseen the consequences. No nation wants a long war as such.

England only stands to lose.

Changes since the World War:

Recognition that a wealthy nation has little to gain, but a great deal to lose:

Every nation must pay with blood:

Even when a war is won the victor emerges with diminished strength. This is the key to an understanding of the actions of men of less than heroic cast.—England overburdened with commitments in all parts of the world.

Fight Germany	Yes
Fight for Allies	?
Fight for others	No

¹ The following are notes of an address by the Führer which form the basis of the summary to be found on pp. 554 ff.

In view of their experiences in the World War, there is little chance that opponents will deliberately run the risk of a major war. They know that it is a different Germany they would have to tackle today. 1914: Socialists, Church.

The factors involved:

Political:

Opponents:

Poland (primary).

England (active), France.

Russia is not in the least disposed to pull chestnuts out of the fire. Nothing to gain, but much to fear. War at the periphery a possibility, perhaps even welcome. Not so in centre. A war lost as much a threat as a victorious army. Interested in disruption of the Western States, access to Baltic.

Neutrals:

Norway, Sweden, Denmark. Will be genuinely neutral, from inner convictions. Britain's overtures to Russia have caused intense irritation.—

Switzerland, Belgium, Holland:

Switzerland will certainly remain neutral.

Holland: neutral on principle; danger to Far East possessions.

Belgium will endeavour to remain neutral. Belgium would be battlefield. Could only stand to lose. A section of the population, with French or Jewish family ties, might wish to pull in opposite direction as long as the guns do not speak.

Hungary requires no mention.

Friends:

Italy is not interested in a major conflict, but would welcome certain adjustments. A victory of the democratic nations would be the end of Italy.—A Man!

Spain will look with disfavour upon any victory of the Western Democracies. Democracies would introduce a monarchy and dependence on Western Powers.

England and France will have to shoulder the burden alone. Nor will the Balkan States be of any help to them.

Military:

Scale of *British* armaments: Supplementary armament programme passed (Navy, Air, Ground Forces). Not yet effective. *Naval armament:* programme not yet started. There will be no increase in battleship strength before 1941, no increase in cruisers and destroyers before 1940. Additional programme, just passed, is still in the misty future.

Ground Forces: One class of conscripts called up. It will be months before they are shaped into fighting units. Forces primarily needed for anti-aircraft. Months will pass before they could be available in any number.

Air: Progress has been made in bomber and fighter strength; improvement in ground organizations. No fundamental changes in ratio of bombers/fighters. No major improvement in anti-aircraft (10 to 12 pieces a month). Three years will be needed to build up an adequate anti-aircraft force. Armament programme is being pushed in too many directions, with resulting mutual interference. On the whole, in the development stage (similar to our situation in 1934).

France: Resembles a weak man trying to carry machine guns, heavy guns, etc., on his back. Age classes of conscripts are small, and for a long time only one

year's service. Armament, too, is not in best shape. Potential of army on the whole limited. Colonial troops tied down.

If Führer were in the place of opponents, he would not accept the responsibility for a war. 125 million lined up against 80.

What can the English and French do?

Offensive: Between Basle and Saarbrücken hopeless. Local successes possible. Do-or-die attack improbable. A violation of neutrality of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland: a quick success, likely to relieve pressure on the Eastern Front, is completely out of question. British could give support with a few Divs.—Blockade (counter measures) is therefore a long-term affair.

No immediate relief could be afforded by any Anglo-French action.

There is nothing to force them into a war.

The men of Munich will not take the risk. Risk of world-wide repercussions.

Nobody has got ready cash for armaments. No more credit to be had.

The only clear-headed people left are the English Imperial General Staff and the French General Staff.

In the political field some English spokesmen are beginning to back down (Duff Cooper).² The Press!

Utmost possibilities: Recall of ambassadors. Embargo on commerce with Germany, promotion of trade with Poland. League of Nations.

Line of retreat: Russia. Poland has not lived up to her promises.—Neutral States oppose passage through their territories. Treaties not ratified; formula: "All support in their power."³

Not really sincere: Were England resolved to help, she would have given money to the Poles. But the English will not put any more money into a bankrupt business.—Politicians take cover behind Ironside Report.⁴ Polish mentality: If England had made any positive commitments, the Poles would be much more cocky. Tapped telephone conversations! Führer is concerned lest England hamper showdown by last-minute offers.

Summing up: In last weeks, conviction of [Poland's] isolation strengthened from day to day.

A necessary condition: That we obtain results within measurable time. In a week or a fortnight the impression [must prevail] that Poland will collapse. Winding up the operation can take longer.

Further necessity: Resolution to fight every corner. In the West build-up must be carried out completely.

Relations with Russia: Loose contacts. Started from negotiations for trade agreement. Under consideration whether a negotiator should go to Moscow, and whether or not this should be a prominent figure. [Russia] not thinking of obligations towards the West. Russians understand destruction of Poland. But what about Ukr[aine]? Promise of delimitation of spheres of interest.—Baltic States? Issue, Lithuania (not Baltic States). Russians want to discuss subject more closely. Distrust. No common frontier.—Führer inclined to meet half-way.

[Führer] has hinted to England that he will approach her with a new offer after disposal of the overriding Polish question. Has registered in London. Paris, too, is informed about his determination. So the great drama is now approaching its climax.—The British commotion happened because of some

² Alfred Duff Cooper, British Conservative M.P.; Secretary of State for War, 1935–1937; First Lord of the Admiralty, May, 1937–October, 1938.

³ A reference to Mr. Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons on Mar. 31, 1939. See *Parl. Deb., H. of C.*, vol. 345, col. 2415.

⁴ See vol. vi of this Series, document No. 752.

careless German boast that the Führer's calculations had always proved correct.

The other nations must be given proof that there will be a shooting war no matter what. (Poland will be polished off in six to eight weeks.) Even if England should step in.

AFTERNOON SESSION

If opinion changes, possible that cheap success taken. [Decision] reserved until 48 hours beforehand.

- a) Central problem is Poland. Must be carried through at all costs.
- b) Situation if *western front is under pressure*: all-out drive against German fortified zone unlikely. Attack possible with violation Belgian-Dutch neutrality.—No need for a change in our attitude before the proper time arrives. Attack to gain an advantageous front line because of lack of forces not necessary. It would thus be a question of: a) ensuring protection of our frontier with least delay; b) investigating the possibilities of creating new reserves or moving up existing ones; c) [no entry made]; d) occupation of the islands and the northern tip.
- c) *East*: How can we seize the Dirschau Bridge? Graudenz.—Führer has ordered study on what could be done about Dirschau Bridge.

Dirschau: (Himmler) Armoured train, *coup-de-main*.

Graudenz: Possibly raiding force in civilian clothes.⁵ Dive-bombers practically out of question.

Slovakia has signed protection treaty.⁶

Disposition of forces has been reviewed. Nothing will be taken away from troops earmarked for East.

Danzig will be left to its own resources. [*Danzig selbst.*]

Navy: Planned: 1 cruiser and 11 submarines will put to sea for exercises on 18th.

Air attack: Gdynia: 8 dive-bomber groups—80 aircraft. Mixed bombs.

Party Rally: Decision [*Nachricht*] 15 August.

Deployment in West advanced to 15 August.

SUMMARY

Morning Session: Review of political situation

Success, political or military, cannot be had without taking risks. The Führer regards the foreign policy risks involved in a German attack on Poland in the light of the risks which he had to take in all his decisions to date, and which, to his mind, were great at first and then steadily decreased.

As opponents, only a matter of England—apart from Poland herself—with France towed in her wake.

England, unlike in 1914, will not allow herself to blunder into a war lasting for years. Talk of England wanting a long war discounted. No Government will make a long war their primary aim. England, knowing war, is well aware that she stands to lose in a war, and that even a victorious war would not make up for the cost of such a war. Such is the fate of rich countries. England is overburdened with responsibilities because of the excessive size of her empire.

⁵* A special task force organized by OKW—*Abwehr* (Adm. Canaris) to seize the strategic Vistula bridge.

⁶ See Editors' Note, p. 50.

She has no leaders of real calibre. ("The men I got to know in Munich are not the kind that start a new World War.") Moreover, the other side is well aware that it has to deal with a different Germany from 1914 (Socialism, Church). (What should England fight for? You don't get yourself killed for an ally.) Not even England has the money nowadays to fight a world war. She can get nothing on credit.

France is not directly interested in waging a war.

Russia has no intention of pulling England's chestnuts out of the fire and will keep out of war. A lost war is as dangerous for Stalin as a victorious army. His interests at most extend to the Baltic States.

Norway, Sweden, Denmark are neutral from innermost conviction. Deeply perturbed over Britain's wooing of Russia.

Switzerland, Belgium, Holland: Switzerland certainly neutral, Holland the same. Belgium will endeavour to remain neutral. As a battlefield she only stands to lose. Possibly there are still some forces pulling in favour of participation at the side of France, but they will be silent once the guns begin to speak. In sum, England and France will have to shoulder the burden alone. Nor will the Balkan States be of any help to them.

Appraisal of military potential of opponents:

England has not gained in naval power over last year. On land, it will be months before stepped-up intake of recruits can take effect in the form of efficient fighting units. Progress has been scored in the air: bombers, fighters, ground organization improved. Anti-aircraft defences, no real improvement yet.—On the whole, everything is still in the development stage, similar to ours in 1934.

France's potential is curtailed by the limitations of her manpower. Colonial troops are tied down. Equipment not ideal.

If the Führer were in the shoes of the Franco-English statesmen, he would not assume responsibility for a world conflict. One hundred and twenty-five million are lined up against eighty.

What military measures can France and England undertake? Drive against West Wall unlikely. A northward swing through Belgium and Holland will not bring speedy victory. None of this would help the Poles. Blockade works slowly and provokes dangerous counter measures.

All these factors argue against England and France entering the war, particularly since they are not under any compulsion. Treaties are not yet ratified. Formula: "Support with all our power" is not genuinely meant. Proof: England does not give Poland money to buy arms in other countries. Politicians are beginning to back down, taking cover behind Ironside Report.

English and French General Staffs take a very sober view of the prospects of an armed conflict and advise against it.

Further evidence that no determined action is to be expected on the part of England may above all be inferred from Poland's attitude. Poland would be even more cocky if she knew she could depend on England. England has strongly remonstrated with Poland over the latest Polish Notes⁷ and is continuously putting on the brakes. Tapped telephone conversations in Poland! Even now England is putting out feelers to find out how the Führer envisages developments after Poland has been disposed of.

All this supports the conviction that while England may talk big, even recall her ambassador, perhaps put a complete embargo on trade, she is sure not to resort to armed intervention in the conflict.

⁷ See document No. 10, and vol. VI of this Series, document No. 774.

The requisite conditions are:

- (1) That we obtain results in Poland within measurable time. "Within a week or two the world must be convinced that Poland is at the point of collapse. The operations themselves may well continue past that date." (Six to eight weeks.)
- (2) Determination to fight every corner.
- (3) Build-up on the Western front must be completed.

Separate issue: Russia.

Questions concerning the Army:

- a) Call-up for West (required 250,000 men, i.e., 12 Divs.)? *Decision 15 Aug.* Decision on movement into Holland including northern part still pending!
 - b) Cancellation of Party Rally? *Decision on 15 Aug.* (Yes!)
 - c) Advance notice to railroads? *Decision on 15 Aug.* (Yes!) Things should go according to our timetable.
 - d) *Dirschau: Coup-de-main.* Himmler! Armoured train? Report and pertinent information to be submitted. *Graudenz:* Paratroops on evening of first day.
 - e) Gdynia. K 5⁸ [gun] to be used. Report to be submitted.
- OB. f) Mobilization in East as prearranged, also for East Prussia. Consult with Bock.
- OB. *Weserübung*⁹
- g) Treaty with Slovakia signed.

14 Aug. Evening: v. Stülpnagel¹⁰ (through v. Weizsäcker): R[ibbentrop]—Ciano:¹¹ [three words illegible]:¹² Ciano exceedingly surprised. M[ussolini] wants to have peace for some more years. Germany's encirclement complete. Italy exhausted; no raw materials; deficiencies in armaments; no coastal fortifications. —Nothing can be undertaken from Libya.

General Staff estimates fighting strength Italy-France at 1:5.

Albania was a disappointment. Operations in Balkans not feasible in near future.

R[ibbentrop]: We don't need you.—C[iano]: The future will show.

15 Aug. 0840 hrs. Talk with State Secretary *Weizsäcker*: He confirms the picture of the situation presented yesterday. *Chamberlain* and *Halifax* in particular wish to avoid bloodshed. U.S. observes marked reserve. Concurs in estimate of developments in the next ten days.

⁸* A 28 cm. railway gun.

⁹* According to Halder this was the designation of an annual Engineer Corps field exercise; usually named after the river where it was held.

¹⁰ See entry for Aug. 31, footnote 7.

¹¹ See Editors' Note, p. 35.

¹²* According to Halder they might be: "M[ussolini] West neutral".

17 AUGUST 1939

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Canaris [Checked with] Section 1 [Operations] Hi[mmler] Hei [Heydrich] Obersalzberg: 150 Polish uniforms with accessories (Dr. Trumler) for Upper Silesia¹ . . .

¹ See *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxvi, document 795-PS, Exhibit GB-54, p. 337, for a record of a conversation held by Keitel on Aug. 17 about Hitler's orders that Heydrich should be supplied with Polish uniforms. The oral evidence of Keitel (*ibid.*, vol. x, p. 515) confirmed that this conversation was with Canaris. See also the oral evidence of Colonel Erwin Lahousen, head of Section II of the *Abwehr* (*ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 449-451 and vol. III, p. 10) and the affidavit by Alfred Naujocks (*ibid.*, vol. xxxi, document 2751-PS, exhibit USA-482) describing the use to which such uniforms were put, and in particular the faking of a Polish raid, reported by DNB on Aug. 31, on the Gleiwitz radio station.

21 AUGUST 1939

Canaris:

- a) First: guarantee pact does not meet Russian wishes.¹ Then programme: Ri[bbentrop] could go [to Moscow] eight days after signing and publication of trade agreement (20 Aug.).² Would have to take with him draft of guarantee pact. Must cover all points of joint interest to Germany and Russia.

Russian draft³ provides for no use of force against others. No support for the aggressor. In event of disagreements, arbitration. Duration for five years from date of ratification.

- b) Attol[ico] at Fuschl:⁴ Expressed misgivings very clearly. Italy won't go along. Result: considerable annoyance. Att[olico] returned to Rome.
- c) Belgium: (Bülow-Schwante) . . .

¹ See document No. 132.

² Document No. 131.

³ See document No. 133

⁴ See document No. 126, footnote 4.

22 AUGUST 1939

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Führer Conference (Obersalzberg, 1200)¹

Present: The Army Group and Army Commanders of the three Armed Forces.

I. Exposition of the situation, and decision (Morning)

1) *Development of the decision* to settle Eastern question: theoretically desirable to settle with West first, but as it has become increasingly clear that Poland would fall on us from behind in any difficult situation the Eastern question must be disposed of before the problems in the West are tackled.

2) *Germany's present position* favourable for settlement of Eastern question. A number of factors are in our favour now which would not exist a few years hence.

(a) *Personal considerations:*

On our side: the personality of the Führer.—The personality of Mussolini as the sole champion of the imperial idea. Proved his strength in Abyssinian

¹ See also documents Nos. 192 and 193.

conflict. The personality of Franco, the champion of unified progressive leadership and of friendship for Germany in Spain.

On the enemy's side: there are no men of the necessary calibre to carry through, firmly and heroically, the very difficult decisions which must be taken, especially on the English side. The enemy has much to lose [whereas we] only stand to gain.

(b) *Political advantages:*

England is contained: in the *Mediterranean*, by tension with Italy; in the Far East, by tension with Japan; in Near East, by tension with the Mohammedan peoples.

England did not win in the last war. In entering a new war the Empire must reckon with changes in its structure.

France's position has also deteriorated. Decline in birth-rate.

Balance of forces in *Balkans* since Albania, Yugoslavia tied down. Rumania vulnerable and dependent on the tension between the other Powers. Turkey has no leadership.

"A showdown, which it would not be safe to put off for four to five years, had better take place now.

"Use of military weapons necessary, before final great showdown with West; testing the [military] machine.

"A general settlement of accounts is not desirable, but rather disposing of specific issues; this is not only politically but also militarily the right way."

(c) *Poland:*

Polish-German relations unbearable. Proposals concerning Danzig and communications through Corridor (Currency question) were turned down at England's instigation. Settlement of Polish tension must not be left to solution by third powers. Time for solution now ripe, therefore strike! Political risk involved cannot be avoided. No great decision without risk.

3) *Reasons leading to [this] decision*

Only two States (England and France) can feel any obligation to assist Poland, England primarily, France towed in England's wake.

England's rearmament has not yet altered the situation substantially in England's favour. Improvement of Navy will not be noticeable until 41/42; on land it will also take considerable time for effects to be felt; only air force improved. Today England's vulnerability in the air is still great. Therefore England desires armed conflict only in three to four years' time.

France's armaments partially outdated, but not bad. Population dwindling. France cannot afford long war.

In the West there remain only two possibilities:

Blockade: Unpromising, as we can utilize Danube basin.

Attack in West:

- (a) Attack on West Wall psychologically impossible, also militarily very difficult.
- (b) Violation of neutral States. These countries really wish to remain neutral. Besides, England also needs their neutrality.

Therefore we expect that England and France will not violate neutrality. Military intervention therefore without prospects. "Long war" not attractive. Germany can be expected to do better in a long war now than in 1914.

Russia will never be so senseless as to fight for France and England.

Developments: Dismissal of Litvinov:² sign of ending of policy of intervention; commercial treaty.³ Even before that, conversations, on Russia's initiative, on non-aggression pact,⁴ intervention in Russo-Japanese conflict, Baltic States.

Russians have informed [us] that they are prepared to conclude pact. Personal contact Stalin-Führer. "With this I have knocked the weapons out of the hands of these gentry [*Herrschaften*]. Poland has been manoeuvred into the position that we need for military success."

Ultimate effect cannot yet be foreseen: new course! Stalin writes⁵ that he expects a great deal for both sides. Tremendous revolution in the whole European political situation.

II. *The Führer's demands on his military chiefs*

1) *Ruthless determination*: Anglo-French counter moves will come. We must stand fast. Build-up in West will go forward [*W-Aufmarsch wird gefahren*]. "Iron steadfastness of all in authority."

2) *Aim: Annihilation of Poland*—elimination of its vital forces. It is not a matter of gaining a specific line or a new frontier, but rather of the annihilation of an enemy, which must be constantly attempted by new ways.

3) *Solution*: Means immaterial. The victor is never called upon to vindicate his actions. We are not concerned with having justice on our side, but solely with victory.

4) *Execution*: Harsh and remorseless. Be steeled against all signs of compassion!

Speed: Faith in the German soldier, even if reverses occur!

Of paramount importance are the wedges [which must be driven] from the south-east to the Vistula, and from the north to the Narev and Vistula. Promptness in meeting new situations; new means must be devised to deal with them quickly.

5) *New frontiers*: New Reich territory? Outlying protectorate territory. Military operations must not be affected by regard for future frontiers.

III. *Details*

1) Probable start: Saturday morning.

2) Slovakia (List):⁶ Instruct Bockhausen to strengthen Slovak frontier defence. Elements of 7th Air Force Division to Zipser-Neudorf. Slovak airmen to be grounded. We guarantee Slovakia against Hungarians taking action.⁷

3) Dirschau: Attack at dawn on Y-day by dive-bomber groups on western end of bridge and town (barracks, power plant, etc.). Simultaneously freight train [*Bahnzug*] from Marienburg, followed by armoured train and remainder of [group] Medem.

4) Gdynia: Air attack simultaneously with Dirschau; simultaneous blockade of harbour.

5) Operation of Army *Reichenau*:⁸ No comment.

6) Review of position of enemy in sector of Army Group North.

² See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 325.

³ See document No. 131.

⁴ See document No. 50.

⁵ See document No. 159.

⁶ Colonel General Siegmund Wilhelm List, C-in-C Fourteenth Army, in Army Group South (Slovakia).

⁷ See document No. 214.

⁸ Tenth Army, in Army Group South (Upper Silesia).

23 AUGUST 1939

OKW Conference (Section Chiefs):

1) Safeguarding *Slovakia*: OKH assume immediate control of Slovak army (Slovak protest) (Instructions to Barchhausen).¹ Safeguarding Zipser-Neudorf. Intelligence [*Abwehr*] Sec. II. (Instructions given by OKH to OQu IV.)

2) *Dirschau-Gdynia*: No indications beforehand! The Führer thinks that Engineers are too valuable [to expend on this operation].

3) *Luxembourg*: In the event of violation of neutrality: reconnaissance and covering parties will be sent out to establish contact. Fight back! Air Force is to protect ground force movements. (Clear with OQu I, Sec. 1, and OQu IV.)

4) *Leaflets*: Führer reserves decision.

5) *Railroad movements to East Prussia* (12,000 to 15,000 men).

6) *For the time being, no conversion to war economy* or setting in operation of war industry. (Thomas² to check with State Secretaries daily at 1100).

Quartermaster-General: (Crüwell!).³

Press Conference at Goebbels's Office at 1100 (Section 6). (Wedel⁴ to see Goebbels at 1030).

7) Y-Day⁵ definitely set for the 26th (Saturday). No further orders.

8) X-Hour: 0430??-0415?? . . .

¹ See document No. 214.

² Major General Georg Thomas, Chief of the War Economy Staff of the OKW.

³ Colonel Ludwig Crüwell, Chief of Section 6 (Supply) of the OKH.

⁴ Lieutenant Colonel Hasso von Wedel, Head of the Wehrmacht Propaganda Department in the OKW.

⁵ See document No. 100, footnote 3.

25 AUGUST 1939¹

1200. *Call from OKW*: Postponement of decision. What is latest deadline?
Reply: 1500.

1330. *Call from OKW*: Last deadline will have to be used. (Henderson.)²

1545. *ObdH*: Luxembourg—Führer ruling—OKW, Sec. 1, has been notified. Evacuation of Red Zone in XII Corps area³ starts tomorrow in accordance with instructions of Army Group. (Crüwell has already been notified.)

Cheval[lerie].⁴ General Staff on war-time footing.—Press?—Printing of situation maps.

1930. *ObdH*:

a) Treaty between Poland and England ratified.⁵

b) No opening of hostilities. All troop movements to be stopped, even near frontier if not otherwise possible.

c) Mobilization continues.

d) Build-up West and East continues.

e) Evacuation of Red Zone, Corps Command area XII, cancelled.

¹ See also entries for 1715 on August 26 and for 1215 (f) on August 28.

² See document No. 265.

³ i.e., the Saarbrücken industrial area of Military District XII.

⁴ Major General Kurt von der Chevallerie, Chief of the Central Department of the OKH.

⁵ See Editors' Note, p. 303.

2035. *Keitel* confirms.
Canaris: Telephone restrictions lifted on England and France. Confirms development of events.
2100. *Bock*:⁶ Enquires whether possibility [of action] tomorrow must be allowed for.
2130. *v. Boeckmann*: Proclamation on Executive Power⁷ to be stopped. All political as well as military measures connected with [Aug.] 26 must be called off.
2150. *Talk with Wagner*⁸ on withholding proclamations on Executive Power.

⁶ Colonel General Fedor v. Bock, Commander Army Group North.

⁷ See Editors' Note, p. 302.

⁸ Colonel Eduard Wagner, Chief of Staff to the Generalquartiermeister of the OKH.

26 AUGUST 1939: [*Mobilization Day*]

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1610. *Canaris*: *Helldorf*¹ (through OQu I). The Army is said to have been blamed for shrinking back. *Hi[mmler]* is being talked of as Minister of the Interior.

1600. *Siewert*:²

- a) Conference at Reich Chancellery has just ended.
- b) Situation unchanged. Decision not yet taken on main problem (not before late tonight).
- c) Feelers have been put out but no results so far.

1715. *Engel*³ (through OQu IV): *Letter to Duce* yesterday.⁴ Action must be taken. History of the Russian Pact. Japan's attitude. Italy must come in. Will benefit Axis.—Att[olico] transmitted letter to Ci[ano]. Att[olico]: first a statement by Italy. The Italians and their General Staff have doubts. England sure to intervene. Italy is not in a position to conduct even a defensive war.—Renewed request, to try to influence Duce, which caused delay from 1400 to 1500 on 25th. Then decision of Führer to give the order at 1502, without [Mussolini's] reply. 1745: Italian reply.⁵ Italy must stick to her statement. Participation is out of the question without guarantee, and actual delivery, of large quantities of war and raw materials.

Führer considerably shaken [*ziemlich zusammengebrochen*].

Ciano has communicated his Salzburg impressions to the English.

Neurath: He can thank the Italians for that.—Roatta.⁶ Cancellation of attack order passed on at 2230 [*sic*].⁷ Subsequent developments: A faint hope that England might still, by negotiation, be brought to accept the demands rejected by Poland. Danzig Corridor. (Henderson: offer on solution of Corridor and Danzig questions:⁸ now in London.)

Italy to be strengthened? ObdH no! Göring no! Demands⁹ said to be

¹* Police Commissioner of Berlin.

²* Lt. Colonel Curt Siewert, Adjutant of von Brauchitsch. Time probably 1630 or 1700.

³* One of Hitler's aides-de-camp.

⁴ See document No. 266.

⁵ See document No. 271.

⁶ General Mario Roatta, Italian Military Attaché in Berlin.

⁷ cf. entries for 1930 and 2035 on Aug. 25 and for 1215 (f) on Aug. 28.

⁸ See document No. 265.

⁹ See document No. 301.

so exorbitant that we cannot accept: fuel, steel, 600 barrels for heavy anti-aircraft guns, etc.

Führer intends to press the Italians again.

Secret clause with Russians:¹⁰ Ukraine and Baltic States, exclusive of Lithuania, sacrificed to the Russians . . .

[*Enquiry at OKW*]: No change. When can we start: 6th or 7th [Mob.] Day.¹¹ Concentrate air power! (Jeschonnek).¹²

Interpretation of Polish Treaty: more jumping-off facilities! *Objectives of forcible means farther* [*Ziele der Gewalt weiter*]:¹³ decision on re-grouping of build-up tomorrow [*Entscheidung über Verwerfen des Aufmarsches morgen*].

Reconsideration scheduled for about 6th Mob. Day. Order follows.

Gö[ring]—Compr[omise]¹⁴

Belgium-Holland-Luxembourg: We shall respect independence.¹⁵

Gamelin-Lipski.

Foerster [sic].

Preparations to continue. Make preparations on assumption that attack be launched on 6th [Mob. Day] (at earliest). Orders follow . . .

¹⁰ See document No. 229.

¹¹ i.e., August 31 or September 1.

¹² Major General Hans Jeschonnek, Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe.

¹³* The shorthand notes are fairly clear and suggest no other rendering. General Halder can no longer interpret this entry, which he believes he made hurriedly at the telephone.

¹⁴ See also document No. 312.

¹⁵* i.e., "We shall respect neutrality." [See document No. 272.]

27 AUGUST 1939: 2nd Mob. Day

OQu IV:

1) Coulondre has been to see Führer.¹ Daladier's urgent appeal to leave the sword in the sheath. (Letter for [my] information; reply;² not yet [seen].) Telephone conversation Coul[ondre]-Dal[adier]; Coul[ondre] said to be negative; will Germany strike? If so, I put my confidence in the strength of the nation.

2) *Navy*: Destroyer sunk in collision.

3) *Henderson* is expected back at 1700.

4) *Japan* deeply displeased. Oshima has sought to lodge protest with Weizsäcker.³ "Relations seriously endangered." Weizsäcker sees no grounds for accepting this protest and for yielding to his insistence.—Gen[eral] Ott: Very bad impression in Japan, especially among Army.—A declaration of sympathy [*Sympathiekundgebung*] by German Army?⁴

France: Frontier build-up now proceeding; only against Germany. Corps commanders still at their peacetime posts. Fourth degree of readiness confirmed. General mobilization not confirmed. No change in disposition of troops on frontier. Transport of "A" Echelons [*A Staffeln*] from Central Corps Areas apparently only partially started.

England: Mobilization started 23 August. First contingent: (regular army) two to three Divs. and two Armd. Divs. were ready on 25 August, morning. No evidence of transports (embarkation).

¹ See document No. 324 and footnote 1 thereto.

² See document No. 354.

³ See document No. 329.

⁴ See documents Nos. 246 and 400.

Belgium: First phase of preliminary mobilization. Frontier troops identified only east of Liège. *Belgium will defend integrity of the country under all circumstances.*

Holland: Anything that can fight is already on the frontiers.

1130. *Groscurth:*⁵ Situation report.

[Word received that] Henderson will not return before tomorrow afternoon . . .

OB/OQu IV: *West:*

England no general mobilization. First wave: 2 [Inf.] Divs. and 1 Armd. Div. First wave not yet on the move. Territorial Army not yet alerted. Anti-aircraft defence in top gear.

Belgium: First phase of mobilization, i.e., regular army: 9 Divs., i.e., 6 Inf. Divs., 2 mot. Divs., 1 Ardennes Chasseur Div., have been mobilized (began at earliest on 25 Aug.). Movement to frontier not yet started. Special Powers for King. First phase [of mobilization] has not yet been passed.

France: No change. Clothing depots in Corps Areas in South shifted to North. *Rumour: Chasseurs Alpins north from Italian border.* Hesitant! General mobilization apparently not yet announced. "A" Echelons from Central Corps Areas only partly to frontier?

Poland: No news of consequence.

⁵ Major Helmuth Groscurth, Chief of the liaison section of the Foreign/Intelligence Department [*Ausland/Abwehr*] of the OKW.

28 AUGUST 1939: 3rd Mob. Day

0800. Conference with *ObdH* on proposals of Army Groups re attack on 6th Mob. Day.

Conference with *ObdH*: Stick it out.¹ . . .

1215. *Oster:*² Finance Minister Popitz: Those who want to stab me in the back again had better watch out.³

a) Conference at Reich Chancellery at 1730:⁴ Reichstag and several Party notables, Führer accompanied by Himmler, Heydrich, Wolff,⁵ Goebbels and Bormann.

Situation very grave. Determined to solve Eastern question one way or another.

Minimum demands: return of Danzig, settling of Corridor question. Maximum demands: "Depending on military situation."

If minimum demands not satisfied, then war: Brutal!

He will himself be in the front line.

The Duce's attitude serves our best interests.

War very difficult, perhaps hopeless; "As long as I am alive there will be no talk of capitulation."—Soviet Pact widely misunderstood by Party. A pact with Satan to cast out the Devil.

Economic situation.

"Applause on proper cues, but thin."

¹* According to Halder this meant: "Don't let anyone change your plans!" After opening of hostilities was called off on Aug. 25, all commanders wanted changes in their orders.

² Colonel Hans Oster, Chief of Staff of the Intelligence Department [*Abwehr*] of the OKW.

³* Presumably citing Hitler.

⁴ Presumably on Aug. 27. See Editors' Note, p. 367.

⁵ SS-Gruppenführer Karl Wolff, Chief of the Personal Staff of the Reichsführer-SS.

Personal impression [of Führer]: exhausted, haggard, croaking voice, preoccupied. "Keeps himself completely surrounded now by his SS advisers."

- b) *Conversation between Coulondre and Forbes*.⁶ Opponents know about target date (26 August) and its postponement. England and France of opinion that it would be impossible to give way as long as troops are on the frontier.

Henderson working to gain time. Chamberlain indignant at personal insults.

- c) Ribb[entrop] has received *Chinese Minister*.⁷—Chiang [Kai-shek]. Trade agreement. Discussion has been held.

Japan: civilian faction has won, is urging conclusion of alliance with France and England.

- d) *Italian press has changed course?* English pressure in Mediterranean [will increase] after cessation of pressure in [sic] Japan.
e) English broadcasts: Mobilization in Germany. No signs in Italy.
f) Sequence of events:

23 August

1400. Chamb[erlain's] letter⁸ to Führer at Berghof: "We stand by our commitments."

1800. Reply:⁹ Rejection of interference.

24 August

0200. Russian Pact¹⁰ signed.

1500. Ch[amberlain] makes statement¹¹ on determination to aid Poland.

1900. Ri[bbentrop] back from Moscow.

25 August

0100. Ri[bbentrop]-Ciano.¹² Changed situation. "Intervention by Western Powers impossible."

1200. Scheduled telephone conversation postponed.¹³

1330. Henderson sees Führer. Memorandum presented.¹⁴ Henderson: No basis for negotiations. Führer would not take it amiss if England were to wage a sham war.

1400. Attolico sees Ri[bbentrop],¹⁵ is informed of letter to Duce. Russian Pact has altered situation. Rumania powerless. Turkey must change course. Duce stands by Führer.

1500. Ciano to Attolico.¹⁶ "Expected improvement is not taking place."

1630. Anglo-Polish Pact announced.

1700. Coulondre:¹⁷ appeal to Daladier not to interfere, "eternal frontiers".

⁶ Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, British Counsellor of Embassy.

⁷ Chen Chieh; no record of this interview has been found; see, however, document No. 327.

⁸ See document No. 200, enclosure.

⁹ See document No. 201.

¹⁰ See documents Nos. 228 and 229.

¹¹ See document the *British Blue Book*, Cmd. 6106, No. 64.

¹² See document No. 263.

¹³ See *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. xiii, No. 234.

¹⁴ See document No. 265.

¹⁵ No German record of this conversation has been found; see *D.D.I.*, Eighth Series, vol. xiii, Nos. 258 and 259.

¹⁶ No record has been found.

¹⁷ See Editors' Note, p. 284.

1800. Duce's reply¹⁸ through Attol[ico]: Concurs with Russian Pact. However, if Western Powers should attack Italy, she would not be able to resist without raw materials and war material.

2000. March order cancelled.

2115. Duce message¹⁹ that list [of requirements] is coming tomorrow.

26 August

0730. Letter Hend[erson]-Ri[bbentrop].²⁰ Will transmit message to Cabinet. I will hurry and not play for time.

1330. Duce's list²¹ of requirements. Offers his services as mediator. 150 anti-aircraft batteries with personnel wanted at once.

1600. Reply²² to Duce, with statement on what deliveries are possible. Question of transport merely touched upon. Not afraid to enter conflict alone.

1835. Duce.²³ "Since Germany is unable to furnish the necessary raw materials, I am unable to take an active part." A political settlement on favourable and honourable basis still possible.

1900. Daladier's reply²⁴ to Führer's appeal. Offers of mediation. But France will have to come to the aid of the Poles.

2300. Führer's letter²⁵ to Duce. Appreciates that Italy is not able to attack. Impression that Italy would come in should, however, be maintained until outbreak of hostilities, in order to tie up enemy forces!

I could then settle the Eastern question and in the winter appear on the Western front with forces equalling those of the English and French. Blockade rendered ineffective by autarky. [Italian] support with industrial manpower.

Von Br[auchitsch].²⁶ If I am pushed to it, I shall even wage a two-front war. Rumanian Minister:²⁷ Hend[erson] has brought little with him. War inevitable unless miracle happens. Rumania will be neutral if Hungary does nothing foolish.

Request by Weizsäcker²⁸

1522. ObdH: Get everything ready for morning of 7th Mob. Day (by telephone from Reich Chancellery) . . .

ObdH:

- 1) Attack starts September 1.
- 2) Führer will let us know at once if we are not to strike.
- 3) Führer will let us know at once if further postponement is necessary.
- 4) It is intended to force Poland into an unfavourable position for negotiations and so achieve maximum objective [*grosse Lösung*]. (Hend[erson].)

Führer very calm and clear.

Appraisal of military situation same as Br[auchitsch's].

Rumour has it that England is disposed to consider comprehensive proposal [*grosses Angebot*]. Details when Hend[erson] returns. According to another rumour England stresses that she herself must declare

¹⁸ See document No. 271.

¹⁹ Not found, but see document No. 282.

²⁰ See document No. 296.

²¹ See document No. 301.

²² See document No. 307.

²³ See document No. 317.

²⁴ See document No. 324.

²⁵ See document No. 341.

^{26*} Presumably citing Hitler.

²⁷ Radu Crutzescu.

^{28*} Probably request to see Halder. See entry at 2200.

that P[oland's] vital interests are threatened. In France more and more representations to the Government against war.

Italy is said to have agreed to [the proposal in] the Führer's letter that she should cooperate (in tying up [forces]). Will play the unknown quantity.

Plan: we demand Danzig, corridor through Corridor, and plebiscite on the same basis as Saar. England will perhaps accept, Poland probably not. *Wedge between them!*

Line to be followed: try to agree with Britain on comprehensive solution [*Grosslösung*]: Danzig, corridor through Corridor, several corridors.

Selection of date: according to political considerations.

Japan uncertain.

Bearing of Army praised.

2200. At Weizsäcker's. No news. There is a proposal to get Russia into the conversations.

29 AUGUST 1939: 4th Mob. Day

OQu IV:

- a) Belgium's neutrality is sure to be respected by France and England (von Pappenheim).¹
- b) Something went wrong at Bratislava.²

Stapf:³

- a) Apart from the scheduled 5 [bomber] groups [*Gruppen*] from the West, 6 more groups [*Gruppen*] will be got ready.
- b) Does date of attack depend on air support?

v. Bock:

- a) Lithuania?
- b) 206th [Div.] will be brought up; their place will be taken by some reserve units sent to frontier for training.
- c) Enemy in Kluge's⁴ sector will hold ground (has three lines, one behind the other).
- d) Air support important.

0930. Set out for Neisse.⁵

Neisse:

1200 to 1400: [Conference with] Cs-in-C and Cs of Staff, Army Group South, and Fourteenth, Tenth and Eighth Armies. ObdH conveys Führer's tribute. Reviews overall situation. Discusses operational plans of Tenth Army (tanks in the lead) and Fourteenth Army (Second Armd. Div. will not be sent off with Fourth Light, but must hold back; instead send Third Mtn. with Fourth Light against Jablunka).

This leaves Second and First Mtn. Divs. with XVIII Corps HQ at Deutschendorf.

OQu I:

X-Hour on 7th Mob. Day, as before, 0430.

¹ Lt. Colonel F. Rabe v. Pappenheim, Military Attaché at Brussels and The Hague.

² Probably diplomatic friction possibly about transit of Fourth Light Division through Slovakia. [See also document No. 468.]

³ Major General Otto Stapf, Oberquartiermeister III of the OKH—Senior Staff Officer: Organization, etc.

⁴ General Günther v. Kluge, C-in-C 4th Army, concentrated in Pomerania.

⁵ HQ of Colonel General Gerd v. Rundstedt, Commander Army Group South.

OQu IV:

Question of closure of Slovak frontier (automobile traffic Jablunka Pass).

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1620. OQu IV:

*Contents of letter:*⁶ Germany knows that England has commitments towards Poland. On the other hand, it is noted with satisfaction that [Germany] is desirous of relieving the tension with England. The English Government share this attitude.

There are two problems: the German-Polish, and the German-English.

The former must first be settled before the latter can be dealt with. It is imperative to settle the former by peaceful means. To this end it is necessary for Germany and Poland to consider the issue jointly and to have the settlement backed by international guarantees. England has commitments towards Poland.

Any solution which jeopardizes Poland's interests is unacceptable to England. England is ready to participate in working out a solution by which, as the Führer has always declared, Poland's interests would be safeguarded.

*Conversation with He[nderson]:*⁷ He[nderson] does not deny to Führer that Danzig is no problem at all, and that Autobahn is also no problem. Corridor: More tortuously expressed, but yet hinted at, is the possibility of resettling minorities in Corridor. (Führer: Not a bad idea at all.) Germany entirely free also in timing her reply. England does not wish to set any deadline for a reply.

The present state of affairs cannot continue. It is anticipated that situation will be clearer by 3 or 4 September.

Führer says: I will do this: from now on I shall act only on an international basis. Bring in international troops, including Russians. Führer has hopes of driving wedge between British, French and Poles.

Today: Poles directed by English to go to Berlin, as required by Germans.

Führer wants them to come tomorrow.

Basic principles: Raise a barrage of demographic and democratic demands. Plebiscite within six months, under international supervision. Those opting for Germany must remain German citizens; the same holds good for the Poles. Poles will not want Germans in their territory.

30.8. Poles in Berlin.

31.8. Blow up. [Zerplatzen]

1.9. Use of force.

Foreign Ministry: The Foreign Ministry believes that no conclusions of a military nature can be drawn??

Lithuania: Official feelers not from Lithuanian side. Lit[huania] has not stirred politically. We have given declaration of [respect for her] neutrality.⁸ Reference to Vilna.

Holland: piqued that no one is paying any attention to her.

Russia: Ri[bbentrop] has suggested that [she] do something on [her] western frontier.⁹

⁶ Evidently the memorandum brought by Henderson is meant; see document No. 384, enclosure.

⁷ See document No. 384.

⁸ See documents Nos. 410, 419 and 429.

⁹ See documents Nos. 387 and 388.

England: Transports to Continent have begun?

Bulgaria: Bruckmann:¹⁰ 40 ammunition trucks and trucks with machine guns for Bulg[aria] alleged to have been stopped by Yug[oslavia].¹¹

Polish airmen: reported to have landed in sector of Group Wartenberg (Eighth Army) . . .

Jodl 1800. (ObdH has been informed):

Chamb[erlain]'s letter conciliatory. Endeavour to find a *modus vivendi*. (Opinion in Cabinet divided.) Dignified tone: IT is clear that we cannot refrain from rendering assistance. Concept of vital interests and integrity elastic. England to participate in definition. Face must be saved.

England gives assurance that Poland will come to conference.

Führer intends to answer letter *today*:¹² Danzig no longer a problem, small corridor no problem, question of large corridor still open.

Führer will pull all the stops of democratic States (proposal for plebiscite; exchange of populations). (International observers to investigate atrocities.) Through England: demand that Polish plenipotentiaries be here by midday tomorrow; deadline for reply evening of 31st.

General impression: England "soft" on the issue of a major war.

Probable directive:¹³ In the West, the other side must fire first shot. Neutrality to be respected.

Air attack on Warsaw called off . . .

¹⁰ Military Attaché at Sofia.

¹¹ See document No. 314.

¹² See document No. 421.

¹³ See document No. 493.

30 AUGUST 1939: 5th Mob. Day

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1840. *Siewert:* Make all preparations so that attack can begin at 0430 on Sept. 1. Should negotiations in London necessitate postponement, then postponement to Sept. 2. In that case we shall be notified before 1500 tomorrow. *Army Group North has already been instructed.*

After the 2nd we will not attack.

(Göring has objected to 0430.) Inform Jesch[onnek].

Poland: Notice too short. Going to Berlin = submission. Führer insists on demand that a Polish negotiator be sent immediately. Führer drafts letter¹ to England, listing in detail demands on Poland.

OQu I:

Clear with Air about 0430. Reinforcement of bomber squadrons [*Geschwader*]: only 2! Warsaw: No terror attack (only military targets!) —Order for West: deployment of forces. Positions.—22nd Div. will be available from evening of 9th Mob. Day . . .

OQu IV: . . .

New letter by Führer¹ to England, detailing our demands.

France: No general mobilization yet; everything else unchanged. British troops in Upper Alsace?

Lithuania: Preparing 3 Divs.

¹ Presumably document No. 458.

ObdH:

Führer's proposal to Poland: Danzig, plebiscite (via Gö[ring] telephone).² Poles have not yet arrived; England has become party [to negotiations]. Fuhrer: either 1 or 2 [Sept.]; all off after 2 [Sept.].

2000. Greiffenberg:³ Instructions to deputy at OKW conference on Aug. 31 re time of jump-off.

² The reference is uncertain, but see Birger Dahlerus: *The Last Attempt* (London, 1947).

³ Colonel Hans v. Greiffenberg, Chief of Section 1 (Operations) of the OKH.

31 AUGUST 1939: 6th Mob. Day

0630. Hauser brings word from Reich Chancellery that jump-off order has been given for Sept. 1 . . .

1130. Take-off from Frankfurt-on-Main. On arrival, von Stülpnagel¹ (1350) reports on fixing of time of attack for 0445; intervention of West said to be unavoidable: in spite of this, Führer has decided to attack. ObdH goes to Berlin. Polish Navy has sailed for England. Naval operation against Gdynia therefore cancelled.

Greiffenberg—OQu I: Preparation of orders.

1600. OKW order for attack.

On receiving word from Canaris that Lipski is seeking to reach Führer, another call put through to ObdH, to find out whether attack is still on.

Gercke:² reports on progress of railway security [sic].³ In the main satisfactory, although effort required is very great.

1620. ObdH: Orders to go out. (Fuhrer refuses to receive Lipski.) . . .

1800. ObdH: Führer calm, has slept well. Letter was not transmitted because it was conditional on Poles coming to him. Letter read to He[nderson].⁴ Reported it to London.

Poles are delaying, tapped telephone conversation.⁵

Decision against evacuation shows that he expects France and England will not take action.

Reichstag tomorrow; demands will be put before it (Danzig, Corridor, plebiscite). Greatest impression on the German people and on the world.

Italy is putting up a comparatively big show. Hopes that Mu[ssolini]'s influence will contribute to the avoidance of big conflict. Restraining influence on France.

Some movements in Russia (alarm!).⁶ By no means impossible that the Russians will move, once we have had our first successes.

Belgium. No agreements on cooperation. No agreement yet.

Lithuania. Nothing new from the North.

"I cannot carry on much longer in this situation; a decision is imperative."

Gö[ring]: Stülp[nagel]⁷ relieved of his post; Fromm has taken over

¹ Presumably Heinrich v. Stülpnagel; see also footnote 7 below.

² Colonel Rudolf Gercke, Chief of Section 5 (Transport) of the OKH.

³ Presumably "movements" was intended.

⁴ See document No. 461.

⁵ See also Dahlerus, *The Last Attempt*.

⁶ See also documents Nos. 360, 383, 387, 388, 413, 414, 424 and 446.

⁷ According to Halder, General Joachim v. Stülpnagel, who had only just been recalled from retirement as Chief of the Replacement Army, had worked against Göring in the cases involving the retirement in February 1938 of the C-in-C of the Army, Colonel General Werner v. Fritsch, and of the War Minister, Field Marshal Werner v. Blomberg. He was not related to General Heinrich v. Stülpnagel, the *Oberquartiermeister I* at the OKH nor to General Otto v. Stülpnagel, recalled from retirement as replacement Commander of a Military District. General Friedrich Fromm now combined Stülpnagel's post with that of Chief of Army Equipment.

(acting) Fritsch-Blomberg. *Situation*: Is furious about Ri[bbentrop].
Impression: England wants to keep out. *Receive Poles!* Attol[ico]:
 Duce has got in touch with London,⁸ pressure on Poland . . .

Wagner: Danzig only through Reich law.⁹

2100. Special announcement on radio: Führer's offer to Poland.¹⁰ . . .

2250. *ObdH*: Führer has telephoned: Ratification of German-Russian Treaty; Molotov's speech.¹¹

⁸ See document No 467.

⁹ This reference presumably foreshadows the action taken on Sept. 1, when Gauleiter Forster, as Head of the State of the Free City of Danzig [see document No. 224] signed a law proclaiming Danzig as part of Reich territory, and the Reichstag passed a law confirming this (see *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1939, Pt. I, pp. 1547-1548).

¹⁰ See document No. 482.

¹¹ See document No. 480.

1 SEPTEMBER 1939: 7th Mob. Day

0630. Frontier crossed everywhere: Dirschau; planes have started; Westerplatte. Landing Company.

Führer's proclamation to Armed Forces. . . .

0840. *ObdH*: Order of the Day.—Conference with Staff (Schaefer). Several possibilities of getting to East Prussia by sea and by air. No reports to Führer that are not cleared with *ObdH*.

0850. *OQu IV: West*: nothing new. No indications of general mobilization.—Time for assembly of troops extended by 48 hours.—Frontier not closed. Intelligence work more difficult. (Numbers [of the units] concealed; large units have mobilization number.)

England, Switzerland, Holland, nothing new.

Belgium: Second stage of mobilization completed (peace-time Army mobilized).

1.9. Three Drafts ordered; this means activation of 7-12 Reserve Divisions. Will be completed by 3 Sept. Ardennes frontier with France occupied by weak forces. West of the Meuse (Fifth Inf. Div.) stronger forces.

Italy: Frontier guard against France mobilized. Reinforced by Alpini Bns.; behind them eighteen divisions in reinforced peace-time strength. First to Fourth Armies.

Hungary is being pressed by France to join the Yugoslav-Rumanian bloc. Turkey favourably disposed. Bulgaria neutral.

Yug[oslavia]: Conference Italy—Western Powers in London? (Grandi there).¹ Italy sends another division to Africa (East).—Air Force increased.

1000. Führer's speech to the Reichstag. (*ObdH* in Reichstag.) . . .

1300. General mobilization in France; state of emergency. . . .

1430. *London*: General mobilization ordered . . .

West: French Cabinet in session; Chamber of Deputies will not meet until tomorrow.

No closing of the frontier, no evacuation, no military measures; radio announcement: no reaction.

London: Cabinet 1130 evening. Both Houses of Parliament . . .

¹ Italian Minister of Justice; he had been Italian Ambassador in London until July 1939. In memorandum St.S. No. 669 of Aug. 31 (52/35369) Weizsäcker noted that Mackensen had telephoned in answer to an enquiry made in telegram No. 423 of Aug. 30 (not printed, 52/35337) to say that Grandi's alleged visit to London had not in fact taken place.

1615. At 1800 Cabinet meeting: Want report before meeting. Reported: Our troops have everywhere crossed the frontier and are sweeping on towards their objectives of the day, checked only slightly by the Polish forces thrown against them . . .

2 SEPTEMBER 1939: 8th Mob. Day

1015. *OQu IV*: Führer wants to receive the Ambassadors of France and England; we must not commit ourselves; links must not be broken.

Eight Polish submarines in the Baltic.

English want to have their entire merchant fleet in safe ports by September 3. Protection by Naval forces on both sides of the Channel. Strong patrols in the northern North Sea. No blockade line yet.

1200. *Führer*:

- a) Review of the situation: Question is examined whether it would be desirable to move troops from the Corridor to East Prussia or whether it would be better to cross the Vistula and attack the Mlava Group from the south. After Army has presented its views, the idea is dropped. Report on the situation and appraisal of the situation.
- b) Westerplatte: Will be dealt with today, Army in charge.
 - 1) *Schleswig-Holstein*¹ moves out so that she may use her guns to full effect.
 - 2) Counter battery fire by Navy, Army and anti-aircraft, which will be at the disposal of the Army for this purpose.
 - 3) Air attack (50 kg. bombs).
 - 4) Inf. attack. Eberhard.²
- c) Evacuation authorized. XII [Mil. District] Red Zone.
- d) (With Keitel.) Allocation of raw materials must give consideration to demands of Army . . .

OQu IV:

Rome-Paris-Berlin: What do we demand for the cessation of hostilities? Duce mediator. Führer enquires: is the Note in the nature of an ultimatum?

Reply: No.³

English Ambassador in Rome⁴: No.

Latest suggestion from Paris (via Rome): Conference⁵ as soon as possible, meanwhile truce. . . .

¹ See documents Nos. 197, 225, 338 and 457.

² Major General (Police) Eberhard, Danzig Chief of Police, who commanded a Brigade in this operation.

³ See documents Nos. 539 and 541.

⁴ Sir Percy Loraine.

⁵ See document No. 535.

3 SEPTEMBER 1939: 9th Mob. Day

1015. Report of French-English ultimatum.¹ OB summoned to Führer . . .

1230. *OQu I*: . . . Declaration of war, England 1130. France 1700. *Change-over to war economy ordered.*

¹ See documents Nos. 560 and 563.

Keitel (OKW): English Admiralty has announced opening of hostilities.

Führer: Tasks for Navy: war against enemy commerce and nava forces. Air Force authorized to attack naval forces, not the homeland.

[*State of war with*] French since 1700 hrs.: Do not open hostilities, but return fire.² . . .

² See document No. 576.

Appendix II

LISTS OF THE RECORDS OF CONVERSATIONS HELD AND OF THE PRINCIPAL TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED DURING THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE PRESENT VOLUME

A careful search has been made in order to establish the whereabouts of the numbered RM and St.S. series of memoranda and of as many as possible of the telegrams exchanged between the Foreign Ministry and the seven main Embassies abroad.

The following lists have been drawn up to indicate the reference within the volume or the relevant Serial and Frame Numbers of all those documents which have been located. From the isolated journals available for this period it has been possible to ascertain that certain telegrams went to files of Pol. I M. and Pol. I Luft which are not held in the archives. Such telegrams have been marked [Pol. I M.] and [Pol. I Lu.] respectively.

The telegram numbers which have been ascertained only by reference to registry minutes have been placed in square brackets. Where the only available copies of a telegram do not show its number, the Serial and Frame Numbers have been placed in square brackets, followed by a question mark, opposite what appears to be the number appropriate to their date. Where the Foreign Ministry copy of a circular telegram, used in the volume, does not bear the telegram numbers and these have been ascertained from the Mission copies, the Serial and Frame Numbers of the latter have been added in round brackets.

It will be observed that all the memoranda of the Führer's conversations and many of those of Ribbentrop's are unnumbered. Where no record of a conversation known to have taken place has been found in the Foreign Ministry archives reference to the relevant note in the volume or other source has been made.

Note : Footnote references are shown in bold figures in the following tables.
Ser./Fr. Nos. = Serial and Frame Nos.

(i)

CONVERSATIONS HELD BY THE FÜHRER AND CHANCELLOR

<i>Date</i>	<i>Conversation with :</i>	<i>Doc. No., etc.</i>
Aug. 12	Italian Foreign Minister	43
13	Italian Foreign Minister	47
23	British Ambassador	200
25	British Ambassador	265
25	Italian Ambassador	271, 1, and App. I, Aug. 28, 15 Ed. Note, p. 284
25	French Ambassador	324, 1
26	French Ambassador	384
28	British Ambassador	384, 1
29	British Ambassador	417, 1
29	Italian Ambassador	478
31	Italian Ambassador	500, 2
Sept. 1	Italian Ambassador	

(ii)

CONVERSATIONS HELD BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER

<i>Date</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>Conversation with:</i>	<i>Doc. No., etc.</i>
Aug. 11		Italian Foreign Minister	Ed. Note, p. 35
18-19		Italian Ambassador	126, 4
23		Soviet Foreign Minister	218
25		Italian Ambassador	App. II, Aug. 28, 15
26		Italian Ambassador	307, 1
29		Italian Ambassador	411
29		Soviet Chargé d'Affaires	431
30		British Ambassador	461
31		Italian Ambassador	474
31	RM 42 ¹	Polish Ambassador	476
Sept. 1	43	British Ambassador	518
1	44	French Ambassador	515
2	45	Italian Ambassador	539
2	46	Italian Ambassador	541
2	47	Italian Ambassador	554
3		British Ambassador	561, 1
3	48	French Ambassador	563

¹ For RM 41 see vol. VI of this Series, document No. 784.

(iii)

MEMORANDA BY THE STATE SECRETARY

<i>Date</i>	<i>St. S. No.</i>	<i>Conversation with:</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos.</i>	<i>Doc. or Fr. No.</i>
Aug. 9	616	Polish Chargé d'Affaires		5
10	617	Bulgarian Chargé d'Affaires		11, 2
11	618	Rumanian Minister		31
11	619	Ambassador Moltke		32
	620	Not found		—
14	621	Ambassador Dirksen		58
14	622	Ambassador Dirksen	2185/472243	—
14	623	Italian Ambassador		59
15	624	French Ambassador		64
	625	Not found		—
15	626	French Ambassador		65
15	627	Duke of Mecklenburg	54/36417	—
15	628	British Ambassador		66
16	629	Yugoslav Minister		81
16	630	Telephone message to Ribbentrop at Fuschl		61, 4
16	631	Yugoslav Minister	52/34998	—
	632	Not found		—
17	633	Deputy State Secretary, Propaganda Ministry	1132/323446	—
18	634	P.S. to No. 633	1132/323445	—
	635	Not found		—
18	636	Dr. Schacht		103, 5
18	637	British Ambassador		114
18	638	Ambassador Dirksen		115
18	639	State Secretary Neumann		116, 1

MEMORANDA BY THE STATE SECRETARY—*cont.*

<i>Date</i>	<i>St.S. No.</i>	<i>Conversation with:</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos.</i>	<i>Doc. or Fr. No.</i>
Aug. 21	640	Prof. Wolgast	7977/E575148	—
	641	Not found		
21	642	Hungarian Minister	7977/E575145	—
21	643	Hungarian Minister	73/51980	—
22	644	Japanese Ambassador		186
26	645	British Chargé d'Affaires		326
26	646	Chinese Ambassador		327
26	647	U.S. Chargé d'Affaires		328
26	648	Japanese Ambassador		329
27	649	French Ambassador		356
28	650	Italian Ambassador		394
28	651	Italian Ambassador		395
28	652	Danish Minister		396
28	653	Danish Minister	52/35253/2	—
28	654	Italian Ambassador		398
28	655	Italian Ambassador	52/35270	—
28	656	Italian Ambassador		399
28	657	Italian Ambassador		400
29	658	Nuncio	7977/E575143	—
29	659	Nuncio	533/239107-11	—
29	660	Nuncio		432
29	661	Nuncio	7977/E575144	—
29	662	Nuncio	533/239113	—
29	663	Nuncio	33/239114	—
30	664	British Embassy (telephone)		445
30	665	Italian Ambassador	1848/421077	—
30	666	Italian Ambassador		452
31	667	British Ambassador (telephone)		466
31	668	Italian Ambassador		467
31	669	Ambassador Mackensen (telephone)		App. I, Sept. 1, 1
	670	Slovak Minister		488
31	671	British, French and Japanese Ambassadors; U.S. and Soviet Chargés d'Affaires		482
Sept. 1	672	Swiss Minister		528
1	673	Polish Ambassador		475
1	674	Italian Ambassador		529
3	675	French Ambassador		562

(iv)

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THE EMBASSIES
IN LONDON, MOSCOW, PARIS, ROME, TOKYO, WARSAW AND WASHINGTON*Telegrams to the Embassy in London*

<i>To London No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fr. No.</i>	<i>To London No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fr. No.</i>
302	Also to: Moscow 168 Paris 357 Rome 366 Warsaw 209	5, 4	305 306 307	8581/E602135 7985/E575285-86 Also to: Paris 362 Washington 258	
303					
304	[Pol. I M.]		308		

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THE EMBASSIES
IN LONDON, MOSCOW, PARIS, ROME, TOKYO, WARSAW AND WASHINGTON—*cont.**Telegrams to the Embassy in London—cont.*

To London No.	Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks	Doc. or Fn. No.	To London No.	Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks	Doc. or Fn. No.
309				Tokyo 267	
310				Warsaw 258	
311	8581/E602137			Washington 219	
312				[Pol. I M.]	
313	Also to:	57, 1	347		
	Moscow 176		348		
	Paris 367		349	Also to:	265, 6
	Rome 374			Paris 404	
	Tokyo 252			Rome 407	
	Washington 207		350		
314			351		
315	7981/E575195		352	5917/E434507	
316	Also to:	66, 1	353	7984/E575260	
	Moscow 180		354		
	Paris 369		355		
	Rome 378		356		
	Tokyo 254		357		
	Warsaw 222		358	Also to:	439
	Washington 208			Moscow 228	
317				Paris 412	
318				Rome 419	
319				Tokyo 279	
320				Warsaw 265	
321				Washington 230	
322	7981/E575202		359		
323			360	52/35331-35	
324				Also to:	
325				Paris 415	
326	Also to:	180	361	Rome 422	
	Moscow 193			Also to:	App. I
	Paris 381			Rome 423	Sept. 1, 1
	Rome 386		362		
	Warsaw 233		363		
	Washington 212		364	7984/E575262-63	458
327			365		
328			366		
329			367		
330	[52/35114-15 ?]	200, 11	368	7968/E575028	
331	Also to:	249		Also to:	
	Paris 388			Paris 421	
332			369	Warsaw 271	
333	8581/E602139		370		
334	52/35152		371		
335	800/274260		372	5917/E434641	
336			373		
337			374		
338	[Pol. I M.]		375		
339	1625/889207		376		
340	7968/E575032		377		
	Also to:		378	7981/E575179	
	Paris 395		379		
341			380	Also to:	523
342				Paris 433	
343	259/169812		381		
344			382		
345			383	5917/E434656	
346	Also to:	343	384	Also to:	535, 4
	Moscow 212			Moscow 245	
	Paris 402			Paris 436	
	Rome 400			Rome 450	

Telegrams from the Embassy in London

<i>From London No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fr. No.</i>	<i>From London No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fr. No.</i>
287	169/82673		331	7891/E571554/8	
288			332		
289		13	333		
290	8581/E602136		334		
291			335		
292		55	336	[Pol. I M.]	
293			337	[Pol. I M.]	
294			338		
295			339	[Pol. I M.]	
296			340	[Pol. I M.]	
297			341	[Pol. I M.]	
298			342	2447/514973	
299			343	7980/E575174	
300		99	344	[Pol. I M.]	
301			345	7973/E575104	
302	7981/E575182		346	52/85272	
303			347	[Pol. I M.]	
304			348	5917/E434620	
305	[Pol. I M.]		349	7984/E575261	
306			350		
307	7981/E575188-89		351	7970/E575050	
308			352		
309			353	[Pol. I M.]	
310	8581/E602138		354	[Pol. I M.]	
311	7985/E575293		355		
312	7981/E575203		356		
313	7891/E571553-54		357		
314	8581/E602140		358		
315	[Pol. I M.]		359		
316	[Pol. I M.]		360		
317	[Pol. I M.]		361	[Pol. I M.]	
318		233	362	[Pol. I M.]	
319			363	52/85383	
320	259/169781		364		
321	7981/E575205		365	[Pol. I M.]	
322	52/35165		366	[Pol. I M.]	
323			367	7968/E575033	
324			368		
325	[Pol. I M.]		369	[Pol. I M.]	
326	7891/E571555		370	7981/E575180	
327	[Pol. I M.]		371	7984/E575265	
328		287	372	[Pol. I M.]	
329	[Pol. I M.]		373		
330		See Ed. Note, p. 303	374	5917/E434667	
			375		558

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THE EMBASSIES
IN LONDON, MOSCOW, PARIS, ROME, TOKYO, WARSAW AND WASHINGTON—*cont.**Telegrams to the Embassy in Moscow*

<i>To Moscow No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>	<i>To Moscow No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>
168	Also to: London 302 Paris 357 Rome 366 Warsaw 209	5, 4	206	52/35101-05	
[169]	7970/E575073		207		285
170	7992/E575541		208	(2830/549102) (Circular)	295
171		50	209		
172		51	210		203, 1
173		54	211	(695/260282) (Circular)	297
174		51, 2	212	Also to: London 346 Paris 402 Rome 400 Tokyo 267 Warsaw 258 Washington 219	348
175		56			
176	Also to: London 313 Paris 367 Rome 374 Tokyo 252 Washington 207	57, 1	213		
177		62	214	34/24052	309
178		73	215	[3781/E041436?]	
179		75	216	388/211546	
180	Also to: London 316 Paris 369 Rome 378 Tokyo 254 Warsaw 222 Washington 208 [3781/E041429 ?]	66, 1	217		353
181		89	218	461/225056-90	360
182			219		
183			220		
184		111	221		381
185		113	222	7992/E575530	
186		135	223		382
187		140	224	7992/E575559	
188		143	225		388
189		142	226		447, 1
190	695/260315		227		431, 4
191		149	228	Also to: London 358 Paris 412 Rome 419 Tokyo 279 Warsaw 265 Washington 230	439
192	695/260311		229		
193	Also to: London 326 Paris 381 Rome 386 Warsaw 233 Washington 212	180	230	(461/225037) (Circular to all Missions)	440 470
194	7992/E575556		231		
195	7992/E575532		232		465
196	127/69476		233		458, 2
197		198	234	7992/E575552-53	
198	34/24013		235		
199		209	236	(477/229830) (Circular to all Missions)	495
200		200, 13	237		
201		206		(477/229829) (Circular)	512
202		200, 11	240		
203			241		511
204	7989/E575443		242		516
205		210	243	[Pol. I M.]	
			244	[Pol. I M.]	

<i>To Moscow No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>	<i>To Moscow No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>
245	Also to: London 384 Paris 436 Rome 450	535, 4	252 253 254	363/205212 (Circular)	567
246	477/229828		255	477/229824-25 (Circular)	569
247	7992/E575555		256	7968/E575022-26	
248	7992/E575529	559, 2	257	Also to: Rome 462 Tokyo 304 Washington 258	
249	(363/205218) (Circular to all Missions)				
250	215/146423				
251	215/146906				

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<i>From Moscow No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>	<i>From Moscow No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>
165	7891/E571527		210	7992/E575538	
166	7992/E575536		211	695/260294-95	
167		27	212	388/211556	
168		28	213		
169		29	214	695/260291	
170		39	215	7992/E575539	
171	7992/E575542		216		288
172	167/183131		217		284
173		51, 3	218		381, 2
174	7970/E575074		219	103/111544-45	
175		70	220		
176	96/107943		221		
177			222		347
178	7969/E575038		223	103/111547-48	
179		73, 1	224	695/260276	
180		92	225		
181			226	7992/E575561	
182		105	227	7992/E575531	
183	7970/E575075		228	2812/548626	
184		120	229	34/24055	
185		111, 2	230		383
186	[Pol. I M.]		231		413
187		125	232		414
188			233		424
189		182	234		425
190		133	235		446
191		144	236		
192		148	237	461/225039	
193	695/260321		238		447
194	34/23977		239		
195	34/23980-81		240		453
196		152	241		456
197		157	242		
198	695/260310		243		471, 2
199		158	244	34/24065	
200		159	245		
201		160	246	34/24074	
202	34/23991		247		
203		181	248		
204		205	249		534
205			250		496, 3
206	34/24037-38		251	[Pol. I M.]	
207		234, 2	252	34/24078/1-2	
208	[Pol. I M.]		253		550
209		283, 1	254		551

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THE EMBASSIES
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<i>To Paris No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>	<i>To Paris No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>
357	Also to: London 302 Moscow 168 Rome 366 Warsaw 209 7985/E575282	5, 4	392 393 394 395	[Pol. I M.] 7968/E575032 Also to: London 340 7976/E575125-26	281
358			396	7991/E575478-79	
359			397	[8132/E582069?]	
360			398		
361	7985/E575285-86		399		
362	Also to: London 307		400		
363			401	[Pol. I Lu.]	
364	7991/E575461		402	Also to: London 346 Moscow 212 Rome 400 Tokyo 267 Warsaw 258 Washington 219	343
365			403	8371/E590673	
366			404	Also to: London 349 Rome 407	265, 6
367	Also to: London 313 Moscow 176 Rome 374 Tokyo 252 Washington 207	57, 1			
368	[Pol. I Lu.]		405		
369	Also to: London 316 Moscow 180 Rome 378 Tokyo 254 Warsaw 222 Washington 208	66, 1	406 407 408 409 410 411 412	5917/E484516 8372/E590682	
370				Also to: London 358 Moscow 228 Rome 419 Tokyo 279 Washington 230	439
371				[Pol. I M.]	
372			413	(7991/E575498)	470
373			414	(Circular to all Missions)	
374				52/35831-35	
375			415	Also to: London 360 Rome 422	
376	7969/E575041				
377			416		
378			417		
379	7981/E575183		418		
380			419		
381	Also to: London 326 Moscow 193 Rome 386 Warsaw 233 Washington 212	180	420 421	7968/E575028	
382				Also to: London 368 Warsaw 271	
383	7991/E575464		422		
384			423		
385			424	(7991/E575499)	495
386				(Circular to all Missions)	
387	(7991/E575469-70)	200, 11			
388	Also to: London 331	249			
389	7991/E575468				
390	7991/E575472				
391	7991/E575474				

To Paris No.	Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks	Doc. or Fn. No.	To Paris No.	Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks	Doc. or Fn. No.
425	5917/E434642		433	Also to:	523
426				London 380	
427	7991/E575508-21		434		
428	7991/E575522		435	5917/E434653	
429	8132/E582070-89		436	Also to:	535, 4
430				London 384	
431	7978/E575165			Moscow 245	
432	[Pol. I M.]			Rome 450	

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From Paris No.	Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks	Doc. or Fn. No.	From Paris No.	Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks	Doc. or Fn. No.
410		22, 2	458		215
411			459		216
412		23, 2	460	7970/E575055	
413		22	461	7991/E575465-67	
414		23	462		238
415		24	463	7985/E575305-06	
416	419/216273		464		
417	419/216274		465	7981/E575184	
418	7969/E575169-70		466		
419		30	467		
420			468	7985/E575310-11	
421	8582/E602145		469		
422	7970/E575053-54		470	[Pol. I M.]	
423	7985/E575287		471	[Pol. I M.]	
424			472	7982/E575216-17	
425			473		
426	7991/E575460		474	7991/E575471	
427			475	7985/E575312-14	
428		49	476	7991/E575473	
429			477	[Pol. I M.]	
430			478	7985/E575315-17	
431			479	[Pol. I M.]	
432			480	[Pol. I M.]	
433	[Pol. I M.]		481	605/247787-89	
434			482	2794/548021-23	
435			483		294
436			484		300
437	[Pol. I M.]		485		
438	[Pol. I Lu.]		486	7991/E575475	
439			487	7991/E575476	
440	52/35023		488		
441		122	489	7982/E575214-15	
442		156	490		310
443	7969/E575039		491	1818/415666	
444		164	492		
445			493		
446			494	7985/E575318-21	
447	34/23992-94		495	7991/E575477	
448	7969/E575042		496		
449	34/23995-96		497		
450	[Pol. I M.]		498		322
451		184	499		
452	[Pol. I M.]		500		348
453			501		351
454	[Pol. I M.]		502	7985/E575327-28	
455	7985/E575297-300		503		[352 ?]
456	[Pol. I M.]		504	7985/E575329-31	
457	[Pol. I M.]		505		

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<i>From Paris No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>	<i>From Paris No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>
506	[Pol. I M.]		541	2042/446527	
507	[Pol. I M.]		542	7985/E575354-57	
508		358, 1	543	[Pol. I M.]	462
509	[Pol. I M.]		544		
510		366	545	5917/E434636	
511			546		
512		370	547	7985/E575358-59	
513			548	[Pol. I M.]	
514	7991/E575480		549	2835/549183-84	
515			550	7976/E575129	
516	1132/323645		551	[Pol. I M.]	
517	7985/E575332-33		552	[Pol. I M.]	
518		376	553		
519	7991/E575481-86		554		503
520	7991/E575487		555	52/35404	
521		377	556	52/35406	
522			557	7991/E575506-07	
523	7970/E575056		558	52/35409-10/2	
524	[Pol. I M.]		559		
525	[Pol. I M.]		560	[Pol. I M.]	
526	7991/E575488-91		561	[Pol. I M.]	
527	[Pol. I M.]		562		
528	5917/E434586		563		
529	7982/E575220		564	[Pol. I M.]	
530	7982/E575219		565	[Pol. I M.]	
531			566		538
532	7985/E575337-43		567		
533			568	7982/E575225-26	
534	7985/E575344-46		569	7982/E575223-24	
535	[Pol. I M.]		570	7991/E575523	
536	7991/E575492-94		571	7991/E575524	
537	[Pol. I M.]		572	7968/E575034	
538	7985/E575347-53		573	7982/E575222	
539	[Pol. I M.]		574	7991/E575525	
540	7991/E575495-97		575	7985/E575361-62	

Telegrams to the Embassy in Rome

<i>To Rome No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>	<i>To Rome No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>
366	Also to: London 302 Moscow 168 Paris 357 Warsaw 209	5, 4	374	Also to: Tokyo 252 Washington 207	57, 1
367			375		
368			376		
369			377		
370			378	Also to: London 316 Moscow 180 Paris 369 Tokyo 254 Warsaw 222 Washington 208	66, 1
371	7990/E575453				
372					
373					
374	Also to: London 313 Moscow 176 Paris 367	57, 1	379		76
			380	8341/E590135	
			381		

<i>To Rome No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>	<i>To Rome No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>
382			421	(2290/483374)	470, 2
383		124		(Circular to all	
384				Missions)	
385	7978/E575168	154	422	52/35331-85	
386	Also to:	180		Also to:	
	London 326			London 360	
	Moscow 193			Paris 415	
	Paris 381		423	Also to:	App. I,
	Warsaw 233			London 361	Sept. 1, 1
	Washington 212		424	[1132/323323?]	
387	7970/E575060		425	7987/E575420	
388	(7987/E575393-94)	200, 11	426		
389			427	7970/E575061	
390	8583/E602150		428		458, 2
391		263	429	7987/E575399-401	
392	(2290/483309)	295	430	7987/E575402-04	
	(Circular)		431	(7987/E575390)	495
393				(Circular to all	
394	[Pol. I M.]			Missions)	
395	8583/E602156		432	7987/E575406	
396			433		
397			434	7987/E575389	
398	(2290/483310-11)	297	435		
	(Circular)		[436]	7970/E575062	
399	8583/E602158		437		
400	Also to:	343	438		
	London 346		439		500
	Moscow 212		440		504
	Paris 402		441	7970/E575063	
	Tokyo 267		442		
	Warsaw 258		443	(7987/E575407)	512
	Washington 219			(Circular)	
401			444	7990/E575456	
402	7978/E575156-60		445		
403		341	446		
404			447		
405			448		
406	8583/E602157		449		
407	Also to:	265, 6	450	Also to:	535, 4
	London 349			London 384	
	Paris 404			Moscow 245	
408				Paris 436	
409	7987/E575397		451	(2290/483345)	559
410				(Circular)	
411			452	7987/E575408	
412			453	7987/E575418	
413			454	7987/E575409	
414			455	7984/E575266	
415	[Pol. I M.]		456		
416			457	7987/E575414	
417				(Circular)	
418		411, 7	458	(2290/483375-76)	569
419	Also to:	439		(Circular)	
	London 358		459		565
	Moscow 228		460		
	Paris 412		461		
	Tokyo 279		462	7968/E575022-26	
	Warsaw 265			Also to:	
	Washington 230			Moscow 257	
420	[8139/E582177 ?]			Tokyo 304	
				Washington 258	

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<i>From Rome No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>	<i>From Rome No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>
341			378		
342			379		320
343			380		
344			381	583/242158-60	
345	8583/E602149		382		
346	7990/E575454		383		
347	8583/E602151		384	[Pol. I M.]	
348	8341/E590134		385		
349			386	7987/E575426	
350			387		
351	2130/465943		388		
352		98	389		423
353	8583/E602152		390		444
354	7978/E575162		391		
355	8583/E602153		392		
356			393		
357		145	394		
358			395	7987/E575405	
359			396	1571/380173	
360	7977/E575141		397	7987/E575421	
361			398		507
362			399		508
363		211	400		
364		212	401		
365			402	[Pol. I M.]	
366			403		556
367			404		556, 1
368			405	7984/E575267	
369	7987/E575395		406	7970/E575064	
370		280	407		
371		282	408	[Pol. I M.]	
372	8583/E602155		409	7982/E575227	
373			410	7987/E575411	
374			411	7987/E575412	
375			412		
376			413		
377	7987/E575396		414		565, 3

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<i>To Tokyo No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>	<i>To Tokyo No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>
249	Also to: Washington 204	5, 4	254	Also to: Rome 378 Warsaw 222 Washington 208	66, 1
250					
251					
252	Also to: London 313 Moscow 176 Paris 367 Rome 374 Washington 207	57, 1	255		
			256		
			257		
			258		
			259		
			260		186, 5
253			261		183
254	Also to: London 316 Moscow 180 Paris 369	66, 1	262	Also to: Washington 214	200, 11
			263		234, 3

<i>To Tokyo No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>	<i>To Tokyo No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>
264			282		
265			283		
266			284		
267	Also to:	343	285		
	London 346		286		
	Moscow 212		287		
	Paris 402		288		
	Rome 400		289		
	Warsaw 258		290		
	Washington 219		291		
268			292	[Pol. I M.]	409, 2
269			293		
270			294		
271		329, 3	295		
272			296		
273			297		
274	[Pol. I Lu.]		298		
275			299		
276	[Pol. I M.]		300		
277			301		
278			302		
279	Also to:	439	303		
	London 358		304	7968/E575022-26	
	Moscow 228			Also to:	
	Paris 412			Moscow 257	
	Rome 419			Rome 462	
	Warsaw 265			Washington 258	
	Washington 230		305		
280	[Pol. I M.]		306		
281			307	977/303403	

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<i>From Tokyo No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>	<i>From Tokyo No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>
339	174/136038		365		
340		7	366		
341	7970/E575070		367	[Pol. I M.]	
342	7970/E575069		368		
343	174/136040		369	[Pol. I M.]	
344		25	370		
345	9954/E696258		371		367
346	[Pol. I Lu.]		372	[Pol. I M.]	
347			373	[Pol. I M.]	
348	[Pol. I M.]		374		409
349	174/136044		375	8135/E582120	
350	7978/E575154-55		376		
351		110	377	[Pol. I M.]	
352	[Pol. I M.]		378		455
353			379	8135/E582121	
354		110, 3	380	[Pol. I M.]	
355	174/136050		381	[Pol. I M.]	
356		174	382	[Pol. I M.]	
357	198/140761-63		383	[Pol. I M.]	
358		246	384	[Pol. I M.]	
359	[Pol. I M.]		385		
360			386		
361			387	[Pol. I M.]	
362			388		
363		262	389		
364	174/136076		390	[Pol. I M.]	

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THE EMBASSIES
IN LONDON, MOSCOW, PARIS, ROME, TOKYO, WARSAW AND WASHINGTON—*cont.**Telegrams to the Embassy in Warsaw*

<i>To Warsaw No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fr. No.</i>	<i>To Warsaw No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fr. No.</i>
209	Also to: London 302 Moscow 168 Paris 357 Rome 366	5, 4	244 245 246 247 248 249		
210			250	[Pol. I M.]	
211		2, 3	251	[Pol. I M.]	
212		13, 5	252	7969/E575046	
213	7983/E575231		253		
214	7983/E575238	46	254		
215			255	[Pol. I M.]	
216	[Pol. I Lu.]		256		
217	7983/E575252		257		
218		57	258		
219	7974/E575108-09			Also to:	343
220				London 346	
221	7983/E575237			Moscow 212	
222	Also to:	66, 1		Paris 402	
	London 316			Rome 400	
	Moscow 180			Tokyo 267	
	Paris 369			Washington 219	
	Rome 378		259	5917/E434601	355
	Tokyo 254		260		
	Washington 208		261	5917/E434503	
223	7966/E575000		262		
224			263		
225			264	5917/E434557	
226			265	Also to:	439
227	7983/E575232			London 358	
228	7983/E575255			Moscow 228	
229	7983/E575243			Paris 412	
230	7983/E575242			Rome 419	
231	7966/E575005			Tokyo 279	
232	7969/E575044			Washington 230	
233	Also to:	180	266		
	London 326		267	5917/E434605	
	Paris 381		268		
	Rome 386		269		
	Washington 212		270		
234			271	7968/E575028	
235				Also to:	
236	7966/E574998			London 368	
237		204		Paris 421	
238				[Not transmitted	
239				to Warsaw owing	
240	7989/E575441			to stoppage of	
241				communications.]	
242	[Pol. I M.]				
243	7969/E575045				

Telegrams from the Embassy in Warsaw

<i>From Warsaw No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>	<i>From Warsaw No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>
158	52/34970	106	181		359
159	52/34971		182		
160	52/34979-80		183	5917/E434556	
161	7983/E575231		184	7966/E75002	
162	7983/E575235		185		
163	7983/E575239		186		
164	7983/E575240		187		
165	419/216277		188		
166	52/35001-02		189		
167			190	52/35243	
168	7983/E575234	217	191	[Pol. I M.]	415
169	7966/E575004		192	5917/E434599	
170			193		
171	7983/E575256		194	5917/E434591	
172	7966/E574997		195		
173			196		
174	[Pol. I M.]		197	[Pol. I M.]	
175	7989/E575438		198		
176	800/274265		199	3442/E016682	
177			200	1818/415675	
178			201	7966/E574994	
179			202	7966/E574995	
180			203	[Pol. I M.]	

Telegrams to the Embassy in Washington

<i>To Washington No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>	<i>To Washington No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>
198	533/239096	5, 4	212	Also to: Paris 381 Rome 386 Warsaw 233	180
199					
200					
201					
202			213		
203			214	Also to: Tokyo 262	200, 11
204	Also to: Tokyo 249				
205			215		
206			216		
207	Also to: London 313 Moscow 176 Paris 367 Rome 374 Tokyo 252	57, 1	217	5917/E434493-94	
			218		
			219	Also to: London 346 Moscow 212 Paris 402 Rome 400 Tokyo 267 Warsaw 258	343
208	Also to: London 316 Moscow 180 Paris 369 Rome 378 Tokyo 254 Warsaw 222	66, 1			
			220		
			221		328, 2
			222		378, 1
			223		
209			224		
210			225		
211			226		
212	Also to: London 326 Moscow 193	180	227	5917/E434572-73	
			228		
			229		

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THE EMBASSIES
IN LONDON, MOSCOW, PARIS, ROME, TOKYO, WARSAW AND WASHINGTON—*cont.**Telegrams to the Embassy in Washington—cont.*

<i>To Washington No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>	<i>To Washington No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>
230	Also to: London 358 Moscow 228 Paris 412 Rome 419 Tokyo 279 Warsaw 265	439	244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258	[Pol. I M.] 7968/E575022-26 Also to: Moscow 257 Rome 462 Tokyo 304	
231					
232					
233					
234					
235					
236					
237					
238					
239					
240		486			
241					
242					
243					

Telegrams from the Embassy in Washington

<i>From Washington No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>	<i>From Washington No.</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos., remarks</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>
258	7985/E575285		285		
259		9	286		
260			287		
261		26	288		
262			289		
263			290	7988/E575433	442
264	2422/511787		291		
265	2422/511785-86		292		
266	6563/E490342-43		293		
267			294		
268	52/35012-13		295		
269			296		
270		108	297		
271	4994/E282248		298	[Pol. I M.]	494
272			299	[Pol. I M.]	
273		171	300		
274			301		
275		239	302		
276		260	303	[Pol. I M.]	
277	7985/E575288		304	[Pol. I M.]	
278	5917/E434561		305		549
279	7988/E575431-32		306	52/35580-81	
280		306	307	52/35576	
281			308		
282		378	309	B21/B005086-87	
283			310		
284	5917/E434626				

Appendix III

MATERIAL RELATING TO PREVIOUS VOLUMES IN THIS SERIES

The documents in this Appendix came to light after the completion of the volumes to which they relate and to which readers are referred for the relevant biographical and other data. They are here grouped in sections according to topics. These sections contain documents concerning:

- A. German-Spanish relations.
- B. German-Austrian relations.
- C. German relations with the Holy See.
- D. The German campaign for colonies.
- E. Germany and the Far East.
- F. German financial support for *Volksdeutsche* abroad (Vereinigte Finanzkontore).
- G. German-Russian relations.
- H. German-British relations.
- I. Germany's relations with Danzig.
- J. Germany's relations with Czechoslovakia.
- K. German military planning.
- L. Editors' Note concerning Volume IV, document No. 383.

(A)

GERMAN-SPANISH RELATIONS

(i)

381/210508-510

*Acting State Secretary Dieckhoff to Ministerialdirektor Doeble*¹

BERLIN, October 1, 1936.

DEAR DOEBLE: On the telegram from General Franco to the Führer² I have the following comments to make:

(1) A reply from the Führer and Reich Chancellor to this telegram would not only signify the *de facto* but also the *de jure* recognition of the Nationalist Government by Germany. As far as I know from Herr von Neurath, it was intended up to the present to announce a recognition, and then only a *de facto* recognition, at earliest at that moment when the Nationalist forces should have occupied Madrid. I think we are adhering to this line and see no reason why we should depart from it. There is no new factor that could induce us to do so, for nothing has happened but a substitution of General Franco for General Cabanellas,³ who had hitherto been head of this Junta of generals; therefore a purely internal event in the Nationalist camp. If, departing from our line, we were now to recognize

¹ Rich. Heinrich Doeble, member of the Presidential Chancellery staff.

² See vol. III of this Series, document No. 92.

³ General San Miguel Cabanellas, member and for a time President of the original Junta of generals set up at Burgos, July 25, 1936.

the Government, we would compromise our work in Spain, and furthermore, quite logically, would have to withdraw our Embassy and hand the Spanish Embassy here their passports.

(2) In my opinion it would not be advisable to proceed without knowing Rome's attitude since, in view of the parallel nature of our interests in the Spanish questions, we cannot act alone. I would therefore propose that I have the view-points given under (1) represented in Rome⁴ and the hope expressed that no reply be made to the telegram at the present moment from the Italian side either.

(3) In order to avoid as far as possible annoying General Franco, he could be confidentially informed within the next few days, through a channel available to us, of the reason why he has received no reply to his telegram, at the same time emphasizing particularly that a premature recognition would only be harmful to his own and to Germany's interests.⁵

Heil Hitler.

DIECKHOFF

⁴ See also vol. III of this Series, document No. 95, and Editors' Note, p. 117.

⁵ See vol. III of this Series, documents Nos. 94 and 96.

(ii)

1500/370388

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister

RM 821

BERLIN, November 17, 1936.

In a conversation with the Führer and Reich Chancellor which took place this afternoon in the presence of the Minister for War¹ and General Admiral Raeder, it was decided to recognize the Franco Government now.² It was agreed to publish this recognition simultaneously with the Italian Government on Wednesday the 18th of this month at 6:00 p.m. Our diplomatic representatives in Spain should be recalled at once. A withdrawal from the Embargo Committee³ is not, however, to take place for the time being.

V. NEURATH

¹ Field Marshal von Blomberg.

² See vol. III of this Series, documents Nos. 119 and 121-125.

³ i.e., the International Committee for the Application of the Agreement regarding Non-Intervention in Spain; see vol. III of this Series, Editors' Note, p. 81.

(iii)

6670/E506137-42

Generalissimo Franco to the Führer and Chancellor¹

CATALAN FRONT, January 11, 1939.

In Year III of Triumph.

MY DEAR FÜHRER: With our entry into the New Year 1939, in which we hope to harvest the fruits of so many sacrifices, I would like sincerely to express to you the gratitude of Nationalist Spain as well as the assurance of her blind faith in final victory, and to give you a brief summary of Spain's military efficiency and foreign policy.

¹ For the circumstances of the delivery of this letter, see vol. III of this Series, document No. 736, where it is noted as not found. The Spanish original has not been found, but a German translation has come to light in a file from the Office of the Adjutants to the Führer, entitled "Functions [Veranstaltungen] 1936-1941", which contains a miscellaneous collection dealing, with the one exception of the document here printed, with arrangements and protocol for official dinners, etc., at which Hitler was host.

Our *military position* is good and unshakeable. Since the victories in the North, in Aragon and on the East coast, the war has been decided in our favour. A share in this is due to our economic and industrial strength, which improves from day to day, while in the Red Camp, with the falling off of the armaments industry, the economy is visibly collapsing.

The reasons why these victories have not yet produced a final result are:—

First: The complete absence of any sense of patriotism in the Red Camp, the leaders of which would rather see their Fatherland reduced to dust and ashes than surrender.

Second: The Russian measures by the police with their commissariats and terror organizations.

Third: Incitement and encouragement to resist by French and British circles. This resulted in the "tactics of resistance at all costs", which can only be carried out by terror; we are therefore compelled to complete the great victories by the total destruction of the enemy forces. Moreover, through the need to protect the extended fronts, and the lack of larger troop formations, operations of deeper penetration are only possible in one theatre of war at a time.

On the other hand, no greater activity or more heroism can be demanded from the troops, for the whole time, summer and winter, they have been fighting unceasingly; nor is there any interruption in the formation of fresh units.

Due to the lack of battle troops as just explained and the shortage of reserves, we were compelled to postpone the Ebro battle in which the Red Catalan army was defeated and severely shaken. We are now continuing our operations there most energetically with the object of destroying these armies and robbing France of the opportunities she still finds to support the enemy camp and come to their assistance.

The first phase of these operations is in full swing and has almost been concluded: a break-through of the enemy front at two points with the destruction and pursuit of the enemy forces along the whole line, cutting off their reserves and exploiting the manoeuvre by advancing on Barcelona in order to cut off the city from the Pyrenees.

As a result of the situation of the fortifications on this front, particularly in the sector of the central plain with its large obstructions in the shape of canals and irrigation works, the zones of the break-through did not correspond to the natural lines of communication, so that in the Northern sector the advance could not be made at greater speed.

The operations are being confidently and energetically continued in spite of all the difficulties of the winter season and the obstacles which the enemy is putting in our way by a system of trenches and demolitions. In this fighting special honours are due to the Condor Legion, so beloved by our Army and our Spain, and to its commanders.

Franco-British Policy. You know, of course, how openly hostile this has been to us since the beginning of the war, particularly French policy, which has attempted with all means and at every opportunity to assist our enemy and rob us of the fruits of our victories.

Britain, being more cautious and more realistic, has adjusted her policy to our military successes and, as our victory is unpleasant to her, relies on indirect means to discredit it.

Her designs are being furthered today by:

(a) The *Non-Intervention Committee*, whose main demands are:—

(1) Withdrawal of the volunteers, in the hope that this will alienate our countries and weaken the solidarity which binds us together.

(2) The control of the seas, aiming at a disguised blockade of our ports in order to destroy our supremacy at sea and our normal supplies.

- (b) *Intrigues abroad*, by which attempts are made in certain countries, by indirect measures, to create the impression that the victory they try to postpone, but which we shall achieve nevertheless, will be of no consequence.

These intrigues are supported by a press which is directly or indirectly controlled by Britain.

- (c) *Mobilizing the Freemasons*, whose campaign the world over is assuming tremendous proportions in every way, especially in the spheres of propaganda and pressure on the so-called democratic governments, whose latest manoeuvre is to raise at Geneva, where the Freemasons feel especially strong, the problems which are being submitted to the Non-Intervention Committee today.
- (d) *Inside Spain*, attempting to divert some Spaniards left over from the old political parties, certain senile Monarchists, from the right path and from their pledged loyalty. Use is even being made of a certain foreign Prince, who is unconditionally in the service of the "Quai d'Orsay" and whose capacity for intrigue is known in your country but not yet in ours.

These are tangible factors which are unavoidable in the formation of any régime, but which, viewed from abroad, obviously prejudice a clear idea of Spain and create a false impression of the unity in our Spain.

This Franco-British policy, spurred on by the Opposition and revolutionary and left-wing parties, finds in our geographical position and friendship with Germany and Italy an "argument" which can easily be exploited, and which therefore compels us to be most cautious in our international relations, in which we must combine the soundness of our doctrines with the necessity of not aggravating suspicion and difficulties. A policy which is useful not only to Spain but also to our friends.

I realize that this caution, which characterizes our relations abroad, may sometimes disappoint public opinion in nations friendly to us, who, having governments founded on clarity, truth and a strong army, are accustomed to courage. I also know what happened in some places during the recent international tension, which threatened to bring Europe to the brink of war.

Hampered by a hard fight claiming all her resources in men and material, with a frontier of more than 1,500 km. with Portugal, along the Pyrenees and in Morocco, without fortresses or garrisons; her coast also exposed to any invasion, her completely unprotected islands and possessions in the Atlantic, and with petroleum and ammunition supplies for only three months, Spain could not extricate herself from this dangerous situation in any other way. When, therefore, the danger became acute and manifested itself by troop concentrations on the frontiers, and as *la guerre brusquée*, which the French General Staff had proposed to Britain, was indeed intended, I, unshaken in my mind, took the decision I had previously announced to our friends,² to instruct our agents in London to make a verbal declaration, so as to remove any possible pretext for an attack on account of our alleged "complicity through our silence". I believed that I was in this way not only serving the interests of Spain but also those of Germany and Italy, for whom the occupation of our territory and the Straits of Gibraltar by their enemies in the event of war would have been the heaviest blow.

It was clear to the Nationalist Government that if war had broken out it would have finished us completely.

But the declaration we made saved us from the intended attack and gave us the

² The reference is evidently to Franco's attitude on the question of neutrality during the Czechoslovak crisis of September 1938, on which see vol. II of this Series, documents Nos. 622, 624, 638, 641 and 659, and vol. III of this Series, documents Nos. 666, 669, 670, 672 and 673.

necessary time to secure vital points in our defence, and also afforded Chamberlain's peace policy a support against French intentions which proved effective at the time.

Even so, Spain did not sleep. For by withdrawing troops and artillery from the fronts, she had, as a matter of precaution, sent fourteen battalions and 12,000 rifles to Morocco which helped to arm 27,000 Harkeños who were concentrated in the interior of the Riff territory in order to threaten Fez and incite the Kabyles to revolt, while the regular troops dug themselves in along the invasion line of Alcazar and Melilla so as to organize a defence in depth of our frontiers.

Social work. I am aware of your own and your people's concern in this field. Despite the war we have already achieved a great deal in improving the living conditions of our workers and the lower-income groups. We have formed a recreational movement, raised the family income, and set up other social institutions which will shortly improve conditions for people with lower incomes and turn them into citizens enjoying equal rights.

Economic policy. British suspicion compels us to be very cautious and not to allow our future economic policy to become too obvious. A modest organization, on the principles of autarky has already allowed us, even in the middle of a war, to solve serious and difficult problems in the field of economic policy.

I, and with me all Spain, thank you very much for the effective and loyal support which you have given us from the first day, which is the firm basis of the friendship between our two peoples and which will become even more effective as our strength increases.

With this in mind, I am determined that, after the end of the war, Spain shall devote herself to the strengthening of her position by a thorough and powerful organization of her necessary armaments.

With best wishes for the future of Germany and the unshakeable friendship of our two peoples, I express to you the assurance of my sincere esteem.

F. FRANCO

(B)

GERMAN-AUSTRIAN RELATIONS

(i)

1744/403123

The German Ambassador in Austria to the Foreign Ministry¹

A.6839

VIENNA, December 2, 1936.

Received December 3, 1936.

Pol. IV 4957.

I have the honour to submit herewith the Memorandum on the conversation of the 29th of this month [*sic*], between the Federal Chancellor and the Counsellor of Legation here, which usefully supplements my *démarche* of yesterday.²

PAPEN

¹ This document is the cover note under which Papen forwarded the report of his Counsellor of Legation, Stein, on the latter's conversation with Schuschnigg on Nov. 29, 1936, and which is printed in vol. I of this Series as document No. 190. Cf. Franz von Papen: *Memoirs* (London, 1952), pp. 381-382.

² See vol. I of this Series, document No. 191.

(ii)

Transcripts of Six Telephone Conversations of March 12-13, 1938

[EDITORS' NOTE: These transcripts of telephone conversations dealing with the German occupation of Austria are taken from a file of such records submitted on his instructions to Göring under a cover note dated March 14 (A 086088) by the Forschungsamt (*lit.* Research Office) of the Reich Air Ministry, an organization which included amongst its functions listening in to telephone conversations. This file, which was numbered 2949-PS, was submitted to the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, as exhibit USA-76; the parts used in evidence are published in *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuremberg, 1948), vol. XXXI, and have therefore not been reprinted here. These documents should be read in conjunction with volume 1 of this Series, chapter II, sections I and J.]

(a)

A 086131-32

*Telephone conversation between Prince Philip of Hesse¹ from the
Foreign Ministry, Rome, and Field Marshal Göring*

Rome 1, March 12, 1938.

12:20-12:22 p.m.

- H. What I want is to reach the Führer.
 G. That is impossible at the moment.
 H. This is what it is about. Mussolini wants to know whether he may publish the Führer's letter.² It would be very important for him here for the sake of his position and public opinion, and secondly also, in view of the coming visit of the Führer.³
 G. Say this to him: He will understand that I must of course ask the Führer about this. It is such an important matter; but I shall certainly be able to reach the Führer in two hours.
 H. Reach him in two hours?
 G. I think so, certainly. I fully appreciate Mussolini's motives, but this is a matter which naturally the Führer alone can decide.
 H. There is a further point—the Fascist Grand Council is in session at present and he would like to announce it to them, too.
 G. I have absolutely no objection to that.
 H. Yes, but what is announced there will also be published in the same terms.
 G. All right, then I would ask Mussolini to be patient enough to give me two to three hours to catch the Führer.
 H. Yes, indeed. Would you then please ring me up?
 G. Right, what number?
 H. It is 80012, Rome 80012.
 G. Right.
 H. I will . . . (*breaks off*) . . . I am now in the Foreign Ministry. I shall drive straight home and wait there for your call.
 G. Yes, but it will take at least . . . I may be lucky . . . him in an hour, but I think, as he is just on the way by car.
They say good-bye.

¹ Son-in-law of the King of Italy; employed as special envoy between Hitler and Mussolini.

² For the full text of this letter, which was transmitted to Mussolini by Prince Philip of Hesse, see vol. 1 of this Series, document No. 352.

³ Hitler paid a state visit to Italy on May 3 to 9, 1938. See vol. 1 of this Series, documents Nos. 758-762.

(b)

A 086133-37

*Telephone conversation between Prince Philip of Hesse and
Field Marshal Göring*

Rome 2, March 12, 1938.

12:56-1:04 p.m.

- G. Yes. What do you want?
- H. The Prince of Hesse here.
- G. Göring here.
- H. All right.
- G. Well, what is the matter?
- H. I thought you had rung me up.
- G. No, no; nothing of the sort. Listen, Prince, I have spoken to the Führer. I shall now dictate the letter to the Führer, to where he is. He says that the whole letter, just as it is, is perhaps not suitable for publication, as there are a few passages in it which could perhaps make fresh difficulties. He will now quickly look through the letter and then let the Duce know the passages which had better be left out. The letter can then be published with these passages left out, and before you go to the Duce I will give you the exact passages which should come out and possibly be changed. The Führer understands just what the Duce's point is, so that the matter will then be settled precisely. That's clear, isn't it?
- It will be roughly like this—I must now dictate the letter to him; then the Führer must make the deletions and dictate them to me. Then I will let you have it. That will probably take an hour to an hour and a half altogether.
- H. An hour to an hour and a half. Right! May I pass on this interim message now?
- G. Yes, but do emphasize that the Führer asks him to wait for it, as he only wants to prevent fresh difficulties. He fully understands the Duce's position. Do you understand? He will manage it discreetly.
- H. Yes, all right. I'll pass it on at once.
- G. Yes, but only to the Duce personally.
- H. May I say something else?
- G. And tell him [text obscure] so that no mistake can possibly arise.
- H. No, no, no! But may I say something else?

Ciano was instructed by the Duce to tell me this. They would be very grateful here if a press announcement could be made in Germany, in which the Duce's and Italy's loyal attitude towards Germany in this matter . . .

- G. Wait a moment! So far we have—this is an important question which we wanted to suggest ourselves. The reason why we have waited up to now is only because we wished to hear from the Duce whether he would like it. We would like nothing better than to give expression to our sincere feelings of deep gratitude and to the loyal attitude of the Duce.
- H. Yes, certainly. I will tell him that personally.
- G. Well then, I will see to this too. And then, thirdly, will you tell the Duce what I already told Magistrati yesterday:¹ The German troops which have entered Innsbruck, have strict orders not to go beyond Innsbruck. Only the Commander—(addressed to someone with Göring: "What is he?")—a Colonel—the Commander of the Mountain Brigade—a Colonel somebody—who knows the Italian gentlemen up at the Brenner personally very well, will himself go up to pay the gentlemen a friendly visit and tell them himself

¹ No record has been found.

that he is down below there and will go no farther. You fully understand, don't you? That is, the Mountain Brigade halts at Innsbruck. The Commander, who knows the Italian gentlemen very well personally, will go up alone and will then tell them himself that we are halting down below and going no farther—he will, so to speak, pay a friendly call.

- H. Right, I will see to that at once. And may I add one more thing, that the British Ambassador here called on Count Ciano about a *démarche*, and got a reply similar to that given to the French.² Would you tell the Führer that?
- G. Right. You know, the Führer must have told you all about it yesterday.
- H. The Führer was marvellous last night on the telephone.
- G. Yes, I can only say I was with him afterwards, and, believe me, it was a wonderful moment. I think the two men are really spiritually allied for ever.
- H. Yes, absolutely.
- G. Right then! The matter will be seen to.
- H. . . . speaking of such marked friendliness. I was there yesterday for just five minutes before the meeting of the Grand Council. It has been in session for the last three days, you know. He was extremely friendly; he just couldn't have been more so.
- G. No, indeed. The Führer only said that he was so tremendously happy because he hadn't for a moment been mistaken about the greatness of the Duce's personality. I can tell you, it really was the happiest moment for the Führer. Not so much on account of the thing itself, about which he is naturally extremely pleased, but because of the personal side of the matter—that was what made him so happy. And because of the whole feeling which he has for the Duce, which you well know, and that it has been so splendidly confirmed. I congratulate you on having been given such a wonderful mission.
- H. Yes, I am so proud of it.
- G. It was the best you have had yet.
- H. Yes, it was splendid. I am terribly proud of it.
- G. Then give my kind regards to the Duce, and tell him I have no need to put it into words, he knows my loyalty, and that I am very happy about it all, and that I knew that such a man as he, a man of his greatness, could only act nobly. And give Ciano my kind regards too.
- H. And am I to keep the 'plane here, or should I send it back?
- G. If you need it, keep it.
- H. It would be better in case there is something important.
- G. Yes, all right, keep it there for the time being.
- H. And where can I reach you, in case anything important comes by telephone?
- G. Now listen: The Führer has now gone down south, and intends to go to Linz, in order at last after all these years to show that for the first time he has the chance of visiting his parents' grave and laying a wreath there—because he is, after all, a son of Austria. He has made me—it will be published at midday today—his full personal representative, until further notice, as Head of the State and Head of the Government, so I am now directing Government affairs, and everything has to be brought to me in any case. Therefore I shall be here all the time; unfortunately I can't get away for the present, and you can reach me at any moment on my telephone.
- H. In the Reich Chancellery or at your residence?
- G. At my residence, or I shall be at Karinhall, but they're on the same line.
- They say good-bye.*

² See vol. 1 of this Series, documents Nos. 350 and 361; *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. 1, Nos. 27, 43 and 53; also Ciano: *L'Europa verso la Catastrofe* (Milan, 1947), pp. 292-294.

(c)

A 086138-41

*Telephone conversation between Prince Philip of Hesse, at present in
Rome, and Field Marshal Göring*

Rome 1, March 12, 1938.

8:20—8:32 p.m.

- G. Prince Philip, have you got the letter in front of you?
- H. Yes, it is here.
- G. Please start reading it out. Now listen: Altogether, only one particular paragraph, and in addition one sentence about the C[zechoslovak] R[epublic] will be crossed out of the letter. Tell the Duce that the Führer requests him not to publish these as it would get him into difficulties with France again over the C.S.R. Everything else can be published. But I'll get my adjutant to phone the exact text through to you in a quarter of an hour. (*Spoken into the room:—Is the Captain there? He is to come in. Quick! He is already there.*)—You have the letter there. It begins: Excellency, in a fateful hour I am turning to Your Excellency to inform you of a decision which appears necessary in the circumstances and has already become irrevocable. Then it goes on: I have in recent months . . . Will you cross out the whole page from "I have" onwards, then the whole of page 2 down to the bottom, where it says "in any way the real desire and will of the Austrian people".
- H. "... this new orientation of the policy of the Austrian State . . .
- G. . . . does not, however, reflect in any way the real desire and will of the Austrian people", cross out up to and including "people". I'll say it again: from "I have in recent months with increasing anxiety", cross out everything up to and including "the policy of the Austrian State does not, however, reflect in any way the real desire and will of the Austrian people". The letter then looks like this: "... already become irrevocable." Then it goes straight on: "For years the Germans in Austria have been . . .", so it's only this paragraph about Czechia from page 1 to 2 to be crossed out. Further on, on page 4 where it says "(1) . . . to permit a hostile military power to establish itself at her frontier, all the more so as such plans are clearly in contradiction to the true will of the Austrian people". The whole of this paragraph is to be crossed out.
- H. Then the whole of No. (1) is to be crossed out?
- G. Yes, it's to be crossed out altogether, and in No. (2) only the figure 2 is to be crossed out. There is no 3. So it's just this small paragraph on page 4 to be left out. And then again, for the same reason, on page 6, where it says at the top: "This country that (?) is to be treated in the same way, to receive the same privileges, or to be subject to the same restrictions, and that at last some measure of security is to be established in the military sphere." Put a full stop here, and cross out the following clause: "... lest the Austrian State should one day become a dependency of the C.S.R." That is to be crossed out. Everything else can stay as it is. In short, tell him that the Führer only asks for the parts about the C.S.R. to be left out, as he will surely understand . . . (*pauses*) . . . that might cause trouble.
- H. That's all then?
- G. Yes, that's all right then. I think the Duce himself wouldn't wish it; it wouldn't be pleasant for him either. Tell the Duce we have succeeded in leaving the C.S.R. out of it altogether, and we have managed so well that

up to now the C.S.R. has declared itself entirely reassured,¹ and this would only mean fresh unrest. That is one thing. The other is that the announcement about Mussolini will be made in the following way: the Führer will send the Duce a marvellous telegram of thanks.² And this telegram will be published, and then the press people will scribble their own stuff about it. But the decisive thing is the telegram which will be sent to the Duce. But please tell the Duce that the Führer implores him in no circumstances to allow what he has crossed out to be published, and to take care that no error is made, and that it doesn't somehow get published by mistake by someone who doesn't understand.

H. No, no, I will go to the Foreign Minister again myself.

G. Go to the Duce again. You must go to the Duce, please. And explain to him why the Führer wants to have that part left out. And then you must cross it out heavily, so that there can be no doubt at all, and request the Duce that he himself . . . so that there is no possibility of a hitch. It would make our position a great deal more difficult. That really would give France the chance to interfere. Do tell him that. That is the only possible chance of France making real difficulties for us. The Führer relies absolutely on the Duce having it taken out. But everything else, the main content of the letter, stays as it is. Then also tell Ciano that there is a splendid telegram coming for the Duce. Now everything is clear.

H. I shall remain available here. About the plane—let me know if it is to be sent back.

G. Yes, all right. If you have time, could you perhaps see about that "Augusta", you know, whether it has been brought out for me. As I said, give the Duce my kindest regards and Ciano too. Good-bye.

¹ See vol. II of this Series, documents Nos. 70-74, 77 and 78.

² Hitler's telegram to Mussolini dated Mar. 13, as published in *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, vol. 6, part 1, No. 29, p. 146, reads: "Mussolini, I shall never forget you for this."

(d)

A 086142-45

*Telephone conversation between Field Marshal Göring
and the Prince of Hesse, Rome*

ROME, March 12, 1938.

7:25—7:31 p.m.

H. I just wanted to report again. I was with the Duce again this afternoon. I gave him all the messages as you asked me. He was tremendously pleased about the greetings from the Führer and yourself. He emphasized that his personal attitude remained . . . on the one hand towards . . . and on the other towards his own country too.

G. Just a moment, I didn't get that.

H. He said it was a twofold duty; on the one hand his duty as a friend and on the other hand his duty to his country, as this was the only logical and only practicable solution of the question.

G. Quite right.

H. I should be very grateful if you would tell the Führer this the next time you speak to him.

G. Certainly.

H. Then he said that he was absolutely in agreement regarding the deletions. It was just what he had in mind. He too had had misgivings. I then had it shown to me. It's all quite in order. It will be published this evening. He will read the letter out in the Council and will also speak this evening in

the Grand Council on Italy's attitude, so as to get the people to consent to his action as well.

- G. Excellent.
- H. Then Britain has again made a move here. And she wants to have another discussion on Italy's attitude to Austria. This was refused, and Britain was told that an answer would be contained in the summary of the proceedings of the Grand Council this evening, which could be seen in the Press. Then he was informed about the colonels—who have driven to the frontier. He was also very pleased that they had got into touch immediately there. Otherwise I have nothing of importance to report today.
- G. Very good news. No, no, I can only tell you again and again that the Führer is really indescribably happy about the attitude there, particularly because he had seen the great man in him and he is very happy because his opinion has been fully . . . It certainly shows that the Axis . . .
- H. Yes, that there is no longer . . . that's quite sure now. Just before I rang up I was with the King, I reported to him too, and he also greatly approves of everything and sends his kind regards. If there is anything further, I'll ring up again. If not, then I shall not ring up again tonight. Tomorrow morning I am going to Ciano again, and then I'll report to you.
- G. In Austria there is unbelievable rejoicing. We ourselves did not believe that the enthusiasm there would be so great.
- H. Yes, it is terrific.
- G. The people are now all freed from the burden; now they no longer need, out of petty anxieties [for] their families or their livelihoods . . . it's only now evident how tremendous the terror was. We can't imagine it. Our people say that the Rhineland, the entry into the Rhineland, wasn't anything like it. The people just wept and sobbed for joy. It was so moving that our own people themselves had no tears left. It was one great shout, as if a people which had been enslaved for years were freed from a gigantic burden overnight. One heard only jubilant voices, and then of course there were the scared Jews and the sympathizers, with guilty consciences of course. And there was the great Fatherland Front which had taken such an adamant attitude, that block of granite and bronze—and there they were, creeping into mouse-holes everywhere. On all Fatherland Front houses the Swastika flags are already flying today; they put them out—I think it's a great joke—most of them put them out because they were Nazis.
- H. Here too the Swastika flags are already flying at the Consulate and the Legation.
- G. Yes, that's a good thing, too.
- H. Then there's also an interesting thing the King told me. Beck¹ had told him that immediately after the Berchtesgaden affair² 25,000 Jews had applied for passports for abroad from Vienna in one day. It is thought it would be a good thing to open the frontiers for a little while so that all that riff-raff can get out.
- G. But not those with foreign currency, otherwise we'll have them escaping into other countries. The Jews can go, but they'll kindly leave the money behind; they've only stolen it anyway.

¹ The Polish Foreign Minister had visited Rome on Mar. 7-10.

² A reference to the Hitler-Schuschnigg meeting at Berchtesgaden on Feb. 12, 1938; see vol. I of this Series, documents Nos. 294 and 295.

(e)

A 086171-77

*Telephone conversation between Field Marshal Göring and
Bodenschatz¹ at Linz*

March 13, 1938.

- B. I am to tell you the following: The question no longer arises because from this evening Austria and Germany are one Reich Territory. And as the Austrian troops will swear the oath of loyalty to the Führer tomorrow, it is clear that all the troops here are Reich German troops. In the next few days some regiments will be going; an Austrian one—I believe—to Munich and another to Nuremberg. And furthermore, would the Field Marshal please decline to speak about things taking place within the German Reich, as we are not in a position to give information. And anyway on the spot there is the British representative, and also Ward Price,² who can find out how the Austrians, the whole population, are coming over to us with great enthusiasm.
- G. Yes, of course, we know that.
- B. He also told me that when we occupied the Rhineland we first carried the action through and afterwards the voting took place, and that it was the same thing here.
- G. Yes, certainly—he should do it in just the same way.
- B. And further, he had told Henderson in a conversation with him one evening some time ago, when he discussed the Austrian question with him, that Britain should not interfere in the dispute on internal affairs between Germany and Austria.³ He had quite clear proofs that the . . . (*unintelligible*), the British Minister in Austria⁴ had tried to the end to back Schuschnigg⁵ up.
- G. Hello! Tell the Führer that reports have just come in, Brown Reports [*braune Meldungen*]⁶ which are always quite plain because they are intercepted. These show beyond doubt that an action was frustrated only because Britain declined.
- B. Good—because Britain declined.
- G. The Führer will get that tomorrow morning. The situation was this: The French certainly intended to embark unconditionally on action, and so had put very heavy pressure on the British. I can send you all the deciphered telegrams. And simply because of Britain's refusal, the action was called off.
- B. The action was called off.
- G. The situation today is that the Great Powers—that is France is informing her envoys in the various countries that she can do nothing because Britain would not commit herself, and, above all, because Britain refused . . .
- B. Britain refused to undertake anything.
- G. . . . to encourage Schuschnigg in his resistance. If the Minister in Vienna has done so . . .
- B. Then it was on his own responsibility.

¹ Maj. Gen. Karl Bodenschatz, Head of the Ministerial Bureau in the Air Ministry.

² Foreign Correspondent of the London *Daily Mail*; see also, for his interview with Hitler on March 13, Baynes: *Hitler's Speeches*, vol. II, pp. 1423-1425.

³ See vol. I of this Series, document No. 138.

⁴ Michael Palaret.

⁵ Kurt von Schuschnigg, Austrian Federal Chancellor, July 1934-Mar. 11, 1938.

⁶ Intercepts deciphered by the Forschungsamt were circularized to recipients typed or mimeographed on coloured paper. The reports cited in this document by Göring have not been found.

- G. . . then he did so on his own responsibility. I must say for the sake of fairness—and the Führer will have the papers by tomorrow morning—that Britain did not encourage him to resist, but definitely refused to give a guarantee.
- B. Yes, I will tell him that.
- G. I should like to say that the Führer ought to read these telegrams tomorrow morning, the ones on the Brown Papers. From them it becomes perfectly clear that France first intended, with Italy and Britain—or with Britain alone—
- B. Yes.
- G. Was ready for absolutely anything.
- B. Yes.
- G. Britain's attitude was decisive.
- B. Yes.
- G. That's why I should like—I would certainly act in this way. But all the same I would like for that reason to be somewhat friendly to Britain.
- B. I think, Field Marshal . . . (*unintelligible*). You needn't use the words the Führer used, but—it can be said briefly and clearly, but put a little better.
- G. Yes, but draw the Führer's attention to it—I mean, I've also told the courier whom I sent down there that the Führer will read the reports.
- B. All right. That the decisive fact is that Britain has really taken a decisive stand here and . . . (*unintelligible*) that she has not given way to France.
- G. Yes; and listen, Bodenschatz. It is quite definite—up to the last minute France declared that she was ready for any action unconditionally—also for any military action—with all its consequences, if Britain would join in.
- B. Yes, yes. And Britain declined.
- G. Britain declined, and had also done so previously.
- B. And if the British Minister in Austria said anything different, he did so on his own responsibility.
- G. Yes. It says literally: Britain was not prepared to encourage Herr Schuschnigg in his resistance.
- B. Yes. About the telegram to the Duce—it will be published.
- G. Yes. Now listen Bodenschatz—do stress that this is not the British statement, but that we are here concerned . . .
- B. . . . (*unintelligible*).
- G. But do listen! We are here concerned with instructions given by the French Foreign Minister⁷ to their Minister on the whole course of events. The case is this, that had Britain not said "no", France would have been ready for anything.
- B. Yes, indeed . . . (*unintelligible*).
- G. And in these instructions the following interesting sentence occurs: To our great regret Anthony Eden resigned from the Cabinet on the 25th.⁸ This points to Chamberlain having thrown Eden over, perhaps also partly on account of the Austrian question.
- B. Yes, indeed.
- G. And—I think the courier will be in Vienna tomorrow morning. And I will again impress on the Forschungsamt courier that he is to report to you.
- B. That he is to report to me, so that . . . (*unintelligible*).
- G. Wait, write down the following number of the Brown Papers, which is important for the Führer . . . (*unintelligible*): 83722 and before that number 83709. I shall send down a special courier by plane perhaps even tonight, or tomorrow morning, who will bring these two reports only.
- B. That will be easy, because there's a special plane leaving Berlin very early

⁷ Yvon Delbos.

⁸ Anthony Eden resigned as British Foreign Secretary on Feb. 20, 1938, and was succeeded by Lord Halifax on Feb. 25.

tomorrow morning. It is taking the Führer's two women secretaries to Vienna. It can bring that too.

- G. Yes. When are you going to Vienna, then?
- B. We leave here at 10 o'clock; at 12 o'clock we'll be in St. Pölten, and we'll have lunch there. It will be about 2 or 3 o'clock by the time we get to Vienna.
- G. I'll see to it that these two reports get to Linz in time. Now listen: when the Forschungsamt courier arrives he is to report and is to say that I would request the Führer to be sure to read these reports. Then please see to it that both these reports are taken out.
- B. Are taken out and submitted to the Führer at once.
- G. From these the Führer will see most clearly the whole attitude of the Powers. And then I would be very glad to know whether he has anything to add to the instructions which he is going to give me.
- B. Yes, certainly.
- G. I don't know at all what Henderson is after. The decisive fact was that . . .
- B. That Britain did not join in.
- G. And, above all, Mussolini.
- B. Mussolini, yes of course. The telegram to the Duce will be published, I said that before. Then the Luftwaffe is taking part in the parade. For this the necessary measures have been taken—in fullest strength. Then, about your coming here, Field Marshal, the Führer said it would be Thursday or Friday before he comes home.⁹ Then the Field Marshal can go to Austria. During the election campaign the Field Marshal must be here anyhow . . . (*unintelligible*).
- G. Yes, well, I'm quite aware that I am to speak then. That's not what I mean, I don't mean while he is down there.
- B. By the way, there's this matter too. Bürckel is being given a special job.¹⁰
- G. A Party job?
- B. A Party job, yes.
- G. Yes, that's obvious.
- B. He said that when he is home again the Field Marshal can go down when the Field Marshal wishes. Then he also came to speak about Spain today, and said that when the affair in Spain was finished he would give the soldiers in . . . (*unintelligible*) a triumphal entry into Germany. He spoke about a medal in different classes, and will make a wonderful show of it, receive them in Hamburg and then lead them in a triumphal procession to Berlin.
- G. The Führer rang me up last night.
- B. Yes, so I heard.
- G. Yes; well, I shall be available in case he still rings me up today.
- B. Yes, he is going to his room now. I can get you connected with him, Field Marshal.
- G. No, later please. The best would be before he goes to bed.
- B. How long will the Field Marshal still be up?
- G. For another two or three hours.
- B. He is going up to his room now.
- G. All right, then perhaps he could ring me presently.
- B. Everybody here is wildly enthusiastic, Field Marshal. You've never seen anything like it.
- G. Yes, yes, I believe that. Well, good-bye then.
- B. Heil Hitler, Field Marshal.

⁹ Hitler returned to Berlin on Wednesday, Mar. 16.

¹⁰ Gauleiter Joseph Bürckel was charged by Hitler on Mar. 18 with the reorganization of the Nazi Party in Austria, see *Dokumente der deutschen Politik*, vol. 6, Part 1, No. 32 B, p. 150.

(f)

A 086178-80

*Telephone conversation between Field Marshal Göring and
State Secretary Körner (?)¹*

BERLIN-VIENNA, March 13, 1938,
10:54-10:57 p.m.

- K. I only wanted to report that Borchard (?)² has just been having a discussion with Fischböck³ (*ph.*)⁴ and has informed me that when they came to speak about fixing rates of exchange, Fischböck said that Keppler (*ph.*)⁴ who is now on his way to the Führer and should arrive at the Führer's place at Linz any moment, will discuss there a rate of 1:1.40.⁵ Now I had told Keppler before he went to Linz, what you said at noon today, that he was to do nothing in the matter, but was to wait for the arrival of Schacht⁶ who will be here on Tuesday, in order to discuss the question with Fischböck and the National Bank privately. And now there is a possible danger that Keppler will speak to the Führer, and perhaps commit the Führer to a rate of exchange—I do not know how far the Führer is informed about this talk with Schacht.
- G. The Führer has been informed that Schacht will put the whole matter in order.
- K. It's all right then, I mean . . .
- G. Just a moment! Ring up Bodenschatz at once.
- K. Yes.
- G. In Linz, and tell him he is to ask the Führer, if Keppler should speak to him about fixing a rate of exchange for the schilling, not to make any decisions before Schacht has been to Vienna and discussed the matter.
- K. Yes.
- G. For once Schacht has some very sensible proposals to make.
- K. Yes.
- G. And it can easily wait for four or five days—Keppler is only thinking of Austria now and not of Germany.
- K. Yes.
- G. And Schacht—Schacht knows a great deal about it.
- K. Quite.
- G. The Bank President also, tell Bodenschatz . . . the Reichsbank President . . . should also express his opinion.
- K. Yes.

¹ Paul Körner, State Secretary and Permanent Deputy to Göring as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan.

² Possibly Stuckart, State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of the Interior. See vol. I of this Series, document No. 395.

³ Dr. Hans Fischböck, Minister of Commerce in the Seyss-Inquart Cabinet.

⁴ i.e., transcribed phonetically.

⁵ On Mar. 12 at 9:54 a.m., in a telephone conversation with Keppler (not printed, A 086129-30) Göring said that Germany should make some concessions to Austria in respect of the rate of exchange between the two currencies and that Austria should not be the loser.

By an ordinance of Mar. 17, 1938 (see *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1938, Part I, p. 253) the Reichsmark was, in addition to the Austrian Schilling, declared legal tender in Austria and the rate of exchange fixed at 1 Reichsmark = 1½ Schilling. According to ordinances of Apr. 23, 1938 (see *ibid.*, pp. 405, 406) and May 25, 1938 (see *ibid.*, pp. 601, 602) respectively, the notes issued by the Austrian National Bank ceased to be legal tender with effect from Apr. 25, 1938, and the Austrian coinage with effect from June 15, 1938.

⁶ Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, March 1933-January 1939; Minister without Portfolio 1937-1943.

- G. And only then should Bodenschatz tell the Führer that Keppler is coming to see him.
- K. Yes, I'll do that. Then I also wanted to say that I have spoken to Pfundtner,⁷ and Pfundtner also wanted to ring up Linz so that your name may appear as well under the Law.⁸
- G. Yes, why not?
- K. Why, because so far only the Führer and Reich Chancellor, the Minister for the Interior, the Foreign Minister and the Führer's Deputy appear under it.
- G. Yes; then tell Bodenschatz that too.
- K. All right.
- G. I should very much like it because after all I did play a very large part in it.
- K. Of course, since as acting Head, [you were] indispensable.
- G. Yes.
- K. Of course.
- G. And please tell Bodenschatz I asked him to tell the Führer that.
- K. Yes, in any case Pfundtner too will 'phone it through of his own accord.
- G. Yes.
- K. Yes, and now I shall tell Bodenschatz too.
- G. Yes, also giving the reason that after all I, up here . . .
- K. Yes, also apart from that.
- G. Also because of my part in it.
- K. Your part, yes. I have nothing else for the moment.
- G. All right.
- K. Heil Hitler.

⁷ Hans Pfundtner, State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of the Interior.

⁸ A reference to the Law on the Reunion of Austria with the German Reich, dated Mar. 13, 1938. This Law was published in the *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1938, Part I, pp. 237-238, over the signatures of the persons mentioned by Körner and that of "The Reich Air Minister Göring, Field Marshal". In Ribbentrop's circular telegram of Mar. 14 to German Missions abroad repeating the Law, the Reich Air Minister's signature does not appear. See vol. I of this Series, document No. 378.

(C)

GERMAN RELATIONS WITH THE HOLY SEE

(i)

7872/E570408

*The Reich Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs to the Foreign Minister*¹

BERLIN, October 9, 1937.

With reference to the communication from the Foreign Ministry of October 5, 1937—Pers H 8461—.²

DEAR HERR VON NEURATH: I am unable to agree to the proposal of the Foreign Ministry to postpone for one year the retirement of the Ambassador to the Vatican, Diego von Bergen.

The German Government have no interest in maintaining the Embassy to the Vatican. In the foreseeable future, final decisions in matters of Church

¹ This document, from the files of the Reich Chancellery, is the copy which was sent to the Head of the Reich Chancellery with a cover note dated Oct. 9, 1937 (7872/E570407).

² Not printed (7872/E570406). In this communication the State Secretary strongly recommended on political grounds the retention of Bergen as Ambassador to the Vatican and the postponement for a year of his retirement under the age limit prescribed by Section 68 of the German Civil Service Law. The Head of the Reich Chancellery was asked to obtain the Government's consent.

policy will probably lead to the necessity of closing the Embassy. It is therefore to be welcomed that the Ambassador is now being retired under the Civil Service Law. The post can be temporarily filled by the senior official of the Embassy.

I should like to remark that when he was in Berlin³ the Ambassador at no time considered it necessary to seek any consultation with me. His reports, up to the present, have not assisted me in the direction of Church policy.⁴

I therefore request you to withdraw the proposals.⁵

I have given a copy of this communication only to the Head of the Reich Chancellery.⁶

Heil Hitler.

KERRL

³ Bergen had gone to Berlin at the end of May 1937 (see vol. I of this Series, document No. 657); a marginal note on a minute of June 22 (1610/386297) says that he had returned to Rome on June 25. The Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs had enquired at the Foreign Ministry on June 4 (8415/E592644) as to Bergen's whereabouts, since the Minister had learned from the press that he had been given leave of absence for some considerable period.

⁴ For a previous complaint about Bergen's reports, see vol. I of this Series, No. 672.

⁵ On Oct. 19, Rust, Reich Minister of Education, in a communication to Lammers, Reich Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellery (7872/E570409) requested a conference of the Ministers concerned with the Foreign Minister, but meantime was opposed to a prolongation of Bergen's period of office.

⁶ In a letter of Oct. 27 (7872/E570411) Neurath informed Kerrl that the Führer considered a change of Ambassador to the Vatican or a Chargé d'Affaires as inexpedient at present and that therefore Bergen must remain at his post for the time being. This decision was communicated to Bergen in telegram No. 45 of Oct. 29 (7872/E570412). See also vol. IV of this Series, documents Nos. 465 and 468.

(D)

THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN FOR COLONIES

(i)

7508/E540892

Minute by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, October 7, 1937.

Pol. X 4013.¹

The Italian Ambassador² spoke to me today, showing signs of uneasiness over the German campaign for colonies. He wanted very much to know whether we have any immediate concrete objective in mind or not. I replied that this was a sphere where the personal views of the Führer played a special role. I added that, as I myself saw the matter, *at least* we did not wish to let interest in conversations on colonies die out but wished to keep it alive.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ This copy was sent under a cover note, Pol. X 4013 of Oct. 11, 1937 (7508/E540891), to the Embassy in Rome, from the files of which this and the three following documents are taken.

² Dr. Bernardo Attolico.

(ii)

7508/E540893-94

Ambassador Hassell¹ to Ministerialdirektor Weizsäcker

ROME, October 14, 1937.

DEAR WEIZSÄCKER: In the minute on your conversation with Attolico which has been sent to me with the despatch of the 11th of this month—Pol. X 4013²—you mentioned noticing that Attolico showed signs of uneasiness over the German campaign for colonies. This uneasiness has somewhat surprised me inasmuch as we here have the opposite impression, namely that the colonial campaign, being after all really directed against Britain, is very welcome here. In any case one can say that in the local press here articles and reports from the German newspapers on the subject are displayed even more prominently than has been the case in Germany. But, on the basis of your impressions, I will try to find out here what the feeling really is about the matter. I would like to take this opportunity of asking you also whether your reply, which really postpones our colonial claims to some extent and refers only to an “interest in conversations on colonies” which at least we did not wish to let die out, was intended merely as a tactical move in this particular case, or whether it represents a kind of directive. I had hitherto believed that the colonial claim was now to be treated as a principal objective in German policy. Perhaps it should even be considered whether a general ruling should be given on language to be held by our Missions on this point.

Yours, etc.,

HASSELL

¹ German Ambassador in Rome.² See immediately preceding document.

(iii)

7508/E540895-96

Ministerialdirektor Weizsäcker to Ambassador Hassell

BERLIN, October 22, 1937.

Pol. X 4205.

DEAR HASSELL: Many thanks for your letter of the 16th [sic]¹ of this month on the colonial affair. The more active treatment of this question in our press in the past weeks was occasioned by the remarks of the Führer on the Bückeberg.² We have not taken any steps with the British Government, with whom in the last resort the solution of the question lies, nor do I foresee that such steps could in the near future be repeated with better results than in the spring of this year.³ However, we naturally wish to use every opportunity to keep this question open and to keep the discussion of it alive outside Germany too.

Your suggestion for a general ruling on the language to be held by our Missions on this point coincides with intentions here, as soon as we have gathered more material than we have at present.

Cordial greetings and Heil Hitler.

Yours etc.,

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See immediately preceding document.² At the Harvest Thanksgiving Festival on Oct. 3, 1937. For the relevant passage, see Baynes: *Hitler's Speeches*, vol. II, pp. 1364–1365.³ Documents on German-British exchanges on the colonial question in the spring of 1937 will be published in Series C.

(iv)

7508/E540897-901

Circular of the State Secretary¹

BERLIN, November 11, 1937.

Pol. X 4323.

In the past few weeks the colonial question has been given more detailed treatment in the German and foreign, and especially the British press. The discussion in the German press was set going by us to emphasize the statements on the colonial problem made by the Führer and Reich Chancellor on the Bückeberg on October 3.² These statements are connected with the speech giving a directive for opening the question, which the Führer and Reich Chancellor made in the German Reichstag on January 30, 1937.³ In this the following was said on the subject:

"The German people once built up a colonial Empire without robbing anyone and without violating any treaty. And they did so without wars. That colonial Empire was taken away from us. The grounds on which it is sought today to excuse this act of confiscation are not tenable.

"First: The natives do not want to belong to Germany.

"Who asked them if they wish to belong to someone else? And when were these natives ever asked if they were glad to belong to the former colonial Powers?

"Second: The colonies were not administered properly by the Germans.

"Germany received these colonies only a few decades previously. Great sacrifices were made in building them up and they were in a process of development which would have led to quite different results today from those in 1914. But yet the colonies had been so developed by us that others considered it worth while to engage in bloody battles for the purpose of taking them from us.

"Third: It is said that they are of no real value.

"If that is the case then they can be of no value to other States either. So it is difficult to see why they nevertheless keep them from us.

"Moreover, Germany has never demanded colonies for military purposes, but exclusively for economic ends.

"It is obvious that in times of general prosperity the value of certain territories may decrease, but it is equally obvious that in times of need such a valuation undergoes an immediate change. Today Germany is living in a time of hard struggle for foodstuffs and raw materials. Sufficient imports could be conceivable only if there were a continued and lasting increase in our exports. Therefore our demand for colonies for our densely populated country will of course be made again and again."

In accordance with this, I request you whenever opportunity offers to point out that the satisfaction of our colonial claim is a requirement of German policy which we have made known and which we shall consistently pursue. In this we proceed from the principle that the confiscation without compensation of our colonial possessions through the Versailles Treaty was made on grounds contrary to truth and by measures of compulsion which ran counter to the spirit of the Treaty. We therefore regard the Versailles settlement as untenable. Our colonial demands are therefore logically for the restoration of the *status quo ante*

¹ Addressees were the principal German Missions abroad, with the exception of those mentioned in the last paragraph of this document.

² See the preceding document, footnote 2.

³ Relevant extracts from this speech are printed in Baynes: *Hitler's Speeches*, vol. II, pp. 1334-1347.

only. If, in the course of practical dealings, it should prove necessary to make certain territorial adjustments, this is a question which we are not yet considering today and which we cannot consider at least as long as our claim is not in fact recognized by the Mandate Powers. The opinion heard here and there that the Reich Government have written off this or that previous protectorate, you should entirely oppose. You should avoid discussion of possible exchanges. In the same way discussions regarding the satisfaction of our raw material needs in return for the renunciation of our territorial claims are undesirable and would be injurious to the vigorous assertion of our claims to restitution.

Interested quarters sometimes try to confuse the discussion by asserting that we have designs on colonial territories other than our former protected territories. The object of such rumours is apparent and they should be denied.

As regards the practical handling of the matter through diplomatic channels so far, we made an attempt in the spring of this year to have a discussion with the British Government regarding our claim; this however was, to our regret, without result.⁴ The official attitude of the Government in London is contained in the Government statements made in the House of Commons on February 15 and March 3 [? 2], 1937,⁵ in which it was stated that the British Government had not considered the transfer of a mandate and would not consider it then. As Prime Minister Baldwin informed the House of Commons on April 28 [sic], 1936,⁶ if the question were raised in the future, the British Government would give an opportunity for it to be fully discussed.

Since then our aim has been to keep the question before the public and we shall continue to do so until it appears advisable to start a fresh diplomatic move. We hope in this way to bring about a clarification of views and positions.

The impression gained from the discussions in the press up to the present is almost completely negative as far as the French press is concerned.

In the British press lately a certain readiness has been perceived to consider, at least in principle, the German colonial claims as such and to listen to our arguments. Particularly noteworthy is an article in *The Times* of October 28, 1937, in which a positive attitude is taken on the question. The writer of the article advocates at some later, calmer moment—and in any case only after the end of the Spanish conflict—a frank and friendly discussion of the problem, which calls for a satisfactory solution, in the interests of maintaining peace. An isolated gesture would be useless, and might in certain circumstances even be dangerous. The writer calls on Great Britain to use all her powers—"a supreme effort"—in order to achieve a final solution of the colonial problem before it is too late. He mentions that the clauses of the Versailles Treaty itself envisaged a revision, without, however, recommending for this particular purpose the application of Article 19.⁷ He says it is necessary to make a serious attempt to find for Germany a suitable field for colonial activity. The article hints at the possibility of such an attempt by a joint action of three or four great colonial Powers who possess territories in Africa bordering on one another.

⁴ See the preceding document, footnote 3.

⁵ For these statements, see *Parl. Deb., H. of C.*, vol. 320, cols. 815-816, and vol. 321, col. 211.

⁶ On April 27, 1936, the British Prime Minister assured the House of Commons that the Government "in the event of any question arising regarding the future status of mandated territories, would not commit themselves to any settlement of the problems at issue without giving the fullest opportunity for discussion in the House" (see *Parl. Deb., H. of C.*, vol. 311, cols. 552-553).

⁷ This article reads: "The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration, by Members of the League, of Treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

Whether these views correspond in any way to those of official British circles is not known to us, but it would doubtless be safe to assume that the British Government would only be prepared to consider our claim within the framework of a more general political discussion.

A special line is being followed by the Government of the Union of South Africa even in public pronouncements. They appear to be of the opinion that, by satisfying our claim within the compass of a territorial rearrangement in Central Africa, they can stabilize the situation in South Africa in which they are interested in view of their plans for hegemony in the southern half of the Continent. They would accordingly be the first to support an initiation of discussions on colonial questions by all Mandatory Powers.

I request you to inform official circles where you are accredited of our views when opportunity occurs, to pay attention to the treatment of the problem in the local press, and, where an opportunity presents itself, to influence the press in our favour.

Material for general information on the colonial question has been sent repeatedly to all recipients of this despatch and will be sent to them in future in increasing quantities (also in the English and French languages).

The Embassies in London, Paris, Tokyo, the Legations in Brussels and Pretoria, the Consulate General in Sydney and the Consulate in Wellington are receiving copies [of this despatch].

MACKENSEN

(E)

GERMANY AND THE FAR EAST

(i)

8133/E582093-94

The Japanese Military Attaché to Colonel General Göring¹

BERLIN, October 21, 1937.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: May I express my most cordial thanks for the kindness shown to me in our conversation at Karinhall.² It was of the greatest importance for me to learn from Your Excellency's words that our views completely coincide, and particularly to note the kind interest that you display towards my Fatherland.

I have accepted with special thanks in the name of my Army your offer to place 20 aircraft, He 111, at our disposal by the end of January, to be followed by 10 more in February. I have at once telegraphed this offer to my country; my General Staff know its great value. As you know, we have meanwhile unfortunately been compelled, in view of the military and political situation, to order a large number of bombers from Italy.³ I have at once, however, taken the opportunity of reporting fully to my country this special kindness that your Excellency is prepared to show to my Army and to my Fatherland.

I hope that the decision being taken in Tokyo, from the standpoint of friendly German-Japanese cooperation especially, will be in the affirmative. I will inform Your Excellency as soon as I receive an answer.

¹ This document comes from a file kept by Göring's Staff Office [*Stabsamt*], entitled: *Reports on Foreign Countries 1933-1939*.

² The words "conversation in Karinhall" are underlined in red pencil. Written against them, also in red pencil, is: "October 18, 1937." According to vol. 1 of this Series, document No. 499, on Oct. 18 Göring gave instructions for all deliveries to China to be stopped by order of the Führer; see also in that volume, documents Nos. 500 and 504. No other material on this conversation has been found.

³ See also the *Ciano Diaries*, entry of Oct. 7, 1937.

It gives me special pleasure to be able to inform Your Excellency that I have received telegrams from my Army today referring to German-Japanese co-operation in China. Our Army takes the view that Japanese policy in China, by carefully protecting all German rights and interests, should lead to close economic cooperation between our two countries. Beyond that, our Army desires also to further and expand as far as possible economic relations between Japan and Manchukuo on the one hand and Germany on the other.

I hope that through Your Excellency's kind support it will prove possible to turn this good will of ours into practical results satisfactory to both sides.

I remain, with renewed cordial thanks,

Yours, etc.,

OSHIMA
Major General

(ii)

145/81151

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in China [Hankow]

No. [103] of [May 13].¹

BERLIN, May [13], 1938 [12:20 p.m.].¹

Pol. VIII [919 II].¹

Following the Führer's declaration of his readiness² to recognise Manchukuo, a German-Manchukuo Treaty was signed today,³ which provides for the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations and later the opening of negotiations for a consular, commercial and navigation agreement. By this Treaty the recognition of Manchukuo is formally ratified. The Treaty has no further significance.

WOERMANN

¹ Supplied from the register of telegrams despatched and received, under the list of telegrams to Nanking. Since November 1937, when the Chinese National Government moved to Chungking, the German Embassy was no longer at Nanking but at Hankow, where the Chinese Foreign Ministry had established a branch office for foreign diplomatic representation.

² In his speech to the Reichstag on Feb. 20, 1938. See Baynes: *Hitler's Speeches*, vol. II, pp. 1376-1409. See also vol. I of this Series, document No. 570.

³ The Treaty was actually signed on May 12; for the text see *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1938, Pt. II, pp. 286-287.

(F)

GERMAN FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR RACIAL GERMANS ABROAD (VEREINIGTE FINANZKONTORE)

(i)

2508/519482-95

The Foreign Ministry to the Finance Ministry

BERLIN, December 9, 1937.

Kult. B 63-01. 6/12.

Drafting Officer: Counsellor Schwager.¹

Subject: Delimitation of the areas to be relieved by credits in aid within the sphere of the work of the Vereinigte Finanzkontore.²

¹ Head of Kult. B, that division of the Cultural Policy Department dealing with economic questions concerning German national communities abroad [*Volkstum*].

² A Government controlled agency (previously named Ossa Vermittlungs und Handelsgesellschaft and also operating under the cover name Excelsior G.m.b.H.) had been founded in 1926 and was engaged in financing and promoting German economic interests in the frontier areas and in territories with German minorities, especially in the so-called "ceded territories", i.e., ceded under the Treaty of Versailles. It was supervised by the Foreign Ministry through the Cultural Policy Department (Kult. B). For its activities in Austria, see vol. I of this Series, documents Nos. 170 and 175; in Poland and Denmark, vol. V, documents Nos. 85 and 462.

For some considerable time there has been a fundamental divergence of views between the Finance Ministry and the Foreign Ministry on the question of further relief by credits for those German communities [*Deutschtum*] not situated in frontier territories or lands detached from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles; in the interests of prompt settlement of current commitments, this divergence of opinion should be removed as soon as possible.³

The Foreign Ministry's view has been expressed both orally and in writing on different occasions and can be epitomized as follows:

The Foreign Ministry agrees with the Finance Ministry that aid by credits for the national communities [*Volkstum*] outside the frontier territories, and particularly for German national groups in more distant localities should, in view of the foreign currency position of the Reich, remain limited to what is most necessary and in general to maintaining existing indispensable organizations. The Reich Finance Ministry is also aware that the Foreign Ministry systematically and constantly promotes the development and strengthening of national [*völkisch*] powers of resistance through *self help*, and furthers all measures designed to strengthen and enlarge the economic foundation of German communities [*Deutschtum*] by means which save foreign exchange (professional and specialist training in Germany of *Volksdeutsche*, employing *Volksdeutsch* organizations for trade with Germany, establishing organizations for vocational advice, and the like). It does not, however, seem advisable to leave these isolated German communities [*Deutschtum*] to their own devices at a time when they are subjected to the strongest pressure from outside; especially in the economic sphere, whilst their powers of resistance are weakened by inevitable disagreements amongst themselves. To do so would run counter both to the principles of National Socialist leadership of people and State and to the aims of our foreign policy.

The Foreign Ministry therefore holds that, in so far as self help in these territories may be insufficient, further credits in aid should be afforded as far as possible, either to prevent loss of land and failures, or, in special cases, to revive economic activities by fresh credits, or to provide the younger German generation with the means of acquiring land.

So far as concerns the further question as to whether the activities of the Vereinigte Finanzkontore should perhaps be restricted to the German community in frontier territories, and measures of assistance for the other territories be reserved for special applications for appropriations by the Foreign Ministry, the latter supports the continuance of the present arrangements, which have proved successful in practice. Since in the Ossa concern, which, if possible, is again to receive a proper budget for the financial year 1938, a useful organization has been built up with trained and experienced personnel in all fields, every practical consideration supports its further use within its previous scope. When special applications are made by the Foreign Ministry, it might also be difficult for the Finance Ministry to make available in good time, from special budgetary funds, the sums required for essential assistance.

³ An unsigned memorandum of Nov. 12, 1937, (2508/519496-98) outlined the Finance Ministry's standpoint as follows: The Vereinigte Finanzkontore (VFK) had only been set up to deal with the "ceded territories" and the other areas, now receiving assistance, had been subsequently included in the area of the VFK's operations contrary to the original departmental agreement governing its operations. The memorandum further stated that the Cultural Policy Department could find no record of an agreement of this kind; the difference of opinion had not hitherto become acute as the Finance Ministry, in practice, had always made sufficient funds available for the "non-ceded territories" too; the Finance Ministry had recently become much more rigid and had turned down various projects not concerned with the "ceded territories"; consequently, some decision, reached through a conference of heads of departments, was essential; the question of a new budget for the VFK would also have to be discussed.

The Foreign Ministry would be grateful for an early expression of views on the principles involved. It is considered necessary here for new directives, adapted to the changed conditions, to be laid down for the relief work, and this, together with the question of making fresh means available, and of drawing up a new budget for the Vereinigte Finanzkontore, should be put in hand without delay after questions of principle have been cleared up.

By order:
PRÜFER⁴

⁴ Director of the Personnel and Budget Department [Pers.].

(ii)

2508/519244-52

Memorandum by an Official of the Cultural Policy Department

BERLIN, December 23, 1937.
e.o. Kult. B 63-01 23/12.1.

*Financing the operations of the Vereinigte Finanzkontore for 1938
and the following years*

In order to ascertain the views of the VFK on the continuance of the relief work for 1938 and the following years, a meeting took place on the 21st of this month in the office of the Director of the Cultural Policy Department.

In addition to the Director of the Cultural Policy Department and the competent official [Schwager], the following were present:

From the Foreign Ministry:	Consul General Lorenz (Kult. A)
	Senior Counsellor Schellert (Personnel and Budget)
	Counsellor Rieger (Pers. R)
from the Vereinigte Finanzkontore:	Regierungsrat (retired) Dr. Krahmer-Möllenberg
	Dr. Werner

After exhaustion of the funds made available from the War Burdens Fund [*Kriegslastenfonds*]¹—the latest being RM 9.6 million per annum in a 5-year plan—the VFK has received no new funds whatever since April 1, 1936. The Finance Ministry takes the view that, considering the actual curtailment of relief work imposed by the shortage of foreign currency, the VFK should first use up their reserves before new funds for continuing the restricted relief work, or even for new purposes, can be made available.

As against this, the VFK holds the view that, through the refusal of assistance in current cash payments during the last few years, there is a particularly grave danger of crises occurring at any time in the offices abroad which would have calamitous effects, and that it is essential that the VFK receive *larger* and immediately available funds and reserves in foreign currency. It was convincingly argued that the situation is tense in a variety of organizations with wide ramifications; that not only economic but also political dangers threaten since it is throughout a question of German community [*Deutschum*] organizations; that developments can by no means be foreseen and that in a serious crisis it is often a matter of hours during which prompt and sufficient credit assistance might stop a "run" and prevent loss of confidence. Experience has shown, however, that in such an emergency it is impossible to obtain, with the requisite

¹ A fund from which payments were made to German nationals who had suffered losses as a result of the First World War.

speed, funds from the Finance Ministry, and the foreign currency required from the Exchange Office. A comparatively large and immediately available reserve of foreign currency is therefore absolutely essential, a fact also fully understood so far by the Reichsbank, which receives the monthly currency statements.

The available funds for the end of November were given by the VFK as RM 4,976,000. The following can be taken as commitments:

Credits promised	RM 1,752,000
Liquid reserves for the Agricultural Bank in Danzig ²	RM 1,230,000
	<hr/> RM 2,982,000 <hr/>

The remainder of about RM 2 million, of which 1.5 millions are in foreign currency, should, in the opinion of the VFK, be kept as a minimum emergency reserve.

The competent official of the Foreign Ministry drew special attention to the fact that the VFK also disposed of an income from refunds and interest amounting to about RM 1 million each current year, the larger part of which was paid in foreign currency, mostly however only usable in the country of origin.

Regierungsrat Krahmer-Möllenberg here put forward the urgent duties to be performed in the next few years:

1. Cooperative Societies

Poland

a) *Pommerellen*. Under Polish pressure, it will no longer be possible to delay the detachment from Danzig of the Raiffeisen Credit cooperatives, dependent on the Raiffeisen Bank of Danzig,³ and the Commodity Cooperatives, which are under the care of the *Grosshandel*⁴ of Danzig. The separation and re-establishment of the organizations to cover the most urgent short, and middle-term, normal credit requirements of the German farmers in Pommerellen will presumably require larger funds, the exact amounts of which cannot yet be foreseen. Otherwise the German farmers must become dependent on the Polish credit and commodity cooperatives.

b) *Poznań*. The widely ramified "Dr. Swart" cooperative organization⁵ (about 600 cooperative societies) will shortly need cash assistance on a larger scale. The reduction of the large organization, which is in itself expedient, cannot be undertaken at present on account of the considerable costs of winding up.

Also the very desirable reduction of interest from 9-10 per cent to about 7 per cent on the last grant can only be made possible with the financial assistance of the VFK.

² A Danzig banking institute, backed since 1925 by the Reich Finance Ministry through "Ossa", providing credits for farmers in Pommerellen and Poznań.

³ The name "Raiffeisen" indicates that these were modelled on, or at one time formed part of, a system of cooperative land banks founded in Germany during the nineteenth century by a Herr Raiffeisen. The Raiffeisen Bank of Danzig had received financial backing from "Ossa" and the Bank of Danzig.

⁴ Presumably an abbreviation for the Landwirtschaftliche Grosshandelsgesellschaft, Danzig, a parent organization of numerous commodity cooperatives in Danzig and Pommerellen.

⁵ An organization of agricultural cooperatives of the German minority in Poznań. The banking institute was the Landesgenossenschaftsbank in Poznań under the direction of a Dr. Swart, director of the League of German Cooperatives in Poland.

2. *Alleviation of the consequences of the Agrarian Reform*⁶

On the principles of November 5,⁷ the Poles should be induced, contrary to their previous practice, to consider German applications also in the parcelling out of German estates, especially in order to alleviate the hopeless plight of the younger generation of Germans. Any consideration shown by the Poles would be of no avail, however, if the German applicants could not be placed in a position by the grant of loans to take advantage of these opportunities. As the lots are handed over completely unencumbered, it is a matter of granting ordinary loans secured as first charges on real estate, but these loans, however, cannot be granted by the German credit institutes in Poland unless they can be covered by the VFK.

As voluntary parcelling offers better prospects for German applicants, the credit institutes should also be placed in a position to make voluntary parcelling possible by advances on the cost.

3. *Leasehold and agricultural settlers' farms and revalued mortgages*

The possibility of a calling-in of the capital invested in the farms [*Rentenkapital*] and of the revalued mortgages from 1937 onwards creates a new danger to German landownership, the extent of which cannot at present be established. It is also not certain whether the Polish Government even know of these possibilities, so that the question should not be mentioned for the time being.

4. *Loans secured on real estate*

In spite of a cessation in principle of the granting of loans secured on real estate, it will not be completely possible to avoid, in special individual cases, granting fresh loans on real estate in order to prevent the loss of valuable land-holdings of importance to the German community.

5. *Loans for redemption of dividend inheritances*

Redemption of estates divided between co-heirs should again be made possible through loans. A considerable part can be paid in the Reich in Reichsmark.

Upper Silesia

A considerable liquidation of the cooperative system will be unavoidable in Upper Silesia; its operation will however demand considerable funds if the individual members are not to be ruined by claims on their guarantees. The losses of the cooperative societies are estimated at about 625,000 Zloty.

Memel

In view of the considerable fluidity of the Lithuanian credit institutes and their political activity, it is an essential condition for maintaining the resistance of the German community that the German credit system should be freed from Lithuanian bondage, and put in a financial position to cover the most urgent normal agricultural credit requirements.

For reconstructing the Raiffeisen Bank or merging it with the Agricultural

⁶ i.e., the breaking up of large estates into smallholdings in accordance with the Polish laws of Sept. 1, 1919, and Dec. 28, 1925.

⁷ i.e., the German-Polish Minorities Declaration of Nov. 5, 1937; see vol. v of this Series, document No. 18.

District [*Landschafts*] Bank, further considerable funds will be needed to achieve the prescribed share capital of 2 million Litass.

North Schleswig

In North Schleswig, in the struggle for land in the face of the active advance of Danish capital, the Vogelgesang Credit Institute⁸ has for years, to some extent held the position with great difficulty and without much in the way of new funds. The shortage of the Institute's liquid funds, however, no longer permits of the saving of threatened properties in need of substantial loans. A moderate contribution to strengthen its liquid resources will shortly be necessary again.

Eupen-Malmédy

The position of the Central Credit Institute⁹ is quite satisfactory, but here, too, moderate funds must be held ready for possible support.

Baltic States

Latvia and Estonia. In these States, by means of moderate grants of loans (RM 200-300,000 for both), extraordinarily favourable results have been achieved in the last few years, through the placing of new settlers, tenants, securing of possession, etc. Special attention was called to the admirable administration and accountancy of the loans. It is all the more necessary to continue these operations as it is to be expected that, in consequence of Government measures, the present possibilities will shortly come to an end.

Lithuania

The German community in Greater Lithuania has not been subsidized for the last few years because of previous unfortunate experiences, for the German national community there had had to be regarded as unsound and its leaders as unreliable. Latterly this has changed, and it does not seem justifiable to treat the Germans ceded to Lithuania differently from those in Latvia and Estonia.

The amounts in question here, too, can only be modest, and foreign currency in cash is no more required than in Latvia and Estonia.

Czechoslovakia

Now that the Credit Institute for Germans [*Kreditanstalt der Deutschen*] in Prague¹⁰ is developing well and has been set in order at great financial sacrifice to the Reich, it should be in a position to meet the normal credit requirements of the German community. Beyond this, credit and assistance operations of a primarily political character are not within the competence of the VFK.

Austria

The operations of credits during the past few years have been predominantly governed by political considerations and are outside the competence of the VFK.¹¹

⁸ The "Kreditanstalt Vogelgesang". For an account of its activities, see vol. v of this Series, document No. 462.

⁹ This institution has not been more closely identified.

¹⁰ The main Sudeten German banking institute, a cooperative bank, founded in 1911 by the "League of Germans in Bohemia".

¹¹ See immediately preceding document.

Yugoslavia

The well-run German credit and commodity cooperatives in Yugoslavia can on the whole be left to self-help, having been thoroughly prepared for this by previous loans. Further, the competent official of the Foreign Ministry has stated that there is a special reserve of RM 100,000 still available here.

Hungary

The political and legal conditions attaching to cooperatives in Hungary are such that the *Volksdeutsch* enterprises cannot be assisted on a cooperative basis. Different forms of organization and other possibilities are therefore being tried. In view of the present state and prospects of German-Hungarian relations, financial support can only be considered within the limits of what is possible and expedient, and modest funds must be made available for the purpose. (The question of short-term commodity credits to further an exchange of goods between *Volksdeutsch* organizations and the Reich, which has just been put forward by the Hungarians, does not appear to be ripe for discussion and was therefore not enlarged upon.)

Rumania

In Rumania, the *Volksdeutsch* banking system has been rescued in the past by a large and costly assistance operation. The Banat Bank Union¹² is developing well, the Hermannstadt General Savings Bank¹³ satisfactorily. The VFK had completely withdrawn from the latter in the past year, making one final grant. Resulting from these operations, there are considerable non-transferable balances in Rumania which, owing to an easing in the foreign currency regulations recently, can now be more easily drawn upon there.

A number of applications from Rumania are to hand.¹⁴ First, there is the possibility of an economic and profitable investment of the available funds in long-term loans to German peasants who want to enlarge their holdings, contributing from their own resources. The Banat Bank Union is already dealing with risk-free commodity credits for furthering *Volksdeutsch* commodity exports. Further there is an application from the head of the German community [*Volks-gemeinschaft*] for the grant of a small loan free of interest to support the *Volksdeutsch* Transylvanian Building Society, which by its nature is less of a profitable capital investment than the support of an institution which, in the VFK's view, is salutary for the German community. The applications from Rumania still need thorough examination.

Financing the Operations

In the discussion on the necessary reserves and the total financial requirements of the VFK for the continuance of its work, Regierungsrat Krahmer-Möllenberg stated that it was virtually impossible to give even rough figures. As against this, the Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department emphasized that, leaving aside, of course, unpredictable events, there must be certain standards based on experience, which must apply even to the tasks now at hand, and that it was impossible to manage without estimates in figures. Under reserve of detailed estimates, Regierungsrat Krahmer-Möllenberg said that it might be

¹² The banking unit of the union of *Volksdeutsch* Agricultural Cooperatives in Timişoara, founded 1929.

¹³ The main *Volksdeutsch* bank in Transylvania.

¹⁴ No record has been found.

assumed that an additional RM 5 million, if not committed as to time, project or territory, would be barely sufficient for three years.¹⁵

When the competent Foreign Ministry official asked whether, in effect, a grant of new funds would make their foreign currency reserves more easily disposable in larger amounts, Regierungsrat Krahmer-Möllenberg gave a negative reply. It was true that if the financial situation were alleviated by new Reichsmark funds for continuing the work there would be some possibility of using up reserves of foreign currency (e.g., in Rumania), or creating new resources, to a limited extent, through private clearing deals (e.g., in the Baltic States), but in the main foreign currency must be made available gradually for the continuance of the work or be paid later when it had been advanced.

Thereupon the Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department stated that a project for the next few years which would call for *fresh* foreign currency to any great extent would be unrealizable and could not be discussed in view of the known shortage of foreign currency.

In the course of further discussion it emerged, however, that continuation of work on a limited scale might after all be possible through fresh Reichsmark resources, if use were made of the possibilities of transfer still available, and if the previous foreign currency grant (in 1937 about $\frac{1}{2}$ million foreign currency) were maintained and claims in Germany were redeemed.

Counsellor Rieger recommended that the VFK should prepare for the future discussions another statement of all transfer possibilities.

The discussions with the Reich Finance Ministry are to take place in the first half of January.¹⁶ By then, the VFK should prepare the appropriate estimates for the several relief areas and ascertain the transfer possibilities.¹⁷ In the Foreign Ministry, the views of the departments concerned on the VFK's programme outlined above, which in existing circumstances must be considered the maximum programme, will meanwhile be obtained.¹⁸

SCHWAGER

¹⁵ In a memorandum of Dec. 11 (2508/519782-84) Schwager recorded a discussion with Krahmer-Möllenberg along these lines.

¹⁶ According to a memorandum (2508/519253-56) by Schwager, a conference took place on Jan. 12 between representatives of the VFK, the Foreign Ministry and the Finance Ministry, when it was decided to submit the Foreign Ministry's case as set out in document No. F (i) above to the Finance Minister and a brief to the Foreign Minister for a conference with him. A brief (2508/519469-70) was submitted to the Foreign Minister by Schwager on Jan. 17.

¹⁷ On Jan. 20, the VFK submitted a document summarizing their programme for 1938 (2508/519451-66) to the Finance and Foreign Ministries, which reproduces in greater detail the outline of the VFK's activities given above. On Jan. 26, the VFK also submitted to the Foreign Ministry (2508/519367-70) summaries of their income and expenditure for 1936 and 1937. There has also been found an unsigned memorandum prepared in the Foreign Ministry bearing a file number dating it Jan. 21, 1938 (2508/519376-80), which gives statistics of subsidies and advances made to credit cooperatives and *Volksbanken* from 1933 to 1937 and analyses the sums necessary for each area in 1938.

¹⁸ A memorandum by Schwager of Jan. 8, 1938 (2508/519228-30) records a conference between the relevant sections of the Foreign Ministry on Jan. 7 in which it was decided that means ought to be provided to support the VFK's activities in the "non-ceded territories".

(iii)

2508/519364-66

Memorandum by an Official of the Cultural Policy Department

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, January 28, 1938.

Drafting Officer: Counsellor Schwager

e.o. Kult. B 63-40 28/1.

(now 63-01 28/1.)

Subject: Financing expenditure for *Volksdeutsch* economic purposes from the secret funds of the Foreign Ministry.

Within division Kult. B (economic credits) as well as in other divisions it frequently happens that unavoidable subsidies for the urgent economic needs of the German community abroad have to be made, for which the Foreign Ministry has no budget resources at its disposal.¹

Within division Kult. B a considerable part of this expenditure, particularly for the preservation of indispensable economic organizations, previously came within the scope of the Ossa relief operations and was covered from their budget, while a smaller part was carried by the political funds of the Foreign Ministry. In the last few years the Finance Ministry has pressed more and more for restricting the Ossa funds purely to providing credits. Therefore, in spite of the greatest economy, these tasks became an ever greater burden on the political funds of the Foreign Ministry.

The competent official of Kult. B, who from practical considerations and for the better management of funds, has always advocated making the Ossa funds more readily available for such essential projects too, has, in the present discussions with the Finance Ministry, supported a return to the previous practice.

Against this the Finance Ministry take the view on principle and over and above the competence of division Kult. B, that all expenditure for *Volksdeutsch* economy which goes beyond economically justifiable credits, should, as being political, be financed from the political secret funds of the Foreign Ministry. The competent official of division Kult. B has always opposed this view on the grounds that these expenditures, though political in origin—as are also, in the last analysis, the credits—nevertheless, in that they are measures of economic assistance, go beyond the purposes for which the political funds are designed and that they constitute too constant and heavy a drain on the funds, in view of the extent and unpredictability of the claims.

During the recent discussions² Ministerialrat Burmeister (Finance Ministry) repeatedly said that for individual applications of this sort, whether from Kult. B or other divisions, the Finance Ministry had no extraordinary funds available, but that an increase in the Foreign Ministry's budget might be considered.

As this question exceeds the competence of Kult. B, the official concerned refrained from expressing an opinion.

SCHWAGER

¹ Typed marginal note: "Examples: Within the competence of division Kult. B. Subsidies for the prevention of intolerable compulsory auctions, economically unjustifiable credits for the preservation of particularly important undertakings (e.g., the German hostels on the Courland Nehrung), support of the Memel fishermen, personal credits to politically persecuted businessmen (chemists and hotelkeepers in Poland), subsidies to cover deficits in indispensable professional advisory associations, accountant's offices, cooperative auditing associations, and the like."

"In other divisions: Subsidies to organizations, and the like, within the sphere of economic assistance activities (e.g., taking up of quotas, customs remissions, etc.), the Austrian assistance operation, conversion of the railway loan to the city of Memel, and the like."

² No record has been found.

(iv)

2508/519448-50

Memorandum by an Official of the Cultural Policy Department

Drafting Officer: Counsellor Schwager

BERLIN, January 28, 1938.
e.o. Kult. B 63-01 28/1.4.

Subject: The future work of "Excelsior" and its financing.

Ministerialrat Burmeister called on me today to inform me of the result of his report to the Finance Minister. With reference to further relief for the ceded and non-ceded territories, the Finance Minister has decided that the Finance Ministry will take the view in principle that the available Excelsior funds, which cannot be increased in the foreseeable future, should primarily be used for the ceded territories; but that the Finance Ministry would raise no objection to continuing relief for the non-ceded territories in urgent cases. The urgency must, however, be proved in each case. The Finance Ministry further agrees that a permanent reserve of between two and three million RM should be held available by Excelsior, the precise sum remaining to be fixed. It must be insisted that the available funds and the accruing interest and repayments should no longer be used separately but be combined, that the Excelsior should in general continue the relief work with the annually accruing interest and repayments, and that only in cases of emergency should the remaining funds be used.

The Austrian operation is to be continued to the extent envisaged and, contrary to the views held by the Foreign Ministry, is to be financed from Excelsior funds, as the Finance Ministry is not in a position to make fresh funds available over and above the RM 350,000 already provided.¹

The competent official of Kult. B again asserted his objections to mixing up the predominantly political Austrian operation with the purely economic relief work of Excelsior, as these were not only objections of principle, but also arose from the fear that the Excelsior reserves would be seriously encroached upon by some political operation, with economically incalculable consequences. He again advocated a clear-cut separation between such political operations and the Excelsior's relief work; but at least the amounts and periods for which the Excelsior was to be responsible should be clearly defined. As Ministerialrat Burmeister maintained that the Foreign Ministry had itself described the Austrian operation as credit operation of an economic character,² no agreement was reached.

¹ Typewritten marginal note: "According to notes made by Ministerialrat Burmeister the position of the Austrian operation is as follows:—

	RM
Funds allocated by the Finance Ministry	350,000
Provisionally by Excelsior	1,670,000
Total	2,020,000
Out of these proposed funds	
Credits approved	1,235,000
of which have been paid out	822,000
still to be paid	393,000
in hand	785,000

[sic]

As the operation is proceeding very slowly, it will certainly not exceed the appropriations in the financial year 1938." For the Finance Ministry's previous view that the "Austrian operation" was not an exclusively economic measure, see vol. I of this Series, document No. 175. Schwager, in reporting a conversation of Jan. 10 with Burmeister, had stated that the latter had "surprisingly" taken the opposite standpoint that this scheme was "of a predominantly economic character and could be financed from Excelsior funds" (2058/519371-75).

² Marginal note in Schwager's (?) handwriting: "This appears to have actually been stated in a letter, Pol. IV, in which Kult. B had no part; in a later note from the Foreign Ministry the opposite was then stated."

A communication in writing from the Finance Ministry must first be awaited in order to ascertain how far the Foreign Ministry can give its unreserved consent and where it must make reservations, as in the Austrian operation. Then a joint discussion should be held soon between the departments concerned and the Excelsior for the purpose of drawing up a programme of work, fixing the amounts of the reserves and laying down general working principles.

SCHWAGER

(v)

2508/519445-47

*The Vereinigte Finanzkontore to the Foreign Ministry and the
Finance Ministry*

BERLIN, April 13, 1938.

Received April 14.

Kult. B 63-01.

With reference to Point 1 of the Directors' Meeting of February 9, 1938,¹ we beg to enclose herewith the draft for directives to govern the conduct of business of the Vereinigte Finanzkontore in its relations with Government Departments.

We would be grateful for your observations on our proposals.²

Vereinigte Finanzkontore G.m.b.H.

KRAHMER-MÖLLENBERG
WERNER

[Enclosure]

Directives for the conduct of business of the
Vereinigte Finanzkontore G.m.b.H.

1. The management of the Vereinigte Finanzkontore G.m.b.H. is entitled to continue the current relief work without the previous approval of Government Departments. Current relief work includes:—

- (a) Administration of existing credits and holdings.
- (b) Normal adjustment of terms of credit, especially rates of interest and amortisation instalments, to the economic situation, as well as the granting of remissions on existing credits insofar as transference to reserve funds and adjustments have already been provided in respect of them.
- (c) Continuation of credit operations already begun, in particular by the increase of credits up to the limits previously operative.
- (d) Granting subsidies to German organizations abroad to the previous extent.

2. Where, within the range of current relief work, new important questions of principle arise, as well as for new undertakings, the management of the Vereinigte Finanzkontore is obliged to obtain the prior approval of the representatives of the Government Departments. The new undertakings include:

- (a) Granting credits to borrowers who have not previously received any credits.
- (b) Granting credits to previous borrowers, when the credits are for new purposes.
- (c) Acquisition of new holdings.

3. Measures taken independently by the management of the Vereinigte Finanzkontore G.m.b.H. under paragraph 1, shall be subsequently reported to the Departments at least twice during the business year.

¹ No record has been found.

² In a memorandum of Apr. 28, 1938 (2508/519444), Schwager recorded that the Foreign Ministry had no objection to the draft.

4. Where, in measures taken independently by the management of the Vereinigte Finanzkontore G.m.b.H., the management has reason to expect political repercussions or think them possible, the Foreign Ministry is to be consulted.

(vi)

2508/519440-43

Memorandum by an Official of the Cultural Policy Department

BERLIN, August 11, 1939.

e.o. K[ult]. B 63-01.

Report on the work and administrative practices of the Excelsior.¹

The basis for the work of the Excelsior is the Cabinet decision of March 31, 1926 (see Enclosure 1), which resulted in its foundation, and in accordance with which Excelsior has to administer the funds approved and appropriated by this decision in cooperation with and supervised by a parliamentary board of control. The same definition of the work of Ossa is given in a directive by the Minister of Finance of October 28, 1938 (see Enclosure 2), whereby Ossa is required to draw up a detailed plan for expenditure and finance *which is to be submitted to the parliamentary board for approval*, and according to which Ossa has then to conduct its transactions.

The position of the Foreign Ministry regarding Ossa is shown in a communication from the Foreign Ministry to Ossa dated May 16, 1929 (see Enclosure 3), according to which the Foreign Ministry, as the Department responsible for defining the political objectives and corresponding application of funds made available by the financial authorities, has *ex officio* a seat and vote in the committees of control.

It is not clear from the reports on meetings available in the files whether voting took place, or, if so, what weight the votes carried. It is equally unclear from the files whether, in approving any project of Ossa, a vote had to be taken in the parliamentary board.

Since the abolition of the parliamentary board, approval for the use of funds made available to Ossa within an agreed compass rests solely with the departments. As to the question of their authority, it must be admitted that the activities of Ossa, in view of their economic character and financial dependence on Reich funds, are subject to supervision by the R[eich] F[inance] M[inistry]. However, as Ossa's activities are exclusively of the nature of foreign policy and consequently fall primarily within the sphere of the Foreign Ministry, the final decision on the value and expediency of Ossa's projects should likewise rest primarily with the Foreign Ministry.

A careful study of the files has shown that the decisions on the use of Excelsior funds rest jointly with the departments and the Party offices. It is in the nature of things that the agencies entrusted with fostering the interests of the national communities, i.e., the V[olks-]D[eutsche] M[itte]l[stelle], Foreign Ministry, and Excelsior, will as a rule be unanimous in their views, whereas the Finance Ministry, as representing a purely fiscal standpoint, will sometimes take a different view.

The previous practice must therefore be followed, that agreement be reached between the Foreign Ministry and the Finance Ministry before the Excelsior meetings, as was already the case over the last meeting on August 9.²

Herewith submitted for information to Minister von Twardowski.³

To be filed.

GROSSKOPF⁴

¹ Cover name for Vereinigte Finanzkontore (previously Ossa); see document No. (i) in this section, footnote 2.

² No record has been found.

³ Handwritten marginal note: "Agreed. v. T[wardowski]."

⁴ Consul General Grosskopf, Head of Kult. H., which dealt with the administration of funds at the department's disposal.

[Enclosure 1]

Copy

IV Po[land] 12630/Politik 25 B. No. 1 Bd.8/December 24, 1926

Submission to the Cabinet on the expansion of the credit operations for the German national communities in European countries outside Germany.

"By a decision of the Reich Cabinet of March 31 of this year, for the furthering of German economic interests in the frontier and German minority areas, especially in the territories lost through the Peace of Versailles, thirty million Reichsmark have been made available, which will be administered by the newly founded Ossa G.m.b.H. in collaboration with and supervised by a parliamentary board of control . . ."

[Enclosure 2]

Extract

Directive of the Finance Ministry on the reorganization of Ossa.

IV a Poland, Pol. 25 B.1 Bd.14/IV Allg.76 of October 28, 1928

The Reich Minister of Finance

BERLIN, Oct. 28, 1928.

I 20 477

"In future, a detailed plan of expenditure and finance is to be drawn up for each year, which is to be submitted to the parliamentary board for approval, and according to which Ossa has then to conduct its transactions. . . .

HILFERDING"

[Enclosure 3]

Copy

IV a Poland, Pol. 25 B. 1 16

Copy (IV B. 223)

BERLIN, May 16, 1929.

"... The duty of Ossa is to administer the funds made available by Reich and State for purposes of national policy, jointly with the competent authorities and the parliamentary board. In order to ensure this cooperation, committees of control have been assigned to Ossa and its affiliated companies. As the Department responsible for defining the political objectives and the corresponding application of the funds made available by the financial authorities, the Foreign Ministry has *ex officio* a seat and vote in these committees of control, which, of course, represent only a further development of the inter-departmental conferences previously convened *on the initiative of the Foreign Ministry*. The Foreign Ministry must therefore reserve to itself in each case the decision as to which of its officials it will entrust with the work of cooperating with the Ossa organization and with the exercise of its right to vote on decisions in committees of control.

By order:

V. MOLTKE"⁵

⁵ Senior Counsellor and Deputy Director of Department IV (Eastern Europe, Scandinavia, East Asia) of the Foreign Ministry 1928-1931; later Ambassador in Poland.

(G)

GERMAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

(i)

5644/H000986-91

*Agreement on Trade and Payments between the German Government and the
Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics of March 1, 1938*

Negotiations have taken place between the German Government and the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics on the regulation of mutual trade and payments for the year 1938,¹ which have led to an extension of the German-Soviet Commercial Treaty of December 24, 1936² to December 31, 1938, in the following terms:

Article I

1. The German Government undertake to make possible the import of Soviet goods into Germany to the maximum value of Germany's imports from the U.S.S.R. in the years 1934 or 1935.

2. The German Government further express their readiness to consider favourably applications by the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany for raising the values hereby laid down for the import of the various goods.

3. The German Government will see that the authorities responsible for the exercise of the foreign exchange control grant without delay the requisite foreign exchange permits within the limits of the above-mentioned values.

4. The goods referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article include only those which are directly imported into Germany by the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany, or by the Exporting Organizations of the U.S.S.R., and for which a special certificate has been issued by the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany. Goods originating in Afghanistan, Mongolia, North and West China, which are usually re-exported to Germany by the Soviet Trade Organizations, are to be afforded the same treatment as Soviet goods.

Article II

1. The two Contracting Parties will endeavour to increase mutual trade to the greatest possible extent.

2. The amounts of Reichsmark accruing from Soviet exports to Germany in the year 1938 will be used for the purposes set out in Articles III and IV; these amounts must be disposed of by February 28, 1939.

Payments for deliveries definitely contracted for by December 31, 1938, as well as payments for incidental expenses directly connected with these transactions, may also be made after February 28, 1939, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

¹ For the German-Soviet economic negotiations preceding this Agreement, see vol. I of this Series, documents Nos. 613 and 619. This Agreement was extended to December 31, 1939, by an exchange of letters dated December 19, 1938 (3781/E041874-75), between Schnurre, who had by then become Chairman of the German Delegation, and Skossyrev, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Trade Delegation. See also vol. IV of this Series, document No. 481.

² Not printed (5644/H001028-40); this amended and extended to December 31, 1937, the German-Soviet Agreement on Trade and Payments for 1936, signed in Berlin on April 29, 1936 (5644/H001094-118).

Article III

1. The total proceeds of the sale of Soviet goods in Germany effected up to December 31, 1938, as well as all further amounts of Reichsmark arising from previous commercial transactions, or from other services outside the commercial transactions, and payable by German authorities, firms or private individuals to the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany, the State Bank of the U.S.S.R., or to Soviet Economic Organizations, will be paid in Reichsmark into special accounts; payments due in 1938 to the U.S.S.R. by the German Potash Syndicate, Ltd., on the basis of the International Potash Convention, will similarly be paid in Reichsmark into special accounts.

2. These special accounts may be held with the following foreign exchange banks:

- (a) Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, Berlin.
- (b) Commerz- und Privatbank, Berlin and Hamburg.
- (c) Deutsche Bank Berlin, Hamburg, Leipzig, Königsberg.
- (d) Dresdner Bank, Berlin, Hamburg, Leipzig, Königsberg.
- (e) Garantie- und Kreditbank für den Osten A.-G., Berlin.
- (f) Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft A.-G., Berlin.

The distribution of the payments amongst the various Banks and the transfer of amounts paid in from one Bank to another is left to the discretion of the holder of the account.

3. It is agreed that the present special account "A" shall be closed on the conclusion of this Agreement and transferred to the special accounts mentioned in paragraph 2 of this Article.

Article IV

The amounts paid into the special accounts listed in Article III shall be freely at the disposal within Germany of the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany and the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. for the payment of bills of exchange falling due in the year 1938, as well as for goods supplied and services rendered in accordance with Article II, and also for the payment of financing costs and incidental expenses connected therewith.

Accordingly, the following may be paid for out of the special accounts:

- 1. Deliveries of goods of all kinds.
- 2. Obligations on Bills of Exchange in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.
- 3. Services rendered.
- 4. Chartering of German shipping space.
- 5. General shipping expenses in German ports (harbour dues, etc.).
- 6. Railway freights on German lines (including the balance which, on settling accounts between the railway authorities on both sides, may be due from the Soviet side to Germany).
- 7. Repayment for freight advances, in so far as they have not been made in a third currency.
- 8. Technical assistance and erection of plant.
- 9. Charges for transport, insurance, storage, and acceptance tests.
- 10. Commissions for commercial transactions and transport.
- 11. Interest and commissions on dealings with banks and supplying or receiving firms.
- 12. Repayments on Bank advances, in so far as they were not made in a third currency.

13. Price rebates, reimbursements and other refunds, as well as payments for compensation on account of non-fulfilment of import contracts.

14. Taxes, customs duties and similar levies.

15. Judicially settled claims, together with court fees and lawyers' charges.

16. Differences in accounts.

17. All interest, including interest on the 200 million Reichsmark credit under the Agreement of April 9, 1935.³

18. The balance which, on settling accounts between the postal authorities of both sides (except the balance on the telegraph and telephone services), may be due from the Soviet side to Germany.

19. The balance which, on settling accounts between Intourist Berlin and the Mittel-Europäisches Reisebüro on the one side, and Intourist Moscow on the other side, may be due for the sale of tickets on German and Soviet railways.

20. The maintenance expenses of the Trade Delegation, and of the commercial, ordering, and testing commissions of the U.S.S.R. in Germany, to a total amount of two million Reichsmark. Should this amount not be sufficient for the year 1938, the German Government express their readiness to enter into new negotiations with the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany with a view to increasing this amount.

Article V

Payment due by German authorities, firms or private individuals in Germany or in the U.S.S.R. for services, and for financing costs and incidental expenses in connection with the supply of goods and the rendering of services, shall be made in Reichsmark from the agreed special accounts.

Financing costs and incidental expenses in connection with trade and payments include the following:

1. Chartering of Soviet shipping space.

2. General shipping expenses in Soviet ports (harbour dues, etc.).

3. Railway freight on Soviet lines (including the balance which, on settling accounts between the railway authorities on both sides, may be due from the German side to the U.S.S.R.).

4. Repayment for freight advances, in so far as they have not been made in a third currency.

5. Technical assistance and erection of plant.

6. Charges for transport, insurance, storage, and acceptance tests.

7. Commissions for commercial transactions and transport.

8. Interest and commission on dealings with banks and supplying or receiving firms.

9. Repayments on Bank advances, in so far as they were not made in a third currency.

10. Price rebates, reimbursements and other refunds, as well as payments for compensation on account of non-fulfilment of import contracts.

11. Taxes, customs duties and similar levies.

12. Judicially settled claims, together with court fees and lawyers' charges.

13. Differences in accounts.

14. All interest.

15. The maintenance expenses of agencies of German private firms in the U.S.S.R.

16. The balance which, on settling accounts between the postal authorities of both sides (except the balance on the telegraph and telephone services), may be due from the German side to the U.S.S.R.

³ Not printed (5644/H001142-46).

17. The balance which, on settling accounts between Intourist Berlin and the Mittel-Europäisches Reisebüro on the one side, and Intourist Moscow on the other side, may be due for the sale of tickets on German and Soviet railways.

The German Government will see that the competent foreign exchange control offices grant the necessary permits without delay.

Article VI

The provisions of Articles III, IV and V do not apply to transit trade and trade with third countries.

Article VII

The German Government agree that the price adjustment procedure adopted by German industry in the export trade shall be applied in relation to the U.S.S.R. in the same way as to other countries for cash purchases which are made in Germany by the U.S.S.R. out of the Reichsmark proceeds referred to in Article III.

The German Government will use their influence with the competent supervisory offices to see that the price adjustment procedure functions smoothly.

Article VIII

The German Government express their readiness to assist the U.S.S.R. in the placing and proper fulfilment of the intended orders.

Article IX

It is agreed that the most favoured nation treatment mutually conceded in the Soviet-German Trade and Commerce Treaty of October 12, 1925,⁴ is not affected by this agreement.⁵

SPITTA

DAVYDOV

⁴ Signed in Moscow; for the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 122, pp. 707-746, and *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1926, Pt. II, pp. 1-59.

⁵ Following the signature of this Agreement, the question of the payment of Soviet bills of exchange falling due in 1938 and other details (including the grant of a revolving credit of RM 15 million) were dealt with in an exchange of letters between Spitta for the Ministry of Economics, and at that time Chairman of the German delegation, and Davydov, Chairman of the Soviet Delegation (5644/H000996; 984-985, 992-994).

(H)

GERMAN-BRITISH RELATIONS

Papers relating to Captain Wiedemann's Mission to London in July 1938

[EDITORS' NOTE: The following five documents are taken from the Wiedemann papers, the originals of which are in the Library of Congress.

Captain Wiedemann had been Hitler's Company Commander in the First World War and served as Adjutant to Hitler from January 1935 to January 1939, when he was appointed German Consul General in San Francisco.

In July 1938 Wiedemann went on a mission to London and, on July 18, had an interview with Lord Halifax, whose record of this conversation is published in *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. I, document No. 510. The letter there printed as No. 511, which was sent to Captain Wiedemann by Sir A. Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, immediately after the interview, has also been found among the Wiedemann papers (8567/E600107-09) but is not reprinted here. See also *ibid.*, vol. VII, App. IV, No. (iv).]

(i)

8567/E600111-12

Directives 15.7¹

I am the man who has known him longest and therefore knows him best. Nothing at all can be achieved with him through threats, pressure or force. This is sure to have the opposite effect—makes him hard and uncompromising.

He was undoubtedly very pleased by the invitation (invitation to me); he was glad to let me go and instructed me to be very polite.

I know from earlier days that he has always been an admirer of England, that he has always honestly striven for an understanding with England. ("If I have to choose between England and another country that might perhaps be closer to me in ideological respects, that would represent no choice for me!") He said that already two years ago.) He has long been badly treated by England, but doubtless has also been wrongly informed about England in many ways.

"England has always shown little understanding for German interests. England must learn to appreciate Germany's vital needs. An understanding with England will come. But first the Central European problems must be solved, then we can talk to England about colonies."

Two years ago a meeting with Baldwin² was to have taken place; that this did not come about doubtless disappointed him.

The door for negotiations with England should, I feel, not be slammed shut.

The Halifax visit³ of one and a half [*sic*] years ago was also a disappointment. Henderson had promised that Halifax would come with definite proposals. It was disappointing that this was not so.

He does not believe that the Chamberlain Government cannot keep in office. Contrast the clear attitude of Mussolini in connection with Austria with that of England. He will certainly never forget that about Mussolini.

"To divide Germany from Italy will never be possible. I cannot sit between two stools. Neither can we ever separate England from France."

He is still embittered over the behaviour on May 21:⁴ "You are to say that; you are to stress that! I told the English Ambassador twice that not a single German soldier had been moved, and in spite of that the agitation against Germany was unleashed in the newspapers."

Rothermere⁵ early supported the German interests and for this reason he has always a specially cordial feeling of friendship for him.

To show the way he was previously treated: R[eichs] W[ehr] 100,000—300,000—200,000.⁶

He is obviously embittered by threats of a preventive war made in the foreign press.

He repeats: "We will one day come to an understanding with England." He is a revolutionary, and cannot be approached by the methods of the old diplomacy.

He is indignant over the behaviour of the English press. "Why do the

¹ This paper is typewritten with no other heading or date.

² British Prime Minister 1935–1937. No documents on this question have been found in the Foreign Ministry archives. See Thomas Jones: *A Diary with Letters, 1931–50* (London, 1954), p. 197 and *passim*.

³ In November 1937. See vol. I of this Series, document No. 31.

⁴ See vol. II of this Series, Chapter III on the May Crisis, also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. I, Chapter IV.

⁵ Viscount Rothermere, British newspaper proprietor.

⁶ According to *British Documents*, *loc. cit.*, No. 510, in his conversation with Lord Halifax, Captain Wiedemann quoted the fact that "in 1923 Herr Hitler had discussed with him the question of the Reichswehr and had said that he would ask for the numbers to be raised to 300,000, though he indicated to Captain Wiedemann that he would be prepared to accept 200,000."

Czechs not give the Sudeten Germans autonomy? England gave it to Ireland, France let the Saar Territory hold a plebiscite. Why do the Czechs not do this? The Sudeten German question must be solved, one way or another. If the Czechs do not give way, it will one day be solved by force. On this I am firmly determined."

"England has clearly declared that she stands by Czechoslovakia. What concern of England's is Czechoslovakia? What concern of the English was Austria? Italy, I can understand. The Czechs are sabotaging a decent reasonable settlement. What does 'by means of negotiation' mean? With whom should we negotiate—with the Czechs who are ill-treating our compatriots!—Who are trampling German vital rights underfoot."

"Göring's visit! What could come out of this now? Some little time would have to elapse; the attitude of the English press would have to change." To my definite question: "What am I to reply if I am expressly asked?—You are to say that you will first have to ask me."

"Should you be asked about the Western fortifications you are to say that we saw on May 21 what we had to expect from France and England. That is why we built these fortifications. You are to say they will be finished in one year, by next August."

Manoeuvres! Last year there were big manoeuvres with 300,000 troops. This year only small ones.

Emphasize—quite enough for this year.

Otherwise there is nothing happening here!

Find out what is happening there!

(ii)

8567/E600113-16

Visit to Halifax, 18.7 10 a.m.—12:15 p.m.¹

Halifax, Sir Alex. Cadogan. He spoke English, I German. I do not wish to be informed by Ol. Hoare.² By way of Pr. H.³ Introductory remarks:

Character of the Führer, attitude to England, attitude to the Czechoslovak question, intentions of a solution by force (as I was instructed!). The desire to come to an understanding with Germany clearly recognizable and pronounced. Equally obvious was the fear that we might take measures which would make an understanding impossible. Again and again: "could it be possible";⁴ that we would give a declaration saying that we did not contemplate solutions by force. To this I said: I am in no way authorized to say anything official about this. To make such a declaration for an indefinite period or for any circumstances ("massacre")⁴ would be impossible. But I know enough of the intentions of the Führer to be able to say that for the foreseeable future (about one year) there is no thought of force. Nevertheless in some way the Sudeten German question must be solved one day. If the Czechs constantly sabotage this a situation might arise which would make it impossible for the Führer to continue to look on. Again and again the counter question: but what happens if the negotiations between Henlein⁵ and the Czechs reach a "deadlock",⁴ what happens then? Answer: If the impression is given that the negotiations are being conducted with goodwill, then somehow they can be taken up again. But it would

¹ This paper is handwritten with no other heading or date.

² Possibly Oliver, brother of Sir Samuel Hoare, the then Home Secretary.

³ Presumably Princess Stephanie Hohenlohe; a press cutting from the *Daily Express* preserved amongst the Wiedemann papers states that Captain Wiedemann was met by Princess Hohenlohe on his arrival in London.

⁴ In English in the original.

⁵ Sudeten German leader; for biographical details see vol. II of this Series, Appendix IV.

be different if there were the impression that they were being sabotaged. The Czechs have given us this impression. If England thinks that the Czechoslovak question must be solved and that until then there is a danger to world peace, then England should surely do everything to bring about a fair solution soon. The Führer has the impression that England is always on the side of our enemies.

On the question of Göring's visit (secret!), again and again the intimation that beforehand a declaration should be made that force would not be used. Reply: see above, besides this the fact that we were seriously considering such a visit shows that we had no secret designs. For if such a visit were to be made then "must it be a success".⁴ What Göring and the Führer think about such a visit. I had to draw a distinction between G[öring] and the F[ührer]. Göring would doubtless be very pleased about the visit or an invitation, and would gladly come. The Führer was not against it in principle, but had certain misgivings and, like Halifax, thought that certain things would have to be cleared up beforehand. It would be a good thing if the English Government were to do more than they have done so far for the settlement of the Sudeten German matter. Question: Does the Führer appreciate that the English Government are doing everything they can to influence the Czechs favourably. Answer: We were grateful for everything the English Government had contributed towards the solution of the question, but we took the view that more could be done. Göring's visit: Points: 1) Press and other demonstrations. 2) Notification of the French Government. 3) Question of the nature of the invitation: detail! Further treatment: 1) Dirksen—me. 2) Henderson—Neurath. Clarification of the following points: 1) Main object, preservation of peace. 2) Continuation of efforts to solve the Czech question by way of negotiation. 3) It is undoubtedly possible to reach a fair settlement on it. 4) A visit by Göring perhaps in the autumn is considered very useful (prerequisite: official, no backstairs diplomacy).

Object of my visit: Fixing G[öring]'s visit.

History of the visit: Bodenschatz⁶—Forster.⁷

Naval Agreement: "public opinion"⁴ did not place much value on it, but the Government did.

What Halifax is working for: Entry of the Führer with the King into B[uckingham] P[alace] amid the "cheering"⁴ of the crowd.

If you and I were dictators.

Von R[ibbentrop]'s statements about Austria; compared with May 21.

Report to the F[ührer]

Greetings from Halifax to the Führer, aim before he dies: F[ührer] in Buckingham P[alace].

Tone of reception: *very* friendly, *very* polite.

Preparation by St[ephane].

H[alifax] has postponed his departure for Fr[ance].

It is significant that he is on the eve of the journey to France.⁸

First: I have said everything which I was instructed to say: angry about the 21st of May—angry about the behaviour of the press—nothing to be done by threats—badly treated by England—England always on the side of our enemies.

⁶ Maj. Gen. Karl Bodenschatz, Head of the Ministerial Bureau in the Reich Air Ministry.

⁷ Albert Forster, Gauleiter of Danzig, visited England July 8–15, 1938, and had talks there with leading personalities. See vol. v of this Series, document No. 49 and footnote 1 thereto; also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. 1, Appendix V.

⁸ On the occasion of the Royal visit of July 19–22; see *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. 1, No. 523.

Repeatedly stressed wish to come to an understanding with us. G[öring's] visit very desirable, big thing, should be a success, discussions in advance.

How it came to G[öring's] visit not clear: Bodenschatz—Forster, Schacht—Basel[?].

Again and again: "could it be possible"¹ that a declaration be given about Czechoslovakia.

Attempt to trick me over the phrasing of the invitation.

Dirksen informed; very pleased—is coming to Germany in 10 days.

Von R[ibbentrop] not informed—wait till the English approach us.

Two possibilities:

(a) either try to come to an understanding,

(b) or, in any case, play for time.

(iii)

8567/E600120-26

Conversation with Lord Halifax on July 18, 1938¹

Origins: Already on my last visit but one to London, about four weeks ago, English friends expressed their intention of introducing me to influential Foreign Office people. Immediately before my departure, my English friends in London sent me word that Lord Halifax had expressed the wish to see me on my next visit to London. Therefore before I set out for London, the day before leaving—Friday July 15, 1938,—I obtained permission from the Führer to comply with Lord Halifax's wishes. The Führer said that he approved of it in principle and gave me the following directives:

I could safely tell Lord Halifax that I was the man who had known him [Hitler] the longest, and therefore best. Nothing at all could be achieved with him by threats, pressure or force, this was sure to have the opposite effect and made him hard and uncompromising. Recently England had always stood on the side of our enemies, and had always shown little understanding for German interests and must learn to appreciate Germany's vital needs. An understanding with England would come one day, but first the Central European problems must be solved. To divide Germany and Italy would never be possible.

He, the Führer, was still embittered over the behaviour on May 21, 1938. He had at that time twice declared to the British Ambassador that not a single German soldier had been moved, and in spite of that the newspapers had represented the matter as if Germany had only yielded to English pressure. The Führer was indignant over the behaviour of the English press.

On the question of Czechia:

"Why do the Czechs not give the Sudeten Germans autonomy? England gave it to Ireland, France let the Saar Territory hold a plebiscite, why do the Czechs not do this too? The Sudeten question must be solved one way or another." If the Czechs do not give way, the question must one day be solved by force, on that he was firmly determined. England has clearly declared that she stands by the Czechs. The Czechs are sabotaging a reasonable settlement.

When I indicated to the Führer that some Englishmen were asking whether a visit by Göring to England would be possible, and that I might—which I did not consider out of the question—be sounded by Halifax on the subject, the Führer replied: "What could come out of this now; some little while would have to elapse and the attitude of the English press change. In any case he must be asked first."

¹ A handwritten note at the head of this memorandum reads "Report to v. Ribbentrop".

In addition, I should particularly emphasize that in one year the fortifications in the West would be completed, that the Führer has quite enough for this year, and that otherwise there was nothing happening with us.

These instructions from the Führer were written down by me immediately after the interview.

When I arrived in London, Lord Halifax let me know that he would be pleased to see me on Monday, at 10 a.m., at his private residence. I arrived there punctually. Present at the talk were Lord Halifax, Sir Alexander Cadogan and myself. The conversation was carried on with Halifax speaking English only, which it was not necessary to interpret as I understood him very well. My answers were given, so far as they were simple, in English; difficult things I said in German, and Sir Alexander Cadogan translated, and I was able to note that he did it very accurately.

At the very beginning of the conversation, I stressed that I had no official messages, my utterances were therefore neither official nor semi-official. They could merely be of an informative character. Both sides agreed that this conversation should be treated as entirely confidential.

No notes were made during this conversation by either side. The course taken by the conversation was that, after introductory words of greeting, I took the lead and repeated to Lord Halifax almost exactly, partly word for word, what the Führer had given me as directives for this conversation. Halifax repeatedly asked whether it would not be possible to obtain from Germany a declaration that the use of force against Czechia was not intended. I always answered plainly: "You will not obtain this declaration."

Halifax asked me about a possible visit by Göring. I gave the answer the Führer had prescribed to me.

The form which the conversation took was that of two parties to a conversation talking over problems without committing themselves. The tone on both sides was very polite (the Führer had particularly impressed this on me). At the end, it was again expressly stated that the whole conversation should remain secret and that it had only an informative character, that everything to be said officially should, as before, go through official channels.

We took leave with marked cordiality, Lord Halifax asking me to remember him to the Führer, and to tell him that he (Halifax), before his death, would like to see, as the culmination of his work, the Führer entering London, at the side of the English King, amid the acclamations of the English people.

He then accompanied me to the front door, where we bid each other a cordial farewell.

(iv)

8567/E600129

[Notes]¹

Enlarge upon Göring's visit, ask for details. Göring himself would be very pleased to come. Did not discuss it with Hoare. Invitation for wife—how would the King react. Visit is a very big thing. Prevent it from becoming another Neurath visit.² If it goes well, a great success. Otherwise irreparable harm.

Colonial problem not acute at present. Settlement of Central European questions first.

¹ This paper is handwritten with no heading or date.

² This appears to be a reference to the British Government's invitation to Neurath to visit London on June 23, 1937. See vol. III of this Series, documents Nos. 281-346 *passim*.

Naval Agreement: Intended by Führer as a noble gesture towards England. "I made the Naval Agreement with England at that time and nevertheless England is always on the side of our enemies." Naval Agreement was to determine our relations with England. Führer is susceptible to distinguished treatment, cf. home politics: Papen, Hugenberg,³ Neurath.

Sabotage by the Czechs: First elections lasting three weeks. New Nationalities Statute. To be brought before their Parliament in the autumn. And for this the Czechs are being praised by the English press.

³ Alfred Hugenberg, German industrialist and nationalist politician.

(v)

8567/E600176-78

Crisis in the spring and summer of 1938¹

I was myself in London on that Saturday when news came of German troop movements against Czechia and of the reaction of the English public to it. There was certainly a danger of war. Shortly after this, about May 28,² the Führer called together Neurath, Göring, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Brauchitsch, Raeder, General Beck,³ von Weizsäcker, Milch,⁴ and adjutants. He gave an address lasting about two hours which he had previously sketched out in writing. Göring, who had some idea of what was happening, was rather excited. A discussion with me—see other paper. Main substance of the address was: "It is my unshakeable will that Czechoslovakia shall disappear from the map."⁵ Reason: To clear the rear for advancing against the West, England and France. "The old generals will still manage Czechoslovakia, then [there will be] some four to five years' time." (Göring: later!) The date was given as not before the end of September, perhaps not till March 1939. Thereupon Neurath said to me: "Well then we have at least a year's time. Much can happen during that."

One often hears it said today that the Führer had again and again approached England but that England had always turned a cold shoulder on us. That is not true. As early as the spring of 1938 the English let us know: "Bombs on Prague mean war. Tactics against the Czechs: not to shoot but to strangle." Already before this, in September 1937 or 1936, Schacht was in Paris⁶ by permission of the Führer and negotiated with Blum. Blum was entirely ready for an understanding, and wanted to advocate to the English that we should get back the colonies or a colonial territory. When Schacht came back he was not received for a considerable time, and then the Führer did not want to hear anything more of the negotiations with the French.

I had a similar experience apropos of my visit to Halifax. The starting point was a question from Bodenschatz whether a visit by Göring to England would be desirable—hint dropped by Forster, Danzig. I had an answer through Stephanie Hohenlohe after three days: "The British Government were prepared to invite Göring. I should come over for preparatory talks." Then I had to inform the Führer, went to Munich and got instructions. "How did you get

¹ This paper comes from a collection of handwritten notes headed "Various Reminiscences". At the beginning of the second paragraph of this paper "San Francisco 5.9" appears in the margin.

² See also Wiedemann's affidavit on the conference of May 28, 1938 (Nuremberg document 3037-PS, published in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, 1946), vol. 1, pp. 520-521).

³ General Ludwig Beck, Chief of the Army General Staff until Oct. 31, 1938.

⁴ General Milch, State Secretary in the Reich Air Ministry, Inspector General of the Luftwaffe; Deputy to the C-in-C of the Luftwaffe (Göring).

⁵ See also vol. II of this Series, document No. 221, enclosure.

⁶ In May 1937. See vol. I of this Series, document No. 83.

this invitation, what do they want, and so on. You are to say you are the man who has known me longest and best. Plebiscite in the Saar Territory, Ireland, why not in the Sudetenland? I showed readiness to meet them with the Naval Agreement but this was never appreciated. Give March 1939 as the date." (I had information at that time that this was in fact planned.) To my definite question as to what I should reply if asked about Göring's visit, answer was at first evasive, and then: "You are to say that you must first ask me once again." The conversation with Halifax very friendly, his question again and again: "Would it be possible to get a declaration from the German Government that no use of force is planned against Czechoslovakia?" Reply: "No." At the end: "If we were both dictators we would probably agree", and "Give the Führer my greetings and say that I, as English Foreign Minister, aim to get so far in my lifetime that one day the Führer will be seen entering Buckingham Palace at the side of the King of England." When I came back to the Obersalzberg, Unity Mitford was there and the Führer went for a two-hour walk with her. He only had a bare five minutes' time for me. I told him what Halifax had said. He just lapped it up. Then, when I cautiously touched on Göring's visit: "There is no longer any question of that." So that business was off. Ribbentrop's attitude to me, not informed by me. Dirksen's opinion.

I

GERMANY'S RELATIONS WITH DANZIG

(i)

7250/E532098

Counsellor Bergmann to Ambassador Moltke

BERLIN, September 13, 1938.

Pol. I 848 g. Rs. III.

DEAR AMBASSADOR: For your personal information I should like today to communicate the following to you:

A few days ago the High Command of the Wehrmacht informed the Foreign Ministry¹ that, according to information received, Gauleiter Forster intends to carry out extensive military security measures in Danzig. In connection with this Herr Forster had referred to an instruction from Field Marshal Göring. An enquiry at Field Marshal Göring's Ministerial Bureau (General Bodenschatz) has however revealed that Field Marshal Göring had only authorized the setting up of anti-aircraft defences within the scope of the Danzig police. Assent for more than this had not been given. General Keitel thereupon took the opportunity of reporting the matter to the Führer who expressed the view that he did not desire to cause anxiety in Poland by military measures in Danzig. It should at present go no further than the setting up of anti-aircraft defences within the scope of the Danzig police.

With obedient respects and Heil Hitler, I am, my dear Ambassador,

Yours etc.,

BERGMANN

¹ No record of this communication has been found.

(J)

GERMANY'S RELATIONS WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(i)

7249/E532082-83

*Minute by the Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the
Danzig Senate*

DANZIG, September 28, 1938.

I had a conversation yesterday with the High Commissioner, Professor Burckhardt, who told me the following:

On his way to Geneva he had called on Herr von Weizsäcker¹ and had then travelled the 925 km. to Geneva in his car in order to get in touch with the British. In Geneva he spoke to Butler² and at his invitation had a telephone conversation with Vansittart³ in London. He had worked with feverish activity to persuade the British that some way must be found to avoid a war. Perhaps Chamberlain could write to the Führer personally. Vansittart thought that such a letter might not even reach the Führer. Herr Burckhardt replied that perhaps it could be brought over by someone personally commissioned by Chamberlain. Vansittart was, however, of the opinion that hardly anything was to be achieved by writing; a personal discussion would have to take place. The High Commissioner, Professor Burckhardt, told me that in this way he had probably brought about Chamberlain's visit to the Führer.

The conversation between the two statesmen at Berchtesgaden⁴ had apparently gone well. The British are of the opinion that in the meantime the Führer had, however, allowed himself to be persuaded into increasing his demands. At the first conversation at Godesberg the Führer had hardly allowed Chamberlain to get a word in, had constantly interrupted him, and had held forth himself and had shown very little understanding of the British mentality. Chamberlain finally rose, saying quietly that he had only come over to try to preserve peace.⁵ Later, mediation between the two hotels⁶ was begun⁷ and the second conversation in Godesberg took place.⁸

In the Secretariat of the League of Nations the view was widespread that Germany had told Poland that she had renounced the Corridor. M. Komarnicki,⁹ the Polish representative in Geneva, had told him with some degree of certainty that the current treaty with Germany had been extended to twenty-five years.

In the Secretariat itself there were two sharply divided parties. The one, represented by Avenol,¹⁰ had become almost conservative and wished war to be avoided at all costs. The other, whose principal leader is Rajchman,¹¹ urged war. Rajchman had already said four years ago that Italy must be forced out

¹ No record has been found. See also *British Documents*, Third Series, vol. vi, Appendix I, No. (v), footnote 1, and vol. ii, No. 775 and Appendix IV, No. (iv).

² R. A. Butler, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who was leading the British delegation at Geneva.

³ Sir Robert Vansittart, Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Foreign Secretary.

⁴ See vol. ii of this Series, document No. 487.

⁵ See *ibid.* document No. 502.

⁶ i.e., Hitler was staying at the Hotel Dreesen and the British delegation on the Petersberg.

⁷ See *ibid.*, documents Nos. 572-574.

⁸ See *ibid.*, documents Nos. 583 and 584.

⁹ Tytus Komarnicki, Polish permanent delegate to the League of Nations.

¹⁰ Joseph Avenol, Secretary General of the League of Nations.

¹¹ Ludwik Rajchman (of Poland), Director of the Health Section of the League of Nations.

of the League of Nations, and then at a favourable opportunity a general war should be started against the two totalitarian States.

A war psychosis prevailed throughout Switzerland. Mobilization was taking place, and bridges and roads were being manned. Here in Danzig he felt as if he were on an island of peace.

VIKTOR BÖTTCHER

(K)

GERMAN MILITARY PLANNING

(i)

9929/E694780-88

*Directive by the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht*¹

The Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht. BERLIN, December 21, 1937.

Chefsache

4 copies

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W.A. No. 94/37 g. Kdos. Chefsache II Ang. L Ia

Ref. 94/37 g.K. L Ia. of Dec. 7, 1937²

Herewith I send you enclosures 1 and 2 to the "1st supplement" to the Directive for the uniform preparation for war by the Wehrmacht".³

They are signed in the draft by the Field Marshal.⁴

By order:

KEITEL

Distribution List:

C-in-C of the Army	1 (Copy No. 1)
C-in-C of the Navy	1 (Copy No. 2)
Reich Air Minister and C-in-C of the Luftwaffe	1 (Copy No. 3)
Wehrmacht Office (L Ia)	1 (Copy No. 4)

[Enclosure 1]

Enclosure 1 to Ob.d.W. No. 94/37. g. Kdos. Chefsache L Ia of Dec. 7, 1937.

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II. War on two fronts with main effort in South-east (Deployment "Green").

1. Prerequisites:

When Germany has achieved complete preparedness for war in all fields, then the military conditions will have been created for carrying out an offensive war

¹ Field Marshal von Blomberg, Reich War Minister and C-in-C of the Wehrmacht, May 1935–February 1938.

² For the German text of this supplement see *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxxiv, document No. 175–C, Exhibit USA–69, pp. 745–747.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 732–745; see also vol. I of this Series, Editors' Note, pp. 433–434.

⁴ Marginal notes: "1) To be submitted to C-in-C Navy. R[aeder] 23/12. 2) Chief of Staff of Naval War Staff. G[use] 23. 3) Chief of Staff, A Ia. Fr[icke] 23."

"Note: Briefing on the changes in directives which this necessitates is planned for January [illegible initial]."

"Note for Chefsachen registrar: This document may only be made available to other officers by special order. It is to remain in custody of A Ia."

⁵ This enclosure, which is crossed out in pencil, bears the following unsigned marginal note: "Replaced by new directive in special folder 'Green' [überholt durch neue Weisung in Sonderheft 'Grün']". This is presumably a reference to the directive of May 30, 1938, printed in vol. II of this Series as document No. 221.

against Czechoslovakia, so that the solution of the German problem of living space can be carried to a victorious end even if one or other of the Great Powers intervene against us.

Apart from many other things connected with this, there is in the first place the defensive capacity of our western fortifications, which will permit the Western frontier of the German Reich to be held with weak forces for a long time against greatly superior strength.

But even so, the Government [*Staatsführung*] will do what is politically possible to avoid the risk for Germany of a war on two fronts and will try to avoid any situation with which, as far as can be judged, Germany could not cope militarily or economically.

Should the political situation not develop, or only develop slowly, in our favour, then the execution of operation "Green" from our side will have to be postponed for years. If, however, a situation arises which, owing to Britain's aversion to a general European War, through her lack of interest in the Central European problem and because of a conflict breaking out between Italy and France in the Mediterranean, creates the probability that Germany will face no other opponent than Russia on Czechoslovakia's side, then operation "Green" will start *before* the completion of Germany's full preparedness for war.

2. The military objective of operation "Green" is still the speedy occupation of Bohemia and Moravia with the simultaneous solution of the Austrian question in the sense of incorporating Austria into the German Reich. In order to achieve the latter aim military force will only be required if other means do not lead or have not led to success.

In accordance with this military objective it is the task of the German Wehrmacht to make preparations so that:

(a) the bulk of all forces can invade Czechoslovakia with speed, surprise and the greatest impetus;

(b) reserves, mainly the armed units of the SS, are kept ready, in order, if necessary, to march into Austria;

(c) in the West security can be maintained with only a minimum of forces for rear protection of the Eastern operations.

It is the responsibility of the C-in-C of the Wehrmacht to synchronize the beginning of the operations of the Army and Luftwaffe.

If there is a reasonable prospect of catching the enemy air forces still in their peace-time stations, the Luftwaffe will be set in action independently of the start of the attack by the Army.

If such prospect does not exist the starting times of the two attacks will be brought closer together.

3. Within the plan of this operation the following tasks fall to the different branches of the Wehrmacht.

(a) Army

The bulk of the field army is to be employed in the attack on Czechoslovakia.

The launching of this operation will depend on the strength and preparedness of the German army at that time, on the state of the Czech fortifications and the possibility of reducing them quickly, and also on the attitude of Poland.

The aim is a strategic and sudden attack on Czechoslovakia properly prepared in peace time. It must take her fortifications quickly, as far as possible, by surprise, catch and destroy her armed forces in the process of mobilization, and, by exploiting ethnic diversity, bring about her defeat in the shortest time.

In case it is later necessary to commit military forces against *Austria*, reserves

of the Army are to be kept in readiness as well as armed units of the SS. Sustained and prolonged resistance by the Austrian armed forces is not probable.

Providing rear cover in the *West* must be limited as much as possible both as far as numbers and quality are concerned. It must be made to correspond to the state of the fortifications at the time. The extent of these limitations is to be based solely on the need to safeguard the Rhineland-Westphalian industrial area and communications between North and South Germany, as well as to maintain a basis of operations for the Luftwaffe.

East Prussia is to be defended. According to the political situation, withdrawal by sea to the Reich of part or the bulk of the first-line forces there must be allowed for.

(b) *Luftwaffe*

The bulk of the Luftwaffe will be committed against Czechoslovakia; only the unavoidable minimum of forces is envisaged for the West.

The primary tasks of the Luftwaffe—which are to be prepared within the mobilization scheme—will be:

Destruction of enemy air forces and ground installations, including petrol and munition dumps, as well as the paralysing of mobilization and of the leadership of the State and the armed forces by attacks on the centres of mobilization and government and on the most important junctions. The object of this is the effective destruction of the Czech State and the facilitation of its occupation by the Army. In the allocation of the battle tasks, however, in our own interests later, all industrial establishments and factories which can be of use to us are to be spared as far as the conduct of our own operations permits.

Protection of the German centres of strength with special attention to Berlin, the central German industrial districts and the Ruhr territory.

Later the question can be considered of using part of the Luftwaffe in demonstrations and leaflet propaganda against Austria, or, in conjunction with the Army, in breaking any opposition of the Austrian armed forces.

(c) *Navy*

The task of the Navy remains the same as in deployment “Red”.⁶

4. The squadrons [*Staffeln*] to be detached to the C-in-C of the Army by the C-in-C of the Luftwaffe on mobilization can be called on by the C-in-C of the Luftwaffe for his first operation if his attack takes place some time before the Army attack. I reserve this decision for myself.

In the same way he can employ the anti-aircraft units earmarked for the Army until the transfer to the Army envisaged on mobilization takes place.

[Enclosure 2]

Enclosure 2 to Ob.d.W. No. 94/37 g. Kdos. Chefsache L Ia of December 7, 1937

Reference: Part 8 of the directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht of June 24, 1937,³ “Special preparations”.⁶

With reference to: C-in-C of the Army, O.Qu.I/1 Abt. 106/37, g. K. *Chefsache* of August 31, 1937.⁷

“ “ “ C-in-C of the Navy, A Ia op 42/37, g. K. *Chefsache* of August 31, 1937.⁷

“ “ “ C-in-C of the Luftwaffe, Gen. St. 1 Abt. 317 and 327/37, g. K. *Chefsache* of Aug. 26 and 24, 1937.⁷

⁶ See the document cited in footnote 3 above.

⁷ Not found.

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Decisions on the above proposals

(1) *Proposal of the C-in-C of the Army, reference "Red":*

"I request, however, before the attack against the main armaments centres of the enemy aircraft industry, that the Luftwaffe should be employed against the French assembly insofar as the fight against the enemy air force leaves us free to do so, and for this purpose I request that this operation be prepared so that it can be carried out on a special order should the occasion arise."

Decision:

The preparation of an operation of this sort is in accordance with instructions for the Luftwaffe (Directive of June 24, 1937, No. 55/37, g.K. *Chefsache* L Ia, p. 13).³ I must, however, reserve for myself the right to order which tasks have priority in any given situation.

(2) *Proposals of the C-in-C of the Army with reference to "Green":*⁶
have been settled by enclosure 1.

(3) *Proposals of the C-in-C of the Army with reference to "Otto":*⁶

(a) "That on operation 'Otto' coming into effect the immediate total mobilization and the simultaneous carrying out of the deployment 'Red' should be ordered."

Decision:

It depends on the political situation at the time and will be ordered in each individual case.

(b) "Besides the normal assignment of reconnaissance and anti-aircraft units, it is necessary to assign a fighter squadron and a bomber squadron to the intervention army."

Decision:

Assignment to the Army is not envisaged. Support for the intervention army will take place in accordance with Luftwaffe Standing Order 16 [L. Dv. 16].

(c) "Should 'Otto' take place completely without warning, i.e., with divisions ready to march, or after previous mobilization?"

Decision:

If the preparations for "Otto" should be ordered, a decision will be made. Consideration should be given to both possibilities.

(4) *Proposals of the C-in-C of the Luftwaffe with reference to "Green":*
have been settled by enclosure 1.

(5) *Proposal of the C-in-C of the Luftwaffe:*

"Dropping of leaflets and landing of party officials [*Absetzen von Parteiorganen*] is considered especially useful."

Decision:

Is envisaged and will be prepared.

(6) *Proposal of the C-in-C of the Luftwaffe with reference to "extension Red-Green":*⁶

"On the transfer of further air formations to East Prussia, these should remain directly under the C-in-C of the Luftwaffe and only come under AOK 3 territorially."

Decision:

If the C-in-C of the Luftwaffe transfers further air formations to East Prussia for purposes of his own air operations, they remain directly under his orders and are under AOK 3 only territorially, except for the Luftwaffe's own supply services.⁸

⁸ See also Jodl's diary, entries of Nov. 5 and Dec. 13, 1937, in *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxviii, document No. 1780—PS, Exhibit USA—72, pp. 355 and 356.

(ii)

9929/E694811-12

Directive by the Führer¹

The Supreme Commander
of the Wehrmacht.
OKW No. 472/38 g. Kdos. LIa

BERLIN, March 18, 1938.
35 copies
11th copy

Directive No. 1

1. I intend, if the Poles march into Lithuania, to reunite the German Memel territory with Germany. I shall decide the time for this.

2. I charge the C-in-C of the Army with the execution of the undertaking on land. The forces of the Luftwaffe which are in East Prussia are also under his command (apart from one F. squadron [*Staffel*]).

I want the Memel territory to be occupied with lightning speed and held by forces ready to march—not mobilized.

The speedy occupation of the town of Memel is imperative in the interests of the German population.

3. The Navy will support the undertaking of the Army by invading from the sea according to detailed orders of the C-in-C of the Navy.

The forces engaged are to be instructed to cooperate with the Army.

All naval air forces ready for action are under the orders of the C-in-C of the Navy for this operation.

4. The Luftwaffe will hold special forces ready outside East Prussia under their own command under detailed orders of the C-in-C of the Luftwaffe so that they can be sent to East Prussia at any time or be committed immediately.

The order to this effect I reserve to myself.

5. The preparations for the undertaking must be made in such a way that on receipt of the order the frontier can be crossed in the shortest time by the foremost sections and that, at the same time, units of the Navy appear off Memel.

Permission to cross the frontier by land and air as well as to enter foreign territorial waters is reserved to me.

6. The C-in-C of the Army is to make the necessary preparations for any protection needed for Danzig.

ADOLF HITLER

Certified correct:

JODL

Colonel, General Staff

Distribution List:

High Command of the Wehrmacht	Copies 1-5
" " " " Army	" 6-10
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¹ This document is the directive referred to in vol. II of this Series, document No. 282, footnote 76, and which had not been found when that volume was printed; see also vol. V, documents Nos. 329 and 333.

(iii)

9928/E694749-53

*Memorandum by Colonel von der Chevallerie of the OKH*Department 10¹

BERLIN, September 3, 1938.

Ia No. 50/38 g. Kdos. Chefsache

4 copies

TOP SECRET MILITARY

4th copy

Officer only

Subject: The Führer's tour of the West, Aug. 27-29, 1938.

Three conferences took place during the tour.

1st Conference, Aug. 27—0800 to 0830 hrs.

Participants: The Führer,

C-in-C of the Army,²General (of Infantry) Adam,³General (of Artillery) Keitel,⁴Colonel (attached to the General Staff) Jodl.⁵*2nd Conference, Aug. 28, about 2100 hrs.*

Participants: as above, and

Colonel (attached to the General Staff) v. der Chevallerie,⁶Major (attached to the General Staff) Siewert.⁷

The Führer spoke first and in a long speech gave his views on France, in effect as follows:

France possesses a peace-time army of 470,000 men and can raise a war-time army of at most 1,700,000-1,800,000 men (including air force). The capacity of French industry is limited, no essential changes have taken place in French armaments since the end of the war. The level of armaments of 1918 cannot be reached by any country at the beginning of a war nowadays. It only became possible in the course of the World War after some years, by gradually training women to take over numerous men's jobs.

Today France is not in a position to despatch her entire Field Army to the North-east frontier for she must maintain strong forces against Italy, both on the Alpine frontier and in North Africa. She will even be compelled to send troops from France proper to North Africa. (The C-in-C of the Army, interrupting, doubted this, but believed that France would leave her North African forces in Africa.)

England, at present, can intervene with five divisions and one armoured brigade. The motorization of these five divisions is not yet completed.

The tank arm has passed its peak. As in the case of earlier cavalry attacks, it can only count on success (a) when it achieves surprise, (b) against a badly shaken enemy. On the Western front we have 2,000 anti-tank guns and we possess an excellent means of defence in the tank mine.

The next age groups to be recruited in France are bad; France needs five to six days for mobilization; in addition to this a still longer period is required for the concentration of troops. The build-up of strong forces in a confined area for a set battle [*Materialschlacht*] would take considerable time.

¹ The fortifications department of the OKH.² Colonel General Brauchitsch.³ Commander of Army Group 2.⁴ Chief of the OKW.⁵ Chief of the National Defence Department of the OKW.⁶ Chief of Department 10.⁷ Adjutant to the C-in-C of the Army.

France can at most place forty divisions in the field against Germany.

Therefore: "France won't risk it." In spite of this I am making all preparations to create the greatest possible security for us in the West. The twenty reserve divisions which I have repeatedly demanded have, up to the present, been declined by the Army.

The C-in-C of the Army thereupon remarked: These twenty divisions form our replacement army. Their activation has not been possible so far owing to a shortage of leaders and material. Now that the order for activating the twenty (replacement) divisions has been given, it can be estimated that eight of them will be ready in three weeks, the remainder much later.

There followed a report by the *General Commanding Army Group 2*:

He started by stressing the difficulties which the Command would face on the Western front. On the most important parts the divisional fronts are 20 kilometres broad and on others much more.

In the operational areas there can only be one master. Therefore in the event of mobilization it is absolutely necessary for the air defence zone [LVZ] to be placed under the command of Army Group 2.

A special weakness exists for the Army Group owing to the fact that in the beginning there will be no reserves at its disposal.

On this the C-in-C of the Army promised that if everything in the South-east went according to plan, the three divisions of the OKH reserve and the first eight replacement divisions would be made available for the West.

General Adam: I have also considered the possibility of Belgium and Holland attacking us with the French. Assuming that no further forces can be sent to the Army Group, I must abandon the Palatinate and turn to a counter-attack against Belgium and Holland.

The Führer: The Palatinate must not be given up. The attack against Czechia will not be broken off. I intend in this case to attack and defeat Holland, the weakest opponent, first.

(The Führer did not speak about the forces to be committed and the timing calculations involved.)

General Adam continued: In view of the French attitude a "surprise attack" is indeed not very probable, but even against this precautions must be taken. The Army Group asks, therefore, that no conditions be imposed concerning the concentration of troops. It is important that divisions should be familiarized with conditions quickly, particularly in view of the breadth of their sectors.

To this the *Führer* stated: "I will order 'Deployment West' in good time, if an attack by France appears possible. Only if I have definite intelligence that France will not attack will I discard 'Deployment West'."

General Adam then dealt with the question of "Breaking off Limes" [work on the Western fortifications]. On this the C-in-C of the Army said: Work will be done as long as possible, but the most advanced line must be "clean" by the end of September, thereafter all workers are to be employed further to the rear.

The *Führer* agreed with this idea and said: Even in the front line there are still gaps which must be closed. Camps in advance of the front are to be removed.

General Adam: In the battle zone of the Army work will be carried on "until the first shot is fired",⁸ then I propose to make the air defence zone strong. At present it can only be considered as a line to be held on to tenaciously. In the

⁸ In a report to Brauchitsch of Aug. 17, 1938 (9928/E694773), Adam stated that his Chief of Staff had been informed by Todt that the Führer had emphasized that work was to continue "at least until 1.10, probably indeed until 15.10, 'in short up to the first shot'" and asked for clarification of this.

next few days I shall put to work reconnaissance staffs with a view to the later construction of the air defence zone as a rear position.⁹

The *C-in-C* of the Army and the *Führer* agreed.

The *Führer*: Premature breaking off of the work is politically risky. Hence no time limits are to be mentioned. The watchword is: "Work goes on until the frost."

The Belgians should see from the construction of fortifications on their frontier that Belgium will be a battlefield if they attack us or allow the French to march through.

Joining in the discussion Colonel Gehrke (attached to the General Staff), Head of Department 5,¹⁰ stated that the deployments South, East and West were now completely separate, with the result that the maximum use must be made of the available rolling stock. "Limes" greatly impairs preparedness for deployment. It is thus necessary to restrict supplies for "Limes" for ten days (Sept. 17-27) so that the deployment can run according to plan.

Daily supplies for "Limes", at present 5,000 wagons (about 100 trains). Todt has told me that he can carry on for 8 days without supplies.

Führer: I shall arrange for an increase in the supplies of materials at once. The "27.9" is not a binding deadline.¹¹ I can postpone it at my discretion, in which case full-scale supplies for "Limes" can continue that much longer.

3rd Conference followed at about 2300 hrs.

Participants as in 2nd Conference and also the following:

General of Engineers Förster	Inspectorate Fortifications
Major General Speich	Inspectorate West
Lieut. General Kitzinger	Air Defence Zone
Colonel Mack	" " "

Inspector General Dr. Todt.

Inspector General Dr. Todt stated:

Of the supplies of materials 70 per cent are gravel and 30 per cent of other building materials. An increase in supplies of these materials is subject to more transport being placed at our disposal and more gravel obtained, which at present is being claimed for many other undertakings.

Führer: Then everything else must be stopped so that the Western fortifications obtain sufficient gravel.

Todt: At present 8,800 motor lorries are in use. There are stocks of building materials for 5-6 days. 70 emplacements a day are being concreted for the Army. This could be raised to 700 a week, if supplies are increased.

148,000 workers for "Limes", 50,000 for fortifications. Engineer Staffs are at work. *Todt* considers it essential that one office responsible to the Army should run the transport.

The *C-in-C of the Army* states that the question has been settled by the appointment of a transport officer at Wiesbaden.

The *Führer* points out that by means of an immediate increase in supplies a reserve of materials for fourteen working days should be built up.

Some separate remarks by the *Führer* regarding the work of construction are set forth in the enclosure.¹²

In conclusion the *Führer* asserted that, as the result of the first two days of inspection, he was "greatly impressed by the work accomplished". In compari-

⁹ In a report of Sept. 8, 1938 (9928/E694724-34), Adam submitted to Brauchitsch his appreciation of the problems concerning "Limes" arising from the *Führer's* tour.

¹⁰ The transport department.

¹¹ See also vol. II of this Series, documents Nos. 221, 282 para. 1, and 424.

¹² Not found.

son with the defensive positions in the World War, our fortifications in the West were very strong. He was convinced that German troops could not be bombarded out of these positions.

Distribution List:

Chief of Gen. Staff	Copy No. 1 (via Central Department)
OQ I	" " 2
Dept. 1 ¹³	" " 3 (less enclosure)
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Dept. 2 ¹⁴	
Dept. 3 ¹⁵	
OQ III	

V. DER CHEVALLERIE¹⁶

¹³ The operations department.

¹⁴ The organization department.

¹⁵ The Western intelligence department.

¹⁶ See also Jodl's diary, entries of Aug. 26-29 and Sept. 15, 1938, in *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxviii, document No. 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72, pp. 375 and 379-380.

(iv)

9939/E695642

The Führer to the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan

Enclosure 2 to Ob.d.M.—B Wi 9063/39¹

BERLIN, January 27, 1939.

I command that the expansion [*Aufbau*] of the navy, ordered by me, shall have priority over all other tasks including the armament of the two other branches of the Wehrmacht and including priority over exports. The expansion covers both the completion of the new building programme and the maintenance of preparedness for war of naval forces.

The C-in-C of the Navy shall present indents, directly and indirectly necessary for the completion of the construction programme by the time fixed, to the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, Field Marshal Göring, who by the necessary instructions to the appropriate departments of the Reich, of Industry and of the Party, is to secure their speedy and punctual fulfilment.

ADOLF HITLER

To: The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, Field Marshal Göring, Berlin.

Certified true copy:

(sgd.) V. D. BORNE

Captain and Head of the War
Economy Department of the
C-in-C of the Navy.

¹ Not printed (9939/E695641/1); this is a cover note of Feb. 7, 1939, circulating, as Enclosure 1, Göring's executive instructions of Feb. 2, 1939 (9939/E695641/2) and, as Enclosure 2, the document here printed.

(L)

EDITORS' NOTE CONCERNING VOLUME IV OF THIS
SERIES, DOCUMENT NO. 383

The penultimate paragraph of this document as originally drafted by Schmidt (F19/087) read:

"Coulondre replied that it was difficult for France to forgo her interests in the East and at the same time to make concessions in the Mediterranean. The Foreign Minister repeated that France could naturally not pursue any policy in the East which would disturb Germany."

The last sentence has been altered in Ribbentrop's handwriting so that the paragraph, as printed in vol. iv of this Series, reads:

"Coulondre replied that it was difficult for France to forgo her interests in the East and at the same time to make concessions in the Mediterranean. France would, however, naturally not pursue any policy in the East which would disturb Germany."

Appendix IV

GERMAN WHITE BOOK NO. 2:¹ NOTE ON SOURCES

Shortly after the outbreak of war, the German Foreign Ministry published, under the title *Urkunden zur letzten Phase der Deutsch-Polnischen Krise (Original Documents on the Last Phase of the German-Polish Crisis)*, some twenty-six documents. In December 1939 this was followed by a much larger publication, entitled *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges, Auswärtiges Amt, 1939, Nr. 2 (Documents on the Origins of the War, German Foreign Ministry, 1939, No. 2)*, which included, amongst a total of four hundred and eighty-two documents, those previously published in the short collection.

As already noted in Volume V of this Series (document No. 10, footnote 1), many of the documents in the Second German White Book appear in versions which differ from the original texts in the Foreign Ministry archives. It has therefore appeared desirable, for the period covered by Volumes VI and VII (March 16–September 3, 1939) to trace, as far as possible, and film all the originals, or what appear to be the originals, of the documents contained in the Second German White Book and to provide readers desirous of making their own comparisons with a guide for locating the original texts. A special microfilm of those of these documents not reproduced in full in Volumes VI and VII will also be made available.

The following table lists the numbers of the White Book documents which fall within this period, and shows whether the original has been identified and, if so, where it may be located. Where it has been published in Volumes VI and VII, reference is made to these volumes. In cases of documents not included in these two volumes, but available on film, the serial and frame numbers of the films have been provided.

An exception has been made in those cases where the White Book merely reproduces speeches or public statements already published elsewhere; here it has been felt sufficient to indicate briefly in square brackets what the subject is.

The White Book documents are arranged by topics; therefore when gaps occur in the list of White Book numbers given below, these represent documents earlier in date than March 16, 1939.

¹ German White Book No. 1 is entitled *Verhandlungen zur Lösung der Sudetendeutschen Frage, Auswärtiges Amt, 1938, Nr. 1 (Negotiations on the Solution of the Sudeten-German Question)* and was issued in 1938.

Note: GWB = German White Book; Ser./Fr. Nos. = Serial and Frame Nos.; A.A. = Auswärtiges Amt. (i.e., German Foreign Ministry). Footnote references in the last column are shown in bold figures.

<i>GWB No.</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Originator</i>	<i>Type of Document</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos.</i>	<i>Doc. or Fr. No.</i>
126	Mar. 21	Teschen	Report 168 T. Ang. IV	8584/E602162-68	
127	May 13	Teschen	Report 295 T. Ang. I	2842/549797-801	
196	Mar. 16	Danzig	Report P. 160 V	1724/400913-19	
203	Mar. 21	A.A.	Memorandum RM 17		VI, 61
204	Mar. 24	Warsaw	Telegram 48	8154/E582586	
205	Mar. 24	Gdynia	Report	Not found	
206	Mar. 24	Warsaw	Telegram 44		VI, 79
207	Mar. 25	A.A.	Memorandum (Bismarck)		VI, 90
208	Mar. 26	A.A.	Memorandum RM 20		VI, 101
209	Mar. 27	A.A.	Memorandum RM 21		VI, 108
210	Mar. 28	Warsaw	Report P I 8 a/3.39		VI, 115
211	Mar. 29	Warsaw	Telegram 54		VI, 118
212	Apr. 6	A.A.	Memorandum St. S. 316		VI, 169
213	Apr. 28		German Note		VI, 276
214	[Apr. 28]		[Hitler Speech]		
215	May 2	Warsaw	Report P 24/5.39	1818/415368-71	
216	May 23	Warsaw	Report P 24/5.39		VI, 429
247	Mar. 18	London	Report A 1119	1585/383050-52	
248	[Mar. 29]		[Chamberlain Statement]		
249	Apr. 6	London	Report A 1389	1585/383072-75	
250	[Apr. 20]		[Chamberlain Statement]		
251	Apr. 26	A.A.	Memorandum St. S. 367		VI, 272, 1
252	July 10	London	Report A 2718		VI, 645
253	July 24	London	Telegram 264		VI, 708
254	[July 28]		[Hoare Speech]		
259	Mar. 16	London	Report A 1101	7848/E569416-19	
261	Mar. 17	London	Telegram 71	1625/388360	
262	[Mar. 18]		[German announcement]		
263	Mar. 18	London	Report A 1536		VI, 35
264	Mar. 24	London	Report A 1209		VI, 26, 3
265	Mar. 24	London	Telegram 92		VI, 26, 3
266	[Apr. 28]		[Hitler Speech]		
269	[Mar. 17]		[Chamberlain Speech]		
270	Mar. 19	London	Telegram 79		VI, 42
271	[Mar. 20]		[Halifax Speech]		
272	Mar. 20	London	Telegram 81		VI, 48
273	Mar. 21	Oslo	Report: not numbered	8153/E582582	
274	Mar. 22	London	Telegram 85		VI, 83, 6
275	Mar. 23	London	Telegram 90		VI, 83, 6
276	Mar. 24	Paris	Telegram 186		VI, 84
277	Mar. 29	London	Report A 1296	7891/E571073-74	
278	Mar. 31	Paris	Report A 1405	605/247768-71	
279	[Mar. 31]		[Chamberlain Statement]		
280	Apr. 1	Warsaw	Telegram 60	1818/415216	
281	[Apr. 1]		[Hitler Speech]		
282	Apr. 3	A.A.	Circular Telegram ¹ e.o. Pol. II 1044		VI, 147
283	[Apr. 3]		[Chamberlain Speech]		
284	[Apr. 3]		[Simon Speech]		
285	Apr. 4	London	Report	Not found	
286	Apr. 10	London	Report A 1487	7891/E571131-33	
287	Apr. 12	A.A.	Circular Telegram e.o. Pol. II 1142		VI, 186
288	Apr. 13	London	Telegram 120		VI, 189
289	Apr. 14	London	Telegram 122	375/208920	
290	Apr. 15	Paris	Telegram 221	7891/E571144-45	
291	Apr. 15	Bucharest	Telegram 185	7891/E571147	
292	[Apr. 18]		[Chamberlain Statement]		
293	Apr. 26	A.A.	Memorandum St. S. 366		VI, 272

¹ Described in the German White Book as addressed to Warsaw only.

<i>GWB No.</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Originator</i>	<i>Type of Document</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos.</i>	<i>Doc. or Fr. No.</i>
294	Apr. 28		German Note		VI, 277
295	[Apr. 28]		[Hitler Speech]		
296	Apr. 29	London	Telegram 151		VI, 291
297	May 2	London	Report A 1696	2767/535867-69	
298	May 9 ²	A.A.	Memorandum St. S. 402		VI, 353
299	May 11		[Chamberlain Speech]		
300	May 13	London	Report A 1870	1730/401844-45	
301	[May 12]		[Chamberlain Statement]		
302	May 15	A.A.	Memorandum St. S. 426		VI, 385
303	[May 19]		[Chamberlain Speech]		
304	May 25	New York	Telegram 52	1625/388781	
305	[June 4]		[Hitler Speech]		
306	June 7	London	Report A 2225	7891/E571329-30	
307	June 13	A.A.	Memorandum St. S. 484		VI, 521
308	June 17	A.A.	Memorandum St. S. 493		VI, 539
309	June 22	London	Report A 2473	3722/E087155-58	
310	[June 23]		[Franco-Turkish Declaration]		
311	June 27	Paris	Report A 2150	1625/388965	
312	[June 29]		[Halifax Speech]		
313	June 29	London	Report	Not found	
314	June 30	A.A.	Memorandum St. S. 529		VI, 594
315	June 30	Therapia	Telegram 199		VI, 590
316	July 6	Paris	Report A 2962	8146/E582313-14	
317	July 10	A.A.	Memorandum (Heinburg)	Not found	
318	July 12	London	Report B 2306	7891/E571460-63	
319	July 15	London	Telegram 245	1625/389103	
320	July 18	Therapia	Telegram 208		VI, 730, 4
321	July 19	London	Report	Not found	
322	July 25	London	Report	Not found	
323	July 28	Paris	Telegram 385		VI, 731
324	July 31	Sofia	Report	Not found	
342	Mar. 22		German-Lithuanian Treaty		V, 405, 2
343	[Apr. 28]		[Hitler Speech]		
344	May 19		German Communiqué		VI, 407, 3
345	May 31		German-Danish Treaty		VI, 461
346	June 7		German-Estonian Treaty		VI, Ed. Note, p. 664
347	June 7		German-Latvian Treaty		VI, Ed. Note, p. 664 VII, 228
348	Aug. 23		German-Russian Treaty		
349	Mar. 27	A.A. ³	Memorandum (Bergmann)	1818/415185	
350	Mar. 28	Thorn	Telegram 23	2821/548759	
351	Mar. 29	A.A.	Memorandum (Bismarck)		VI, 126, 1
352	Mar. 30	Warsaw	Telegram 56		VI, 154, 3
353	Mar. 30	Thorn	Telegram 26	8150/E582386	
354	Mar. 28 ⁴	Thorn	Report 919	2821/548753-58	
355	Mar. 31	Posen	Report 658	1818/415209-14	
356	Mar. 29 ⁵	A.A.	Instructions to Warsaw zu Pol. V 2577	8150/E582383-84	
357	Apr. 4	Posen	Report 670	7638/E545470-71	

² In the German White Book the date is given as May 8.³ In the German White Book this document is described as instructions to Warsaw.⁴ In the German White Book the date is given as Mar. 30.⁵ In the German White Book the date is given as Apr. 2.

<i>GWB No.</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Originator</i>	<i>Type of Document</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos.</i>	<i>Doc. or Fn. No.</i>
358	Mar. 27 ⁶	A.A.	Instructions to Warsaw e.o. Pol. V 2684	1785/407810	
	Apr. 26 ⁶	Warsaw	Report P III 2 a	8603/E603804	
359	Apr. 18	Danzig	Report 590	8603/E603805	
360	Apr. 18	Warsaw	Report P III 2 a/4.39	2821/548780-82	
361	Apr. 18	Thorn	Report 1163	2287/483033	
362	Apr. 22	Kattowitz	Report 786	7638/E545652-60	
363	Apr. 24	Kattowitz	Report 786 Ang. II	7638/E545672-74	
364	Apr. 28	Kattowitz	Report 838	7638/E545667-71	
365	May 6	Kattowitz	Report 842 Ang. II	2821/548809-13	
366	May 8	Lodz	Report Kult. 3 d	8150/E582388-90	
367	May 8	Warsaw	Report	8150/E582391-93	
368	May 11	A.A.	Circular Instructions ⁷ zu Pol. V 3303	Not found	VI, 367
369	May 12	Petition by representatives of the German national group to the Polish President		2842/549528-31	
370	May 15	Lodz	Report Kult. 3 d		VI, 402, 1
371	May 18	Lodz	Report Kult. 3 d		VI, 402, 1
372	May 19	Kattowitz	Report 992	8150/E582436-91	
373	May 22	Posen	Report 1023	8156/E582603-07	
374	May 22	Warsaw	Report P III 2 a/5.39	8156/E582609-12	
375	May 25	Posen	Report 1074	8156/E582614-19	
376	May 30	Kattowitz	Report 1053	8150/E582492-551	
377	June 2	Teschen	Telegram 5	8156/E582623	
378	June 6	Warsaw	Report P III 1 d/6.39	1818/415500-01	
379	June 6	Teschen	Report 358 T	8156/E582633-35	
380	June 6	Thorn	Report 2510	1818/415517-20	
381	June 7	Lodz	Report Kult. 3 d	8150/E582395-405	
382	June 15	Warsaw	Report P III 1 d/6.39	1818/415462-65	
383	June 16	Posen	Report 1228	2291/483513-17	
384	June 19	Posen	Report 1232	8150/E582408-09	
385	June 19 ⁸	Deutsche Stiftung Memorandum transmitted by letter 1458 of June 29		8156/E582639-42	
386	June 22	Kattowitz	Report 1200	2291/483532	
387	June 23	Thorn	Report 2714	8155/E582590	
388	June 24	Lodz	Report Kult. 3 d	8150/E582411-15	
389	June 26	Kattowitz	Report 1248	8149/E582341-61	
390	June 26	A.A.	Telegram 155 to Warsaw	2842/549610	
391	June 27	Warsaw	Telegram 128	2291/483549-50	
392	June 27	German Embassy, Warsaw	Aide-mémoire to the Polish Foreign Ministry	1818/415558-59	
393	July 3	Thorn	Report 2864	8151/E582567-68	
394	July 5	Warsaw	Report	Not found	
395	July 10	Posen	Report 1397	8155/E582591-99	
396	July 10	Thorn	Report 2942	8150/E582416-20	
397	July 11	Warsaw	Report P III 1 d/7.39	2821/548907	
398	July 12	Posen	Report 1398	8156/E582643-45	
399	July 13	Teschen	Report 411 T Ang. III	8156/E582647-57	
400	July 15	Lemberg	Report Kult. 3 a/34	8150/E582422-26	
401	July 20	Thorn	Report 3031	8150/E582428-33	
402	July 24	Kattowitz	Report	Not found	

⁶ On Mar. 27 the Embassy in Warsaw was instructed to protest against an appeal by Polish ex-servicemen to boycott all things German. The Embassy reported on Apr. 26 that a protest had been lodged with the Polish Foreign Ministry. The document printed in the German White Book, as a despatch from Warsaw of Apr. 4, appears to be based on the two documents cited above.

⁷ In the German White Book this document is described as instructions to London.

⁸ Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the document printed in the German White Book are based on the Memorandum submitted by the Deutsche Stiftung. A document reproducing the information in paragraphs 3-5 has not been found.

<i>GWB No.</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Originator</i>	<i>Type of Document</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos.</i>	<i>Doc. or Fr. No.</i>
403	July 25	Thorn	Report 3088	8150/E582553-62	
404	July 28	Teschen	Report 380 T Ang. IV	8149/E582362-76	
405	Aug. 8	Teschen	Report 539 T ⁹	8149/E582378	
406	Aug. 8	Kattowitz	Telegram 8	8150/E582563	
407	Aug. 9	Lemberg	Report Kult. 3/151	8156/E582661-68	
408	Aug. 10	Thorn	Report	Not found	
409	Aug. 12	Posen	Telegram 31	52/34972	
410	Aug. 16	A.A.	Memorandum (Schliep)	52/34997	
411	Aug. 15	Posen	Report 1654	8156/E582670-71	
412	Aug. 16	Kattowitz	Telegram 90	2842/549788	
413	Aug. 16 ¹⁰	Teschen	Telegram 17	8584/E602165	
414	Aug. 18	Teschen	Report 601 T. Ang. III	8149/E582379	
415	Aug. 23 ¹¹	A.A.	Circular Instructions e.o. Pol. V 8139		VII, 218 & 2
416	Aug. 23	A.A.	Memorandum (Bergmann)	Not found	
417	Aug. 28	Thorn	Report	Not found	
418	May 11	Danzig	Report 789	8148/E582330-32	
419	May 15	Thorn	Report	Not found	
420	May 22	A.A.	Memorandum (Bergmann)	8049/E578596-98	
421	May 24	Danzig	Report 886 II	8049/E578631-40	
422	May 24	Main Customs Office, Elbing	Report	8148/E582333-37	
423	June 5	Danzig	Report 930 II		VI, 471 & 4
424	June 9	Danzig	Report 959		VI, 749, 6
425	June 12	Danzig	Report 977		VI, 515
426	June 12	Danzig	Report 976		VI, 652, 3
427	June 23	Danzig	Report 1073	8147/E582320-22	
428	June 23	Danzig	Telegram 10	8147/E582319	
429	July 7	Danzig	Report 1190	8157/E582677-78	
430	July 11	Thorn	Report 2945		VI, 599, 3
431	July 29	The President of the Danzig Senate	Note to the Polish Diplomatic Representative in Danzig		VI, 749, 8
432	Aug. 4	The Polish Diplomatic Representative in Danzig	Note to the President of the Danzig Senate		VI, 774
433	Aug. 4	ditto	ditto		VI, 774, 2
434	Aug. 7	The President of the Danzig Senate	Note to the Polish Diplomatic Representative in Danzig		VI, 780
435	Aug. 23	A.A.	Memorandum (Bergmann)	7989/E575440	
436	Aug. 24	A.A.	Memorandum (Schulz-Sponholz)	7989/E575444	
437	Aug. 31	Danzig	Telephone communication	Not found	
438	[July 10]		[Chamberlain statement]		
439	July 13	A.A.	Memorandum St. S. 559		VI, 665
440	July 14	A.A.	Memorandum St. S. 566		VI, 671
441	July 21	Warsaw	Telegram 146	1724/401028	
442	July 22	Warsaw	Report P III 1 a/7.39	1724/401030-33	
443	July 22	Warsaw	Telegram 148	52/34922-23	
444	Aug. 1	Warsaw	Report P 24/8.39		VI, 754

⁹ In the German White Book this report is described as a telegram.

¹⁰ The only document found which approximates to the telegram of Aug. 17 reproduced in the German White Book.

¹¹ This circular is signed by Woermann and appears to be the original of the German White Book document which is there described as a memorandum by Bergmann and dated Aug. 20. No memorandum by Bergmann of that date on that subject has been found.

<i>GFR No.</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Originator</i>	<i>Type of Document</i>	<i>Ser./Fr. Nos.</i>	<i>Doc. or Fr. No.</i>
445	Aug. 9	A.A.	Memorandum St. S. 616		VII, 5
446	Aug. 10	Polish communication to the German Chargé d'Affaires in Warsaw			VII, 10
447	Aug. 11	Warsaw	Telegram ¹²		
448	Aug. 10	London	Telegram 289		VII, 13
449	Aug. 15	A.A.	Memorandum St. S. 624		VII, 64
450	Aug. 15	A.A.	Memorandum St. S. 628		VII, 66
451	Aug. 18	A.A.	Memorandum St. S. 637		VII, 114
452	Aug. 21	Washington	Report	Not found 7891/E571553-54	
453	Aug. 22	London	Telegram 313		
454	Aug. 22	The British Prime Minister	Letter to the Führer and Chancellor		VII, 200, enclosure
455	Aug. 23	A.A.	Memorandum (Loesch)		VII, 200
456	Aug. 23	The Führer and Chancellor	Letter to the British Prime Minister		VII, 201
457	Aug. 25	A.A.	Unsigned Memorandum		VII, 265
458	Aug. 25	A.A.	Memorandum (Woermann)		VII, 267
459	[Aug. 25]		[Anglo-Polish Treaty]		
460	Aug. 26	The French Minister President	Letter to the Führer and Chancellor		VII, 324
461	Aug. 27	The Führer and Chancellor	Letter to the French Minister President		VII, 354
462	Aug. 27	Warsaw	Telegram 190	52/35243	
463	Aug. 28	British communication to the Führer and Chancellor			VII, 384, enclosure
464	Aug. 29	German communication to the British Government			VII, 421
465	Aug. 30	Warsaw	Telephone communication		VII, 451
466	Aug. 31	A.A.	Memorandum (Schmidt)		VII, 461
467	Sept. 1 ¹³	A.A.	Circular Telegram e.o. Pol. II . . .		VII, 495
468	Aug. 31	Official German Communiqué			VII, 482
469	[Aug. 31]		[Polish wireless report]	Not found	
470	Sept. 1	A.A.	Memorandum (Schliep)		
471	[Sept. 1]		[Hitler Speech]		
472	Sept. 2	A.A.	Memorandum RM 43		VII, 513
473	Sept. 2	A.A.	Memorandum RM 44		VII, 515
474	Sept. 2	Italian Ambassador, Berlin	Memorandum handed to German State Secretary		VII, 535
475	[Sept. 2]		[Havas report]		
476	[Sept. 2]		[Halifax Statement]		
477	Sept. 3	British Ambassador, Berlin	Note to the German Foreign Minister		VII, 560
478	Sept. 3	British Foreign Secretary	Note to the German Chargé d'Affaires, London		VII, 564, enclosure 1
479	Sept. 3	A.A.	German communication to the British Government		VII, 561, enclosure
480	Sept. 3	French Ambassador, Berlin	Communication to the Foreign Minister		VII, 563, enclosure
481	Sept. 3	A.A.	Memorandum RM 48		VII, 568
482	Sept. 3	A.A.	Circular Telegram e.o. Pol. II 3185		VII, 569

¹² No record of a telegram despatched from Warsaw on this date can be traced. Warsaw telegram No. 157 was despatched on Aug. 8, telegram No. 158 on Aug. 12 (see Appendix II).

¹³ In the German White Book the date is given as Aug. 31.

Appendix V

ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY¹

THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER
von Ribbentrop

a) *Secretariat*: Senior Counsellor Dr. Kordt (Erich)
Minister Dr. Schmidt (Paul Otto)
Counsellor Dr. Brücklmeier
Legationssekretär Dr. Sonnleithner
Legationssekretär Dr. Bruns
Hauptreferent Stahmer

b) *Personal Staff*: Head: Senior Counsellor Hewel
Senior Counsellor Dr. Schmidt (Paul Karl)
Counsellor Likus
Legationssekretär Gottfriedsen

THE STATE SECRETARY OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
Freiherr von Weizsäcker

Secretariat: Counsellor Dr. Siegfried
Counsellor von Kessel

THE HEAD OF THE AUSLANDSORGANISATION IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
State Secretary E. W. Bohle

STATE SECRETARY FOR SPECIAL DUTIES
W. Keppler

AMBASSADOR FOR SPECIAL DUTIES
Dr. Ritter

PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT

Head of Protocol: Minister Dr. Freiherr von Dörnberg

Deputy: Counsellor Dr. von Halem

¹ A new department, the Information Department (INF.), was set up on Aug. 21, 1939. Apart from this change and such changes in personnel as occurred within the period covered by the present volume, the organization plan here printed is substantially the same as that included in vol. VI of this Series, which has been translated and condensed from a German Foreign Ministry organization circular of Feb. 15, 1939 (1780/406632-58). A fuller version of the organization plan with effect from Dec. 1, 1937, is printed in vol. I; from June 1, 1938, in vol. II; from September 1936 in vol. III; from Feb. 15, 1939, in vol. IV; and from Dec. 1, 1939, in vol. VIII.

PERSONNEL AND BUDGET DEPARTMENT (PERS.)

Director of Department: Ministerialdirektor Kriebel

Deputy Director: Minister Schroeder

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT (POL.)

Director of Department: Under State Secretary Woermann as
Ministerialdirektor

Deputy Director: Minister Prince von Bismarck as Ministerialdirigent

Pol. I	League of Nations, military questions, armaments, aviation, defence:	Senior Counsellor von Kamp-hoevenor, Counsellor Dr. von der Heyden-Rynsch, Legationssekretär von Nostitz (Gottfried)
Pol. Ia	Special duties:	Consul General (unassigned) Dr. von Luckwald
Pol. II	Western Europe:	Senior Counsellor von Rintelen
Pol. IIIa	Spain, Portugal:	Counsellor Dr. Schwendemann
Pol. IIIb	Vatican:	Counsellor Dr. Haidlen
Pol. IVa	Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy (Ethiopia, Libya), Yugoslavia, Rumania, Hungary:	Senior Counsellor Dr. Heimbürg
Pol. IVb	Austria (Liquidation), Czechoslovakia:	Senior Counsellor Dr. Altenburg (until August 1939)
Pol. V	Eastern Europe:	Senior Counsellor Dr. Schliep, Counsellor Bergmann, Counsellor Meyer-Heydenhagen
Pol. VI	Scandinavia and Baltic States:	Senior Counsellor Dr. von Grundherr
Pol. VII	Near and Middle East:	Senior Counsellor Dr. von Hentig
Pol. VIII	Far East and Australia:	Counsellor Dr. Knoll
Pol. IX	America:	Senior Counsellor Freytag
Pol. X	Africa:	Senior Counsellor Dr. Bielfeld
Pol. MC	Matters connected with German property seized in the United States, German-American Mixed Claims Commission:	Minister (unassigned) Rohland
Pol. Grenz	Frontier treaties and other technical questions concerning Reich frontiers which are the subject of negotiations with foreign Governments:	Senior Counsellor Dr. Roediger (Conrad)

ECONOMIC POLICY DEPARTMENT (W.)

Director of Department: Ministerialdirektor Wiehl

Deputy Director: Minister Dr. Clodius as Ministerialdirigent

Directly subordinate to Head of Department:

Leader of delegations for commercial treaties:		Minister Dr. Hemmen
W I	General Section for questions concerning economics and finance:	... , Legationssekretär Dr. Pawelke
W II	Western and Southern Europe (excluding Great Britain and Italy):	Senior Counsellor Sabath, Counsellor Dr. Kreutzwald
W III	South East Europe including Italy and the Near East:	Senior Counsellor Moraht, Consul (unassigned) Dr. Kalisch, Legationssekretär Dr. Junker
W IV	Eastern Europe:	Senior Counsellor Dr. Schnurre
W V	Northern Europe:	Counsellor Dr. van Scherpenberg
W VI	Great Britain, Dominions and British possessions (excluding Canada):	Senior Counsellor Rüter
W VII	Far East:	Counsellor Dr. Voss
W VIII	America:	
	a) North America including Canada and Mexico:	Senior Counsellor Dr. David- sen
	b) South America including Central America:	Counsellor Dr. Becker
W IX	Shipping:	Senior Counsellor Bleyert
W X	Reich Office for Foreign Trade:	Senior Counsellor Dr. Win- gen
W XI	Raw materials:	Senior Counsellor Bisse
W XII	General transport questions:	Minister Dr. Martius

LEGAL DEPARTMENT (R.)

Director of Department: Ministerialdirektor Dr. Gaus

Deputy Director: Senior Counsellor Dr. Albrecht

CULTURAL POLICY DEPARTMENT (KULT.)

Director of Department: Minister Dr. von Twardowski as Ministerialdirigent

Deputy Director: Senior Counsellor Rühle

NEWS SERVICE AND PRESS DEPARTMENT (P.)

Acting Director of Department: Senior Counsellor Dr. Schmidt (Paul Karl)

Attached:

1) As personal assistant:	Dr. Steinbichl
2) For official announcements by the Foreign Ministry and liaison with the German daily press:	Attaché Lohse

Special duty	Minister Braun von Stumm
<i>Deutsche diplomatisch-politische Korrespondenz:</i>	
P. Gen. Organization and routine, including protocol questions of the Department. International press agreements:	Counsellor Dr. Hellenthal
P. Ausl. Press advisers and foreign correspondents:	Ministerialrat (retd.) Dr. Jahncke
P. Information	Referent H. Kleinlein
Material for press and political campaigns. Information for German Missions. German periodicals. Reference library of the Department:	
Special duty	Minister (unassigned) Dr. Kirchholtes
General questions affecting South-east Europe:	
P. I England, Ireland, South Africa, British possessions (if not dealt with elsewhere) German colonies:	Legationssekretär Leithe-Jasper
P. II France and French possessions; Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg:	Senior Counsellor von Eckhardt, Legationssekretär Dr. Platzer
P. III Spain, Portugal, Vatican, Italy (Albania, Ethiopia, Libya):	Counsellor Ritter von Zeileissen
P. IV Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary:	Minister (unassigned) Dr. Schwörbel
P. V Eastern Europe (Poland, Danzig, Soviet Union):	Legationssekretär Dr. Staudacher
P. VI Scandinavia and the Baltic States:	Legationssekretär Dr. Schlemann
P. VII Near and Middle East (including British India):	Minister (unassigned) Dr. Schwörbel
P. VIII Far East; Australia, New Zealand; Indo-China and Netherlands East Indies:	Referent Prince Urach
P. IX United States; Canada; Central and South America:	Consul-General (unassigned) Dr. Soehring, Referent Dr. Sallet, Consul Hammer-schmidt
P. X Foreign and German press archives:	Counsellor Dr. Busse
P. XI Press conferences and reports:	Dr. Schacht

INFORMATION DEPARTMENT (INF.)

Director of Department: Minister Dr. Altenburg

Deputy Director: Counsellor Dr. Rahn

Special section: General planning: Counsellor Dr. Rahn

Inf. I	Procurement and evaluation of reports and other material usable for propaganda (German origin):	Counsellor Dr. Kastner
Inf. II	Military reporting and propaganda services:	Consul (unassigned) Baron von Tucher
Inf. III	News release and feature article service (foreign press):	Consul Dr. Seelos
Inf. IV	Mass propaganda:	Consul von der Damerau-Dambrowski
Inf. V	Propaganda direction (Supervision of the propaganda activity of internal German agencies):	Research Assistant Völkers
	Liaison office for radio:	Counsellor Dr. Schirmer
	Liaison office with Ministry of Propaganda and the Dienststelle Ribbentrop:	Legationssekretär Büttner

SPECIAL SECTION FOR GERMANY

Information for foreign Missions about important internal political events. Policy towards the Jews. Racial policy. Anti-Comintern questions. International police cooperation. Emigré affairs. Flags. National anthems:	Counsellor Dr. Schumburg
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SPECIAL PARTY SECTION

Business between the Foreign Ministry and the departments of the NSDAP (excluding the sphere of the AO and liaison with the Security Service and the Gestapo). The Party Rally. Visits abroad by prominent persons in the State and Party:	Senior Counsellor Luther
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Appendix VI

LIST OF GERMAN FILES USED

The following table identifies the German file from which each document has been derived. The documents of the Foreign Ministry were bound into volumes by the Germans. The documents in these volumes have been microfilmed, and each film of a file has been identified by a film serial number, while each page of the documents has been identified by a frame number stamped on the original at the time of filming. The documents published in this collection are identified by the film serial number and frame numbers in the upper left-hand corner of each document. By reference to the following table of film serial numbers the location in the German Foreign Ministry archives of the copy of the document used in this publication may be determined. In some few cases separate files, usually on closely related topics, have been filmed consecutively under a single serial number; these are marked by an asterisk (*). A number of serials are given as supplementary to earlier ones; these are cases where a re-check of the file in question indicated that additional filming might be useful to scholars or, as is more often the case, where in the process of editing for publication the editors wished to provide a film record of documents of lesser importance to which references appeared in the documents selected.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
A/084793 ff.	Special film of the Prosecution Exhibits before the International
084802 ff.	Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.
086088 ff.	
B 18	State Secretary: Finland.
B 21	State Secretary: United States of America.
22	State Secretary: Norway.
26	Pol. VI: Northern Europe—Military Affairs.
34	State Secretary: U.S.S.R.—Negotiations; Economy; Non-Aggression Pact. Under State Secretary Woermann: U.S.S.R.*
43	Dienststelle Ribbentrop: Confidential Reports.
51	Under State Secretary Woermann: Naval Warfare.
52	State Secretary: Poland.
53	State Secretary: Conference of the Heads of Missions in South America.
54	State Secretary; Memoranda on Conversations with and Visits of Non- Diplomatic Personages.
66	Paul Otto Schmidt: Papers
73	State Secretary: Hungary.
91	State Secretary: Ireland. Under State Secretary Woermann: Ireland (Veesenmayer).*
96	State Secretary: Turkey.
97	State Secretary: Danzig.
100	German Embassy in Italy: Mackensen Papers.
103	State Secretary: U.S.S.R.

*Film Serial
Numbers*

Title of File

- 115 Reich Foreign Minister: Liechtenstein: Lithuania; Latvia; Luxembourg; Memel; Austria.*
- 116 Reich Foreign Minister: Africa; Albania; Danzig; Estonia; Croatia.*
- 121 State Secretary: German-French Relations.
- 127 German Embassy in the Soviet Union, Secret: Political Relations of the U.S.S.R. with Germany.
- 129 State Secretary: Portugal.
- 136 State Secretary: German-Spanish Relations.
- 141 State Secretary: Belgium.
- 145 Under State Secretary Woermann: Far Eastern Conflict.
- 147 Reich Foreign Minister: Poland; Conflict with Poland.
- 167 German Embassy in the Soviet Union, Secret: Political Relations of the U.S.S.R. with other States.
- 169 State Secretary: Rumania.
- 173 State Secretary: Netherlands.
- 174 State Secretary: Japan.
- 183 State Secretary: Switzerland.
- 198 Economic Policy Department: Clodius Papers—Japan.
- 205 State Secretary: Sweden.
- 215 German Embassy in the Soviet Union, Secret: Miscellaneous Secret Papers.
- 230 State Secretary: Yugoslavia.
- 247 State Secretary: Denmark.
- 259 State Secretary: Anglo-German Relations.
- 276 German Embassy in the Soviet Union, Secret: Schulenburg Special Political File.
- 319 Economic Policy Department: Wiehl Papers—Sweden.
- 321 State Secretary: Lithuania.
- 323 State Secretary: Latvia.
- 328 State Secretary: Luxembourg.
- 350 Under State Secretary: Slovakia.
- 363 German Embassy in the Soviet Union, Secret: Political Relations of Germany with Italy.
- 370 German Embassy in the Soviet Union, Secret: Political Relations of the U.S.S.R. with the Balkan Pact States.
- 375 State Secretary: Halifax's Visit and its Consequences.
- 381 State Secretary: Correspondence of the State Secretary on Political Matters.
- 388 Pol. V: Political Relations of the U.S.S.R. with Germany.
- 406 State Secretary: Estonia.
- 419 State Secretary: Foreign Propaganda; Press.
- 439 State Secretary: Correspondence of the State Secretary on Political Matters.
- 452 State Secretary: Political Correspondence of the State Secretary with Officials of the Foreign Service.
- 461 German Embassy in the Soviet Union, Secret: Political Relations between Germany and Poland, also Danzig.
- 472 State Secretary: Political Correspondence of the State Secretary with Officials of the Foreign Service.
- 477 German Embassy in the Soviet Union, Secret: Political Relations between Germany and Poland.
- 495 State Secretary: Memoranda on Visits of Diplomats.

*Film Serial
Numbers*

Title of File

- 506 State Secretary: Memoranda on Visits of Diplomats.
- 533 State Secretary: Relations with the Holy See.
- 583 State Secretary: German-Italian Relations.
- 585 State Secretary: Bulgaria.
- 591 Pol. IV: Italy—Resettlement Question—S. Tyrol.
- 605 Pol. II: France—Foreign Policy: General.
- 610 State Secretary: Slovakia.
- 621 Pol. II: Political Relations of France with Germany.
- 644 Political Department: German-Soviet Treaties 1939–1941; also Supplementary to 127.
- 695 Supplementary to 127, 644.
- 799 Under State Secretary: Poland-Danzig.
- 800 Under State Secretary: Poland-Danzig.
- 823 Dienststelle Ribbentrop: Confidential Reports.
- 909 Pol. Geheim: Poland—Political Affairs.
- 910 Pol. Geheim: Poland—Political Affairs.
- 967 German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers 1936–1940.
- 977 Pol. II: Political Relations between Great Britain and Japan.
- 1132 Under State Secretary Woermann: Documents on the Outbreak of War.
- 1133 Under State Secretary Woermann: Speeches and Notes.
- 1256 Pol. V: Political Relations of Poland with the U.S.S.R.
- 1318 Economic Policy Department: Clodius Papers—the Netherlands.
- 1500 Pol. IV: Political Relations of Italy with Germany.
- 1559 German Embassy in Belgium: Germany—Foreign Policy: General.
- 1570 Supplementary to 121.
- 1571 Supplementary to 583.
- 1585 Pol. II: Political Relations of Great Britain with Germany.
- 1594 Pol. VII: Turkey—Foreign Policy: General.
- 1601 German Embassy in Belgium: Belgian Foreign Policy.
- 1602 German Embassy in Belgium: Political Relations of Belgium with Germany—Treaties: General.
- 1610 Pol. III: Political Relations of the Holy See with Germany.
- 1619 Pol. II: Political Relations between Great Britain and India.
- 1625 Pol. II: British Attempt to build an anti-German Group of Powers.
- 1632 Pol. IV: Political Relations between Rumania and the U.S.S.R.
- 1649 Pol. Geheim: Austria—Political Affairs.
- 1671 Pol. Geheim: War between Great Britain, France, Poland and Germany—Far East.
- 1724 Pol. V: Political Relations of Danzig with Poland.
- 1730 Pol. V: Political Relations of Danzig with Great Britain.
- 1744 Pol. IV: Political Relations of Austria with Germany.
- 1746 Hewel Papers: Miscellaneous.
- 1785 Pol. V: Exchanges of Visits by German and Polish Statesmen.
- 1793 Pol. VI: Russo-Finnish War.
- 1807 Pol. VI: Political Relations between Latvia and the U.S.S.R.
- 1818 Pol. V: Political Relations of Poland with Germany.
- 1848 Supplementary to 583.
- 1925 Hewel Papers: Correspondence with Germans 1938–1942.
- 1926 Supplementary to 53.
- 2002 Pol. IV: Political Relations of Slovakia with Germany.
- 2042 Pol. VI: Lithuania—Internal Politics, Parliament and Parties.
- 2059 Economic Policy Department: Clodius Papers—Italy.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
2092	Economic Policy Department: Wiehl Papers—U.S.S.R.
2130	German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers 1939.
2131	German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers 1939.
2134	Supplementary to 495.
2178	Supplementary to 1133.
2185	State Secretary: Memoranda on Internal Directives; Views of Specific Questions; Telephone Conversations, etc.
2273	German Embassy in France: Secret Papers 1939.
2281	German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers 1940-1941.
2287	Pol. V: German Community in Poland.
2290	German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers 1939.
2291	Pol. V: German Community in Poland.
2361	German Embassy in Turkey: Armaments Industry.
2422	Pol. IX: Political Relations of the USA with Germany.
2447	Economic Policy Department: Clodius Papers—Great Britain.
2508	Inland II D: Ossa—Budget, Finance etc., 1930-1942.
2642	Pol. VI: Schleswig—German Community Abroad.
2721	Supplementary to 388.
2722	Pol. V: Political Relations of the U.S.S.R. with Turkey.
2767	Supplementary to 1625.
2770	Pol. II: Political Relations of Great Britain with the U.S.S.R.
2780	Supplementary to 147.
2794	Supplementary to 605.
2798	Supplementary to 121, 1570.
2812	Pol. II: French Diplomatic and Consular Representation abroad, except in Germany, and vice versa.
2818	Pol. V: Poland—German Community in Poland—Olza Area.
2821	Pol. V: Poland—Excesses against Reich Germans and <i>Volksdeutsche</i> .
2822	Supplementary to 1785.
2830	German Embassy in the Soviet Union, Secret: Press and Propaganda: General.
2835	Supplementary to 621.
2840	Cultural Policy Department: Secret Papers of Kult. U; Secret Papers of Kult. W.*
2842	Pol. V: German Community in Poland.
2855	Pol. V: Danzig—Ministries.
2856	Supplementary to 1601.
2871	Political Department: Treaties, 1936-1944.
2872	German Legation in Luxembourg: Ore Deliveries.
2898	Pol. VIII: Political Relations of Japan with Germany.
2899	Head of the Auslandsorganisation: Poland.
2901	Economic Policy Department: Clodius Papers—Sweden.
2915	Economic Policy Department: Wiehl Papers—Denmark.
2916	Economic Policy Department: Clodius Papers—Denmark.
2950	Economic Policy Department: Clodius Papers—Turkey.
2988	Pol. IV: Rumanian Diplomatic and Consular Representation abroad, except in Germany, and vice versa.
2993	Pol. IX: United States of America—Neutrality Questions.
2997	Pol. IX: United States of America—Heads of State and their Families.
3001	Supplementary to 1133, 2178.
3059	Supplementary to 1133, 2178, 3001.
3068	Pol. III: Holy See—Archbishoprics and Bishoprics in Germany.

*Film Serial
Numbers*

Title of File

- 3442 Pol. V: Poland—Ministries.
- 3722 Pol. II: Great Britain—General Foreign Policy.
- 3730 Pol. II: Political Relations of Great Britain with Eire.
- 3781 Supplementary to 2092.
- 4994 Economic Policy Department: Wiehl Papers—America.
- 5556 Economic Policy Department, Secret: Trade in War Material—Rumania.
- 5558 Economic Policy Department, Secret: Trade in War Material—Bulgaria.
- 5644 Economic Policy Department: Clodius Papers—U.S.S.R.
- 5917 Legal Department: Appointment of neutral Protecting Powers to represent German interests in enemy territory.
- 6563 Economic Policy Division VIIIa (later IXa): United States of America—Imports, Exports and Transit Trade.
- 6670 Office of the Führer's Adjutants: Functions, 1936–1941.
- 7249 German Consulate General at Danzig: Conversations with the High Commissioner.
- 7250 German Embassy in Poland: Top Secret Matters 1937–1939.
- 7433 Foreign Policy Office: General Matters.
- 7508 German Embassy in Italy: German Colonial Policy.
- 7638 Pol. V: Political Relations of Poland with Germany; Internal Politics, Parliament and Parties; German Community in Poland; Excesses against Reich Germans and Volksdeutsche; Labour Questions.*
- 7693 Pol. V: Danzig—Customs.
- 7848 Supplementary to 1625, 2767.
- 7872 Reich Chancellery: German Diplomatic and Consular Representation abroad.
- 7873 Reich Chancellery: Germans abroad: General.
- 7891 Supplementary to 1625, 2767.
- 7895 Supplementary to 5556.
- 7950 Supplementary to 97.
- 7951 Supplementary to 2185.
- 7966 Supplementary to 388, 2721, 2818, 2842.
- 7967 Supplementary to 1724.
- 7968 Legal Department: German Minefields, German Civilian Internees abroad, in Egypt, in Great Britain.*
- 7969 Head of the Auslandsorganisation: Rallies in Stuttgart; France; Poland;* —also Supplementary to 2899.
- 7970 Economic Policy Department: Clodius Papers—Great Britain; France; Italy; Japan; U.S.S.R.*
- 7971 Pol. IX: International Political Problems—Pan-America; Political Relations of the United States of America with Germany; United States of America—Internal Politics, Parliament and Parties.*
- 7972 Pol. VIII: Japan—Ministries.
- 7973 Pol. II: Great Britain—Internal Politics, Parliament and Parties.
- 7974 Supplementary to 910.
- 7976 Pol. I M.: Abwehr: General; Agents' and Spies' Reports; Agents and Spies—individual cases.*
- 7977 State Secretary: German-French Relations; German-Italian Relations; Memoranda by the State Secretary on Visits of Diplomats; Correspondence on Political Matters.*
- 7978 Legal Department: Reports on Police Organization at home and abroad; International Police Cooperation; Position regarding Passports—Bohemia and Moravia.*

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
7979	Legal Department: Prosecution of Herschel Grünspar.
7980	Special Section for Germany: War.
7981	Economic Policy Division VI (later IIB): Great Britain—Miscellaneous.*
7982	Economic Policy Division II (later IIA): France—Miscellaneous.*
7983	German Embassy in Poland: Miscellaneous.*
7984	Economic Policy Division XI: Prize and Blockade Matters.
7985	Press Department: Miscellaneous.
7987	Supplementary to 2290.
7988	Cultural Policy Department: Confidants 1939.
7989	Pol. I Luft: Poland—Frontier Violations by Aircraft.
7990	German Embassy in Italy: German-Italian Relations; Poland.*
7991	German Embassy in France: Danzig; Information Telegrams.
7992	Supplementary to 477, 2830.
8049	Pol. V: Danzig—Frontier Violations: Kalthof Incident.
8132	Supplementary to 7991.
8133	Göring's Staff Office [<i>Stabsamt</i>]: Reports on Foreign Countries 1933–1939.
8135	Special Party Section: Party Rally 1939.
8137	Pol. VIII: China—Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties.
8139	Supplementary to 2898.
8144	Supplementary to 1585.
8146	Pol. II: Political Relations between Great Britain and France.
8147	Supplementary to 1724, 7967.
8148	Pol. V: Danzig—Frontier Violations.
8149	Supplementary to 2818, 7966.
8150	Supplementary to 2821, 7638.
8151	Pol. V: Poland—Food and Agriculture; Forestry, Hunting.
8152	Supplementary to 147, 2780.
8153	German Legation in Norway: Dissolution of Czechoslovakia: Return of Memel 1939.
8154	German Embassy in Poland: Poland—Military Matters.
8155	German Embassy in Poland: Recent Papers—Miscellaneous 1939.
8156	Cultural Policy Department: Fostering of the German Community in Poland.
8157	German Embassy in Poland: Economy—Recent Papers: Miscellaneous 1939.
8279	German Embassy in Italy: Party Rally 1939.
8286	German Legation in Switzerland: Swiss Neutrality.
8287	German Consulate General at Danzig: Visit of Cruiser <i>Königsberg</i> or <i>Schleswig-Holstein</i> .
8294	Legal Department: Slovakia—Treaty Negotiations.
8295	Supplementary to 53, 1926.
8296	Legal Department: Treaties—Slovakia.
8340	Economic Policy Division III (later IVA): Yugoslavia—Mines and Foundries.
8341	German Embassy in Italy: Visits 1939.
8342	German Embassy in Turkey: Economic Relations of Turkey with Germany.
8345	Pol. II: France—General Foreign Policy.
8350	Economic Policy Division VI (later IIB): Belgium—Effects of British Economic Warfare on German Trade.
8369	German Legation in Switzerland: Secret Papers 1939.
8371	German Embassy in France: Party Rally and Meetings.

*Film Serial
Numbers*

Title of File

- 8372 German Embassy in France: Claims and Complaints against the German State.
- 8376 German Legation in Hungary: Outgoing Telegrams 1939.
- 8377 German Legation in Rumania: Rumania—Foreign Policy.
- 8378 German Legation in Rumania: Political Relations between Hungary and Rumania.
- 8379 Economic Policy Department: Treaties with the U.S.S.R.
- 8390 German Legation in Latvia: The Neutrality of the Baltic States.
- 8391 Supplementary to 121, 1570, 2798.
- 8392 Supplementary to 2130.
- 8393 Pol. V: Poland—Frontier Violations.
- 8394 Supplementary to 2855.
- 8395 Supplementary to 2290, 7987.
- 8415 Supplementary to 1610.
- 8418 Pol. I Vbd.: Yugoslavia.
- 8470 Supplementary to 1818.
- 8504 Supplementary to 621.
- 8505 German Legation in Luxembourg: Luxembourg—Security Questions, etc.
- 8567 Wiedemann Papers: 1938.
- 8568 German Legation in Norway: Norwegian Neutrality.
- 8581 Special Party Section (later Inland I): Party Rally 1939—Great Britain.
- 8582 Special Party Section (later Inland I): Party Rally 1939—France.
- 8583 Supplementary to 8279.
- 8584 Supplementary to 2818, 7966, 8149.
- 8589 Naval Archives: OKW Directives (Führer).
- 8608 Supplementary to 1785, 2822.
- 9882 Supplementary to 7989.
- 9887 Supplementary to 7991, 8132.
- 9928 Army Archives: Top Secret Papers of Department 10 [Fortifications] of the OKH.
- 9929 Naval Archives: Out of date Operational Instructions and Orders.
- 9939 Naval Archives: Treue A [Naval Building Policy].
- 9954 Supplementary to 198.
- 9968 Supplementary to 7991, 8132, 9887.
- 9989 Supplementary to 247.
- 9990 Legal Department: Finland-Neutrality.
- F 1, 5, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19: German Foreign Ministry film of files of the Reich Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

Appendix VII

LIST OF PERSONS¹

- ABETZ, Otto, Paris representative of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop until July 1939.
- ALTENBURG, Günther, Head of Political Division IVb (Austria and Czechoslovakia) in the German Foreign Ministry; Director of the Information Department from August 21, 1939.
- ARCISZEWSKI, Mirosław, Assistant Under Secretary of State in the Polish Foreign Ministry.
- ARITA, Hachiro, Japanese Foreign Minister.
- ASTAKHOV, Georgi, Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Germany.
- ATTOLICO, Bernardo, Italian Ambassador in Germany.
- BARCKHAUSEN, Franz, Lieutenant General, Member of the German Military Commission in Slovakia.
- BÁRDOSY, László de, Hungarian Minister in Rumania.
- BECK, Józef, Colonel, Polish Foreign Minister.
- BEIGBEDER ATIENZA, Juan, Colonel, Spanish Foreign Minister.
- BERGEN, Diego von, German Ambassador to the Holy See.
- BERNARD, Hans, German Minister in Slovakia.
- BLÜCHER, Wipert von, German Minister in Finland.
- BLUM, Léon, President of the French Socialist Party.
- BOHLE, Ernst Wilhelm, Gauleiter and Head of the Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP; State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry.
- BONNET, Georges, French Foreign Minister.
- BORMANN, Martin, Reichsleiter, Chief of Staff in Office of the Führer's Deputy (Rudolf Hess).
- BÖTTCHER, Viktor, Staatsrat, Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Danzig Senate.
- BRAUCHITSCH, Walter von, Colonel General, Commander-in-Chief of the German Army from Feb. 4, 1938.
- BRÄUER, Curt, Counsellor of the German Embassy in France.
- BUJOIU, Ion, Rumanian Minister of Economics.
- BÜLOW-SCHWANTE, Vicco von, German Ambassador in Belgium.
- BURCKHARDT, Carl, League of Nations High Commissioner in Danzig.
- CĂLINESCU, Armand, Rumanian Minister President, Minister of the Interior and of National Defence.
- CANARIS, Wilhelm, Admiral, Head of the Intelligence Department [*Abt. Abwehr*] of the OKW.
- CAROL II, King of Rumania.
- ČERNÁK, Matúš, Slovak Minister in Germany.
- CHAMBERLAIN, Neville, British Prime Minister.
- CHIANG KAI-SHEK, Generalissimo, Commander in Chief of the Chinese Armed Forces; Chief Executive of the Kuomintang.
- CHODACKI, Marjan, Polish Diplomatic Representative in Danzig.
- CIANO DI CORTELLAZZO, Galeazzo Count, Italian Foreign Minister.

¹ The particulars here given relate principally to the period and subjects covered by the documents in this volume.

- CINCAR-MARKOVIĆ, Aleksandar, Yugoslav Foreign Minister.
- CLODIUS, Carl, Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- COULONDRE, Robert, French Ambassador in Germany.
- CSÁKY, Count István, Hungarian Foreign Minister.
- DALADIER, Edouard, French Minister President and Minister of National Defence.
- DE VALERA, Eamon, Irish Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs.
- DIRESEN, Herbert von, German Ambassador in Great Britain.
- DURČANSKÝ, Ferdinand, Slovak Foreign Minister.
- ERDMANNSDORFF, Otto von, German Minister in Hungary.
- ERKKO, Eljas, Finnish Foreign Minister.
- FABRICIUS, Wilhelm, German Minister in Rumania.
- FLANDIN, Pierre Etienne, Leader of the French Left Republican Party.
- FORSTER, Albert, Gauleiter of Danzig.
- FRANCO Y BAHAMONDE, Francisco, General, Head of the Spanish State, President of the Government and Generalissimo of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
- FRANÇOIS-PONCET, André, French Ambassador in Italy.
- FROHWEIN, Hans, German Minister in Estonia.
- FRÖLICHER, Hans, Swiss Minister in Germany.
- GAFENCU, Grigore, Rumanian Foreign Minister.
- GAMELIN, General Maurice Gustave, Chief of the French General Staff and Vice President of the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre.
- GAUS, Friedrich, Director of the Legal Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- GOEBBELS, Josef, Reich Minister of Propaganda.
- GÖRING, Hermann Wilhelm, Field Marshal, Reich Minister for Air; Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; Commissioner for the Four Year Plan.
- GRANDI, Dino Count, Italian Ambassador in Great Britain August 1932–July 1939; Minister of Justice from July 12, 1939.
- GREISER, Arthur, President of the Danzig Senate and Senator for Foreign Affairs.
- GROLMAN, Ernst von, German Vice Consul in Danzig.
- GRUNDHERR, Werner von, Head of Political Division VI (Scandinavia and the Baltic States) in the German Foreign Ministry.
- HALIFAX, Viscount, Edward Wood, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- HEEREN, Viktor von, German Minister in Yugoslavia.
- HEMPEL, Eduard, German Minister in Eire.
- HENDERSON, Sir Nevile, British Ambassador in Germany.
- HEWEL, Walter, permanent representative of the Reich Foreign Minister with the Führer; Head of the Reich Foreign Minister's Personal Staff.
- HEYDRICH, Reinhard, SS-Gruppenführer, Chief of the Reich Security Head Office and the German Security Police (incorporating the Secret State Police and the Criminal Police).
- HILGER, Gustav, in charge of economic affairs at the German Embassy in the Soviet Union.
- HIMMLER, Heinrich, Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police.
- HIRANUMA, Baron Kiichiro, Japanese Minister President until August 28, 1939.
- HITLER, Adolf, Chancellor of the German Reich; Head of the State with the title of Führer and Chancellor of the Reich; Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht.
- HORTHY DE NAGYBÁNYA, Miklós, Admiral, Regent of Hungary.
- HOYNINGEN-HUENE, Oswald Baron von, German Minister in Portugal.
- İNÖNÜ, İsmet, General, President of Turkey.
- JANSON, Martin von, German Consul General in Danzig.

- JODL, Alfred, Major General, Artillery Commander of the 44th Division (Vienna and Brno) October 1938–August 1939; Chief of the Operations Staff of the OKW from Aug. 23, 1939.
- KEITEL, Wilhelm, Colonel General, Chief of the OKW.
- KENNARD, Sir Howard, British Ambassador in Poland.
- KEPPLER, Wilhelm, State Secretary for Special Duties in the German Foreign Ministry; Commissioner of the Führer for Economic Questions; Director of the Central Office for the Economic Policy Organizations of the NSDAP; Reich Commissioner for Austria March–June 1938.
- KERILLIS, Henri de, French deputy and journalist; Editor of *L'Epoque*.
- KIOSSEIVANOV, Gheorgi, Bulgarian Minister President and Foreign Minister.
- KIRK, Alexander C., United States Counsellor of Embassy and Chargé d'Affaires in Germany.
- KÖCHER, Otto, German Minister in Switzerland.
- KORDT, Erich, Senior Counsellor in the Reich Foreign Minister's Secretariat.
- KORDT, Theodor, Counsellor of the German Embassy in Great Britain; Chargé d'Affaires during the absence of Ambassador Dirksen.
- KÖSTRING, Ernst, Lieutenant General, German Military Attaché in the Soviet Union.
- KOTZE, Hans Ulrich von, German Minister in Latvia.
- LEOPOLD III, King of the Belgians.
- LIKUS, Rudolf, official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop; on the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff.
- LIPSKI, Józef, Polish Ambassador in Germany.
- LORAINÉ, Sir Percy, British Ambassador in Italy.
- LORENZ, Werner, SS-Obergruppenführer, Head of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle.
- MACKENSEN, Hans Georg von, German Ambassador in Italy.
- MAGISTRATI, Massimo Count, Counsellor of the Italian Embassy in Germany.
- MOLOTOV, Vyacheslav, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union; People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
- MOLTKE, Hans-Adolf von, German Ambassador in Poland.
- MOTTA, Giuseppe, Swiss Federal Councillor; Head of the Political Department (Foreign Ministry) of the Federal Council.
- MUNCH, Peter, Danish Foreign Minister.
- MUSSOLINI, Benito, Founder of the Fascist Party; Head of the Italian Government; Supreme Commander of the Italian Armed Forces.
- NEUHAUSEN, Franz, Consul General, special representative for Yugoslavia of the Four Year Plan.
- NEURATH, Constantin Freiherr von, Reich Foreign Minister June 1932–February 1938; President of the Secret Cabinet Council from February 1938; Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia from March 1939.
- NOËL, Léon, French Ambassador in Poland.
- ORSENIGO, Cesare, Monsignor, Apostolic Nuncio in Germany.
- OSHIMA, Hiroshi, Japanese Ambassador in Germany.
- OTT, Eugen, German Ambassador in Japan.
- PAPEN, Franz von, German Ambassador in Turkey.
- PAUL, Prince, Regent of Yugoslavia.
- PIERLOT, Hubert, Belgian Minister President.
- PIUS XII, Pope since March 2, 1939.
- RADOWITZ, Otto von, German Minister in Luxembourg.
- RAEDER, Erich, Grand Admiral, Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy.
- RENTHE-FINK, Cecil von, German Minister in Denmark.
- REYNAUD, Paul, French Minister of Finance.
- RIBBENTROP, Joachim von, Reich Foreign Minister.

- RICHTHOFEN, Herbert Freiherr von, German Minister in Bulgaria.
- RINTELEN, Emil von, Head of Political Division II (Western Europe) in the German Foreign Ministry.
- RITTER, Karl, Ambassador for special duties in the German Foreign Ministry.
- ROOSEVELT, Franklin Delano, President of the United States.
- ROSENBERG, Alfred, Reichsleiter, Head of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP.
- ROSSO, Augusto, Italian Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
- SAHM, Heinrich, German Minister in Norway.
- SALAZAR, António de Oliveira, Portuguese Minister President and Foreign Minister.
- SARACOĞLU, Şükrü, Turkish Foreign Minister.
- SCHLIEP, Martin, Head of Political Division V (Eastern Europe) in the German Foreign Ministry.
- SCHMIDT, Paul Karl, Acting Director, subsequently Director, of the News Service and Press Department of the German Foreign Ministry; also press officer to the Reich Foreign Minister and member of his Personal Staff.
- SCHMIDT, Paul Otto, as interpreter in the German Foreign Ministry from 1923, was present at many of the meetings between German leaders and foreign statesmen; member of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.
- SCHNURRE, Julius, Head of Economic Policy Division IV (Eastern Europe) in the German Foreign Ministry.
- SCHULENBURG, Friedrich Werner Count von der, German Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
- SERRANO SUÑER, Ramón, Spanish Minister of the Interior and of Propaganda.
- SHIRATORI, Toshio, Japanese Ambassador in Italy.
- STALIN, Josif, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and member of the Politburo.
- STOHRER, Eberhard von, German Ambassador in Spain.
- STRANG, William, Head of the Central Department of the British Foreign Office.
- SZTÓJAY, Döme, Hungarian Minister in Germany.
- TELEKI, Pál Count, Hungarian Minister President.
- THOMSEN, Hans, Counsellor of the German Embassy in the United States; Chargé d'Affaires during the absence of Ambassador Dieckhoff.
- TISO, Jozef, Minister President of Slovakia.
- TWARDOWSKI, Fritz von, Director of the Cultural Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry; previously Deputy Director, November 1935-June 1939.
- VEESENMAIER, Edmund, the Reich Foreign Minister's Special Representative in Danzig.
- WEIZSÄCKER, Ernst Freiherr von, State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry.
- WELCZECK, Johannes Count von, German Ambassador in France.
- WIED, Viktor Prince zu, German Minister in Sweden.
- WIEHL, Emil, Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- WIESNER, Rudolf, Leader of the Young German Party in Polish Silesia.
- WILHELMINA, Queen of the Netherlands.
- WOERMANN, Ernst, Director of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry with the personal title of Under State Secretary.
- WÜHLISCH, Johann von, Counsellor of the German Embassy in Poland.
- ZECH, Julius Count, German Minister in the Netherlands.
- ZECHLIN, Erich, German Minister in Lithuania.

Appendix VIII

GLOSSARY OF GERMAN TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AA, Auswärtiges Amt, Foreign Ministry

Abt., Abteilung, department

Abt. Abw., Abteilung Abwehr, the Intelligence Department of the OKW (*q.v.*)

Abt. Ausland, Foreign Department of the OKW (*q.v.*)

A.-G., Aktiengesellschaft, joint stock company

Ang., Angabe, when action of more than one sort is to be taken on a paper the relevant instructions are usually split up as Ang. I, II, etc., this follows the file number

Anschluss, union, annexation, especially the annexation of Austria by Germany

AO, Auslandsorganisation, Foreign Organisation of the NSDAP concerned with German nationals living abroad

AOK, Armeeoberkommando, Army Headquarters; the particular Army (*Armee, q.v.*) is denoted by an Arabic numeral, e.g. AOK 14

APA, Aussenpolitisches Amt, Foreign Affairs Office of the NSDAP (*q.v.*), headed by Alfred Rosenberg

Armee, Army, i.e. *an* Army as distinct from the Army (*Heer, q.v.*)

Ausl., Ausland, abroad; has the meaning "foreign" when prefixed to another noun, cf. *Auslandsorganisation*

Auslandsdeutsche, German nationals or persons of German origin residing abroad

Autobahn, motor highway

BRAM, Büro RAM, Secretariat of the Reich Foreign Minister

Brigadeführer, SA and SS rank approximately equivalent to Major General

Chef, Chief, Head

Chefs., Chefsache, *lit.* matter for Chiefs.

This was a qualification of g. Kdos. (*q.v.*) by which distribution was restricted to heads of sections of a High Command and to Divisional Commanders

Deutsche Stiftung, an organization for providing funds for the education of Volksdeutsche (*q.v.*)

Dg. Pol., Dirigent der Politischen Abteilung, Deputy Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry

Dienststelle Ribbentrop, office of Ribbentrop in his capacity of foreign affairs adviser to Hitler; of decreasing importance after his appointment as Foreign Minister

DNB, Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, German News Agency, owned by the Ministry of Propaganda

e.o., ex officio, where this precedes the file number, it indicates a draft for which there are no preceding papers (*see zu*)

Führer, Leader (i.e., Hitler)

g., geh., geheim, secret

Gau, *see under* *Hoheitsgebiet*

Gauleiter, *see under* *Hoheitsträger*

Gauleitung, headquarters of the NSDAP in a Gau (*q.v.*)

Geheimrat, *lit.* Privy Councillor, an honorary title

gehobener Dienst, the "Upper Service" in the German Civil Service which comes between the *mittlerer Dienst* (*q.v.*) and the *höherer Dienst* (*q.v.*). This corresponds roughly to the Higher Clerical and Executive Classes in the British Civil Service. It contains four grades, for details of which *see* vols. II and VI of this Series

- Gen. Qu., General Quartiermeister,** Chief Supply and Administration Officer of the OKH (*q.v.*)
- Gesandter,** Minister, grade in the Foreign Service; see under **höherer Dienst**
- g. Kdos., geheime Kommandosache,** top secret military
- G.m.b.H., Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung,** limited company
- g. Rs., geheime Reichssache,** top secret
- Gruppenführer,** SA and SS rank, approximately equivalent to Lieutenant General
- Hauptamtsleiter,** director of the head office of an NSDAP organization
- Hauptreferent,** head of a section in the Dienststelle Ribbentrop (*q.v.*)
- Hoheitsgebiet,** the territorial province of a Hoheitsträger (*q.v.*)
- Hoheitsträger,** the highest ranking representatives of the NSDAP, the most important of whom, according to rank and province, were as follows;
- Führer—Reich
 - Gauleiter—Gau
 - Kreisleiter—Kreis
 - Ortsgruppenleiter—Ortsgruppe
- höherer Dienst,** the "Higher Service" in the German Civil Service which corresponds to the Administrative Class in the British Civil Service, though the functions of certain lower grades may be more executive than administrative. It contains six grades, for details of which see vols. II and VI of this Series.
- Kreis,** see under **Hoheitsgebiet**
- Kult., Kulturpolitische Abteilung,** Cultural Policy Department of the Foreign Minister, each division being designated by a letter, e.g. Kult. A, the division dealing with minorities' questions
- Kult. Spez.,** this file reference indicates the section of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry to which Missions, in accordance with instructions of May 3, 1939 (904/283670-71), were to report for propaganda purposes on political blunders and failures by the democracies.
- L., Abteilung Landesverteidigung,** National Defence Department of the W.A. (*q.v.*) and later of the OKW (*q.v.*)
- Landesgruppe,** an organization of the NSDAP subordinate to the Landesgruppenleiter, as the Hoheitsträger (*q.v.*) of the Auslandsorganisation (*q.v.*), within the territory of a foreign State
- Landesgruppenleiter,** see under **Landesgruppe**
- Landrat,** head of a rural administrative district (Landkreis), appointed by the Government.
- Lebensraum,** living space
- Legationsrat,** Counsellor, grade in the Foreign Ministry; see under **höherer Dienst**
- Legationssekretär,** grade in the Foreign Ministry; see under **höherer Dienst**
- Leiter,** director, head
- Lu., Luftfahrt,** aviation; documents dealt with by the section of Political Division I concerned with aviation bear the file number Pol. I Lu. (see Appendix V)
- Luftwaffe,** German Air Force
- M., Militärfragen,** military questions; documents dealt with by the sections of Political Division I concerned with military questions bear the file number Pol. I M. (see Appendix V)
- M.D., Min. Dir., Ministerialdirektor,** grade in the Civil Service, usually the director of a department in a Ministry; see under **höherer Dienst**
- Ministerialdirigent,** grade in the Civil Service, usually the deputy director of a department in a Ministry; see under **höherer Dienst**
- mittlerer Dienst,** the "Intermediate Service" in the German Civil Service, which corresponds to the Clerical Class in the British Civil Service. It contains three grades, for details of which see vols. II and VI of this Series
- Mob., mobilization**
- MR., Ministerialrat,** grade in the Civil Service; see under **höherer Dienst**

NSDAP, **Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei**, National Socialist German Workers' Party, the full title of the Nazi Party

O.B., **Oberbefehlshaber**, Commander in Chief (In Appendix I frequently used as an abbreviation of **Ob.d.H.**, *q.v.*)

Ob.d.H., **Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres**, Commander in Chief of the Army (i.e., Brauchitsch)

Ob.d.M., **Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine**, Commander in Chief of the Navy (i.e., Raeder)

Ob.d.W., **Oberbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht**, Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht (*q.v.*) (i.e., Blomberg, May 1935–February 1938, and Hitler from Feb. 4, 1938)

OKH, **Oberkommando des Heeres**, High Command of the Army

OKM, **Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine**, High Command of the Navy

OKW, **Oberkommando der Wehrmacht**, High Command of the Wehrmacht (*q.v.*)

O.Q.I, **O.Qu.I**, **Oberquartiermeister I**, First Senior General Staff Officer: Operations; also Assistant Chief of the Army General Staff

O.Q.III, **O.Qu.III**, Third General Staff Officer: Organization; also Assistant Chief of the Army General Staff

O.Q.IV., **O.Qu.IV**, **Oberquartiermeister IV**, Fourth Senior General Staff Officer: Operational Intelligence; also Assistant Chief of the Army General Staff

Ortsgruppe, **Ortsgruppenleiter**, see under **Hoheitsträger**

P., **Nachrichten- und Presseabteilung**, News Service and Press Department of the Foreign Ministry

Pers., **Personal- und Haushalts-Abteilung**, Personnel and Budget Department of the Foreign Ministry, each division being designated by a letter, e.g. **Pers. R.** (for further details, see vol. IV of this Series, Appendix I)

Pol., **Politische Abteilung**, Political Department of the Foreign Ministry; subdivided according to geographical

areas, each designated by a Roman numeral, e.g. **Pol. IV** (see Appendix V)

Promi, (**Reichs-**) **Propagandaministerium**, Reich Ministry of Propaganda

Prot., **Protektorat**, Protectorate

R., **Recht**, **Rechtsabteilung**, Legal Department of the Foreign Ministry (see Appendix V)

RAM, **Reichsaussenminister**, Reich Foreign Minister.

R.d.L.u.Ob.d.L., **Reichsminister der Luftfahrt und Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe**, Reich Minister of Air and Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe (i.e., Göring)

Ref., **Referat** (*q.v.*), **Referent** (*q.v.*)

Referat, section, division within a department of a Ministry

Referent, head of a **Referat** (*q.v.*); drafting officer

Reich, Germany (i.e., the Third Reich, Hitler's Germany)

Reichsdeutsche, Reich Germans, i.e., those Germans who were Reich citizens, often contrasted with **Volksdeutsche** (*q.v.*)

Reichsführer-SS, Commander in Chief of the SS (*q.v.*) (i.e., Himmler)

Reichsgesetzblatt, "Reich Law Gazette"; official publication of the Reich Ministry of the Interior giving the text of new laws, decrees and regulations in Part I, and of treaties and agreements with foreign States in Part II

Reichsleiter, highest NSDAP rank signifying membership of the Supreme Party Directorate (**Reichsleitung**)

Reichsrechtsamt, Reich Law Office of the NSDAP, headed by **Reichsleiter Hans Frank**

Reichsstatthalter, Reich Governor, representative of the Reich Government in one of the Federal States of Germany (**Land**) or administrative areas (**Reichsgau**) in the annexed territories, controlling its entire administration

RLM, **Reichsluftfahrtministerium**, Reich Air Ministry

RM, **Reichsmark**, the unit of German currency

- RM, Reichsminister**, any member of the Reich Cabinet, but in Foreign Ministry documents usually refers to the Reich Foreign Minister
- SA, Sturmabteilungen der NSDAP**, Storm Troops of the NSDAP (brownshirts)
- SS, Schutzstaffeln der NSDAP**, used for military and police purposes
- Staatsrat**, State Councillor
- St. S., Staatssekretär**, State Secretary, the highest career official in a Reich Ministry
- U. St. S., Unterstaatssekretär**, Under State Secretary
- Vbd., Völkerbund**, League of Nations; documents dealt with by the section of Political Division I concerned with the League of Nations bear the file number Pol. I Vbd. (see Appendix V)
- V.L.R. Vortragender Legationsrat**, Senior Counsellor, grade in the Foreign Ministry, see under **höherer Dienst**
- Volksdeutsche**, ethnic Germans, i.e., persons of German stock but not of Reich nationality and living outside the frontiers of the Reich (see **Reichsdeutsche**)
- Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (Vomi)**, a department of the SS whose duty was the care of German minorities abroad and the resettlement in Germany of *Auslandsdeutsche* (*q.v.*) and *Volksdeutsche* (*q.v.*)
- Volksgruppenführer**, leader of a *Volksgruppe* or German national group outside the Reich
- W., Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung**, Economic Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry (see Appendix V)
- W.A., Wehrmachtsamt**, the Wehrmacht Office in the Reich War Ministry. The functions of both of these departments were taken over by the OKW (*q.v.*) when this was set up on Feb. 4, 1938
- Wehrmacht**, Armed Forces of the German Reich
- WFA, Wehrmachtsführungsamt**, Operations Office of the OKW (*q.v.*)
- zu**, further to, in connection with; where this precedes the file number it indicates that the previous papers on the subject have this number